Tape 101 - International trade for a rich country

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Announcer	Welcome once again,	0:02
	is MIT Professor Paul Samuelson discusses	0:02
	the current economic scene.	0:05
	This bi-weekly series is produced by	0:07
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated	0:08
	and was recorded May 8th, 1972.	0:10
-	[Professor Paul Samuelson] Today, I'd like to tackle	0:14
	a very large subject,	0:16
	It's the question of whether a very affluent country,	0:18
	like The United States, can find equilibrium	0:24
	in international trade.	0:27
	Has a little bit, the ring to it of that mock question	0:30
	can a girl find happiness on Park Avenue	0:36
	at the $100000 a year, but I can assure you	0:41
	that many of our people and some people abroad	0:44
	are of this profound opinion that trade between countries	0:49
	which differ very much in the standard of living	0:54
	can not be a viable equilibrium thing.	0:57
	This is a topic which I've chosen to talk on	1:03
	in this coming week in New York.	1:07
	There is a custom, which is growing up, if you don't	1:10
	have old traditions you have to forge traditions,	1:14
	that the Noble Award winner in economics	1:17
	on the occasion of him going to Stockholm	1:21
	to receive that award, should in addition	1:24
	to his scientific lectures, give a public lecture	1:27
	sponsored by The Federation of Swedish Industries.	1:31
	Unfortunately, that's such a busy week and so overwhelming	1:34
	is the hospitality of the Swedish people,	1:38
	that although the spirit is willing the flesh is weak,	1:41
	and I was not able at that time to give the lecture.	1:44
	Nor has it been convenient to go back and give the lecture,	1:49
	and yet they didn't like to break a new tradition	1:51
	and so it turns out that if	1:55
	Muhammad can't go to the mountain,	1:57
	so overwhelming is their hospitality that they're bringing	1:59
	the mountain to Muhammad, and I am able to give that talk	2:03
	before the Swedish American Chamber of Commerce in New York,	2:08
	and so, naturally that's what's been filling my mind	2:13
	these days, and let me get as far as I can in this tape	2:19
	and carry over into another one,	2:23
	as I believe I will not be able to exhaust that topic.	2:27
	I may say that the topic of an affluent country	2:33
	and it's trade relations with the rest of the world,	2:37
	would naturally be one that would interest people in	2:39
	the Swedish economy because next to the economies	2:42
	of North America, the Swedes are by all odds the most	2:46
	affluent economy in the world, and their wages are	2:49
	much higher than that of most of their neighbors in	2:52
	Western Europe.	2:56
	This, despite the fact, that Western Europe is the next	2:57
	region to the United States.	3:03
	I correct myself, Australasia, New Zealand and Australia	3:05
	would also be right up, right up there.	3:10
	This might even be a subject of interest to the Japanese	3:15
	because we suppose that they're far-seeing, and I do think	3:19
	they have the right to dream at night of	3:22
	that approaching date when their rapidly growing	3:24
	per capita real wages will equal ours in American	3:26
	and perhaps go on to surpass ours.	3:31
	Well, as I never tire of preaching when abroad,	3:34
	the American pattern of things does have a vital interest.	3:38
	Not because there's anything special about being American,	3:41
	but merely because, what one fool will choose to do at	3:44
	a high income level, so will another.	3:48
	The Americanization of Europe has little to do with	3:51
	forced infection imported from America.	3:54
	It maybe that Columbus's sailors brought to Europe	3:57
	a physalis, but I don't think that the affluent standard	4:00
	of life, can be said to have been brought to Europe	4:05
	by America in the sense that Europe	4:08
	wouldn't have got there by itself	4:10
	if America had not existed.	4:13
	It simply is the case, that everybody who gets to	4:17
	a real income of two or three thousand dollars a year,	4:19
	will want a car, will want a telephone, automatic heat,	4:22
	a winter vacation and all the things that Americans,	4:25
	quite by accident, happen to have the opportunity	4:27
	to enjoy first.	4:31
	You might say that our economy is, so to speak, an analog	4:34
	computer, to show the rest of the world	4:38
	the shadow of its own future.	4:41
	Some people would say, for better or for worse.	4:43
	Our own historians here, vie to formulate,	4:47
	what is it that makes America distinctive?	4:51
	At the turn of the century, Frederick Jackson Turner	4:54
