Tape 24 - Response to subscribers

Download
- Rights
- Limited Re-Use
  CC BY-NC 4.0
  More Rights Info
- Files (1)
- MP3
- Please be patient with media downloads. They are often large files.
Share

Embed Code
<iframe src='//idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r4ks6jm64?embed=true' height='125px' width='100%' frameborder='0' marginwidth='0' marginheight='0' scrolling='no' allowfullscreen></iframe>
Permalink

https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r4ks6jm64
Skip to Item Info

Loading the media player...

Files for this Item

Transcript

Transcripts may contain inaccuracies.

-	Hello again, and welcome to this week's commentary	0:02
	on the current economic scene with Dr. Paul Samuelson,	0:04
	professor of economics at the Massachusetts	0:08
	Institute of Technology.	0:10
	This weekly series is produced and recorded	0:12
	by Instructional Dynamics Incorporated of Chicago.	0:14
	Professor Samuelson, one of our readers	0:18
	or subscribers, has sent in the following question:	0:20
	"We enjoy your economic commentaries very much,	0:23
	"and we derive much benefit from them.	0:25
	"We wonder, though, whether they would	0:28
	"not be even more valuable to your subscribers	0:30
	"if you could make them just a little more controversial.	0:32
	"What about it?"	0:35
-	I now feel as if I have heard everything.	0:36
	Just imagine a jury accusing an economist	0:39
	of not being sufficiently quarrelsome.	0:42
	However, joking aside, I suppose	0:46
	it is a matter of taste and style	0:48
	as to just how much of a polemical tone	0:50
	one introduces into any current discussion.	0:53
	There are always two schools of thought	0:55
	in these matters.	0:57
	One says to debate is to disagree and to find fault.	0:59
	Another school hold to debate is to analyze.	1:03
	When I can, I try to stick with the second school,	1:09
	but being only human, I sometimes do slip in	1:12
	to the ranks of the other,	1:15
	and who is to say that one is occasionally	1:18
	not more effective by being selectively polemical?	1:20
	To be specific, let's consider current differences	1:26
	in opinion that seem to divide the economics fraternity	1:29
	in America at this time.	1:34
	We have a new and increasingly	1:37
	important school of monetarists.	1:42
	The monetarists have their fountainhead,	1:45
	you might say, at the University of Chicago,	1:49
	but they have a beachhead at the Federal Reserve Bank	1:51
	of St. Louis, at the University of California	1:54
	at Los Angeles, at the University of Virginia,	1:58
	and, indeed, in Washington itself,	2:01
	there is a beachhead in the Joint Economic Committee.	2:05
	Now how have things been going as	2:10
	between the monetarist school and the more conventional	2:12
	group of modern economists?	2:18
	I hesitate to call the non-monetarists fiscalists,	2:20
	because I don't think it's an issue	2:26
	between whether fiscal policy is all-important	2:27
	or whether monetary policy is all-important.	2:30
	The proper issue in my viewpoint is the following:	2:33
	Is money, by itself, broadly speaking enough,	2:37
	or are other elements such as the strength	2:41
	of investment demand, such as the state	2:46
	of the fiscal budget also important?	2:49
	Well now, not trying to be controversial,	2:53
	let me survey the difference of opinion	2:59
	and how they are going.	3:04
	One of the bank economists who is very high	3:06
	on the monetarist methods called me up recently,	3:09
	and he asked me, isn't it the case	3:13
	that 1968 has been a crucial test	3:16
	between the two competing theories?	3:20
	And hasn't the actual failure of the economy	3:24
	to slow down in the last half of 1968,	3:29
	and as I think, in the first quarter of 1969,	3:34
	hasn't that been testimony that, after all,	3:39
	the quantitative monetarists are correct?	3:43
	Since he asked me, I told him.	3:48
	And my answer was no.	3:50
	I don't think that 1968 gas been a crucial experiment.	3:52
	It is true that most GNP model builders had	3:56
	at mid-year predicted lower rates of growth	4:00
	than had actually materialized.	4:03
	I may add myself to those numbers.	4:05
	I didn't have a specific complicated model,	4:08
	but I did think there would be a greater slowdown	4:12
	than did materialize.	4:16
	But I don't think that that fact of greater strength proves	4:18
	that an eclectic theory was wrong.	4:22
	Let me give some reasons for that view.	4:25
	First, suppose we review the year 1968	4:29
	from the viewpoint of a simple-minded monetarist.	4:33
	Suppose he is armed with the formula	4:37
	that the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank has developed	4:39
