Tape 11 - The 10 Percent Surtax, the 1969 Economic Report, Is a New Crisis Coming?
Loading the media player...
Transcript
Transcripts may contain inaccuracies.
Interviewer | Instructional Dynamics Incorporated | 0:02 |
welcomes you to another in a continuing series | 0:03 | |
of commentaries on the current economic scene. | 0:06 | |
With us again for the week of January 20th | 0:08 | |
is Dr. Paul Samuelson, professor of economics | 0:11 | |
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. | 0:14 | |
Professor Samuelson, one of our subscribers | 0:17 | |
has sent in some questions in the hope | 0:19 | |
that you will answer them. | 0:21 | |
"We are an investment counseling group," | 0:22 | |
says the this question, "Much interested | 0:24 | |
in general economic predictions. | 0:26 | |
As we listen to your tapes, and those of Pro. Freedman, | 0:28 | |
there is much that you are agreed on. | 0:31 | |
But we are occasionally puzzled by | 0:33 | |
possible differences in opinion. | 0:35 | |
Our first question then is whether you agree | 0:38 | |
with Pro. Freedman with floating exchange rates | 0:39 | |
in some form are desirable and are likely | 0:42 | |
within the next year or two, and also | 0:44 | |
do you agree with what seems to be his | 0:47 | |
cheerful analysis that the sliding peg | 0:48 | |
would encounter no serious difficulties from speculation? | 0:51 | |
Paul | Let me do my best with this question. | 0:54 |
There are many points of overlap between | 0:58 | |
my own analysis and that of most present-day economists. | 1:03 | |
And there are many points of overlap | 1:08 | |
between my analysis and that of Pro. Freedman. | 1:11 | |
There are some differences, I suppose that | 1:14 | |
our listeners are most interested | 1:17 | |
in the reasons behind our disagreements | 1:20 | |
rather than just in the views expressed. | 1:25 | |
With respect to the first question, | 1:28 | |
I'm very happy that this is a question | 1:30 | |
upon with I can express a great deal | 1:32 | |
of agreement with Dr. Freedman. | 1:35 | |
I do think that the flexibility | 1:37 | |
of exchange rates are desirable. | 1:41 | |
I think that there was a fatal and fundamental flaw | 1:43 | |
in the Bretton Woods Agreements of 1944 | 1:47 | |
and we have come to recognize that, | 1:51 | |
namely that in a world where people will not | 1:55 | |
play the rules of the Gold Standard game, | 1:58 | |
will not automatically inflate and deflate | 2:01 | |
a domestic economy in order to provide flexibility. | 2:06 | |
It is anomalous to keep exchange rates inflexible. | 2:12 | |
Now, I've expressed this agreement that we need more | 2:16 | |
flexibility with Pro. Freedman, | 2:19 | |
and I would go farther, | 2:21 | |
I'd like to pay a personal tribute to him, | 2:23 | |
as he said a couple of weeks ago on his tape, | 2:27 | |
he was a lone voice crying in the wilderness, | 2:31 | |
in favor of floating exchange rates just a few years ago. | 2:33 | |
Well, he's no longer in the wilderness, | 2:37 | |
the bulk of the academic economic fraternity | 2:40 | |
has gone over to his general view. | 2:45 | |
And I think that this is a tribute | 2:50 | |
to the cogency of his analysis. | 2:54 | |
Now, I say some measure of flexibility is desirable. | 2:59 | |
This could be in the form of a crawling peg, | 3:07 | |
with widened gold points around the crawling peg. | 3:09 | |
I speak of gold points but I mean just import | 3:15 | |
and export points even if we had no Gold Standard system. | 3:18 | |
And as far as I'm concerned, I would like to see | 3:25 | |
more experimentation with floating exchange rates. | 3:30 | |
Although I don't insist upon having the practical | 3:33 | |
men of the world become converted | 3:37 | |
in a short time to that viewpoint. | 3:38 | |
However, what I think is desirable, | 3:42 | |
and what I think is likely are not always the same thing. | 3:46 | |
I believe that the men of affairs | 3:49 | |
in the central banks and finance ministries | 3:52 | |
of the world are slowly being persuaded | 3:55 | |
by events and the logic of academic economists | 3:58 | |
toward looking more favorably upon the flexibility, | 4:04 | |
but they are riding a tiger, | 4:08 | |
