Tape 112 - Economic Outlook for 1973

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Clark	Hello, this is William Clark,	0:02
	of the Chicago Tribune, welcoming you,	0:03
	once again, on behalf of Instructional Dynamics	0:05
	to another visit with the eminent economist	0:08
	professor Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago.	0:10
	We're recording this interview on November 29, 1972.	0:14
	And Dr. Friedman, your friends at Instructional Dynamics	0:19
	have asked that you devote your remarks today	0:23
	to talking about what things are going to be like in 1973.	0:26
Friedman	Well that's certainly a request	0:31
	that's natural at this time of the year	0:34
	as December approaches, and we have been having	0:36
	a spate of such forecasts from other groups.	0:39
	One of the interesting things about this	0:44
	particular year's forecasts is that they are	0:46
	extraordinarily homogeneous.	0:48
	Everybody is saying exactly the same thing:	0:51
	that 1973 is going to be a continuation of 1972,	0:53
	that it's gonna be an extremely good year,	0:58
	that output will be rising at the rate	1:01
	of about five and a half, 6%,	1:04
	that prices will be raising at the rate	1:08
	of maybe 3% so the total GNP will be rising	1:10
	at the rate of about 9%.	1:13
	That's not only the consensus, it's the forecast.	1:16
	Everybody is saying exactly the same thing.	1:20
	Now the interesting question is to ask,	1:23
	"What underlies this forecast?	1:25
	What's the basis for it?"	1:28
	And as you study the various bases,	1:31
	it's very hard to see a great deal	1:33
	underlying that forecast outside of inertia.	1:35
	The economy expanded in 1971.	1:38
	It has been expanding in 1972,	1:42
	and it's more or less a expectation	1:45
	of a continued expansion in '73	1:47
	that underlies the forecast.	1:51
	If you look further beyond that,	1:52
	the fiscalists have been stressing	1:55
	the fact that there will be	1:58
	a fairly substantial deficit in 1973.	1:59
	However, what matters from that point of view	2:04
	is really not accepting, entirely,	2:08
	their own conclusion, their own approach.	2:10
	It's not the size of the deficit	2:13
	but its relation to the deficit of 1972.	2:15
	And while the deficit in '73 will	2:19
	certainly be large, and maybe somewhat larger	2:21
	than in '72, it's by no means clear that it will be.	2:24
	That partly depends on what success	2:27
	President Nixon has in trimming down	2:30
	the budget according to his	2:33
	very well-publicized desire to do so.	2:35
	[chuckle]	2:37
Clark	Yeah.	2:37
Friedman	The monetarists, on the other hand,	2:38
	point to the fact that if you take	2:40
	year-by-year changes in quantity of money,	2:42
	they have been of the order of 6%	2:47
	and, therefore, the narrow money supply.	2:51
	And the Fed has expressed the view	2:54
	that it desires to keep it at 6%.	2:56
	And this is, indeed, a relevant basis	2:58
	for supposing that if you have money	3:02
	increasing at around 6% per year,	3:06
	the nominal GNP, or national income,	3:09
	will increase something at the rate of 8 to 9%	3:13
	since 2 to 3% increase in velocity	3:16
	is not abnormal for this stage of an expansion.	3:20
	Velocity of M one has been fairly stable.	3:24
	I'm sorry, velocity of M one has been rising	3:28
	in general over the post-war period,	3:32
	but in addition, it tends to rise more	3:34
	during a cyclical expansion and less	3:37
	during a contraction.	3:39
	If you look at M two, it has been going up	3:40
	recently at the rate of 8%, and earlier	3:43
	than that at the rate of about 9% per year.	3:45
	The velocity of M two has been highly stable.	3:48
	It has shown much less fluctuation	3:51
	in the last 10 years than the velocity of M one.	3:53
	And so that, too, is consistent	3:56
	with the GNP rate of growth prediction of 9%.	3:58
	Well I've been describing, essentially,	4:02
	what I think to be the background	4:04
	of the various current forecasts.	4:05
	Whenever you see everybody combined	4:09
	together and come out with the same entry,	4:11
	you have to be suspicious.	4:13
	[chuckle]	4:15
Friedman	And as I see it, the suspicion,	4:16