	famous Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin,	4:58
	stated the thesis that the central fact shaping	5:02
	America's history was the fact of the open frontier.	5:06
	Well, if that thesis was valid in its time, by now	5:10
	the frontier of free land is certainly ancient history.	5:13
	For a very long time, America was the newest nation,	5:18
	the most modern democracy,	5:21
	but founded prior to the French Revolution,	5:25
	by now The United States	5:28
	is about the oldest of existing governments,	5:29
	that is governments which have existed	5:32
	by a legitimate chain unbroken.	5:35
	By that test, we're one of the oldest nations.	5:39
	I once argued, that you might judge the age of a nation	5:43
	by how long it has been since it reached levels of	5:48
	varying degrees of affluence, and by this test	5:52
	America is not young, virile, vigorous, by this test	5:55
	America is middle-aged, it's one of	5:59
	the oldest nations going.	6:02
	Let me call your attention, the thesis of David Potter	6:06
	a distinguished historian who died just a few years ago.	6:10
	He was a Professor of History in the South, and at Yale,	6:13
	and, I think in his last years, at Stamford.	6:16
	He asserted that what has been the distinguishing	6:21
	feature in American history, almost from our beginnings	6:24
	has been, that we've been the land of plenty.	6:28
	I think that's the title of his	6:31
	University of Chicago Press book.	6:33
	I suppose, it's little wonder then	6:36
	that Kenneth Galbraith Affluent Society evoked	6:38
	a resonant response, equaling, indeed, if not exceeding	6:41
	that of Thorstein Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class	6:46
	written at the turn of the century.	6:51
	Potter would argue that this affluence,	6:55
	and our consciousness of it in comparison	6:57
	with the rest of the world, has been the central fact	7:00
	of the American experience.	7:03
	Now why is it, that as the bible says, it's harder	7:06
	for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven	7:09
	than for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle?	7:11
	There must be some reason.	7:15
	And I suppose that reason is better known to Europeans	7:17
	who have had to put up with American tourists for	7:20
	a century, than to Americans themselves.	7:22
	Affluence breeds self-confidence,	7:26
	even to the point of arrogance.	7:28
	As Samuel Butler said, there's always a certain lack	7:31
	of amiability about the go-getter.	7:33
	Leaving aside admiration and fear, we tend to like	7:37
	a person in inverse relationship in his ability	7:40
	to survive in the struggle for success.	7:44
	If it's natural to expect a class struggle within	7:47
	a country based on differences on income and wealth,	7:50
	why is it not natural to expect international	7:53
	antagonisms based on the same economic disparities?	7:56
	If the class struggle had never existed, we should	8:01
	have had to invent it in order to explain the facts	8:03
	of modern life.	8:06
	But what's all this to do with economics?	8:09
	Afterall, in The Competitive Equilibrium of Leon Walras	8:12
	or, for that matter, Alfred Marshall, there's precious	8:16
	little room for the sociology of class warfare.	8:19
	It's in personal supply and demand that dictate	8:23
	the final equilibrium.	8:25
	If in any sense there's personal rivalry of brother	8:28
	against brother in a competitive market it is	8:31
	the substitutability of one identical worker against	8:35
	the other worker.	8:37
	In other words, the class struggle	8:40
	is an intra-class struggle.	8:42
	Labor against labor in depressing the market wage,	8:44
	capitalist against capitalist in raising the real wage	8:48
	depressing commodity prices and the rate of profit.	8:52
	Well, back in 1817 when Ricardo laid the foundations	8:56
	for the theory of international trade, I'm referring now	9:01
	of course to his famous doctrine of comparative costs	9:03
	or comparative advantage, there was no particular role	9:06
	played by the relative affluences of the trading regions.	9:10
	But what about the brute fact of size	9:16
	that The United States	9:20
	aside from having highest per capita incomes,	9:21
	has also been one of the economies of greatest	9:24
	land area and population.	9:26
	Near size is suppose to change one.	9:29
	If you're very tall, that's suppose to give you extra	9:33
	self-confidence.	9:37
	If you're very short, that's supposed to give you an	9:40
	inferiority complex for which you always have to compensate.	9:43
	Well certainly, The United States has always been	9:47
