Tape 20 - General topics

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Announcer	Hello and welcome	0:02
	to Professor Paul Samuelson's economic commentary	0:02
	for the week of March 24th.	0:06
	This series is produced and recorded	0:08
	by Instructional Dynamics Incorporated of Chicago.	0:10
	Professor Samuelson, what's on your mind today?	0:13
-	[Professor Samuelson] Well, many things are happening	0:16
	these days.	0:18
	The gold price situation settles down a little bit,	0:19
	but then there's an increase in the prime rate.	0:23
	So that the index of excitement on the economics' scene	0:26
	remains at a high and a soaring level.	0:32
	The increase in the prime rate was no surprise.	0:37
	The conditions of money were so tight in the money market	0:41
	that it was just a matter of time	0:46
	until the announcement was made.	0:48
	As a matter of fact, you all noticed the stock market	0:50
	took it very much in stride, almost relieved	0:53
	that the shoe which they had expected to drop had	0:56
	in fact finally dropped.	0:59
	To see why the prime rate had to go up,	1:02
	let me picture the situation of a typical, a large bank	1:07
	in one of our large cities.	1:14
	The president of the bank told his loan officers	1:16
	to go easy because they were losing money on every loan.	1:21
	They were paying 8 1/2% in the Euro-dollar market,	1:24
	and were getting only 7%.	1:30
	Now I realize that that's his way of reckoning it.	1:34
	We might take into account	1:39
	that a typical prime loan customer keeps	1:40
	a compensating balance of 20%.	1:45
	And therefore, when he pays the new 7 1/2% prime rate	1:48
	it's really more like 9% .	1:54
	So let's not shed crocodile tears that the bank is	1:57
	losing money out of hand.	2:01
	But still the prime rate was out of line	2:03
	witH the shortage of funds, and the pressure	2:05
	of supply and demand.	2:09
	I may say that the phenomenon that I'm speaking of is	2:11
	not confined to the large city banks.	2:14
	I was talking to a banker in a small Texas bank,	2:16
	and I said what are you getting for mortgages	2:20
	these days, and he said 8%.	2:22
	Well, I whistled because that may seem high	2:25
	to some people but I thought in Texas	2:28
	that's a pretty good rate.	2:31
	Well, it turns out that that rate is just being given	2:33
	to very good customers whom the bank wants to woo,	2:36
	and get into its orbit.	2:39
	And it'd be more like 10% rate for an ordinary customer	2:41
	who himself came in off the street	2:46
	and wanted to initiate the contract,	2:48
	and he'd be lucky at that to get it.	2:51
	I said what do you do with your money	2:53
	because in that part of the world	2:55
	things are not all that booming.	2:58
	And he said, well, we send it to the big Dallas banks,	3:01
	and we get on a very short term basis more than 8%.	3:03
	So the prime rate increase merely reflects	3:09
	that degree of tightness.	3:15
	Now what's still to come?	3:18
	In my opinion, the discount rate is going to go up.	3:21
	Maybe by the time you hear my voice it will have gone up	3:25
	because the discrepancy is going to be very large indeed.	3:28
	When I talked to that big city banker	3:32
	who was paying more than 8% on his loans	3:34
	in the Euro-dollar market, I said	3:38
	have you exhausted your privilege at the discount window?	3:40
	He said no. He says, as a matter of fact, he'd been	3:48
	at the regional federal reserve bank for lunch	3:50
	not too long ago, and he had the impression rather	3:53
	that they were inviting him to use that privilege more.	3:55
	I said well, why do you continue to borrow at 8%	4:00
	when you've got an unused privilege at, I guess, 5 1/2%?	4:04
	And he said, I just really don't know how solid	4:10
	that privilege is, and I feel that if I lean on it,	4:14
	that at some future time when I need emergency money	4:17
	very much, it just won't be available.	4:22
	So the hidden cost to me of using it is	4:25
	more than the stated discount rate of 5 1/2%.	4:27
	It shows that the discount rate in this country is	4:33
	not an effective rate, and there are some plans	4:35
	as many of you will know, for changing that	4:41
	and moving in the direction of a more genuine rate	4:45
	at which the banks have a true independent right to borrow,	4:48
	but we're still working on that structural change,	4:51