and they don't know how to get off that tiger. | 4:10 | |
And so as purely betting man I wouldn't be so sanguine | 4:12 | |
that what is desirable will come about in the near future, | 4:16 | |
which means in a year or two. | 4:23 | |
Now I don't say that Canada might not again | 4:24 | |
have a floating exchange rate | 4:27 | |
or one or another small country, | 4:28 | |
let's say Denmark as an example. | 4:31 | |
But the question is whether any | 4:34 | |
key currencies will be floating. | 4:35 | |
My candidate, a year or two ago, | 4:39 | |
for a floating exchange rate was the pound, itself. | 4:41 | |
But the price that was exacted apparently, | 4:45 | |
to support the pound against speculative capital movements | 4:48 | |
by the powers that be and the group of ten, | 4:52 | |
apparently precluded the pound, the British, | 4:55 | |
from having that particular option. | 4:59 | |
So, I guess I wouldn't at even odds, | 5:03 | |
bet upon floating exchange rates | 5:06 | |
within the next year or two. | 5:10 | |
That doesn't mean that I disagree with Pro. Freedman, | 5:11 | |
in his implied belief that we're going to have | 5:15 | |
one or another major crisis in the next year or two, | 5:17 | |
I would suppose that in the next two years | 5:21 | |
the old Farmer's Almanac's proper odds are | 5:24 | |
we're going to have about one and a half crises, | 5:26 | |
one of them serious, certainly. | 5:29 | |
And probably there'll be some realignment of exchange rates. | 5:32 | |
I don't believe the authorities have exhausted | 5:35 | |
all the remedies that are available to them. | 5:38 | |
For example, the use of exchange controls | 5:41 | |
has just been broached and just been begun | 5:46 | |
in many of the deficit countries. | 5:48 | |
And although it may lack wisdom, | 5:51 | |
to push exchange controls harder, | 5:53 | |
that certainly is a weapon in the arsenal of the authorities | 5:56 | |
and it's the kind of weapon which in emergency times | 6:00 | |
becomes very appealing because it does have | 6:04 | |
some short run effectiveness. | 6:07 | |
Let me, finally, go to the last part | 6:09 | |
of the international question. | 6:12 | |
Do I think that a sliding peg will encounter | 6:17 | |
some possible problem from the standpoint | 6:20 | |
of speculators? | 6:23 | |
We don't have any real experience with this, | 6:26 | |
and I won't pretend that I've thought through | 6:28 | |
all of the intricate analytical aspects of the question. | 6:33 | |
But, let me just think aloud, so to speak, | 6:39 | |
off the top of my head and give some views. | 6:42 | |
First, I assume that a sliding peg means that | 6:47 | |
the exchange rate could adjust downward or upward | 6:51 | |
about one percent per year, or two percent per year. | 6:56 | |
One and a half percent. | 7:01 | |
There are a dozen different devices | 7:02 | |
that will determine exactly | 7:05 | |
where in that range the peg would move. | 7:07 | |
You may say in the beginning, | 7:11 | |
"What's the importance of one percent, | 7:13 | |
or one and a half percent?" | 7:16 | |
Well that isn't very important. | 7:17 | |
You'd have to be a real elasticity optimist | 7:18 | |
to think that a small change in exchange rates | 7:21 | |
of that magnitude will itself have | 7:24 | |
great equilibrating efficacy. | 7:27 | |
But, that's only one or two percent per year. | 7:30 | |
And in a decade, one or two percent per year | 7:34 | |
is the equivalent to ten or twenty percent. | 7:39 | |
And I don't suppose, most econometricians | 7:42 | |
after they think about the problem | 7:46 | |
will be of the opinion that, | 7:47 | |
in well-run countries at least, | 7:50 | |
and mind you, floating exchange rates | 7:53 | |
or sliding pegs are no substitutes for discipline | 7:55 | |
and for making sure that you do run your country well, | 7:59 | |
in any case, that in well-run countries | 8:03 | |
the equilibrium change in exchange rates | 8:06 | |
needed for equilibration, needed to repair that | 8:09 | |
fundamental flaw in the Bretton Woods system | 8:12 | |
is probably not more than 10 or 20 percent per decade. | 8:15 | |
Now, if you're a country like Chile or Brazil, | 8:20 | |
undergoing constant inflation greater | 8:22 | |