	we have to recognize that there are	4:19
	really three possible scenarios for next year.	4:22
	Scenario number one is this consensus	4:26
	typical forecast, and I do not believe	4:29
	that you can rule it out.	4:32
	Indeed, I have to confess that I think	4:34
	it is the most likely of any one	4:36
	of the three scenarios.	4:38
	Although I would not say it's likely	4:40
	that I believe it's high as most	4:41
	of the other people who have been talking about the economy.	4:44
	It is, in my opinion, a sensible forecast	4:48
	because of what I've been saying	4:51
	about the monetary developments.	4:52
	If, indeed, the Fed sticks to its guns	4:55
	and does what it says-- more or less	4:58
	it said it's going to do, which is	5:00
	about 6% per year, well then the GNP	5:03
	increase oughtta be about the same	5:09
	as people have been saying: somewhere around 9% per year.	5:10
	However, I would differ from the consensus forecast	5:14
	in the predictions of inflation under those circumstances.	5:17
	Let's suppose that that develops with GNP.	5:21
	Then I expect a higher level of inflation	5:23
	than most people have been expecting.	5:26
	I said in the middle of the year, I think,	5:28
	sometime I've forgotten the exact date	5:32
	May or June, in a Newsweek column	5:34
	that I thought the tapering off	5:36
	of inflation had come to an end.	5:38
	And then from here on out, if anything,	5:40
	we were heading for a higher rate of inflation.	5:42
	Certainly the price statistics	5:45
	that have come out since that day	5:47
	have been entirely consistent with that.	5:49
	If you look at those statistics,	5:52
	they show certainly no further deceleration of inflation.	5:53
	And certainly, if you look at the cost	5:59
	of living statistics, they show some acceleration.	6:01
Clark	Yes.	6:04
Friedman	Now, of course, everybody goes	6:04
	around and says, "Oh, well. But that's just food prices."	6:06
	But, you know, that's not a correct answer.	6:10
	I have emphasized in the past that the effect	6:15
	of wage and price controls, insofar as they	6:17
	have any effects at all, are to shift demand	6:20
	not to reduce it.	6:23
	Given the total aggregate amount of demand,	6:25
	if it's not allowed to come out	6:27
	in one place, it'll come out in someplace else.	6:28
	So you cannot suppose that the behavior	6:31
	of food prices is independent of the downward pressure.	6:33
	And I know that prices-- indeed,	6:37
	I think if you go back and look	6:39
	at the behavior of food prices	6:40
	versus other prices, you will see	6:42
	that there is a curious coincidence	6:45
	between the imposition of the freeze in wage price control.	6:46
	And food price is becoming the culprit	6:51
	for the general rise in prices.	6:56
	Well to go back to the main picture,	6:58
	I think, as I've said on earlier tapes,	7:01
	6% per year was a money ride.	7:04
	And M one was consistent in 1971	7:08
	with the tapering off of inflation,	7:14
	but it is not consistent with a long	7:15
	period continued 3% per year rate of rise in prices.	7:18
	And the long period will start to show up in 1973.	7:23
	And, therefore, I would expect	7:30
	that if the consensus forecast	7:32
	about GNP does come out to be true,	7:33
	a larger part of it will take the form	7:37
	of prices and a smaller part of it	7:39
	will take the form of output	7:40
	than has been widely anticipated.	7:42
	Now what are the other scenarios?	7:45
	Scenario number one, which as of four months	7:47
	ago, I would have said was overwhelmingly	7:51
	the most likely, would be a much more rapid	7:54
	rate of rise in GNP than the consensus forecast.	7:58
	Four months ago, the Fed was increasing	8:01
	the narrow money supply at the rate	8:04
	of something like seven to 8%.	8:06
	It was increasing the broader	8:09
	money supply at a rate of over 10%.	8:10
	Those were rates which, if they had	8:13
	been continued, would've been certain	8:15
	to accelerate inflation in a much more dramatic	8:17
	and substantial sense than I have just indicated	8:21
	for the consensus forecast.	8:24
	However, three to four months ago,	8:27
	the Fed made a drastic change.	8:32
