Tape 39 - 1970 Forecast

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-	Hello.	0:02
	This is Instructional Dynamics,	0:02
	inviting you to another of our biweekly interviews	0:04
	with Dr. Milton Friedman, professor of economics	0:07
	at the University of Chicago.	0:10
	We are taping this interview on Wednesday, December 17.	0:12
	Professor Friedman, what is happening	0:17
	on the monetary front these days?	0:19
-	The main thing that's happening has been	0:22
	a bunch of false alarms and misleading signals.	0:24
	A week or so ago I was on a	0:27
	early morning Today TV show with George Mitchell,	0:32
	one of the members of the Federal Reserve Board,	0:37
	and George Mitchell, who as you may know	0:40
	is one of two members of the board who have been	0:42
	in the minority these past months,	0:45
	as revealed by the published minutes of the	0:47
	Open Market Investment Committee.	0:50
	Let me go back.	0:52
	They have been in the minority in the sense that	0:53
	George Mitchell and Sherman Maisel have been	0:55
	voting against a continuation of the	0:59
	exceedingly tight monetary policy	1:01
	that the Fed has been following.	1:03
	They have been voting for some easing without of course	1:06
	a return to the inflationary policy of 1967 and 1968.	1:10
	Well to go back, George Mitchell on this Today program	1:16
	said that he thought the quantity of money	1:22
	had been going up in October and November	1:26
	and was suggesting that it would continue to go up.	1:31
	I was somewhat taken aback, I must say,	1:34
	because the latest figures I had seen did not	1:36
	fit in with that particular diagnosis.	1:40
	Similar statements appeared in the paper	1:43
	from other people that there were some signs of easing up.	1:45
	I had earlier as you may recall been expressing a hope	1:48
	that there would be some easing up,	1:52
	and indeed saying that it was very likely there would be	1:54
	because the logic of the situation called for an easing.	1:59
	I am sorry however to report that after reexamining	2:01
	all the figures on the basis of what Mitchell said,	2:05
	I can see very, very little evidence indeed	2:09
	for any appreciable ease.	2:12
	If you look at the weekly figures on the money stock,	2:15
	that's narrowly defined currency plus	2:19
	adjusted demand deposits,	2:22
	and the weekly figures are the average of daily figures.	2:23
	These are the finest intervals for which	2:28
	you have any kind of reliable result	2:30
	and they enable you to trace the movements	2:32
	of this particular magnitude about as closely	2:35
	as you can trace any important economic magnitude.	2:38
	I have the chart before me which shows this.	2:42
	There's a distinct break in the chart in May	2:45
	and since May it is very hard to describe	2:47
	that movement as anything other than	2:50
	erratic fluctuations around the horizontal line.	2:52
	Over the period from May to the last week for which	2:55
	there are figures which is the week ending December 3rd,	2:58
	the total of currency in adjusted demand deposits	3:02
	has varied between a low point of just over $198 billion and	3:04
	a high point of a little over 200 billion, 200.3 billion.	3:10
	That whole range is only $2 billion or 1% of the figure	3:15
	in question and that's a period of over six months.	3:21
	The initial period figure for let's say	3:28
	the week ending May 28th is 199.5.	3:32
	The last figure we have is 199.2.	3:43
	A little bit lower.	3:46
	Now the initial figure is a high figure for that period	3:48
	and you may say that last last figure's a low figure,	3:51
	so I would not wanna argue at all with anyone	3:54
	who says, well, maybe the rate of growth,	3:56
	that the rate of 1% or a half of 1% or 1.5%,	3:59
	but that is certainly a high estimate,	4:04
	and more important there is no sign of any break	4:06
	occurring in the last few months.	4:10
	What is true is in the last few months,	4:12
	the numbers have varied erratically,	4:14
	more erratically from one week to the next.	4:16
	As a further indication of the same thing,	4:24
	you can look not only at the money stock	4:26
	narrowly defined as currency plus demand deposits	4:29
	but it's interesting to look at a broader definition,	4:32
	which includes commercial bank time deposits.	4:34
	If you look at that definition you find that	4:36
	from May to the end of August, it fell very sharply	4:39
	by something like nearly $10 billion	4:46
	from over 400 billion to a little over 390 billion.	4:50
	The major reason for that decline of course	4:56