than the rest of the world | 8:24 | |
then obviously this moderate change in the peg | 8:25 | |
will not do the trick but nothing will. | 8:32 | |
And I don't direct my remarks to such countries. | 8:35 | |
I do direct my remarks to countries like Germany, | 8:39 | |
and to countries like the United States. | 8:45 | |
Germany, in my opinion, has had an over-valued currency, | 8:47 | |
excuse me, an under-valued currency. | 8:51 | |
And the United States has had for a dozen years | 8:53 | |
or so an over-valued currency. | 8:57 | |
This relationship between the mark and the dollar | 9:00 | |
drifted slowly into this disequilibrium | 9:04 | |
and I think the sliding peg could very well | 9:08 | |
have handled that particular problem | 9:10 | |
as far as the magnitude of the changes concerned. | 9:13 | |
How would this have worked if in 1955 we'd had | 9:15 | |
a sliding peg between the common market countries | 9:20 | |
and the United States? | 9:23 | |
We have no experience, but I conjecture that | 9:25 | |
this is the way that things would have happened. | 9:29 | |
In 1955, we were probably poised between | 9:32 | |
the dollar shortage, when the dollar was under-valued, | 9:36 | |
and the dollar glut, when the dollar was over-valued. | 9:39 | |
And so, if it had been introduced at that time | 9:42 | |
that would have been a pretty good time | 9:44 | |
perhaps to have made that reform. | 9:45 | |
For a year or so, the exchange rate probably | 9:50 | |
would have wobbled from day to day | 9:55 | |
but within narrow limits, | 9:57 | |
just the ordinary brownie in motion | 10:00 | |
of good crops and bad crops and this rumor and that | 10:03 | |
but with speculators alert to make money, | 10:07 | |
by buying a currency when it goes down and is weak, | 10:10 | |
because the dollar movement is a temporary operation. | 10:13 | |
And this kind of scalping would tend to limit | 10:17 | |
the amount of the change. | 10:21 | |
However, because of our Cold War commitments abroad, | 10:23 | |
because of our private business corporations learning | 10:27 | |
that direct investment in the advanced countries | 10:33 | |
of the common market in Japan, | 10:37 | |
was extremely profitable I think that | 10:39 | |
the sliding peg would have come into operation | 10:42 | |
with the mark rising and the dollar falling. | 10:44 | |
I'd like to leave gold out of this melodrama, | 10:48 | |
because people find it more alarming | 10:50 | |
if I depart from speaking about relative currency parodies | 10:55 | |
and talk about gold but I suppose | 10:59 | |
that if we had not had a two-tier price system | 11:03 | |
at that time that probably the dollar | 11:06 | |
would have declined relative to gold | 11:10 | |
that is the $35 price per ounce | 11:13 | |
would have gone up a little bit | 11:16 | |
and in the case of the mark, | 11:17 | |
the price of gold might have gone down, | 11:22 | |
you might split the difference so to speak. | 11:23 | |
I think this would have been a equilibrating direction, | 11:26 | |
it would have been a substitute for many | 11:28 | |
of our tyings of foreign aid. | 11:31 | |
It would have been a substitute for the | 11:34 | |
tying of our military aid, | 11:35 | |
It would have been a substitute for the fiats | 11:37 | |
which require the American armed services to buy | 11:41 | |
things in this country even at a higher price. | 11:43 | |
And I think we would have been in a better position today. | 11:47 | |
But the force of the question of our subscriber is, | 11:51 | |
"Would there be some problems from speculators?" | 11:54 | |
Now I assume that if we had let's say | 11:56 | |
one and a half percent ratchet on the sliding peg | 12:01 | |
that the dollar would always have been | 12:06 | |
throughout this period at the low end of that ratchet, | 12:08 | |
And I think, therefore, that there would have been | 12:12 | |
a slight tendency for speculators to pile on | 12:15 | |
to the movement and to make the situation worse. | 12:20 | |
The reason is, that that speculators could predict | 12:24 | |
probably with considerable confidence, | 12:28 | |
which way the peg would move. | 12:30 | |
Now it is true, as I think Pro. Freedman may have said | 12:32 | |