	one of the nations of greatest land area	9:50
	and of greatest population.	9:55
	In this respect we differ a lot from Sweden or Switzerland.	9:58
	In the same way that half a century ago the huge areas	10:02
	of Brazil and Argentina differed from the affluent	10:06
	Switzerland of Latin America.	10:10
	Those words have a wry ring today.	10:12
	I'm referring to Uruguay, which has lost its prosperous	10:15
	status just a Czechoslovakia, which was the Switzerland	10:19
	of Eastern Europe has lost its affluent status.	10:23
	Travelers to Brazil report what an exhilarating feeling	10:29
	it is to the Brazilians just because they're so large.	10:33
	They think the future is theirs.	10:36
	They think that god was a Brazilian.	10:38
	Well, what about size?	10:41
	Absolute size of course does not itself	10:46
	mean per capita affluence.	10:49
	We've only to look at the teeming millions of India	10:51
	and China to realize that large absolute numbers,	10:54
	if it's not matched by commensurate magnitudes of resources	10:57
	makes for low poverty and poverty.	11:02
	But still, going back to Adam Smith, and in our own time	11:05
	Bertil Olean the Swedish economist, there has been	11:09
	the realization that mere size may be beneficial	11:13
	to the extent that it permits industries or society	11:19
	to realize the economies of mass production	11:22
	and economies of scale that do characterize many	11:25
	industrial processes.	11:28
	Increasing the extent of the market, has always been	11:31
	a very powerful argument in the arsenal of the free trader.	11:34
	The common market is so important to Western Europe,	11:40
	precisely because it gives to Western Europe the kinds of	11:43
	mass markets that the vast	11:46
	American continent has long enjoyed.	11:48
	Of course, you might say, if you had universal free trade	11:52
	you wouldn't need that, but of course, if my aunt Sally	11:54
	had wheels she'd be a stagecoach, but she isn't.	11:57
	Nonetheless, once markets are large enough to afford	12:01
	competition among many efficient scale producers,	12:04
	mere size ceases to be an important variable in the models	12:09
	of conventional international trade theorists.	12:13
	Thus, I don't think very many of them would agree with	12:18
	the contention of Lord Balogh, Thomas Balogh of Oxford,	12:21
	that small countries are at a disadvantage trading with	12:26
	the larger United States, provided of course, that	12:29
	the collusive power of concerted governmental action	12:33
	is not pursued by America.	12:36
	A cartel that monopolizes international markets for some	12:39
	commodities is a bad thing, but a Dutch cartel wouldn't	12:42
	smell any sweeter just because it came from a small country.	12:46
	Nor would the same cartel be more malevolent merely	12:52
	because of the giant size of its mother country.	12:55
	I might mention, that in the comparative advantage theory	13:00
	of Ricardo, and of Mill, John Stuart Mill,	13:04
	in those examples of Portugal and England	13:08
	trading cloth and wine,	13:11
	it would be small Portugal that would stand to gain	13:15
	a larger share of the advantage from trade	13:18
	from international specialization than would large England.	13:21
	Actually, if English customers, consumers, are so numerous	13:26
	that their needs for Portugal's export good	13:30
	can't be fulfilled by Portugal, even it's producing to its	13:35
	full capacity, so that that its needs	13:40
	have to be produced in part,	13:42
	from domestic English production	13:44
	then it follows from Ricardo's comparative cost theory	13:46
	that Portugal will get 100% of the gains from trade	13:50
	and England will get none.	13:53
	Under perfect competition, smallness makes for rarity	13:56
	and advantage, largeness for abundance	13:59
	and selfish disadvantage.	14:03
	Well, in summary, as far competitive international trade	14:07
	analysis is concerned, I'm speaking now of the conventional	14:10
	wisdom, there's no reason why mutually profitable trade	14:13
	should not take place between affluent countries	14:16
	like America, Sweden, Australia, Western Europe,	14:19
	among themselves now.	14:23
	Or, and, between any of them and intermediate income	14:25
	or under developed countries, such as the countries	14:31
	of Latin America, or Africa or Asia, and for that matter	14:34
	there could be profitable trade between countries of	14:38
	the West and countries of Eastern Europe whatever	14:41
	their degree of affluence provided that the control	14:45
	authorities in those countries did agree to balance	14:48
	trade and or themselves following the principle of	14:52