	was a sharp run off in commercial bank CDs,	4:58
	the large certificates of deposits of $100,000 and over.	5:01
	Since the end of August that series too has fluctuated	5:06
	around roughly a horizontal line	5:09
	going within a very narrow bend,	5:12
	and the most you can say is it has shown	5:15
	a decline from May to August and zero movement since August.	5:18
	If you try to examine what caused these movements,	5:24
	it has been largely as I say,	5:28
	or the discrepancy between the movements,	5:30
	it has been largely the decline in	5:32
	the large time deposit, certificates and deposits.	5:34
	That decline has tapered off largely because	5:37
	the most volatile time deposits have	5:41
	already been pulled out or converted into	5:45
	euro dollar deposits or into treasury bills	5:48
	or into commercial paper.	5:51
	Of the remaining commercial bank CDs,	5:54
	large certificates of deposits,	5:58
	a not inconsiderable fraction consists of items on which	5:59
	the Regulation Q interest rate ceiling does not apply.	6:04
	There is an exception in that regulation	6:09
	which permits commercial banks to pay any interest rate	6:12
	that they may wish to foreign bank holders of	6:15
	commercial bank time deposits in this country,	6:24
	and my impression is that this loophole now covers	6:28
	a substantial fraction, perhaps almost as much as a half,	6:30
	of the remaining outstanding CDs	6:34
	so that with respect to those,	6:36
	there is no special artificial pressure	6:38
	which is forcing them down.	6:40
	I hope that Mr. Mitchell's hopes for the future	6:43
	will indeed be realized and that we shall	6:46
	not continue with this policy of essential constancy	6:48
	in the quantity of money	6:52
	because that does seem to me to be a much too tight a policy	6:54
	and one that is almost sure to intensify	6:57
	the readjustment in which we have already entered	7:00
	and which is likely to intensify.	7:05
	There has been a further confirming	7:08
	item to confirm that we are indeed in a decline.	7:11
	The Index of Industrial Production again dropped,	7:16
	this time the sharpest drop in many years.	7:19
	That is a little unfair because half of that was due to	7:25
	the General Electric strike but even if you leave that out,	7:28
	you clearly have further continued evidence	7:31
	of a decline in the physical output.	7:34
	You also are beginning to have a little bit of evidence	7:39
	of some decline in the rate of price rise.	7:42
	Prices have been rising rapidly but a trifle less rapidly	7:45
	than they were a couple of months ago.	7:49
	What's happened has been that up until	7:52
	a couple of months ago the rate of price rise	7:55
	was getting bigger and bigger,	7:57
	now it has stopped getting bigger	7:59
	and it has gotten a little slower.	8:00
	So there are all the signs that a recession is in the offing	8:02
	or a slow down and it is most unfortunate	8:08
	if the Fed were to continue in its present	8:12
	unduly restrictive policy.	8:16
-	Don't these erratic short term ups and downs	8:19
	raise some questions about your own proposal	8:23
	for a steady rate of increase in the quantity of money?	8:25
	Is that kind of increase feasible?	8:30
-	They really don't raise any such questions	8:34
	because one of the main reasons why you have	8:37
	such erratic movements is that the Fed	8:40
	is not trying to control the money stock direction.	8:42
	It is taking as its immediate objectives of policy	8:45
	more than the money stock	8:50
	or things other than the money stock,	8:52
	such as short term interest rates, treasury bill rates,	8:54
	the rate on federal funds and so on.	9:02
	And also when it looks at demand need peri-aggregate,	9:07
	it looks not at the money stock	9:10
	but at the so-called bank credit proxy.	9:12
	As a result given that it is devoting its efforts	9:15
	to controlling other things,	9:19
	it is not at all surprising that the money stock	9:21
	which then becomes an incidental consequence of	9:24
	the other things it's doing should vary around quite a bit.	9:26
	For example in these money stock figures	9:30
	there is a fairly clearly marked quarterly seasonal	9:35
	that is a 13 week movement which seems to reflect	9:39
	the ebb and flow of the financial demand for funds	9:43
	on the market over a quarterly period.	9:47
	As you know many things do occur quarterly,	9:50
	dividend dates come quarterly,	9:51
	bonds come due quarterly and things like that happen.	9:54
	This quarterly movement is one of the reasons why	9:58