	and I kind of doubt that that structural change will	4:56
	come in a period of a peak of the highest amount of money.	5:00
	If the discount rate does rise, as I think likely,	5:06
	then I suppose the next possible thing to go up will be	5:11
	the Regulation Q ceiling rates.	5:16
	Those Regulation Q ceilings are bearing down	5:20
	very hard particularly on the commercial banks.	5:25
	And causing the runoffs of CD's which we've	5:29
	talked about a great deal.	5:32
	And I believe this is a purely calculated gambit	5:34
	by the Federal Reserve.	5:38
	It knows exactly what is happening.	5:39
	It's trying to put pressure.	5:41
	And when that pressure becomes unbearable	5:44
	in its opinion it will ease up.	5:47
	So don't be surprised if the Regulation Q ceilings do	5:49
	go up in the days or weeks or months ahead.	5:54
	And, of course, when that happens without any question	5:59
	the regulation ceiling rates that hold	6:03
	on the savings and loan associations,	6:07
	which has been part of our legal structure now since 1966.	6:09
	Those too will go up.	6:13
	I believe that it's consistent	6:17
	with the general philosophy of the Nixon administration	6:19
	to try to keep these administered rates	6:22
	from being too far out of line	6:26
	in comparison with the actual market rates.	6:28
	Nevertheless, it's a minority government,	6:32
	and they don't have the courage, I believe,	6:35
	to get rid of these instruments.	6:41
	I may say that I would not myself at this time	6:44
	abolish by the stroke of a pen these various regulations	6:48
	because we lack discriminating weapons in this area,	6:52
	and the Regulation Q rates, granted that they create	6:58
	a certain amount of distortion and some headaches.	7:03
	And do involve some compromise with notions	7:06
	of freedom in the market.	7:10
	Nevertheless, they do provide one extra weapon	7:11
	for selective pressure to alleviate the tightness	7:15
	of money as it affects the housing industry.	7:21
	It is the housing industry which historically has been	7:25
	most affected by tight money episodes.	7:28
	I have written, and I suppose it will be published	7:33
	in the months to come a survey of the problem	7:37
	of ceiling interest rates.	7:43
	And there I go into analysis of the history,	7:46
	and analysis of how they work.	7:50
	And spell out in some detail	7:51
	how you do get an extra weapon.	7:54
	Now my general recommendation is that over the long run	7:56
	these are not worth a keep,	7:59
	and we oughta move towards liquidating them.	8:03
	But I don't think that we are in a position	8:05
	to get rid of them at once.	8:09
	And I would like to get some use out them	8:10
	on the way out so to speak.	8:12
	Well, can it be said that we've had our tight money,	8:19
	and that this is the peak.	8:21
	And that from now on things will level off	8:23
	in the interest rate structure,	8:28
	and perhaps even go down.	8:30
	I don't think so.	8:32
	I don't yet believe we've arrived at this stage.	8:33
	One of the most important news events,	8:36
	which helped to trigger off the increase in the prime rates,	8:38
	I'm sure, was the very surprising plant and equipment survey	8:41
	of businessmen's intentions.	8:49
	Published recently by the official SEC office	8:51
	of Business Economics of Department of Commerce survey.	8:56
	This showed that businessmen claimed	9:00
	that during the rest of this year they would be stepping up	9:02
	their plant and equipment expenditures.	9:06
	Their fixed investment expenditures by 13.9% or really 14%	9:10
	which is much more than the previous figure.	9:16
	This was not completely a surprise because Pierre Remfrey	9:19
	of the Remfrey Boston organization had	9:24
	in his private survey, revised his own figures upward	9:28
	to about this particular level.	9:32
	Now, I don't know whether this estimate is going to be	9:34
	realized in practice when we come	9:38
	to look back on this period.	9:40
	I suspect that mere physical limitations upon supply will	9:44
	not permit plant and equipment deliveries	9:49
	to go up commensurate with these intentions.	9:53
	To my mind though, these intentional surveys are	9:57
	like Gallop polls indicating something	10:01
	about the mood of business.	10:03
	And they tell me something about the length of the queues,	10:05
	the waiting lines in the capital goods industries.	10:09
