Tape 9 - 1969 forecast; new administration policies; surtax possibilities

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-	Hello.	0:02
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated welcomes you	0:02
	to this weekly series of commentaries	0:05
	on the current economic scene.	0:07
	Reporting to you will be one of the nation's	0:08
	leading economists, Professor Milton Friedman	0:11
	of the University of Chicago.	0:13
	Professor Friedman, since this is	0:15
	your first report for 1969,	0:17
	would you want to venture any forecast for the new year?	0:19
-	I shall be glad to summarize my general views,	0:21
	which I have stated on some of these reports before,	0:27
	but this is certainly a very appropriate time	0:31
	to restate them.	0:33
	I should explain, however, that I do not engage	0:34
	in the practice of making detailed numerical forecasts	0:37
	of GNP and other magnitudes.	0:41
	That's an extremely useful and valuable activity,	0:43
	but it happens to be one	0:47
	that I haven't myself gotten involved in.	0:49
	To do it properly requires spending an amount of time	0:51
	just with the numbers that I have not	0:54
	found reason to put into it.	0:57
	So I will have to content myself	0:58
	with a more qualitative forecast.	1:01
	To begin with, if you look back a little,	1:03
	the second half of 1969-	1:06
	I'm sorry, the second half of 1968	1:10
	confounded many economic forecasters.	1:12
	Probably the bulk of economic forecasters	1:17
	expected that the tax surcharge would bring	1:19
	a slowdown in the economy.	1:23
	They were wrong.	1:24
	The tax surcharge was not followed by a slowdown	1:25
	in the third quarter of '68.	1:28
	And then after many commentators started saying	1:31
	it would occur in the fourth quarter,	1:35
	it didn't occur in the fourth quarter either.	1:36
	If you look at the record for the last half of '68,	1:38
	it's a record of continuous economic expansion.	1:41
	I was not, as you know, one of those	1:45
	who forecast the slowdown.	1:47
	On the contrary.	1:48
	I have throughout argued that the tax increase	1:49
	was not likely in and of itself	1:53
	to exercise much of a restraining influence,	1:55
	that its main effect was simply to leave	1:58
	less money in the hands of taxpayers	2:01
	and more money in the hands of those	2:03
	who otherwise would have had to lend to the government	2:05
	in order to pay for the government deficit.	2:08
	I have throughout emphasized that the major factor	2:11
	which in the short run seems	2:15
	to be related to the course of the economy	2:17
	is the rate of growth of the quantity of money,	2:19
	monetary policy.	2:22
	That's not the only factor.	2:23
	It may not even be completely the dominant factor	2:26
	in very short period,	2:29
	but it is certainly the factor	2:31
	over which the government exercised its control	2:33
	which has the most important influence	2:35
	on the course of the economy in the short run.	2:38
	Monetary growth has been booming on.	2:42
	Indeed, it has accelerated.	2:44
	From about November 1967 to about May or June 1968,	2:47
	there was what looked like a slowdown	2:53
	in the rate of monetary growth	2:56
	to something like, if I recall correctly,	2:57
	about 6% per year in currency	3:00
	plus all commercial bank deposits demanded in time,	3:04
	the total which I have myself found	3:07
	to be most consistently and closely related	3:09
	to the changes in GNP and other economic magnitudes.	3:12
	This was a very desirable step,	3:17
	and at the time, I was so incautious	3:20
	as to go out on a limb in a Newsweek column	3:22
	and praise the Fed for having exercised monetary restraint	3:24
	without overdoing the matter.	3:28
	But almost no sooner was my column printed	3:31
	than the Fed apparently thought better of its policy	3:34
	and decided to expand the quantity of money	3:37
	much more rapidly.	3:39
	And from that point to this, the quantity of money has risen	3:40
	at a rate of over 11% per year,	3:43
	an extraordinarily rapid rate of growth.	3:46
	Given this monetary background,	3:50
	as I note and noted in previous reports,	3:52
	I thought all along that you would have a continued boom	3:56
	throughout the second half of 1968,	4:00
	and that is indeed what happened.	4:02
	On this occasion, and it has occurred	4:04
	repeatedly on previous occasions,	4:07
	the behavior of the money supply	4:09