	you have had a recent confusion about	10:01
	the movement of the money stocks.	10:03
	Because a fairly sharp rise in the money stock	10:05
	in a couple of recent weeks was part of the up swing	10:08
	of that 13 week quarterly movement,	10:12
	last week's decline may be part of a down swing	10:16
	of that quarterly movement	10:18
	but these erratic quarterly movements only result	10:20
	because they are the indirect reflection of the forces	10:23
	altering the magnitudes which the Fed looks at	10:30
	most closely in its control policy.	10:34
	If the Fed changed its approach,	10:36
	if it said, no, we are going to look not at interest rates,	10:38
	we're going to look directly at the quantity of money,	10:44
	we are going to try to set our sights	10:46
	so as to make the quantity of money	10:49
	grow at a steady rate month after month,	10:51
	well they could not make it absolutely perfectly precise.	10:54
	There is a little leeway.	10:56
	You can't get it on the nose every day.	10:57
	There is no doubt whatsoever that they would be able to	11:01
	reduce the fluctuations to a far smaller magnitude	11:05
	than have occurred in the past, or even are occurring now,	11:08
	and that they could come very close	11:12
	to a steady rate of growth of quantity of money.	11:14
	So I do not believe that this evidence is in any way	11:18
	a reflection on the feasibility	11:20
	of the kind of policy that I have proposed.	11:22
-	Professor Friedman, the papers have recently been giving	11:28
	great prominence to Pierre Rinfret's predictions for 1970.	11:31
	Do you want to comment on that?	11:37
-	Pierre made those predictions at a luncheon talk	11:39
	of a meeting in New York at which I gave a talk	11:43
	at one of the earlier sessions.	11:46
	Some of the newspapers presented it as if we had had	11:48
	a face-to-face confrontation, which we did not.	11:50
	Not that that really affects the substance of the comments.	11:53
	Several things impress me about Pierre's predictions.	11:59
	The first is that his verbal predictions	12:03
	do not completely jive with the numerical values	12:05
	he attached to them.	12:09
	His verbal predictions are of a very exuberant character.	12:11
	He speaks of there being an unprecedented burst	12:15
	of economic activity in 1970 and at least	12:20
	leaves the impression that he is anticipating	12:22
	a speeding up rather than a slowing down	12:25
	in the present rate of growth of GNP	12:28
	and price inflation and so on.	12:31
	Yet when you look at the actual numerical values	12:35
	of the predictions he made,	12:38
	while his predictions for 1970 are higher than those which	12:40
	are being made by most people who are forecasting GNP,	12:44
	they imply a smaller rate of increase in GNP from '69 to '70	12:48
	than occurred from '68 to '69.	12:55
	They are as I say on the outer range of the predictions,	12:58
	but they're not quite so extreme as his verbal predictions.	13:01
	But now with respect to either of them,	13:06
	they aren't very different from those I've been making	13:09
	or from those most other analysts	13:13
	at the moment have been making.	13:14
	You cannot say that they're incapable of being realized.	13:17
	The interesting thing about economic events of this kind	13:21
	is that there is a considerable element of chance in them.	13:24
	Let's suppose somebody offered to bet you a dollar	13:29
	that if he tossed a coin seven times in a row,	13:35
	there would be seven heads.	13:39
	And he offered to bet you a dollar	13:43
	against a dollar, even money.	13:44
	You would be a fool not to take that bet	13:47
	because there's only one chance in 128 that	13:49
	assuming he's using a fair coin	13:54
	and not one with heads on both sides,	13:56
	you would get seven heads in a row.	13:58
	But suppose you made the bet, suppose it is a fair coin.	14:01
	It might still come up that there would be	14:04
	seven heads in a row.	14:06
	I always remember very well a comment made	14:07
	at a lecture I once attended by the most famous	14:11
	mathematical statistician of our time,	14:14
	Mr. Ronald A. Fisher, who died a couple years ago.	14:18
	R. A. Fisher in this lecture was talking about	14:23
	these problems of probabilities	14:25
	and he said, "You know, it's a funny thing	14:27
	"about the one chance in a million.	14:29
	"It happens just once in a million times.	14:31
	"It only surprises you when it happens to you."	14:34
	Well the same way to go back to our coin case	14:37