	And they tell me something about the pressure	10:13
	on prices in those industries.	10:16
	So the important thing, it seems to me,	10:18
	for a Federal Reserve observer who gets	10:21
	this new figure will in fact plant	10:24
	and equipment expenditures go up by the state of 14%,	10:28
	but rather will businessmen try to get them up	10:33
	by that amount and will they be unable to do so,	10:37
	and in trying to do so will they be bidding up prices.	10:41
	You've all noticed that inflation is not over.	10:46
	Prices are going up all around us.	10:49
	There was some sign of an accelerated rate	10:52
	of price increases in January and February.	10:54
	If you keep a notebook of announcements by industries	10:58
	of price increases, you can get an index	11:02
	of what's happening, and I think such an index would have	11:04
	shown a rather sharp increase in January.	11:08
	I myself would associate something of this timing,	11:14
	some part of this timing to the new administration.	11:19
	The new administration has said	11:23
	that as a matter of philosophy	11:24
	it does not believe in wage price guideposts.	11:26
	It does not believe as a matter of causal fact	11:29
	that they will work.	11:34
	That they will have any great effects.	11:37
	And it has stated that to a degree,	11:40
	that if these things do have any effects	11:41
	they probably are distorting and bad	11:44
	and discriminatory and uneven.	11:46
	Well, the consequences of this position	11:48
	which has some factual merit, and which has	11:53
	some attractiveness in terms of ideology.	11:58
	I may add that it also has some drawbacks, in my opinion.	12:03
	But nevertheless, let's take things as they are.	12:08
	The consequence of this is that if you are	12:10
	a price namer in a large industry,	12:13
	what's called an oligopolistic industry,	12:17
	and the way economists define industries these days	12:21
	most of the large industries,	12:24
	let's just take the chemical industry have	12:28
	to be regarded as being in this category.	12:31
	You are debating whether to name a higher price.	12:33
	Now you don't have unilateral power.	12:39
	You can't do something different from the crowd.	12:41
	And you and the crowd together cannot do	12:44
	exactly what you'd like to do independently	12:48
	of the forces of supply and demand.	12:50
	But this is a world of great uncertainty.	12:52
	Nobody knows exactly what his demand curves are.	12:54
	Nobody knows what the elasticity of demand is exactly.	12:57
	Of these curves, nobody's in a position to find	13:01
	his maximum profit point with any great accuracy.	13:04
	The textbooks that people like myself write	13:09
	which show marginal cost curves intersecting	13:12
	with marginal revenue curves have a useful function,	13:14
	but they certainly do not provide the sharp, exact tools	13:17
	that a businessman can use in his day to day administering	13:24
	or naming of prices.	13:27
	Consequently when demand is strong,	13:29
	you are asking yourself all the time	13:32
	can I get a higher price margin at this time.	13:36
	Will Mr. A down the street or across the country follow me	13:40
	if I raise this particular price.	13:45
	If I do raise this particular price	13:48
	and make a little more money in the short run	13:49
	will I lose in the long run because substitutes	13:51
	for my commodity will come into existence?	13:53
	This is the sort of thing that is being asked	13:58
	all the time in every large corporation.	14:00
	Now before December, and particularly,	14:03
	two or three years ago when President Johnson was	14:09
	very popular and had a consensus behind him.	14:11
	An extra consideration was taking place	14:14
	in these deliberations, namely what kind of flack are	14:16
	we gonna get from the White House	14:20
	if we announce this increase in sulfuric acid prices	14:22
	or this kind of magic or that kind of resin.	14:28
	Well, now I think that blood pressures went down	14:31
	a little bit in all the board rooms of the nation	14:35
	after January 20th, and the anticipation of that time.	14:38
	And there was thought, well, at least that particular	14:44
	headache which has plagued us is gonna be lessened.	14:47
	Now mind you, what I've been talking about is	14:51
	much more important in explaining	14:55