	And for the past three months,	8:33
	the rate of growth of M one has been	8:35
	about 4% and of M two has been 8%.	8:37
	And, therefore, that's what introduces	8:41
	the third possible scenario, which is	8:44
	of a mini recession in the last half	8:46
	of '73 and the first half of '74.	8:48
Clark	Hmm.	8:52
Friedman	Now if you listen	8:52
	to most forecasters talk about it,	8:54
	they would say that's a pessimistic forecast.	8:55
Clark	The third scenario?	8:58
Friedman	That's right.	9:00
	They would regard the consensus	9:01
	forecast as an optimistic one, and maybe	9:03
	even the accelerating of inflation is an optimistic one.	9:07
	But from my point of view, the best	9:10
	of those three outcomes would be the third scenario.	9:12
Clark	Why is that?	9:15
Friedman	That's an optimist because it's the only way	9:16
	in which you are gonna prevent inflation	9:18
	from resuming its upward path.	9:20
	If we are serious about wanting to get	9:22
	inflation down to 2% a year or less,	9:25
	we cannot do so at present rate--	9:28
	well, I've gotta stop that.	9:31
	We cannot do so at rates of monetary	9:33
	expansion measured year to year.	9:35
	Let's say a 6% rate for M one,	9:39
	a 9, 10% rate for M two.	9:42
	I halted before because I was starting	9:45
	to say, "We cannot do so at present	9:48
	rates of monetary expansion," but that depends	9:50
	on whether you measure present breaks	9:52
	over the past three months or over the past year.	9:54
	We cannot do so at rates of monetary	9:57
	expansion that have prevailed over the past year.	9:59
	We can do so at rates of monetary	10:02
	expansion that have prevailed over the past three months.	10:04
	I would like to see the Fed continue	10:08
	the rates of monetary expansion	10:10
	that have prevailed over the past three months.	10:12
	If it did so, that would produce	10:14
	a mini recession in the last half of '73	10:17
	which would continue, presumably, onto the first half.	10:21
	And that would be the best thing in the world	10:24
	because that would provide a little bit more force	10:26
	to the anti-inflation movement.	10:30
	After all, we had something like nine months	10:32
	of really tight money, in the sense	10:36
	of low monetary expansion, in 1969.	10:39
	And we've been living on that capital ever since.	10:42
	How long can you live on nine months?	10:44
	We need to have that capital reinforced.	10:46
	Well, as I say, that third scenario	10:50
	as of three or four months ago	10:54
	I would have given it a very, very low probability.	10:55
	But as of now, I am inclined to take it more seriously.	10:58
	I am inclined to take it more seriously	11:02
	for two very different and, indeed,	11:04
	almost contradictory reasons.	11:06
	The first is the past history of the Fed.	11:09
	Every time in the past when the Fed	11:13
	has moved in the direction of tightening up,	11:16
	it had tended to go too far.	11:19
	The whole record of the Fed has been	11:21
	one of swinging too far in whichever direction it's moved.	11:23
	Well if that pattern were to continue,	11:28
	then the third scenario would certainly develop.	11:30
	And, indeed, it might develop in even a more	11:35
	dramatic form than I have suggested.	11:37
	Now the other reason for believing	11:41
	this is possible that I say is	11:42
	almost the reverse, almost contradictory	11:44
	is that in the past year, the Fed	11:47
	has changed its mode of operation:	11:50
	its acceptance of RPD, reserved	11:55
	behind private deposits as a intermediate	11:58
	target of monetary policy, its far	12:04
	greater emphasis on monetary aggregates	12:08
	in its targets and its stated objective,	12:10
	and an emphasis that seems much realer	12:17
	this time than it has before, much less	12:19
	simply a verbal acceptance much more of a real acceptance,	12:22
	offers the hope that they have really,	12:28
	for the first time, gone onto the right path	12:30
	and have gotten control of what they're controlling.	12:33
	Now given that, why might they continue a 4% rate?	12:36
	Because they are just as aware	12:41
	as I am that the rates that have prevailed	12:43
	over the past year, the 6 and 10 or 12% rates,	12:47