	importing those goods that can't less cheaply be	14:56
	produced at home.	14:59
	Now, needless to say, there's not unanimous agreement	15:01
	with these doctrines, which are the doctrines of classical	15:04
	and post-Keynesian establishment economics.	15:07
	My purpose now is to subject these arguments to	15:10
	searching re-evaluation.	15:14
	And let me confess that my bias in the effort	15:18
	is to see whether I cannot find merit in the suspicions	15:21
	and apprehensions of those who doubt and criticize this	15:25
	conventional wisdom.	15:30
	To bring out the issues in the debate, let me state	15:33
	rather boldly and crudely and overly complacent	15:36
	optimistic view of the world, which might be taken up	15:40
	by a naive student who has just learned the doctrines	15:43
	of international trade.	15:46
	Then, as fairly as I can, let me go on to state what	15:49
	are some of the dire views and apprehensions of	15:53
	that larger fraction of the world's population	15:56
	who have not had a formal grounding in the theories	15:59
	of classical and neo-classical economics.	16:02
	Well, for brevity, here's a dogmatic list of optimistic	16:06
	conventional views.	16:10
	One, until recently, there was a weighty group of	16:14
	international financial experts who believed that the dollar	16:19
	was in some special sense a key international currency.	16:22
	This would be a majority of the experts.	16:27
	Maybe they still would have a bear voting majority.	16:29
	Just as a sovereign government can issue money ad-lib	16:34
	within a country and have it always be acceptable,	16:38
	although of course at the cost of raising all prices,	16:42
	so, according to this comfortable doctrine, United States	16:46
	had in a sense a privilege of a counterfeiter.	16:49
	Therefore, by definition we were hardly capable of	16:54
	running an international deficit.	16:57
	I mean an international deficit that mattered.	16:59
	Since the dollars of deficit would automatically	17:02
	be financed by foreigners accepting whatever those	17:05
	dollars were in magnitude and they were thrust upon them.	17:09
	The dollar was, so to speak, not merely as good as gold	17:14
	it was better, particularly if The United States	17:17
	showed its determination to get rid of gold as an element	17:21
	in international momentary systems by dumping our	17:24
	Fort Knox supplies on the markets for whatever price	17:27
	below the official price of $35 a ounce, those gold	17:30
	supplies would fetch from dentists, jewelers and hoarders.	17:34
	Of course, according to this view of The United States	17:38
	as providing the world's currency and therefore	17:41
	as licensed counterfeiter, we would be exporting inflation	17:43
	when we ran huge deficits.	17:49
	Well now, in this extreme form that I've stated it,	17:52
	few experts or even non-experts would still hold	17:55
	to this comfortable view in its undiluted form.	18:00
	At best, it can be argued that the rest of the world	18:05
	has a desire to hold some fraction of its wealth	18:10
	in the form of dollars because of the convenience	18:13
	of dollars for exchange and as a store of liquidity.	18:16
	And this, if only because the American GNP constitutes	18:20
	some three eighth of world GNP, and because ours has been	18:24
	historically a stable society that has protected	18:28
	private property rights, and that has not always been	18:31
	true abroad.	18:34
	It follows then that to a limited degree The United States	18:37
	can indeed finance a genuine deficit in its payments	18:40
	by issuing dollars that would be readily acceptable	18:44
	abroad in limited amounts, not ad-lib.	18:47
	And various calculation have been made, sometimes its	18:50
	been suggested that one to two billion dollars of deficit	18:52
	for The United States would be normal because it's	18:57
	supplying the world with the dollars which the world	18:59
	will want in a growing world as a reasonable fraction	19:03
	of the world's portfolios.	19:07
	Well, now two, although in the historic past America	19:13
	was a high tariff country, it's always been endemic	19:16
	in our ideology going right back to our beginnings	19:19
	Reaching, of course, a notorious crescendo	19:25
	in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930.	19:28
	Still, under four decades of reciprocal trade programs	19:32
	associated with Cordell Hull, Franklin Roosevelt	19:36
	successive successor administrations,	19:39
	Kennedy, Rouse and so forth, our duties have been cut	19:43
	in half, cut again and still again in half.	19:47
	And as a result, though we are often regarded abroad	19:51