	and which you've heard about on some of these tapes.	4:42
	According to this formula, in order to predict	4:46
	what is going to happen to GNP,	4:49
	and to do it in the best way that is possible,	4:51
	you must know the rate of growth of the money supply	4:55
	for the present quarter, the last quarter,	4:58
	and for four quarters in all.	5:02
	You can modify your forecast slightly	5:05
	by knowing government expenditure,	5:07
	but tax rate information is absolutely worthless	5:10
	to you, and the formula, if you try to put tax changes	5:13
	into it, spits out an answer of zero effects	5:17
	from tax changes.	5:21
	Now, suppose we knew this formula	5:23
	at the beginning of the year.	5:26
	We didn't, because it wasn't published	5:28
	until November of 1967, but we can job backwards	5:29
	and see how it would have done.	5:33
	And I've been helped in this audit,	5:35
	this post-mortem, by a recent publication	5:38
	by the Federal Reserve of St. Louis itself.	5:41
	And suppose that we're trying to predict	5:45
	what would have happened in 1968 calender year.	5:48
	That means the four quarters after the last quarter	5:54
	of 1967, and suppose for the sake of the experiment	5:57
	that we actually knew at the beginning of 1968	6:02
	what we could not have known, namely,	6:05
	the exactly correct figures for the money supply	6:08
	in each of the actual four quarters for 1969.	6:11
	And suppose then upon this basis	6:16
	we had predicted where the GNP would be	6:18
	at the end of 1968.	6:22
	If I said 1969 a moment ago, I meant 1968.	6:26
	All of these tests are on the year	6:30
	that has just passed.	6:32
	As I understand it from reading the Federal Reserve,	6:36
	the Federal Reserve forecast would have been in error.	6:40
	It would have been too low.	6:45
	Indeed, like a simple-minded fiscalist,	6:48
	a simple-minded monetarist would have been too low.	6:52
	And suppose then that the forecast	6:55
	of a simple minded fiscalist had turned out to be true.	6:59
	Suppose, for example, the third quarter increase	7:03
	in money GNP last September had turned	7:06
	out to be only 12 billion.	7:10
	And suppose the fourth quarter increase last December	7:13
	had turned out to be only 10 billion,	7:18
	pretty much in line with what had been forecast	7:20
	by the middle of year fast GNP models.	7:23
	Then, if I understand what the Federal Reserve Bank	7:28
	of St. Louis has been saying, the final answer	7:30
	as then given would have been more nearly	7:34
	in accordance with the predicted value	7:37
	from their formula.	7:40
	Now, if I were a polemicist I would make a lot	7:42
	of this, but I actually don't, because I don't	7:44
	think that anybody at mid year	7:47
	who was a sophisticated monetarist would have used the	7:49
	end of the year data.	7:54
	And so as I fair-mindedly score what has been going on,	7:57
	I think qualitatively the monetarists have prepared	8:01
	their own opinion and public opinion,	8:07
	and the opinion of more eclectic economists like myself,	8:09
	more for what was actually happening	8:13
	by playing down the weakness in the economy.	8:16
	Now, mind you, nobody had told us exactly	8:21
	what the strength in the economy was due to.	8:24
	It may have been due to increases	8:30
	in the money supply at this date or that date,	8:33
	but as I've reported on this tape earlier,	8:36
	I assure you that playing that game,	8:38
	that kind of a numbers game in which you try fair-mindedly,	8:41
	just from the money supply, to make good forecasts	8:45
	of the GNP will lose you your money at Las Vegas	8:48
	and will lose you your money	8:51
	at the National Industrial Conference Board sweepstakes,	8:52
	just as easily as almost any other method.	8:55
	And I will remind listeners to this tape	8:59
	that I have collected from monetarists	9:02
	the most astounding spread of actual forecasts	9:05
	for the present time and for the past time.	9:10
	So, if anyone were naive enough to think	9:14
	that a crucial experiment in a complicated field	9:17
	like economics were possible between two	9:22
	such divergent viewpoints, he would	9:26
	at the very least have to have a recorded case	9:29
	where a fair, documented account of all the forecasts made	9:33
	with one method was contrasted	9:39
	with all the forecasts made by the other method,	9:41
	and then it turned out that one of the methods agreed	9:44
	among itself and agreed with the subsequent facts,	9:48
	and the other method agreed among itself	9:51
	but disagreed with the subsequent facts.	9:54
	That I must report to you, in all seriousness,	9:57
	and not at all in a polemical vein,	9:59