	was far more important in affecting	4:11
	the short-term course of the economy	4:14
	than what happened to taxes and government expenditures.	4:18
	But now if we go back, you see	4:22
	that over the past six months,	4:24
	or let's say over the past three months,	4:26
	prices have been rising at the rate	4:28
	of something like 5% per year.	4:31
	Output has been rising at something like 5% per year,	4:32
	so that nominal income, GNP or net national product,	4:35
	has been rising at something like roughly,	4:39
	to put it in very rough terms, about 10% per year.	4:40
	That's a little slower than the rate of rise	4:44
	in the money supply, which is not unexpected	4:46
	because the behavior of income during these months	4:50
	has in large part reflected the behavior	4:54
	of the money supply in much earlier months.	4:56
	And as I said, there had been something of a slowdown	4:59
	for about six or so months, from 1967 to 1968.	5:02
	What this rapid rate of increase in the money supply	5:09
	during the past six months portends	5:12
	is a very rapid rate of increase	5:14
	in national income and so on during the next six months.	5:16
	One can, I think, be reasonably confident	5:22
	that substantial inflationary pressure	5:24
	is built into the system	5:27
	and that it will certainly be at least the middle of 1969	5:28
	before there is any sign of a dampening down	5:33
	of this boom in the economy.	5:36
	I am very hesitant to go much beyond that date	5:42
	in any hard way because the course of the economy	5:46
	in the final six months of 1969	5:53
	will depend on what happens in the first six months.	5:56
	It's not written in the cards.	5:58
	We mustn't get the impression	6:00
	that there's nothing anybody can do	6:02
	that would alter or change substantially	6:04
	the course of events.	6:08
	In order, therefore, to try to get some idea	6:09
	of what's likely to happen in the final six months of 1969,	6:12
	at least as a result of the monetary measures	6:16
	which the government takes,	6:19
	we have to make some predictions	6:21
	of what the Federal Reserve System,	6:23
	or the monetary authorities,	6:25
	will do in the first part of 1969.	6:26
	We know what they've been doing up to date.	6:30
	They've been printing money like a man on a spending spree.	6:32
	They've been raising the quantity of money	6:39
	at an incredible rate.	6:40
	Are they going to continue?	6:42
	Will they turn around?	6:43
	If they turn around, will they turn around a little	6:45
	or will they turn around a lot?	6:47
	Well, now there are some signs of change,	6:48
	some signs that perhaps the Fed is getting ready	6:53
	for a shift of a substantial kind,	6:56
	not in what it says, but in what it does.	7:00
	It always says that it is working against inflation	7:03
	and following an anti-inflationary policy,	7:06
	but as I've been arguing,	7:08
	it has been doing the opposite for quite some time now.	7:09
	What are these signs of change?	7:13
	In the first place, there was a recent	7:14
	discount rate increase by one quarter of 1%.	7:16
	Of course, that is not, in my opinion,	7:19
	of any importance whatsoever except as a sign	7:22
	of a changed attitude on the part of the Fed.	7:25
	The Fed, of course, made a great play about the fact	7:28
	that the discount rate increase showed	7:32
	that it was really getting tough	7:34
	and was really going to tighten up.	7:35
	But in point of fact, that discount rate	7:37
	was only a belated, mild response on its part	7:40
	to its own prior inflationary policies.	7:43
	Those policies had caused income to rise rapidly,	7:47
	which had raised the demand for loans,	7:51
	which had tended to raise interest rates,	7:53
	and so the discount rate had gotten out of line.	7:54
	The Fed, in a tardy and timid move,	7:57
	brought it back a little bit into line.	7:59
	But along with it, there was a good deal of talk	8:01
	emanating from the Fed that this was but the first step	8:04
	in an attempt really to slow down the economy.	8:07
	Tilford Gaines, an economist	8:11
	at the Manufacturers Hanover in New York,	8:14
	and who formerly worked at the Federal Reserve,	8:16
	with the Federal Reserve System,	8:20
	was reported in the Wall Street Journal recently	8:23
	as saying that he anticipated a severe money crunch	8:25
	in the first half of 1969,	8:29
	comparable to the one we had in 1966.	8:32
	A further straw in the wind is that	8:36