	as still being a protected market, this is really only	19:54
	because of cultural lag.	19:59
	America has in truth become one of the freest markets	20:01
	in the world, which is to the advantage,	20:03
	so the argument goes, both to our workers	20:06
	and to workers abroad.	20:10
	As evidence for this, the substantial penetration	20:13
	of the American market by Japanese imports in the last	20:16
	two decades, would be proof of our low protection status.	20:19
	I may say that the, up until recent years, the endemic	20:26
	protectionist ideology of the America public generally	20:32
	had gradually been succeeded by a freer trade ideology,	20:37
	you might say ideology has followed trade in this matter,	20:42
	but that's only up until recently things have changed	20:46
	as we'll see.	20:50
	Well now, point number three.	20:51
	Within the framework of the beneficial free trade	20:54
	regime of the Bretton Woods system, even some optimists	20:57
	were admitting that the American dollar	21:01
	had, prior to August 1971, become somewhat overvalued.	21:04
	To some, this was merely a consequence of the post-1965	21:11
	acceleration of the Vietnam war,	21:15
	with its subsequent demand pull and cost push inflations.	21:17
	To others, including myself, the overvaluation	21:21
	of the American dollar has been a longer term phenomenon	21:24
	related to both the miraculous recovery of Western Europe	21:27
	and Japan after the 1949 devaluations,	21:30
	and to the expenditures of The United States	21:33
	in the Korean, Indo-Chinese and general Cold War efforts.	21:36
	You can add to that list the move	21:40
	by American corporations to invest abroad.	21:45
	Now four, still in the comfortable view.	21:49
	Even if the dollar had to be regarded	21:54
	as somewhat overvalued, it was said that this primarily	21:56
	put the onus on the surplus countries to unilaterally	21:59
	appreciate their currencies, appreciate their currencies,	22:03
	particularly the mark and the yen,	22:09
	or else, they should swallow our dollars of deficit	22:11
	without complaining.	22:14
	They couldn't have it both ways.	22:17
	They complain, there's an easy remedy for them.	22:19
	Well now, running contrary to this comfortable view	22:23
	of benign neglect which was enunciated both by conservatives	22:28
	and liberals among American economists, was the recognition	22:31
	by some of us, that the regime of swallowing dollars	22:35
	could not be expected to last, and that therefore,	22:38
	putting off the day of disequilibrium correction	22:42
	would only exasperate the inevitable process	22:44
	of needed adjustment.	22:47
	Now five, the true optimist held that any overvaluation	22:51
	of the dollar, even if it were fairly substantial,	22:54
	and more or less independently of what was its cause,	22:57
	that overvaluation could be cured by the medicine of	23:00
	dollar depreciation or surplus country appreciation,	23:04
	much along the lines of the actual December 71	23:08
	Smithsonian Agreement in Washington.	23:12
	Under the two-tier gold system, the free price of gold	23:14
	in the unofficial tier was of no importance,	23:18
	and within the official tier, the only point in making	23:22
	a token upward evaluation of the dollar price of gold	23:26
	and of the STR's paper gold, was for the purpose	23:29
	of expediting agreement on new currency parities	23:32
	with lower dollar parities.	23:36
	Since the dollar depreciation in December 1971	23:39
	was actually substantial, averaging some 12% relevant	23:42
	to other currencies, these quote 'elasticity optimists'	23:46
	unquote, thought that the therapy agreed upon	23:51
	in Washington should be ample to restore equilibrium	23:54
	in the reasonably near future.	23:57
	Indeed, some believe that the slight reduction,	24:00
	the very slight reductions in our export prices	24:04
	relative to export prices abroad, will trigger off	24:06
	great improvements in our current international trade	24:09
	credits and great improvement in our current debits.	24:13
	And these super optimists of elasticity have even been	24:18
	fearful that the dollar was depreciated too much	24:22
	in 1971 and will soon prove to be an undervalued currency.	24:25
	This will show itself presumably in the dollar soon	24:29
	rising to the top of the two and quarter percent	24:33
	discretionary range agreed to in December 1972	24:36
	when the official band of flexible exchange rates	24:41
	was more than doubled in width,	24:43
	two and a quarter percent above,	24:46
	two and a quarter percent below,	24:47