	is not the case.	10:03
	The monetarist forecasts that I have	10:04
	in my files are for an 11 billion increase	10:06
	in the first quarter of this year	10:10
	from one of the best of the monetarists	10:12
	and also one of the most vocal,	10:14
	and I have from some fiscalists forecasts	10:17
	that are a low as that, but very few	10:23
	from such people, and the actual facts	10:25
	which we do not yet know, I am convinced,	10:30
	will be considerably higher than that.	10:32
	Now it is true that there are some monetarists	10:35
	who have a higher figure for the first quarter	10:38
	but now you must catch your rabbit	10:41
	before you can make the stew.	10:44
	You much catch the right monetarist	10:46
	and I will say this,	10:48
	that if you can catch the right forecaster	10:51
	you don't need fiscalism, monetarism,	10:53
	or anything else.	10:55
	All you need is a man who is clairvoyant	10:56
	and he will give you the best answers.	11:00
	Now, let me, I will return	11:04
	if time permits later to the exact expectations	11:07
	of a reasonable eclectic model	11:13
	and I will compare them with	11:15
	what I would think would be reasonable expecations	11:17
	from a monetarist model.	11:21
	But I don't think we should try to make bricks without straw	11:22
	and so I suggest that right now	11:25
	we shift gears and we begin to talk	11:27
	about the current situation.	11:29
	Let's bring some facts into the picture.	11:31
	Where do we stand a little bit	11:35
	after the middle of April?	11:38
	First, as I am talking we do not yet have	11:41
	even the first official estimates of the first quarter	11:45
	of the year, so I must guess on those,	11:48
	and I will give you my best guesses.	11:52
	If I had to put down a single number,	11:55
	I suppose I would put down the number	11:57
	of a $17 billion increase in the money GNP,	11:59
	in comparison with the fourth quarter of last year.	12:04
	This is every bit as large an increase	12:08
	in the rate of growth of the money series	12:12
	as took place in the fourth quarter.	12:15
	I won't quarrel.	12:19
	Perhaps it will be a little bit less than that.	12:20
	Perhaps it will be a little bit greater than that.	12:23
	A few weeks ago I would have said a little bit less	12:26
	than this figure, but that was before	12:29
	I saw the February inventory figures,	12:32
	and I then had to bank on the January inventory figures,	12:35
	which were extremely modest.	12:41
	In fact, they were almost unbelievably modest.	12:42
	As it turns out, they were unbelievable,	12:45
	because now the Department of Commerce has revised	12:48
	those figures upward.	12:51
	They still are modest in January,	12:52
	but February is consderably above January.	12:55
	And so it seems to me that strength in final demand,	12:59
	which I mentioned in an earlier tape,	13:04
	will now be reinforced by some strength,	13:06
	not outstanding strength,	13:11
	but at least not weakness, in the rate	13:13
	of inventory accumulation.	13:15
	And as we all know, for short run purposes,	13:17
	knowledge of what's gonna happen	13:21
	in inventories can be very precious knowledge	13:22
	for the short run predictor.	13:25
	What about prices?	13:30
	I see no signs that the rate	13:32
	of price inflation is yet abating.	13:34
	We still are getting increases in copper prices,	13:38
	in metal prices, in administered prices,	13:41
	so that, although I am constantly	13:45
	on these tapes speaking of a better	13:48
	than 4% rate of price inflation,	13:51
	perhaps I should mend my ways	13:53
	and speak more accurately of a 4.5% and a 5% rate	13:56
	of price inflation.	14:00
	Now I am surprised by how short the viewpoint is	14:03
	of the marketplace and the financial commentators.	14:10
	It constantly amazes me,	14:14
	and I should not be amazed, because	14:16
	I've been watching them for many years,	14:17
	and I should now philosophically accept the reality,	14:19
	but I am so amazed that in one two week period	14:23
	everybody is talking about tight money.	14:26
	Then in another two week period	14:29
	they are talking about the end of tight money.	14:31
	Then a few weeks go by and again	14:35
	they are talking about tight money.	14:37
	The marketplace, if I may say so,	14:40
	overreacts to every bit of news.	14:43
	Let me illustrate.	14:47
	The bond market, during the month of March,	14:50
	and early in April, very first days in April,	14:54
	was actually improving in terms of the price of bonds.	14:58
	Interest yields were actually going down.	15:02
	Why?	15:05
	Well, one of the explanations given was	15:06
	that the Federal Reserve is a paper tiger.	15:08