	it might happen once in 128 times,	14:40
	and this might just be that time	14:43
	that he got seven heads in a row.	14:45
	You would lose your dollar.	14:46
	But would you feel you had made a wrong bet?	14:48
	Not at all.	14:50
	If he offered you that bet over again the next minute,	14:51
	you'd probably take it.	14:54
	This is sort of my reaction to Pierre Rinfret's statement.	14:56
	I feel that the chance that 1970 will turn out	15:00
	to show a rapid acceleration over 1969,	15:08
	that you will have a much larger increase in GNP,	15:13
	that inflation which in recent months	15:16
	has started to decelerate a little	15:18
	will turn around and accelerate,	15:20
	I feel the chances of that are very small.	15:22
	They're about one in 128, but they're not zero.	15:24
	There is a good deal of slip in these relationships	15:28
	we observe, there's a good deal of error in observation	15:31
	and in the reaction of the economy to various variables,	15:35
	so it could be, I can't say it's completely impossible	15:38
	that his predictions will come out to be true.	15:42
	Of course if they do, he will look very, very good,	15:45
	but that will not make me feel that	15:48
	this was other than the one chance in 128 coming true.	15:53
	That's why I keep emphasizing in answer to people who say,	15:58
	well isn't this a crucial experiment?	16:01
	Will this really tell a difference?	16:02
	Are you really trying to rest everything on this?	16:04
	I keep saying no, the evidence for the relationships	16:07
	we're talking about is evidence based on	16:10
	many observations, many episodes over a long period of time.	16:14
	No single episode is going either to disprove	16:17
	or to confirm these relationships.	16:22
	So then going back to Pierre,	16:25
	there's a chance that he may be right,	16:27
	but I think it's a bad bet.	16:30
	It's very hard to believe that once you get a	16:32
	development in force of the kind we've had,	16:37
	and that we are having, that you can have it turn around.	16:40
	One of Rinfret's forecasts has to do of course	16:44
	with interest rates, he thinks interest rates	16:49
	are going to go up still higher,	16:51
	and I might add one point about that that I think	16:53
	that I've discovered is confusing in various discussions.	16:56
	Pierre sometimes refers to the prime interest rate	16:59
	and it might well be,	17:03
	the prime interest rate might do anything because	17:04
	in my opinion as I've expressed on these tapes before,	17:07
	the prime interest rate is a highly artificial rate.	17:09
	It is not a real market rate.	17:13
	It is artificial both because it is agreed to	17:16
	by groups of banks implicitly and established,	17:19
	but more important because it is part of a	17:22
	joint bargain involving compensating balances.	17:24
	The prime interest rate is now if I recall it correctly 8.5%	17:28
	but the actual rate of interest which borrowers are paying	17:33
	to get commercial loans from banks	17:36
	is more nearly 10 or 11%, not 8.5%.	17:38
	So the prime rate might do anything	17:42
	but I do not think there's much of a chance	17:44
	that the other rates of interest,	17:47
	the rates of interest that are market rates,	17:50
	the bill rate, bond rate, are likely to behave	17:51
	the way in which Rinfret suggests.	17:56
	Again there's one chance maybe in a hundred,	17:57
	one chance in a thousand that they will behave that way,	17:59
	but the odds seem to me all in the other direction.	18:02
	One of the interesting questions about predictions	18:07
	of the kind that Rinfret makes is how people get to this	18:10
	kind of a position, what is their theoretical basis,	18:13
	what is the reason that leads them this way?	18:17
	And I have been increasingly impressed	18:20
	as I have had more contact with people in business	18:24
	and people in Washington with the sort of	18:27
	a schizophrenia in their reactions.	18:31
	With respect to operations in their own business,	18:33
	businessmen are capable of taking	18:38
	an extraordinarily long view.	18:40
	They can today engage in decisions which involve	18:43
	erecting a plant for output that they don't expect	18:47
	to be demanded for four or five or six or seven years.	18:51
	They can invest large sums for many years	18:55
	in developing new processes which may or may not work out.	18:57
	In these respects, they are very long-sighted.	19:01
	Yet when it comes to current policy,	19:04
	or when it comes to immediate governmental actions,	19:06
	they tend to be extremely short-sighted	19:09