	if you judge what the Fed is likely to do	8:40
	by what it has done in the past,	8:43
	there are also some indications that it might turn around.	8:45
	In the first place, the Fed has finally,	8:49
	when it has gotten really concerned, after waiting too long,	8:53
	has reacted to widespread criticism	8:58
	of the kind that it is now getting	9:01
	for overexuberant monetary growth.	9:03
	When it has reacted to it, it has done so	9:05
	by sharply slowing down the rate of growth	9:08
	in the money supply, going much too far in that direction,	9:12
	swinging from one extreme to the other.	9:15
	And so if it does,	9:17
	if these slight straws in the wind betoken a change	9:19
	in the Federal Reserve policy,	9:22
	there is a great danger, great possibility,	9:23
	that what it will do will be to step on the brake too hard	9:26
	and produce a really severe monetary tightness	9:29
	comparable to what it did in early 1966..	9:32
	Another bit of evidence along that line	9:35
	is that in the past, the Fed's preoccupation	9:38
	has been strongly with interest rates.	9:41
	If you look at what's likely to happen	9:44
	to interest rates in the next six months,	9:45
	it's not easy to say.	9:47
	There is an upward pressure from the general economic boom,	9:48
	but on the other hand, the federal government itself	9:52
	is going to shift from a large borrower	9:55
	to a repayer of debt.	9:57
	And it may be that will take enough pressure	10:00
	off interest rates, the Fed looking at interest rates.	10:01
	Will feel that it can reduce the rate of increase	10:04
	in the quantity of money.	10:07
	Now, all in all, I find it very hard myself	10:08
	to come out with any definite prediction on that basis.	10:11
	We'll have to wait and see,	10:14
	but I do think there is a possibility that you will have	10:15
	a very, very sharp tightening up indeed in money supply,	10:17
	and if you do, then the second half of 1969	10:20
	might see a turnaround in the economy.	10:23
	But as I say, we'll have to wait more definitely	10:26
	to see about that.	10:29
-	These comments seem closely related to a question	10:30
	asked by an IDI subscriber.	10:33
	He asks, "Isn't it better for the new administration	10:35
	"to adjust the economy downward?	10:37
	"In other words, have bad times	10:40
	"the first two years of their term,	10:41
	"and then inflate the last two years	10:43
	"when the people do the voting?	10:44
	"Isn't this good politically?"	10:46
-	It is a very possible tactic,	10:48
	and from a purely Machiavellian point of view	10:51
	would make a great deal of sense.	10:54
	If you're gonna do things that are going to be unpopular,	10:55
	the time to do them is right away,	10:58
	as the subscriber suggests, and then reverse	11:01
	and hope you can get the benefit from it later on.	11:04
	That was a gamble in Britain which Wilson took	11:07
	when he came into office in a landslide a couple years ago.	11:10
	He started on a strong Austerity program,	11:16
	but unfortunately it has backfired on him	11:19
	because the Austerity program didn't work.	11:22
	He was then later forced to devalue,	11:24
	and he's still in trouble.	11:26
	The reason for making this comparison is	11:27
	because the question not only assumes	11:29
	a Machiavellian approach to politics,	11:34
	which I think is correct.	11:35
	I think all politicians are Machiavellian	11:36
	to a very large extent,	11:38
	and have to be if they're going to stay in business.	11:39
	But I think it also assumes a degree of ability	11:41
	to control the gyrations of the economy,	11:49
	which may not be in accord with reality.	11:51
	As I've been emphasizing, what happens	11:54
	in the second half of 1969, as in the first half,	11:57
	in the realm of inflation, boom, and price rises,	12:04
	depends in the first instance on what monetary policy	12:08
	the Federal Reserve System follows.	12:12
	But the Nixon administration has no direct control	12:14
	over the policy that the Federal Reserve follows.	12:18
	The Federal Reserve is an independent agency,	12:21
	and while like the Supreme Court it no doubt	12:24
	listens to the election returns,	12:27
	it hasn't shown in recent years	12:29
	that it listens to them very accurately	12:30
	or responds to them very sophisticatedly,	12:32
	so that the first task for Mr. Nixon and his administration	12:36
	in following this kind of a policy	12:42