	are not consistent with a 2% inflation.	12:51
	That's no mystery to them.	12:54
	I'm not telling them anything.	12:55
	[chuckle]	12:56
Friedman	At any rate, if I'm telling them	12:58
	anything, they've heard it from me already.	13:00
	You don't need to have a retell.	13:01
	And consequently, it is not at all	13:05
	impossible that that is their objective, as well.	13:08
	That is to say that they are aware	13:12
	that this is the only way to get the economy under control.	13:16
	Now people will say, "But my God!	13:20
	The administration wouldn't like that,	13:22
	even a mini recession.	13:24
	Are you sure?"	13:25
	Put yourself in the position of the administration,	13:27
	and take a long view.	13:29
	Don't look for six months, but look for four years.	13:30
	And ask yourself, where do you wanna be in '76?	13:33
	Do you want in '76 to be in a depression?	13:36
	In a recession?	13:40
	Or do you want in '76 to be in a situation	13:40
	where inflation is accelerating?	13:44
	What choices do you have?	13:46
	If you look at the time's [inaudible] pattern.	13:48
	'73 is the world's best year-- from a political	13:51
	point of view is the best year	13:55
	to add another inflationary counter irritant.	13:56
	[Laughter]	14:04
Friedman	I wanna say	14:05
	anti-inflationary--	14:05
Clark	I see.
Friedman	Measures.	14:07
	After all, you know, the dating	14:08
	is not too bad from the past four years.	14:09
	'69 was a best year, wasn't it?	14:11
	And everybody criticized Mr. Nixon	14:13
	for taking a recession in 1970.	14:17
	But suppose Mr. Nixon had insisted	14:22
	and suppose the Fed had followed	14:25
	his insistence, which is a big if.	14:26
	But suppose they had done it.	14:30
	Suppose instead of the tight money	14:32
	in '69 you had had a rapid increase	14:33
	in the quantity of money.	14:36
	What would have happened?	14:37
	The inflation would have continued to accelerate.	14:39
	You would have been forced a year or two	14:42
	later to have taken very tight measures to try to hold it.	14:44
	You would have run into the '72 election	14:47
	in an economy that was severely recessed or depressed.	14:51
	By taking a recession in 1970,	14:56
	it was perfectly possible for Mr. Nixon	14:58
	to be coming out of it by '72,	15:00
	to be having unemployment going down,	15:02
	and at the same time inflation tapering off.	15:04
	Well now, look ahead at the four year political timetable.	15:06
	When are you gonna have a better opportunity	15:10
	than in 1973 to take a minor recession?	15:12
	Let me emphasize this is all my conjecture.	15:20
	I have no inside word on this.	15:24
	I have not talked to anybody at the White House about it.	15:25
	I am aware on from many sources	15:29
	that what I've described is the pattern for 1968 to '72.	15:33
	That's not entirely a figment of my imagination.	15:39
	I'm sure of that.	15:42
	But I have talked to no one or checked	15:43
	with no one about the '72 to '76.	15:44
	But I think one oughtta proceed	15:48
	on the assumption that you're dealing	15:49
	with intelligent people who know	15:51
	about as much as we do about these patterns.	15:52
	And I think if you analyze that,	15:55
	it becomes perfectly clear that	15:58
	from the administration's point of view,	16:00
	they would not be adverse to this kind of development.	16:02
	Second, there is an independence	16:05
	between the Treasury and the-- I'm sorry,	16:09
	between the Fed and the administration.	16:12
	That independence is very far, indeed, from complete.	16:14
	There is no doubt that on a basic,	16:17
	really important thing, the administration	16:19
	will ultimately have its way.	16:21
	But a Fed can, for a time, move	16:24
	very much against the administration's will.	16:26
	It has in the past.	16:29
	I haven't the slightest doubt that Mr. Burns	16:32
	and the rest of his colony would not depart	16:36
	from what they seriously thought	16:40
	to be the right policy simply in order	16:42
	to be nice to Mr. Nixon.	16:45
	So I'm not sure it matters what the administration	16:49
	believes, but even so, I'm saying I think	16:51
	the interests are in common.	16:53