	the local time development of prices	14:57
	than the long-term position and trend of prices.	15:01
	You cannot by White House frowning	15:06
	and by White House oratory and by behind the scene	15:11
	executive office pressure.	15:16
	You cannot raise prices, I mean lower prices, by 10%	15:19
	or keep them 15% lower than where	15:24
	they otherwise would have been.	15:27
	But you can change the timing of these announcements.	15:29
	Now, you might say this all fine scale stuff,	15:32
	and for the most part it is.	15:35
	And that's why economists say that wage price guideposts are	15:38
	no substitute for proper macroeconomic policy.	15:42
	And proper macroeconomic policy involves policy	15:47
	to control the total of aggregate dollar spending	15:51
	in comparison with the producible amount	15:55
	of products at current prices.	15:58
	Now, those macroeconomic policies you know, in my opinion,	16:01
	involve fiscal policy, that is public expenditure	16:05
	and tax rate changes, and also involve	16:10
	Federal Reserve policy in connection	16:14
	with interest rates and connection with reserves.	16:16
	And connection with the rate of growth of the money supply.	16:19
	All of those things.	16:23
	Those are all important.	16:24
	Nevertheless, the theoretical studies of economists show	16:26
	that the general price level is a much more unstable thing	16:30
	than the price of a particular industry or commodity.	16:37
	If a particular industry or a firm raises its price	16:41
	relative to the rest, the elasticity of demand is	16:46
	gonna be very great, and it's gonna be punished.	16:49
	But if they all do it together, the general aggregate	16:51
	demand curve against the price level	16:55
	if you want to look at it that way is much more elastic.	16:58
	Now to be sure if you keep a solid anchor on fiscal policy	17:01
	and on monetary policy and on the stock of money,	17:06
	then even the general price level cannot go sky high.	17:09
	There is a elasticity of demand that comes in	17:14
	under those circumstances.	17:18
	And the industry under those circumstances	17:20
	if it continued in concert, and I don't mean in conspiracy.	17:21
	But just each one doing what comes natural,	17:26
	and then making it easier for the next fellow	17:28
	and all the fellows to do that which comes natural.	17:31
	They can price themselves out of the market.	17:34
	I might add that in a mixed economy	17:37
	it probably doesn't work that way.	17:39
	Because probably the mixed economy,	17:41
	the government, the treasury, the Congress,	17:42
	the Federal Reserve does not have the guts	17:47
	to roll back those prices.	17:50
	And so a permissive action which justifies and fulfills	17:52
	that increase in price will probably take place,	17:58
	by which I mean, that an increase	18:01
	in the amount of money will be permitted	18:06
	to support the new high price level.	18:08
	Well, now, if this your vision of how a mixed economy,	18:11
	in fact, works, and it is my vision.	18:14
	Then you can see that although wage price exhortations	18:17
	and wage price attitudes have no efficacy	18:21
	as a substitute for macroeconomic policy.	18:29
	They still can be an important supplement	18:32
	to macroeconomic policy.	18:34
	And in my Boston region, I was amused to see	18:39
	that John Kenneth Galbraith, who loves to write letters	18:43
	to the editor, and who loves to exercise	18:47
	his sense of humor on these problems made a prediction	18:49
	that the Kennedy administration having...	18:55
	I'm sorry the Nixon administration, a Freudian slip.	19:00
	The Nixon administration having, through the mouth	19:04
	of President Nixon himself, repudiated	19:08
	wage price guideposts.	19:10
	And through the mouth of his spokesmen, Arthur Burns	19:13
	and Paul McCracken having repudiated it.	19:18
	Galbraith predicted that before very long	19:21
	there would begin to make noises	19:24
	asking businessmen to exercise moderation	19:27
	and just showing that nature does imitate art,	19:30
	not very many days passed by,	19:36
	but what the same newspaper was carrying	19:39
	the story of a speech made by Paul McCracken	19:41
	before a business group in which he did not wave	19:44
	a big club and say we'll call you into the White House,	19:47
	and subject you to exquisite torture	19:50
	if you raise prices unduly.	19:55