in one of his earlier tapes, | 12:35 | |
that interest rates differentials | 12:37 | |
within the United States could compensate | 12:39 | |
for this advantage to the speculators | 12:44 | |
in putting their chips on one of the currencies | 12:48 | |
rather than the other. | 12:51 | |
However, under the circumstances that I'm envisioning | 12:52 | |
one of the main purposes of the sliding peg | 12:56 | |
is to free domestic policy from the international restraints | 12:59 | |
And so, in the sluggish late 1950's, | 13:05 | |
it would not have been optimal domestic policy | 13:09 | |
for us to have had higher interest rates than Germany. | 13:12 | |
And so, I don't think that there is any warm comfort, | 13:16 | |
there's only cold comfort in the notion | 13:21 | |
that you could off-set the effects on speculators | 13:23 | |
on the sliding peg by interest rate changes. | 13:26 | |
If those are interest rate changes that we | 13:30 | |
don't want for domestic purposes. | 13:32 | |
Well, I don't pretend that this is a considered analysis, | 13:34 | |
but let me conclude it by saying that | 13:39 | |
I'm generally in agreement with Pro. Freedman, | 13:43 | |
because this sliding peg with whatever | 13:45 | |
little problems it might involve | 13:47 | |
that I've just now discussed, | 13:50 | |
involves those problems much less | 13:52 | |
than a non-sliding peg which then has to give in a big way. | 13:55 | |
And which gives the speculators a one-way gamble. | 14:00 | |
Let's put it this way, | 14:04 | |
under the Bretton Woods arrangements, | 14:05 | |
when parodies get out of kilter, | 14:07 | |
speculators can hope to make yields | 14:10 | |
by bare-rate on a currency that are the order | 14:14 | |
or magnitude of ten percent a year. | 14:19 | |
Under the sliding peg, | 14:25 | |
the speculator is perhaps guaranteed an easy | 14:26 | |
one or two percent but one or two percent | 14:29 | |
is small compared to what speculators | 14:32 | |
are out for generally and this is only a minor debit item | 14:35 | |
against the notion of the sliding peg. | 14:39 | |
Now, I do want to put in a caveat | 14:42 | |
after much reconsideration, it's possible | 14:46 | |
that I would arrive at a different opinion | 14:50 | |
because it just occurs to me as I am talking about it | 14:53 | |
that letting a price move in the direction it ought to move | 14:57 | |
but keeping it from moving as far as it ought to move | 15:02 | |
might actually accentuate the psychological | 15:05 | |
destabilizing effects of speculation | 15:11 | |
and so a more detailed analysis might | 15:15 | |
moderate what I've just now said. | 15:20 | |
Interviewer | Our second question then, | 15:25 |
Pro. Samuelson, is what do you think may be wrong | 15:26 | |
about Pro. Freedman's qualitative prediction | 15:29 | |
that the first half of 1969 will be as | 15:31 | |
over-exuberant as 1968 was generally? | 15:34 | |
And that the last half of the year's strength | 15:38 | |
will depend primarily upon how tough the Fed gets | 15:40 | |
in the next six months? | 15:42 | |
Paul | Well, this cannot be a complete love-fest here. | 15:44 |
We do develop some real differences of opinion | 15:52 | |
between Pro. Freedman and myself. | 15:56 | |
First, I don't think that my reading the facts | 16:03 | |
would substantiate the view that the last half | 16:09 | |
of 1968 has been as strong as the first half. | 16:16 | |
I think the fiscal restraint has | 16:21 | |
been working in some measure. | 16:25 | |
Just this last week, we got the first estimates | 16:28 | |
for the fourth quarter and they are higher | 16:35 | |
than the estimates that the econometricians made in June, | 16:38 | |
but they are statistically significantly lower | 16:43 | |
than the actual facts as of last June. | 16:47 | |
The GMP has increase 16.8 billion in the fourth quarter. | 16:53 | |
If anything that's a bit weaker than I myself had expected. | 17:00 | |
It's undoubtedly due to the fact | 17:04 | |
that the poor Christmas retail sales | 17:06 | |
turned out to be verified in the actual statistics. | 17:10 | |
Consumptions was surprisingly weak. | 17:15 | |
The savings ratio which I will remind you had been | 17:18 | |
seven and a half percent of disposable income | 17:23 | |