	to have very little sense of perspective.	19:12
	They expect something to happen tomorrow	19:14
	and if it doesn't happen tomorrow	19:16
	they go running and want instant cures for the problem.	19:17
	This is particularly exaggerated in the case of	19:23
	people in the financial markets.	19:27
	People in the financial markets are engaged in a business	19:28
	of watching the day-to-day movements in stocks	19:31
	or maybe the hour-to-hour or maybe the minute-to-minute.	19:33
	They in the process lose all sense of,	19:37
	well all sense is a little strong,	19:41
	lose a good deal of sense of a feeling of perspective,	19:43
	of a feeling of the time that it takes to do things.	19:48
	Each month seems like a long period.	19:51
	The tendency for increasing comments to be heard	19:56
	about Nixon's anti-inflation policy is not working,	20:01
	monetary's changed, it's having no effect,	20:04
	why is nothing happening,	20:06
	reflect in my opinion predominantly this	20:08
	lack of time perspective on the part	20:12
	of the persons making the comments	20:16
	which includes a very high proportion of those	20:18
	in these highly volatile short time span markets.	20:21
	In fact as I've stressed on these tapes,	20:26
	if we stand back a little, look at things	20:28
	from the perspective of the ivory tower,	20:31
	taking into account the past time delays	20:33
	between changes in economic policy	20:37
	and particularly monetary policy	20:40
	and changes in the economy,	20:42
	the present course of events is not in any way	20:45
	out of line with past experiences.	20:49
	Things are happening just about on schedule.	20:52
	The point is that it's as we look at this schedule,	20:55
	we're passing through it, we're impatient for results,	20:58
	and it seems to us to be taking much longer than it is.	21:01
	I suspect that in part this is the reason	21:04
	for the kinds of forecasts that Rinfret makes	21:08
	and for the kind of welcome that these forecasts get.	21:11
	Another interesting feature that I was impressed with	21:16
	in Rinfret's comments was a set of prescriptions he had	21:19
	for what to do something about it,	21:23
	because obviously in the modern day and age	21:25
	when there must be a pill for every ill,	21:27
	as Senator Barry Goldwater used to say	21:31
	in the course of his presidential campaign,	21:36
	the tendency if you say something is ill	21:39
	is to prescribe the pill and so Pierre comes along.	21:43
	Needless to say, I should say I am not saying this	21:47
	in any criticism because goodness knows	21:50
	I've been one of the worst offenders in this respect.	21:52
	I haven't hesitated to hawk my pill,	21:55
	and Rinfret's pill I am now reading from a	21:57
	New York Times story of his talk,	22:01
	would include a ban on bank credit cards,	22:04
	reimposition of wartime controls on consumer credit,	22:06
	an increase in the surtax to 15%	22:09
	and an increase in the investment tax credit to 10% from 7%.	22:12
	Now this is a curious mixed bag.	22:17
	A ban on bank credit cards is of negligible importance	22:20
	for anything.	22:23
	Bank credit cards may be good or mad but it is	22:23
	inconceivable that they can play an important role	22:27
	as a matter of quantitative magnitude in an inflationary	22:30
	process of a short time magnitude over the next year.	22:34
	Over a course of 10 or 15 years they may change	22:38
	as the demand for money to such an extent	22:41
	that you would get increased velocity,	22:43
	that it would be desirable to have	22:45
	a slower rate of growth the quantity of money.	22:48
	I doubt it very much but it might happen.	22:50
	In my opinion the great credit card craze	22:52
	is simply the twentieth century substitute for	22:55
	the account at the corner grocery store of our grandparents	22:58
	and great grandparents 75 or 80 years ago.	23:02
	It's not by any means clear that a larger fraction	23:05
	of transactions today are done on credit	23:08
	than were done on credit let us say 80 years ago.	23:10
	But at any rate whatever may be its longer run	23:15
	implications it is an absurdity to suppose in my opinion	23:17
	that it could have any affect in the short run.	23:21
	The second reimposition of wartime controls	23:24
	on consumer credit is another gimmick	23:26
	which is of wider importance.	23:29
	It certainly is of more significance but	23:32
	the examination of experience under those controls	23:38
	suggests that they have very limited effectiveness	23:42