	But he was threatening them that they would be	19:57
	killing the golden goose if they did exercise	20:01
	their price power indiscriminately	20:04
	and did not show moderation.	20:07
	So, in the words of Galbraith, we're getting	20:09
	wage price guideposts without the guidance,	20:12
	without any particular numbers	20:16
	and without any particular force.	20:18
	I may add that I am not of the persuasion	20:20
	as I have read what has been happening	20:24
	in the mixed economies of the world,	20:26
	including our own mixed economy of the last decades.	20:28
	Such open mouth, jaw bone types of persuasion are	20:32
	without efficacy.	20:38
	I think that in this quasi-oligopolistic situation	20:39
	where the general price level has a almost	20:43
	a neutral stability particularly	20:47
	with our macroeconomic style of action to reinforce it.	20:49
	That such remarks do have some importance.	20:55
	And I'm speaking now, not as an observer	21:01
	of the Nixon administration, not as a critic,	21:04
	not as a partisan of it, but just as	21:06
	a observer of the American scene.	21:09
	I think it'll be a very good thing	21:12
	for American business if they do show moderation.	21:14
	Try to pick up in real volume	21:18
	rather than in short-term increases in margin.	21:20
	I think that the coming slow down,	21:24
	in order to, lessen the rate of inflation will be	21:27
	measurably less severe and have to be	21:31
	measurably less severe if that, in fact, is done.	21:35
	Let me turn, if I may, to a different,	21:40
	although related topic.	21:46
	The plant equipment expenditures intentions,	21:50
	how can we explain their buoyancy?	21:55
	The ordinary regression equations that my colleagues use	22:01
	to estimate investment, I think have been showing	22:05
	a residual this year.	22:08
	The intentions to invest are a little higher	22:12
	than you would have predicted from multiple correlation	22:16
	based upon past data.	22:18
	One way to get rid of that residual, to explain it,	22:23
	to account for it is to put in the rate of increases	22:28
	of prices and costs in those industries.	22:32
	And I'm told by one of my colleagues	22:36
	that when he does that he is pretty much on the nose.	22:37
	If this turns out to be a correct explanation,	22:42
	this is an objective manifestation	22:48
	of what I've talked about in early tapes	22:50
	that there may, almost for the first time, begin to be	22:53
	built in to the business scene inflationary expectations.	22:58
	I say almost for the first time because past behavior	23:05
	in 1965, 1966, for example, when I would've thought	23:12
	there was legitimate ground for inflationary expectations	23:18
	didn't show such residuals that needed	23:22
	to be explained in this way.	23:24
	Inventory accumulation was, on the whole, modest.	23:28
	Anticipatory forward actions on the part	23:33
	of the consumer didn't seem to be very prominent.	23:37
	And maybe that's changing.	23:41
	And, as a matter of fact, since it takes a long time	23:43
	to form opinions, and since the quickening of the inflation	23:46
	really began after the summer of 1965,	23:52
	it may be just be a matter of human psychology	23:57
	that it takes some time to build up	23:59
	a true, effective conviction with respect to inflation.	24:02
	By the same token, it would be	24:06
	a little bit hard to change that.	24:09
	Even after the winds of making for inflation have	24:11
	quieted down a bit, you may still have	24:16
	in the mind of businessmen and consumers some residue.	24:18
	That's why I've said earlier on these tapes	24:23
	that some of the gain that you get	24:27
	from moderation and the real rate of growth,	24:29
	and from some mild increase in unemployment.	24:32
	Some of the moderation that you get on wage contracts	24:36
	and on price contracts is a delayed moderation,	24:38
	and so we mustn't judge by this Thanksgiving's harvest	24:41
	of price moderation whether any softening	24:47
	that the Federal Reserve or the administration induces	24:52
	between now and Thanksgiving has been a failure.	24:55
	We must wait for the full harvest	24:59
	which will be all the way into not this coming Easter,	25:02
	but Easter a year from now.	25:05
	Still I want to contemplate that increase	25:10
	in plant equipment.	25:13
	Seems to me that from a standpoint	25:16