prior to the surcharge and which had mystified | 17:26 | |
some of the experts by going down so much | 17:30 | |
in the third quarter just six and a quarter percent, | 17:32 | |
has now moved back. | 17:36 | |
It has not moved back to seven and a half percent | 17:38 | |
but those experts did not expect it to | 17:41 | |
move back to seven and a half percent. | 17:43 | |
It has moved back according to the preliminary figures | 17:44 | |
to seven percent and that suggests that | 17:46 | |
the fiscal restraint is having an effect | 17:50 | |
even distinct from the rate of change of the money supply. | 17:55 | |
So you know that mine is the more eclectic position. | 17:59 | |
There is a measure of disagreement. | 18:03 | |
Now similarly, I would expect going into the first | 18:05 | |
and second quarter, well let me put it differently, | 18:11 | |
I should be astonished if the first and second quarter | 18:15 | |
of this coming year are as strong as the first | 18:19 | |
and second quarter of the last year. | 18:22 | |
And yet by looking at the rate of change of the money supply | 18:25 | |
using any of the measures of the money supply | 18:30 | |
which you cared to use, | 18:34 | |
I see no qualitative rough method of estimation | 18:36 | |
which would not justify a forecast qualitatively | 18:42 | |
that the first half of 1969 would be at least | 18:48 | |
as strong as the first half of 1968. | 18:52 | |
I think at Las Vegas or down at | 18:57 | |
the First National City Bank | 18:59 | |
or at the the Harris's Trust Bank in Chicago | 19:01 | |
you can get very good odds that will not be the case. | 19:04 | |
In other words, those analysts who follow | 19:09 | |
the data very closely and who generally lean | 19:12 | |
towards monetarism, that is great weight | 19:16 | |
upon the money supply, | 19:20 | |
in fact are not betting in terms of monetarism. | 19:21 | |
I saw the official forecast of the Harris Trust | 19:25 | |
of which Dr. Barrell Sprinkle is Vice President, | 19:32 | |
and that forecast for the year is a good deal | 19:35 | |
lower than my own forecast. | 19:38 | |
The private forecast of Dr. Sprinkle, | 19:41 | |
who is not the economist in charge of the official forecast | 19:48 | |
I understand to be a little bit higher than | 19:52 | |
the official forecast but he is still, I believe, below me. | 19:54 | |
Now concretely, I don't see how in making a judgment about | 19:59 | |
the first and second quarter of next year, | 20:05 | |
I can as a confirmed eclectic, | 20:08 | |
fail to take account of the fact that | 20:12 | |
the fourth quarter has shown an increase in inventory | 20:15 | |
to ten billion annual rate from seven and a half billion | 20:17 | |
in the third quarter. | 20:21 | |
The strength of final demand, | 20:23 | |
that is the strength of GMP after you purge it | 20:25 | |
of temporary inventory changes | 20:28 | |
declined considerably in the fourth quarter of the year. | 20:31 | |
It declined, if I remember correctly, to something | 20:37 | |
like 13, to 14 and a quarter billion | 20:41 | |
from a previous quarter of 21 and a half billion. | 20:46 | |
Now that has no certain implications for | 20:49 | |
the first two quarters of the coming year, | 20:53 | |
but I think it has certain probability hunches. | 20:56 | |
And that is that this inventory was in part unwanted, | 21:00 | |
it was accumulated because the retail sales were | 21:07 | |
a little bit on the soft side in part at least. | 21:10 | |
And therefore in a sense it is hanging over the market | 21:14 | |
and it augers in the first half of the year, | 21:20 | |
we may, we may I say, see inventory accumulation | 21:24 | |
going to a lower rate. | 21:29 | |
In any case, I put great store if you remember | 21:31 | |
on the spread on the likely GMP increase of all the experts. | 21:35 | |
And I said I was between 12 and 18 billion | 21:41 | |
for the fourth quarter, | 21:44 | |
this was befor the fourth quarter. | 21:45 | |
And expressed my own view that it would be | 21:49 | |
towards the upper end of that range. | 21:51 | |
And justify my eclectic position said I would | 21:53 | |
find it fantastic if it were to be 22 billion | 21:58 | |