	The Federal Reserve does not mean what is says.	15:12
	The Federal Reserve does not mean business.	15:14
	I believe it was on Thursday, April 3rd,	15:17
	when the Federal Reserve showed	15:20
	that it did mean business.	15:23
	It raised the discount rate,	15:24
	and what is perhaps more significant as a signal	15:27
	to the marketplace, since after all the discount rate	15:30
	was lagging behind the increase	15:33
	in the prime rate and market rates generally.	15:36
	What was more significant,	15:39
	the Federal Reserve increased reserve requirements.	15:40
	Then the market said for several days	15:43
	the Federal Reserve does mean business.	15:47
	We're going to have monetary restraint.	15:50
	The money supply is not going to grow	15:54
	as fast as it grew in 1967,	15:58
	or as it grew in 1968.	16:01
	The Fed does mean business.	16:03
	And indeed, for a day or two, bond prices fell,	16:06
	and bond yields hardened.	16:09
	But then the market decided	16:13
	it would work the other side of the street.	16:16
	The market said, well, if the Fed means business,	16:18
	and is fighting inflation, the Fed will succeed	16:21
	in its fight in inflation, and if inflation is controlled,	16:23
	then there's no reason for interest rates	16:29
	to be so high, and consequently,	16:30
	we saw for several days, again,	16:33
	a weakening, a lowering of long term interest yields.	16:37
	Now, what a jump, what a leap that was	16:47
	from the Fed has an intention to control inflation	16:51
	to the conclusion that the Fed has all	16:54
	but controlled inflation and so we might as well act	16:58
	as if it's controlled inflation	17:00
	and begin to buy bonds and assume	17:01
	that the money market is going to ease.	17:04
	It reminds me of the Gilbert	17:07
	and Sullivan play The Mikado.	17:10
	You remember in the play, someone is to be punished,	17:13
	and the executioner is told by the mikado	17:18
	to punish, to behead the guilty person,	17:22
	and the execution, without doing a thing,	17:26
	says since the word of the mikado is law,	17:28
	and he's all-powerful, then it is	17:31
	as if the thing has been done.	17:32
	If it is as if the thing has been done,	17:34
	it has been done, and how marvelous	17:36
	it was nobody had to take any actions whatsoever.	17:38
	Well, the Federal Reserve is not that kind of a mikado.	17:41
	It is not all-powerful.	17:44
	By setting its mind to controlling inflation	17:46
	it doesn't succeed instantaneously	17:49
	in controlling inflation.	17:50
	And so we must look for actual slowdowns	17:52
	in the rate of real growth of the economy	17:56
	before we can say that the Federal Reserve	17:58
	is getting anywhere in its fight.	18:01
	Now I believe that some of these slowdowns	18:04
	are on the way.	18:06
	Monetarists believe that some slowdowns are	18:08
	on the way.	18:11
	Eclectic economists believe the slowdowns are	18:13
	on the way, but we must see signs of them,	18:16
	and we must evaluate quantitatively those signs	18:21
	before we write the scenario of overkill	18:25
	and of recession.	18:28
	So let me count straws in the wind	18:30
	and go over some of the signs of what's happened	18:33
	in the economy.	18:36
	The unemployment rate, which had been 3.3%,	18:38
	a very low rate for the United States,	18:42
	for several months, three months,	18:44
	or was it four months, has risen by 1/10	18:46
	of 1% to 3.4%.	18:49
	Big deal.	18:52
	What kind of a significant sign of a slowdown is that?	18:53
	I would say, objectively, that as yet	18:59
	it says very little.	19:02
	Moreover, if I remember the figures correctly,	19:04
	the length of the working week actually increased	19:08
	in the last sample.	19:12
	So in the labor market itself, we have, at best,	19:13
	only the beginning of a slowdown.	19:19
	There is an old proverb, a journey	19:22
	of a thousand miles begins with one step.	19:25
	Well said, well told, but I would add	19:28
	that after you have taken one step,	19:32
	you have not gone a thousand miles,	19:34
	you've only gone one step.	19:35
	That is a prosaic fact of life.	19:37
	And so, in the labor market, we do not yet have	19:40
	any significant sign of easing.	19:44
	And make no mistake about it,	19:48
	all the indications are that the new administration,	19:50
	the Nixon Administration, has no hidden weapons	19:54
	by which it can go from a 4.5% rate	19:57
	of price inflation to, I will not say a 1% rate,	20:01
	or a 2% rate, or a 0% rate, but to a 3% rate,	20:05
	just by wishing it and without creating	20:10
	some significant slackness in the economy.	20:13
	So I take that particular straw in the wind,	20:16