	the new agreed upon parities.	24:49
	Well now, to such optimists as these perhaps	24:52
	the whole August 15th 1971 crisis was unnecessary,	24:56
	being in the nature of an optical illusion,	25:00
	or being merely the self-fulfilling consequence	25:04
	of an irrational avalanche of speculation against	25:06
	the dollar.	25:09
	Likewise, the war of nerves that has been going on in	25:11
	the first half year following the Washington Agreement	25:14
	of last December, that is regarded by the super optimists	25:16
	as an irrational self-aggravating movement likely	25:20
	to come soon to an end.	25:24
	Or, they say, if irrationality should carry the day	25:26
	that would be an unfortunate	25:30
	and basically unnecessary outcome.	25:31
	Now, my final point, according to the optimist	25:35
	it is desirable that the fatal flaw of the Bretton Woods	25:41
	set-up, it's attempt to peg exchange rates,	25:44
	that that be removed in some, in favor of some kind	25:47
	of gliding band in which currency parities can move	25:51
	up or down a few percent in each year,	25:54
	or, two, we go outright in to some scheme of relatively	25:56
	clean floating exchange rates, in which organized	26:00
	speculative markets will give exporters protection	26:03
	against fluctuating exchange risks, and in which no	26:06
	deficits will ever again be possible.	26:09
	With exchange rates flexible and tariffs, import quotas,	26:14
	and other protective devices gradually removed	26:18
	the American real wage will benefit in its rate of	26:20
	improvement, in its trend of increase and the same will	26:23
	take place abroad as everyone everywhere benefits from	26:26
	more efficient international division of labor.	26:30
	But to be sure, in the ebb and flow of relative	26:34
	technological change and change in tastes certain	26:37
	specialized workers within a country might find	26:40
	that their scarcity rates deteriorate because of	26:43
	foreign trade when foreign competition takes away much	26:45
	of their advantage.	26:48
	And the same can happen to the rents enjoyed by capital	26:49
	and non-labor resources when their specialized occupations	26:52
	no longer viable in the face of international competition.	26:55
	However, provided the country follows proper post-Keynesian	26:59
	fiscal and monetary policies, it should be able to ensure	27:03
	full employment and job opportunity for all.	27:06
	Displaced workers and machines will go into other lines	27:10
	of activity in which the country still has a comparative	27:13
	advantage to the benefit of the real GNP and its broad	27:15
	factor share claimants.	27:19
	Maybe some financial assistance in the transition	27:21
	would be a desirable thing.	27:24
	Well now, my time is up.	27:26
	I've stated the optimists case.	27:28
	When you listen to it, you won't think of economics	27:31
	as a dismal science, quite the contrary.	27:34
	This is a fairly cheerful outlook.	27:37
	It's a well reasoned outlook.	27:41
	I, therefore, feel no shame that I'm leaving you for	27:43
	a couple of weeks at least with that comfortable view	27:48
	because who's to say that it's not in the end correct view?	27:54
	It's very important in closing though for me to emphasis	27:59
	that this is the view that is believed in primarily	28:01
	by academic economists.	28:06
	The minute you leave the campus and go out into	28:08
	the real world, the real world of industry, of housewives,	28:11
	of employers, of employees you find almost nobody	28:14
	who believes in that, and so next time I want to try	28:19
	to give, as best I can, as the devil's advocate	28:22
	so to speak, a statement of the dire nameless fears	28:25
	and apprehensions which fill the bosom	28:31
	of the man in the street about the future of America's	28:33
	competitiveness in international trade.	28:37
Announcer	If you have any comments or questions,	28:40
	for Professor Samuelson address them to	28:41
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	28:44
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611.	28:45

Item Info

Title:

Tape 101 - International trade for a rich country

Date:

1972

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Search Collection Guides

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0099
ref2337_7gs
samuelsonpaul
duke:325122
pstau001099
ark:/87924/r4nz8162q
96218697-63a4-4891-99bc-e909e4dd6cbd

Permalink:

https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r4nz8162q

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Tape 101 - International trade for a rich country

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