Tape 132 - Watergate; the money crunch

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-	Welcome once again as MIT Professor,	0:02
	Paul Samuelson, discusses the current economic scene.	0:04
	This series is produced	0:07
	by Instructional Dynamics Incorporated.	0:08
	This program was recorded July 13th.	0:10
-	One of our subscribers has written in and asked me	0:15
	how it feels to be on the enemy List of the White House.	0:18
	Perhaps a word or two about that would be in order.	0:21
	All the jokes that you've heard about whether a person	0:26
	is or isn't included on that list, are true.	0:30
	In the present environment in the country,	0:34
	particularly in the academic liberal circles,	0:37
	it is a mark of honor to be on the list	0:42
	and people's noses are out of joint	0:44
	if they're not on the list.	0:46
	It's no exaggeration, I was in Washington	0:49
	testifying for a committee a couple days ago,	0:51
	and complete strangers came up to me in the airport	0:53
	and shook my hand and congratulated me and so forth.	0:57
	But the more interesting and more serious question is,	1:01
	do I really deserve it?	1:06
	Am I really earning my passage on that list?	1:08
	And so I've tried to go back and review	1:14
	what it is that I've been saying in tapes like these.	1:20
	What it is that I've said in Newsweek columns.	1:22
	What it is that I've written in articles	1:24
	in the English newspapers and the Japanese newspapers	1:28
	and what it is that I've said	1:33
	in various speeches around the country.	1:34
	Well, first I have to make clear,	1:37
	that from the beginning of President Nixon's first term,	1:41
	I have never blamed him for the inflation in being.	1:45
	It seems to me that the least that a fair critic can do	1:48
	is to face up to the fact and admit that in 1969,	1:52
	President Nixon inherited from President Johnson,	1:59
	his predecessor, an inflation in being.	2:02
	An inflation in being which was still primarily	2:06
	of a demand-pull type,	2:09
	attributable in the first instance to the re-acceleration	2:12
	of the Indo-China War in the summer of 1965,	2:18
	and that new increase in the velocity	2:22
	of circulation of money, that new increase	2:26
	in government spending was superimposed upon an economy	2:28
	already approaching very close to full employment.	2:34
	It was not off-set by exceptionally	2:38
	contractionary Federal Reserve Monetary Policy	2:40
	and it was not off-set by an increase in tax rates	2:44
	or a cut in civilian expenditures.	2:50
	So on that point my conscience is clear.	2:54
	I did argue very vigorously in the first year	2:58
	of the Nixon administration	3:02
	that the policy of gradualism was a mistake.	3:05
	That it would not break the back of the inflation,	3:08
	it would only prolong the agony.	3:13
	And I wrote at the end of that period	3:17
	that I suspected when the economic historians	3:21
	look back on that period and look for the single big mistake	3:24
	it would be the extreme gradualism.	3:28
	I don't wanna go into the reasons	3:33
	for aspousal of that policy,	3:35
	although I think I know some of the reasons.	3:37
	In part it was simply an extreme reaction	3:40
	against the arrogant fine-tuning retentions	3:44
	of the previous team of economists in Washington,	3:48
	but it was a little bit more than that.	3:52
	It had to do too, with a rather curious aspect	3:55
	of monetarism, one which I thought at the time	4:00
	had no particular rationale	4:04
	in terms of the causal mechanisms	4:06
	of monetarism which I could discern and respect,	4:08
	namely that you move to higher rates of change.	4:12
	Rates of change, of rates of change	4:15
	and deciding what is or is not stabilizing.	4:17
	And the gradualism which we actually saw	4:20
	in the first year of the Nixon administration,	4:22
	was not as extreme, not as immoderate, not as excessive,	4:26
	as what had actually been recommended	4:31
	in one of the working parties of Candidate Nixon.	4:34
	I recall because I was asked my opinion of it	4:42
	by an interested member, whether it was really good policy	4:45
	to have as your program, if say,	4:52
	the rate of growth or money supply has been excessive	4:57
	and has been going at nine or 10% a year,	5:00
	can the country really afford	5:03
	to move to six or seven in one year,	5:05
	and then in another year, to four or five	5:10
	and then finally in the third year, to three or four	5:14
	and I argued that was very bad from the standpoint	5:18
	of optimal control theory.	5:21
	That what you wanna do, is to press down hard on the brake,	5:23
	be ready to release your pressing down hard on the brakes,	5:29
	be ready to press your foot again on the accelerator,	5:34
	again pumping on brake alternately,	5:38
	rather than that steady gradualist.	5:41
	Of course I was very familiar	5:44