	and I say we are at the beginning of the process at best.	20:20
	What about housing?	20:25
	We recently got some housing numbers,	20:27
	and the number of housing starts,	20:29
	for the month of March I guess it was, is down.	20:31
	It's down to just a little bit above a million	20:35
	and a half housing starts,	20:38
	which is down from the previous month,	20:39
	and which is down from the previous month.	20:42
	So here I would say, although one cannot	20:44
	from a few spring months discern	20:47
	with great confidence a strong trend,	20:51
	still here I would say we're beginning	20:54
	to see some signs that credit policy,	20:55
	that monetary restraint, is beginning	20:59
	to bite a little bit, and it is showing itself	21:02
	where a priori, and plausible reasoning,	21:05
	and historical experience tells us	21:08
	it ought to show itself in the construction area.	21:10
	So I believe that we're a little bit along the way,	21:15
	but again, this is still the very beginning	21:19
	of the process.	21:23
	I made a forecast in January	21:24
	at the institutional investors conference,	21:28
	that by the end of the year housing starts	21:31
	would be down considerably.	21:33
	It caused a great deal of consternation,	21:35
	I was later told, in that audience of 2,700 people.	21:38
	I suppose some of them were rushing	21:42
	to their brokers to get rid of their gypsum stocks,	21:44
	but it just seemed to me that	21:47
	that's the old Farmer's Almanac standard	21:48
	textbook explanation based upon having	21:52
	to control inflation primarily	21:57
	through the instrumentality	21:59
	of Federal Reserve monetary policy.	22:02
	Let me now turn to the budget.	22:05
	We have heard recently of the provisional Nixon budget.	22:08
	On the face of it, there is a cut	22:16
	from the Johnson numbers.	22:18
	There is a cut in the defense area	22:22
	of a little bit over of a billion dollars.	22:25
	And there's a cut in the welfare,	22:27
	civilian non-defense area,	22:30
	of a couple of billion dollars.	22:33
	I don't think it's profitable for me	22:36
	in a discussion like this to go	22:39
	into the numbers game of just	22:43
	which of the figures area likely to be phony,	22:45
	and which are likely to be genuine,	22:48
	which are important cuts,	22:50
	and which are unimportant cuts.	22:54
	I think that Mr. Nixon has given	22:57
	us a signal that he takes very seriously	23:00
	the inflationary problem, and his signal says	23:03
	he's going to do the best he can	23:06
	to control fiscal expenditures.	23:07
	Mr. Nixon is not, apparently, a monetarist.	23:11
	He does believe it makes a considerable difference	23:15
	how the fiscal position stands,	23:19
	both with respect to taxation	23:22
	and with respect to expenditures.	23:23
	And so, I will summarize the recent news	23:26
	in this regard simply in this way,	23:29
	that Mr. Nixon has promised us a slightly tighter budget	23:32
	than it was thought he would be able to contrive.	23:39
	Now events may falsify his estimates,	23:44
	and when I say events, I mean events in Vietnam.	23:48
	I mean events like the North Korean airplane incident	23:53
	which has taken place recently.	23:59
	Fiscal expenditures are not made in Washington.	24:03
	I repeat, fiscal expenditures	24:06
	of the United States are made in Moscow,	24:08
	are made in Peking, are made in Hanoi,	24:11
	are made in Seoul, and are made all around the globe.	24:16
	So this is a factor which we all must take into account.	24:20
	Mr. Nixon has restated his wish	24:27
	that the surtax be extended.	24:31
	And the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee,	24:36
	Wilbur Mills, whose good will is needed	24:40
	for the extension of that surtax,	24:43
	has said that he will put a great deal	24:45
	of pressure upon the Nixon Johnson budget	24:48
	to squeeze it even harder than has been squeezed	24:52
	in the official presidential estimates.	24:55
	And since Mr. Mills has a certain limited degree	25:00
	of unilateral power, he is a strong-minded man	25:03
	with a great deal of elbow force in the Congress,	25:07
	I take it that there will be considerable pressure.	25:11
	Now I'm not a political soothsayer,	25:16
	and I cannot tell you how much of	25:19
	this pressure will succeed.	25:22
	I think inevitably there will be some slippage	25:25
	between the numbers that Mr. Mills says	25:28
	he's satisfied with and what actually happens.	25:33
	But nevertheless this will not be a loose budget.	25:36
	It will be on the whole a tight budget.	25:38
	As a matter of fact, from the standpoint	25:40
	of a humanitarian, very much interested	25:43