	would be somehow to persuade the Federal Reserve	12:44
	to go along and to change their tune.	12:47
	And at the moment, it is not clear how that can happen.	12:50
	The most influential man at the Federal Reserve System	12:53
	is undoubtedly William McChesney Martin.	12:55
	His term does not formerly expire until January 1970.	12:57
	Although he testified before Congress some years back	13:03
	in favor of having the term of the governor	13:06
	of the Federal Reserve System	13:10
	coterminous with that of the President,	13:11
	he has made no offer to resign,	13:13
	and indeed it has been announced	13:14
	that he has been asked by Mr. Nixon to stay on.	13:15
	If he stays on his full term, it will not be	13:19
	until January 1970 that Mr. Nixon can have his own appointee	13:21
	in as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.	13:27
	And then, as I have argued, a change in policy	13:29
	would take six or nine or twelve months	13:33
	before it had its real impact on the economy.	13:34
	And thus, the Machiavellian policy	13:37
	that the subscriber suggests,	13:39
	however good it might be as politics,	13:41
	may be a very, very difficult one to bring off	13:43
	as a matter of actual economic management.	13:46
	The new economists under Kennedy and Johnson	13:48
	have stressed and so will the idea of fine tuning.	13:52
	My comments really say,	13:55
	we do not know-	14:01
	we are not able sensitively enough to fine tune the economy	14:03
	in order to be able to achieve this kind	14:08
	of a delicate political policy.	14:09
-	So far, you've been talking about domestic affairs.	14:13
	What would you say about the international situation?	14:16
-	Well, as always, the international situation is one which-	14:18
	The image I like to use for it is one I've used many times,	14:24
	is that there, you're always sitting on a keg of dynamite.	14:28
	If nobody lights the fuse,	14:32
	you won't even know that what you've been sitting on	14:34
	was a keg of dynamite instead of a stuffed armchair.	14:36
	On the other hand, at any time	14:40
	a fuse can light and blow up.	14:41
	Now, what I have in mind by this analogy is, of course,	14:43
	the notion of an international liquidity crisis	14:48
	of the kind that we experienced a couple of months ago	14:50
	when there was a run on the franc	14:53
	and a move toward the German Mark.	14:54
	Such graces can blow up very, very rapidly,	14:57
	and once it blows up, it can go very far.	15:00
	On the other hand, it may stay in advance for some time.	15:05
	If it does, you may not know that an emergency passed.	15:11
	History makes it clear	15:18
	that the international monetary situation	15:19
	is in a very unstable situation.	15:21
	We have had crisis following crisis and threat upon threat.	15:25
	And I think it is highly likely, therefore,	15:29
	that you will have further crises this year.	15:32
	The prediction I would be willing to make	15:35
	with little fear of contradiction	15:38
	is that exchange rates among major currencies	15:40
	will not be the same a year from now as they are now.	15:43
	Whether they differ because there have been	15:47
	official appreciations or devaluations,	15:49
	or because exchange rates have been allowed to float,	15:55
	I do not know.	15:58
	But I would not rule out the possibility	16:01
	that at least some exchange rates will be allowed to float	16:04
	before the year is out.	16:07
	In the week between Christmas and New Year's,	16:10
	the American Economic Association	16:13
	held its annual convention, as it does every year.	16:15
	In the course of that convention,	16:18
	I participated in a round table	16:19
	on the problem of exchange rate policy.	16:21
	That round table discussion was concerned	16:24
	not so much with predictions	16:27
	about what was going to happen to exchange rates,	16:29
	but with the question of what policy the US should follow.	16:31
	I was enormously impressed in the course of the round table	16:35
	by the tremendous change that has taken place	16:40
	in professional opinion over the last 10 or 15 years ago.	16:42
	When a similar round table was held 10 or 15 years ago,	16:47
	the problem would've been to find people	16:53
	who were willing to attack the then-existing system	16:57
	of fixed exchange rates as set up under Bretton Woods.	17:01
	Most economists would've defended that.	17:06