	of desirable social policy, it's successive.	25:19
	It means an increase in backlogs.	25:23
	It means a lengthening of queues.	25:25
	It means inflationary pressure.	25:27
	It means inflationary pressure in an area	25:30
	which is competitive with our exports,	25:32
	and probably will result in an overflow of imports	25:35
	of competing machines from Europe	25:39
	with a possible deterioration in our balance of payments.	25:42
	For all of these reasons in the current Newsweek,	25:46
	I don't mean to give a plug to that publication,	25:52
	but I want to explain my point of view.	25:55
	I have come out for a temporary suspension	26:00
	of the investment tax credit.	26:05
	In other words, my advice to Mr. Nixon,	26:07
	it's unsolicited advice, it's free,	26:11
	and it's worth every penny, is	26:14
	that he should suspend the investment tax credit.	26:17
	That was my advice all through 1966, and September of 1966	26:22
	the investment tax credit was suspended.	26:28
	I think that a review of the history which is...	26:31
	We don't have time for here.	26:34
	Would show that on the whole, taking all the risks	26:37
	into account, taking all the headaches	26:40
	of the Treasury into account, and they are very grave.	26:42
	The administrative difficulties of turning	26:45
	this thing on and off are not minor.	26:47
	But taking all those into account it seems to me	26:50
	that it would be a good thing now to invest,	26:52
	to suspend temporarily the investment tax credit	26:56
	to bring down the pressure	26:59
	in the fixed investment industries.	27:01
	And, I add, and this is almost	27:05
	the most important reason for it	27:07
	to reduce the contraction on the housing industry	27:08
	which will be, I fear, the prime heritage of tight money.	27:15
	We've had a post mortem on the 1966 crunch	27:24
	by Professor Irwin Friend and his collaborator,	27:29
	Mrs. Jean Crockett on how did that tight money incident	27:34
	work in 1966?	27:42
	What were its effects?	27:44
	Now I don't think that these very able investigators were	27:45
	in a position to make a definitive autopsy.	27:48
	And I don't agree completely with the sharpness	27:52
	of their conclusions.	27:56
	But let's not second guess the evidence,	27:57
	and let's not second guess their interpretation	27:59
	with our own judgmental factors.	28:02
	Let's take it at face value in order to see	28:05
	how it should change our judgment.	28:09
	Their finding is that the money crunch of 1966 had	28:11
	almost no effect upon plant and equipment spending	28:16
	of that period.	28:18
	And that almost all of its effects were spent	28:20
	in reducing housing.	28:25
	Well, demographically we're moving into a period	28:29
	where they're gonna be great housing shortages.	28:32
	Rents are rising, vacancies are down.	28:34
	And I think it would be a shame in	28:37
	what I hope are the waning years of the Vietnam War	28:40
	if the tightness of money which is deemed	28:44
	to be necessary in order to fight inflation	28:49
	and slow down the rate of real growth of the economy,	28:51
	were to have its full impact upon housing,	28:54
	were to reduce housing starts from 1.8 million	28:58
	down to 1.2 million.	29:01
	Were to dismantle the work crews in that industry,	29:03
	and were to add to the housing shortage	29:07
	which the experts tell us are ahead	29:10
	and waiting for us for demographic reasons	29:16
	as the baby boom of 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 become	29:18
	the young marrieds and the young parents,	29:29
	and begin to want to move out themselves to the suburbs.	29:34
Announcer	Thank you, Professor Paul Samuelson.	29:38
	If you have comments, questions, or suggestions	29:41
	write Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	29:43
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611.	29:46

Item Info

Title:

Tape 20 - General topics

Date:

1969

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0020
ref2179_4pc
samuelsonpaul
duke:325043
pstau001020
ark:/87924/r4h12vq31
36a3e8d1-53d3-4e98-b87e-b9a6b39aa151

Permalink:

https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r4h12vq31

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Tape 20 - General topics

Transcript

Item Info

Economists' Papers Archive

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