	And that's the second reason why I would	16:55
	put some weight on this third alternative.	17:00
	Under this third alternative, what might you see?	17:03
	Under this strong third alternative,	17:07
	you would see a peaking out of the rate	17:09
	of growth, of GNP, probably in the first	17:11
	quarter of next year, maybe in the second quarter.	17:14
	By the present monetary pattern,	17:18
	if you take that and stress only that	17:21
	present monetary pattern and assume	17:23
	that the rate of growth of 4% is	17:25
	gonna be continued, then you would see	17:27
	the peaking out in the first quarter	17:29
	with a slightly lower rate of growth in the second quarter.	17:31
	It doesn't mean that you would have	17:34
	a very low rate of growth.	17:36
	It doesn't mean that output would not continue to expand.	17:37
	But instead of output growing at 6%	17:40
	it would be growing at 4%.	17:42
	Instead of GNP growing at maybe 9%	17:44
	per year would be growing maybe at 8%	17:49
	per year or 7% per year.	17:51
	That is it's a pattern that I envisage	17:53
	in the case of this third alternative	17:56
	is sorta something like the pattern	17:58
	that we had in '67, '68.	18:00
	We're in the first part of '67,	18:08
	the mini recession of '66, '67.	18:09
	You had a very slight dampening down,	18:12
	but no absolute declines.	18:14
	Well, I think maybe you did have an absolute decline	18:18
	for one quarter at that time, I think, in GNP.	18:20
Clark	I think that's right.	18:22
Friedman	But I would envisage	18:25
	something even milder than that	18:26
	because I may say that the turnaround	18:28
	on monetary growth when I'm now	18:29
	talking about is a much smaller	18:31
	turnaround than you had at that time.	18:34
	At that time monetary growth was brought down	18:36
	to zero for something like six months.	18:38
	What I'm talking about now is bringing	18:40
	monetary growth down from something	18:42
	like about seven or 8% down to something like 4%.	18:44
	Now all of this may not occur.	18:50
	These three, four months changes	18:53
	in monetary growth cannot by themselves be important.	18:56
	If tomorrow you were to return	19:00
	to a seven or 8% monetary growth,	19:02
	you could wipe out this three month	19:04
	interlude as an erratic observation.	19:05
	So everything depends on what happens	19:08
	from now on with respect to monetary growth.	19:11
	But to summarize, then, I think	19:13
	that there are three scenarios	19:15
	that are possible or not.	19:17
	One, that probably the most likely	19:18
	of those is the consensus forecast	19:21
	of something like a 9%-- I'm just pulling that number out.	19:24
	I haven't made detailed numerical calculations.	19:30
	But of a continued expansion of an expansion	19:33
	that is somewhat more rapid-rate,	19:36
	but with somewhat more of improving prices	19:38
	and less of an output than people expect.	19:41
	I think the second most likely alternative	19:43
	at the moment is what I've called the third scenario:	19:46
	a mini recession in 1973 starting somewhere	19:49
	in the second or the third quarter	19:52
	and produced by a continued slow rate	19:54
	of monetary growth over that period.	19:56
	The third possible scenario goes	19:59
	to the other extreme: that the Fed,	20:01
	being frightened with what it's doing	20:03
	and afraid to continue it too much,	20:04
	moves over to the other side and produces an expansion.	20:06
	If you wanna know which of those	20:10
	is the most likely, I think you should ask	20:11
	yourself the following question.	20:13
	If you were sitting in the seats	20:15
	of the Federal Reserve, which alternative	20:16
	would bother you more-- which mistake	20:19
	would you regret the more: a mistake	20:21
	which caused more recession that was necessary	20:24
	but caused a slowing down of inflation	20:27
	and prevented a resumption of inflation,	20:30
	or a mistake which caused too much inflation?	20:32
	The fascinating thing about these	20:36
	economic matters is that you almost	20:38
	invariably get the thing that worries you less.	20:40
	This is a long-term history.	20:44
	In 1929 people were much more worried,	20:46