	and that their only effect is not on inflation	23:44
	but on interest rates for other than consumer credit.	23:49
	Insofar as they reduce the amount of credit	23:53
	that goes to consumer credit they increase	23:56
	the amount that's available for other things	23:57
	but it is far from clear that	24:00
	they have any effect on inflation whatsoever.	24:01
	I once wrote a lengthy article examining	24:04
	this wartime episode and analyzing it	24:07
	from the point of view of policy	24:09
	and the conclusion I came to was that	24:11
	it was a very undesirable method of credit control.	24:12
	If you're going to control credit,	24:18
	do so by general monetary means which enables	24:20
	a pinch to be spread through market mechanisms,	24:25
	not by having some set of bureaucrats decide	24:29
	whether people should put a third of the purchase price	24:32
	or a quarter of the purchase price down in advance.	24:35
	His third proposal was for an increase in the surtax to 15%.	24:38
	For those who believe that fiscal effects	24:46
	aren't important for inflation,	24:48
	this is a proposal of a very large magnitude.	24:51
	It's a very important proposal.	24:55
	It's big.	24:56
	That's the only one in this set of four items	24:57
	which conceivably could be of any significance	25:00
	and I think the political probability of it	25:03
	is about the same as of the proverbial snowball.	25:05
	Finally so far as an increase in the investment tax credit,	25:10
	if that had any effect it would be in the short run,	25:13
	it would be to stimulate in attempted investment	25:15
	expenditures and to offset the effect of the credit control.	25:18
	So whatever may be his predictions,	25:21
	I think his prescriptions have little to be said for them.	25:23
-	But Professor Friedman, suppose your policies don't work.	25:27
	What are the further policies that you would suggest?	25:31
-	There are no real alternatives except more of the same.	25:36
	The other proposals that people make like	25:43
	price and wage controls, which is a favorite one,	25:45
	would not in fact have any effect on inflation.	25:48
	There are few things of which we have	25:51
	more extensive experience over thousands of years	25:53
	from the time of Diocletian to the present,	25:55
	that the main effect of such wage and price controls	25:58
	is to shift inflationary pressure, not to stem it.	26:00
	So if indeed events change their behavior,	26:05
	instead of continuing as they have been	26:11
	on the course that you would expect from what's been done,	26:13
	if there were to be a move along Rinfret's direction,	26:17
	if that one chance in 128 did emerge,	26:20
	there is no alternative other than to maintain	26:23
	a still closer control on the expansion	26:26
	of the quantity of money on the one hand	26:30
	or if you were a fiscalist,	26:32
	if you believe in fiscal effects on tax policy on the other.	26:34
	I do not believe any of that will be necessary	26:38
	because as I say I believe the danger is all the other way,	26:40
	that we are now over killing	26:43
	because of a lack of perspective and patience,	26:45
	not under killing.	26:47
-	We have very little time left.	26:49
	Are there any other late items	26:51
	that you'd like to comment on?	26:52
-	Yes, I would like to make a comment	26:54
	at this time of the year on the reindeer market.	26:56
	This is that time of the year when I would like to	27:00
	take the opportunity of expressing	27:03
	the best of holiday wishes and the best wishes	27:06
	for a happy and prosperous new year	27:10
	to all of you who are doing me the honor of listening to me	27:12
	as I make these comments on the economic situation.	27:16
-	Thank you very much, Professor Friedman.	27:20
	Remember subscribers, if you have any questions or comments	27:23
	or topics you would like to hear discussed in this series,	27:26
	please send them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	27:28
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	27:32
	Dr. Friedman will be visiting with you again in two weeks.	27:37

Item Info

Title:

Tape 39 - 1970 Forecast

Date:

1969

Contributor:

Friedman, Milton, 1912-2006

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Milton Friedman

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0231
ref2602_fok
samuelsonpaul
duke:325254
pstau001231
ark:/87924/r4gt5fx9d
9aaf0be0-1d9d-4e2e-9377-e31b1207ca47

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Tape 39 - 1970 Forecast

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