or more as a simplest reading of the money supply | 22:03 | |
of figures would perhaps suggest. | 22:09 | |
Well, we never have controlled experiments | 22:12 | |
and we never can confirm and prove anything | 22:15 | |
in economics by waiting until a quarter is over. | 22:18 | |
We just have to take the bulk of a man's experience | 22:21 | |
over a lifetime to form his judgment | 22:24 | |
but such as it is we were well within that range | 22:26 | |
of expert guesses and I think we'll be | 22:31 | |
within the range of expert guesses for the current quarter. | 22:36 | |
Now what are the range of expert | 22:40 | |
guesses for the current quarter? | 22:45 | |
I would suppose that it goes something like 8 to 16 billion. | 22:47 | |
My own would be that we would probably be | 22:55 | |
a little over the middle of that range. | 23:00 | |
And I don't think that I could arrive at this view | 23:04 | |
except by giving weight to non-money supply factors. | 23:09 | |
Let me go on though, to soft pedal the disagreement | 23:17 | |
by saying that I quite agree that what | 23:27 | |
the Federal Reserve does in the next few months | 23:30 | |
will be extremely important in connection | 23:33 | |
with what happens in the of the year. | 23:37 | |
But it is something that can be off-set | 23:39 | |
by a fiscal policy and I think quite possibly would be. | 23:41 | |
I may mention that we've had the | 23:49 | |
State of the Union message by Pres. Johnson. | 23:51 | |
It has confirmed the forecast that I made | 23:54 | |
as to what he would have to recommend. | 23:58 | |
There was a problem of political jockeying | 24:01 | |
as to whether Pres. Johnson who was told by | 24:04 | |
nine out ten of the experts he consulted | 24:09 | |
that it was only prudent at this time to indicate that the | 24:12 | |
ten percent of the surcharge probably should be | 24:17 | |
maintained after the six month period, | 24:20 | |
but he had the problem of politics | 24:23 | |
that he didn't want to make that prudent suggestion | 24:25 | |
and then to find that the facts had gone | 24:30 | |
the other way and to have the new president | 24:33 | |
make capitol that he had come in and he had managed | 24:37 | |
to reduce taxes compared to the outgoing president. | 24:41 | |
Mr. Nixon at this point had to make an agonizing decision, | 24:44 | |
he had to call in all of his experts | 24:49 | |
because one suspects Pres. Johnson put him | 24:51 | |
on the spot behind the scenes and said, | 24:54 | |
"My recommendation is going to be perhaps | 24:58 | |
an imprudent one unless I get some backing from you." | 25:00 | |
Well you can be sure that the measured backing | 25:04 | |
for continuation of the surcharge unless | 25:08 | |
we learn some important facts of the contrary | 25:11 | |
which I understand President-Elect Nixon | 25:13 | |
has been announced to have given, | 25:15 | |
was given by Pres. Nixon only after let's say | 25:18 | |
8 out of 10 of his advisors told him that the | 25:22 | |
outlook does call for this. | 25:26 | |
And their analysis was based on the premise that it does | 25:30 | |
make the difference for overall inflation | 25:34 | |
whether the taxes go up. | 25:37 | |
In other words, they wouldn't agree | 25:42 | |
with the analysis in the November | 25:43 | |
St. Louis Federal Reserve letter | 25:46 | |
which by statistical estimation | 25:48 | |
came out with the conclusion that | 25:52 | |
tax rates have no predictable affect | 25:53 | |
upon the rate of increase of the GMP. | 25:56 | |
I think we'll have to leave to another time | 26:00 | |
the deeper economic analysis of why | 26:02 | |
I think that fiscal policy variables have to | 26:07 | |
regarded as having a predictable effect on the | 26:11 | |
average on the state of aggregate demand. | 26:16 | |
Interviewer | Thank you, Pro. Paul Samuelson of MIT. | 26:20 |
If you have questions, comments, or suggestions | 26:23 | |
please write us at: | 26:25 | |
Instructional Dynamics Incorporated | 26:26 | |
166 East Superior Street, Chicago, 60611 | 26:28 |
Item Info
The preservation of the Duke University Libraries Digital Collections and the Duke Digital Repository programs are supported in part by the Lowell and Eileen Aptman Digital Preservation Fund