	still, about inflation than they were about depression.	20:49
	They were worried about inflation	20:52
	'cause you were, after all, only eight	20:54
	years away from World War I inflation,	20:55
	particularly the post-World War I inflation	20:59
	in which prices rose by a third in the course of two years,	21:01
	and as a result you got a recession, depression.	21:06
	In the post-war period we have been consistently	21:10
	worried much more about recession	21:12
	than we have been about inflation.	21:14
	Therefore, we've gotten inflation.	21:15
	It's not a very strange thing.	21:17
	If you're walking down the street	21:19
	and you're worrying that you might stumble	21:20
	over a rock, you're more likely to hit	21:22
	your head on a branch overhead, I mean.	21:24
	Then if you've got the opposite	21:26
	fears, then that's the way it is here.	21:27
	So I think if you wanna know which way	21:29
	the Fed if it errs, and there's no way of avoiding	21:31
	some measure of error-- if you wanna know	21:37
	which way it's likely to err,	21:39
	try to answer that question for yourself.	21:40
Clark	Milton, I wonder if I could persuade	21:44
	you to be like the weatherman who says	21:45
	there's a 10% chance of precipitation	21:46
	and assign percentages of likelihood	21:49
	to these three scenarios.	21:51
Friedman	Well I would say the consensus	21:52
	scenario probably has a likelihood of something like 60%.	21:54
	The mini recession scenario, something like 30%.	21:58
	And the movement into unduly rapid	22:02
	inflation something like 10%.	22:06
Clark	That's very interesting.	22:08
	And what does all this mean as far	22:09
	as interest rates are concerned?	22:11
Friedman	Well what happens to interest	22:12
	rates depends critically on these three scenarios.	22:14
	If the consensus scenario develops,	22:17
	short-term interest rates will continue	22:21
	to rise and long-term interest rates	22:23
	will start to rise because as inflation	22:25
	starts resuming, even if it's only a moderate	22:28
	acceleration, even if it only goes	22:31
	from 3% to three and a half or 4%,	22:33
	that will reawaken fears of inflation,	22:36
	cause investors and both borrowers	22:38
	and lenders to assign a higher	22:41
	premium for inflation protection	22:45
	and thus raise interest rates.	22:48
	If the scenario involving a possible	22:50
	mini recession were to eventually--	22:54
	then short-term interest rates	22:57
	might, well, continue to rise,	22:59
	but they would rise very, very modestly.	23:01
	Indeed, I interpret the fact that short-rate	23:03
	interest rates have risen so little	23:07
	in the past three months to an indirect	23:08
	reaction to the beginning of such a policy.	23:10
	And in that case, it is highly likely that long-term	23:14
	interest rates would stay horizontal	23:18
	and would not show much of a rise next year.	23:20
	Obviously on the third scenario	23:22
	of a resumption of a rapid acceleration	23:24
	of inflation and inflation going up	23:27
	to four, four and a half, 5% by the end	23:29
	of 1973, then both short- and long-term	23:31
	interest rates will rise, and rise substantially.	23:35
Clark	Thank you, professor Friedman.	23:39
	May I remind you subscribers that if you	23:40
	would like to suggest subjects	23:42
	for Dr. Friedman to talk about or ask	23:44
	questions of him, you may do so	23:46
	by writing to Instructional Dynamics	23:48
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, six oh six one one.	23:51
	We'll be talking again with professor Milton Friedman	23:57
	of the University of Chicago in another couple of weeks.	23:59
	[silence]	24:02

Item Info

Title:

Tape 112 - Economic Outlook for 1973

Date:

November 29, 1972

Contributor:

Friedman, Milton, 1912-2006

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Milton Friedman

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0277
ref2694_2ai
samuelsonpaul
duke:325299
pstau001276
ark:/87924/r4m61c61t
11f5a840-0719-4eef-ada8-d2f48cd5e0b2

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Tape 112 - Economic Outlook for 1973

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