	Only a few mavericks like myself, hello,	17:08
	would have objected to it and stressed the importance	17:12
	of having exchange rate flexibility.	17:14
	As of now, the situation is quite different.	17:18
	As of now, interestingly enough,	17:21
	the difficulty was to find defenders	17:24
	of the fixed rate system.	17:25
	There were four of us who served	17:27
	on the panel and one moderator.	17:29
	The four panel members, two of us,	17:32
	Gottfried Haberler and myself,	17:35
	were announced advocates of the US	17:37
	discontinuing the pegging of exchange rates	17:41
	and permitting exchange rates to float freely	17:44
	if that seemed ...	17:46
	If foreign countries were unwilling to support them.	17:48
	The other two, Professor Henry Wallich of Yale	17:54
	and Professor Peter Cannon of Columbia University,	17:57
	were supposedly there as proponents	18:03
	of the present system of fixed exchange rates,	18:06
	as opponents of floating exchange rates,	18:08
	flexibility in exchange rates.	18:13
	What impressed me was the extent to which	18:15
	they regarded themselves on the defensive.	18:17
	Ten years ago in a similar interchange,	18:20
	I would've been on the defensive.	18:22
	A proponent of the fixed rate would've been proclaiming	18:24
	the great virtues of the fixed rate.	18:27
	They would've been talking about	18:29
	the enormous defects of flexibility.	18:32
	On this session, things went quite differently.	18:35
	Wallich and Cannon clearly felt-	18:39
	were clearly of the opinion	18:44
	that the existing rate structure was not working well,	18:46
	that something had to be done about it,	18:48
	and they were hesitant to recommend a floating rate	18:50
	or a wider range or a crawling peg	18:53
	or any of the other alternatives that have been suggested.	18:57
	They played their part in the discussion	19:00
	of defending the fixed rate.	19:04
	Yet it was perfectly clear	19:06
	they really did not have their heart in it,	19:07
	and that what they were doing was a much weaker performance	19:09
	than any one of them would've given four or five years ago.	19:13
	The chairman of the session was Fritz Machlup,	19:16
	who also, as it happens, is a proponent	19:18
	of greater flexibility of exchange rates.	19:22
	I have no doubt that if you were today	19:24
	to survey the profession,	19:27
	and those members of the profession	19:28
	who specialize in international financial arrangements,	19:30
	money and banking, you would find	19:32
	that probably 75, 85, 95% of them	19:35
	would be in favor of a move away	19:39
	from our present system of rigid exchange rates.	19:41
	One of the interesting discussions	19:45
	that was engaged in was an old story.	19:47
	When people discuss exchange rates,	19:51
	they tend to contrast stable exchange rates	19:54
	with fluctuating or unstable exchange rates,	19:58
	but that's the wrong contrast.	20:00
	Those of us who are in favor of free market exchange rates	20:04
	are also in favor of stable exchange rates.	20:08
	What we argue is that the trouble	20:10
	with the fixed exchange rate system	20:12
	is that it is so unstable,	20:14
	that when it produces a change in exchange rates,	20:15
	it produces a large change.	20:18
	Five or six years ago, this argument was difficult to make.	20:21
	Today it is almost self-evident.	20:24
	For who does not recognize that the large change	20:26
	in the price of the British pound a year ago	20:30
	was a highly unstabilizing phenomenon,	20:33
	that the enormous flows of funds	20:35
	on the occasion of the Mark and the franc crisis	20:37
	were highly unstabilizing?	20:40
	And indeed, even more remarkable,	20:42
	not only are academicians recognizing this.	20:44
	Even some central bankers are.	20:47
	Professor Machlup quoted a comment made by Mr. Eminger,	20:48
	who was one of the directors of the German Central Bank,	20:54
	in which Mr. Eminger said that clearly it was desirable	20:58
	to have some mechanism for flexibility	21:02
	in the price of the German Mark,	21:06
	but it was desirable to have one	21:08
	which could be adjusted from time to time.	21:11
	What Eminger was referring to	21:13
	was a set of import taxes and export subsidies,	21:15
	or import and export taxes, that the Germans have	21:19
	and which they have manipulated from time to time.	21:24
	But it was an admission of the need	21:27
	for flexibility in the effective exchange rate	21:29