	in the poor, and very much interested in the aged,	25:45
	the Nixon budget will appear as a reactionary budget,	25:49
	because Social Security wage taxes are to go up,	25:54
	and Social Security benefits are to go up,	25:59
	but they are not to go up as much	26:01
	as had been promised by President Johnson.	26:03
	And that is one of the ways that Mr. Nixon is getting	26:07
	his extra surplus.	26:11
	Now, in fairness I should say that,	26:13
	although Mr. Nixon appears to a humanitarian	26:16
	to be a reactionary, some of the most anguished voices	26:19
	that one hears in the land these days	26:22
	are the truly conservative Republicans	26:25
	who think that Mr. Nixon has compromised on every matter,	26:28
	and that he has turned out to be	26:32
	a wishy-washy, Tweedledum liberal.	26:34
	I think there is no help for that.	26:38
	Both are saying the same thing.	26:40
	Mr. Nixon, by and large, has taken the middle road.	26:42
	I would like to see him move a little bit	26:46
	to the left of that middle road,	26:48
	but speaking for myself I'm pleased	26:50
	that he isn't way off there in the right.	26:52
	He's moved very slowly in all matters.	26:54
	And since I come from a university campus,	26:57
	it happens at the moment to be a peaceful campus,	27:01
	I rather like a situation in which the people	27:04
	in control move very slowly.	27:07
	That's what the doctor prescribes	27:10
	in these particular days.	27:12
	Let me return to an analysis of the prudent man's outlook	27:18
	for business conditions in the United States	27:25
	for the rest of 1969.	27:27
	Without doubt, a most important factor is	27:30
	what is happening to the peace negotiations	27:33
	in Paris and elsewhere.	27:36
	Without doubt, a most important factor is	27:39
	what will happen in terms of deescalation	27:43
	of the war.	27:46
	If we begin to bring out tens of thousands,	27:47
	50,000 troops from Vietnam by the end of the year,	27:50
	that will make a significant difference.	27:56
	Having said that, I must say that the people	28:01
	who trade stocks from day to day	28:04
	in the market, have been extremely volatile	28:06
	is this matter.	28:09
	As with respect to the Federal Reserve,	28:11
	they are plunged from gloom one day	28:15
	into rosy optimism another.	28:18
	Almost nothing will happen out of Paris.	28:21
	Almost no announcement of any significance will be made,	28:24
	but suddenly the go-go performance fund-minded people	28:27
	in Wall Street will decide that we're	28:32
	in a peace rally of the stock market,	28:34
	and that peace is almost here.	28:38
	So I must depart from my role as a reporter	28:41
	and try to be an analyst and sage,	28:45
	and tell you what I think is happening.	28:48
	As I read between the lines,	28:51
	I think we're moving very slowly	28:53
	a little closer towards peace.	28:55
	I think it's very slow, but the most important signal	28:58
	to my mind is that it looks to me	29:03
	as if the new Nixon team has got the message	29:05
	that the country doesn't like the war,	29:09
	and that they are prepared to make some sacrifices	29:11
	of face in order to get out of the war.	29:16
	And this is in the Nixon style of moving slowly,	29:20
	but I think a little progress is being made,	29:23
	so I wouldn't go out and buy stocks	29:25
	on the basis of what's happening	29:28
	or sell sell stocks when the thing moves	29:30
	a little bit the other way,	29:33
	but in making my forecasts of the GNP	29:35
	for the last quarters of the year	29:39
	and into the next year, I think	29:40
	you should take into account the significant probability	29:42
	that some lessening of pressure	29:46
	on the balance of payments and on expenditures,	29:49
	onshore and offshore, may come from these movements,	29:53
	and for a analyst who keeps his eye	29:58
	on the middle vision vista, I think	30:03
	that is extremely important.	30:08
-	Thank you very much Professor Paul Samuelson of MIT.	30:11
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated welcomes	30:15
	your questions or comments.	30:17
	Write IDI, 166 East Superior Street, Chicago, 60611.	30:18

Item Info

Title:

Tape 24 - Response to subscribers

Date:

1969

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

Rights Note:

This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0024
ref2187_rdn
samuelsonpaul
duke:325047
pstau001024
ark:/87924/r4ks6jm64
6d9fad36-30a3-48b7-85cc-070b6070fd3a

Permalink:

https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r4ks6jm64

Sponsor:

Sponsor this Digital Collection

Tape 24 - Response to subscribers

Transcript

Item Info

Economists' Papers Archive

More Info & Options