	that would've been inconceivable five or six years ago.	21:31
	And that is the reason why	21:34
	I really think that it is highly likely	21:36
	that you're going to have a system	21:40
	under which exchange rates have	21:42
	much more flexibility than they do now,	21:44
	and that that is highly likely to develop	21:46
	within the course of the next year or two.	21:48
	When I made some comment of this kind	21:50
	to a newspaper reporter who was interviewing me at one time,	21:52
	he said to me, "Is that a political prediction?"	21:56
	because we had been taking in part	22:00
	about the economic policies	22:01
	that the Nixon administration might follow.	22:03
	And I said no, it was not a political prediction at all,	22:06
	that I was not trying to say what policy	22:08
	Mr. Nixon would follow.	22:10
	I was only trying to say	22:12
	that the world international monetary situation	22:16
	had come to a point where the next major crisis,	22:19
	about the only thing that would be left	22:22
	which would there to give would be exchange rates.	22:25
	All other mechanisms of	22:30
	trying to get by particular difficulties	22:35
	of shoring up a jerrybuilt system have been tried.	22:38
	What else is there left?	22:41
	Then it ends, do not be surprised	22:42
	if sometime in the next year, maybe next six months,	22:45
	maybe it'll be two years,	22:48
	you see a substantial change in the extent to which	22:50
	exchange rates of various currencies	22:54
	are pegged to one another.	22:56
-	To return to domestic affairs, Professor Friedman,	22:59
	you didn't say anything about the surtax.	23:01
-	I take it what you have in mind	23:04
	is whether it's going to be continued or not.	23:05
	As you know, Mr. Nixon	23:08
	promised that he would reduce it as soon as possible.	23:14
	Mr. Stands has recently repeated this.	23:17
	The interesting thing about it is,	23:19
	as a matter of prediction,	23:21
	that the surtax is likely to be lowered	23:23
	if we either continue to have substantial inflation	23:29
	or if my forecast should be wrong	23:33
	and we should turn around and to have substantial deflation.	23:35
	Either extreme, it seems to me,	23:37
	will mean a elimination in whole or in part of the surtax,	23:39
	while a middle ground will not.	23:45
	The reason why continued rapid inflation	23:47
	may mean a reduction in the surtax	23:50
	is that that will keep government revenues rising.	23:52
	That will make the budget look very good.	23:55
	It will make it look as if it's possible	23:57
	to get rid of the surtax without	23:59
	going into any substantial deficit.	24:00
	On the other side of that picture, if we had a slowdown,	24:04
	if there were signs of an economic contraction,	24:08
	then whether rightly or wrongly,	24:10
	most Congressmen, Senators, and others believe	24:13
	that a reduction in the surtax	24:15
	would be an expansionary move.	24:17
	As I've emphasized ad nauseum,	24:19
	I don't think it would have much effect	24:22
	on either inflation or deflation,	24:23
	provided it didn't affect Federal Reserve monetary policy.	24:26
	But obviously, my view is not the one which is widely held	24:29
	or which is held by Congressmen and Senators.	24:33
	And so if you had any deflationary sign,	24:35
	I suspect the surtax would be removed on that ground.	24:40
	Putting these two together, I think the best bet	24:44
	is that there will be in June	24:47
	a reduction in the level of the surtax,	24:48
	but it is unlikely to be eliminated completely.	24:51
-	Thank you, sir.	24:54
	If you have questions or comments, or suggestions	24:55
	for topics you would like discussed in this series,	24:58
	please send them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	25:00
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago 60611.	25:04

Item Info

Title:

Tape 9 - 1969 forecast; new administration policies; surtax possibilities

Date:

1969

Contributor:

Friedman, Milton, 1912-2006

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Milton Friedman

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0201
ref2542_hsy
samuelsonpaul
duke:325224
pstau001201
ark:/87924/r4xd0rd8x
da1f6c2f-f58d-4cfb-9277-21dbee334c78

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Tape 9 - 1969 forecast; new administration policies; surtax possibilities

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