	with this kind of optimal control problem	5:46
	because during the war, I was engaged in	5:48
	anti-aircraft fire control design	5:51
	and we used the Wiener-Kolmogorov theories	5:55
	which have in the post-war period,	5:59
	in the field of several mechanism, become extremely popular,	6:01
	of how to minimize the squared deviations	6:04
	of your message or of your gunfire,	6:08
	how to separate noise from a signal,	6:15
	when of course you don't know what the future	6:17
	of your system will be but where you do have some idea	6:20
	of what the general statistical properties	6:23
	of the system are as determined by past experience.	6:25
	And so from my feel of the general statistical properties,	6:30
	the auto-correlations, implicit and explicit,	6:35
	in the American GMP Vector,	6:38
	I thought that this was a very bad policy.	6:41
	I noticed that Professor Milton Friedman,	6:44
	in his article earlier this year	6:47
	in the Morgan Guarantee Trust monthly letter,	6:51
	himself has changed his mind in part on this.	6:57
	He doesn't go as far as I'm going here.	7:01
	If I understand his argument,	7:05
	and if I am recollecting it correctly from memory,	7:07
	he now believes it would have been better policy	7:11
	to go from an excessive rate say of 8%,	7:16
	immediately to your goal rate,	7:22
	let's say if your goal rate is 4% for the M1 and 6% for M2,	7:25
	and if you decide that that's the way	7:35
	they're related to each other, then he would say,	7:36
	you should go instantly to that rate and hold to it.	7:40
	Now just what considerations	7:42
	in terms of the auto-correlation	7:47
	of the likely noise-signal data	7:49
	and our ignorance about the future,	7:54
	would lead to that being optimal	7:56
	rather than to an overshoot?	7:58
	I don't know.	8:00
	I think it would be a not difficult exercise	8:01
	to work that out but I think it would be a very odd,	8:05
	a concatenation of circumstances	8:10
	under which that would be the case.	8:12
	So if I were having to defend that particular thesis,	8:14
	I wouldn't do it in terms of its optimal control properties.	8:16
	I would do it in terms of the weakness	8:20
	of the human mind or the weakness of the committee system.	8:22
	That what mankind needs is a very simple,	8:26
	shibboleth and a rule which you can sell	8:29
	in which mankind can understand, which mankind	8:32
	can irrationally adhere to, is needed.	8:35
	So the argument would go and it's better	8:38
	to just always in season and out of season,	8:40
	insist upon absolute the stability	8:43
	of your input that isn't optimal.	8:47
	But given the weakness of men's minds	8:50
	and committees determinations that would be a second best,	8:54
	which could be defended.	8:59
	Well, it's not for me to make such argument as that,	9:00
	but as I look back on that particular period,	9:05
	I am pleased that I spoke out and I wished	9:07
	that I spoken out a more plunging plea.	9:12
	In particular, there was a period back there	9:16
	when the old definition of the money supply,	9:19
	made it seem as if the Federal Reserve	9:24
	was being a rather beastly in the views	9:27
	of those who believe in a standard fixed,	9:30
	steady adhered to rate of growth, the money supply.	9:34
	And there was much grieving if you will remember	9:37
	at that time against the wickedness of the Federal Reserve	9:40
	as being over restrictive this during the 69 inflation,	9:43
	this during, the expansion period.	9:47
	And I didn't feel that way, I felt at the time	9:52
	that if that was the consequence of simple monetarism,	9:56
	then that was the reason for discrediting simple mantras	9:59
	because the economy didn't yet feel	10:03
	as if it was too weak.	10:06
	Well, so I'm glad that I asked for even greater tightness	10:09
	by the Federal Reserve at that time.	10:17
	Of course, in the event it turned out	10:18
	that the rate of growth of the money supply	10:20
	when you properly redefined it	10:23
	so as to include the euro dollar market data	10:26
	was right on target.	10:29
	And of course, right on target at a time	10:32
	when we're on an inflation is according to my notions	10:33
	of good optimal control programming, very bad.	10:37
	You're off target, you should be leaning	10:41
	against the wind at that particular time.	10:42
	So, there too, I don't feel that I in retrospect	10:45
	would want to change my criticisms of the Nixon team policy.	10:52
	We come to a third area, the Nixon team policy.	11:00
	Here I must say, we're in an area that involves	11:03
	considerable amount of value judgments.	11:06
	The earlier Nixon policy	11:08
	was not to have any income as policy.	11:12
	I don't know why Pinera Frei, who was the president's	11:16
	so called official economic spokesman in the last campaign	11:19
	and we've been aboard the campaign party	11:22
	as an advisor in the first campaign.	11:27
	I don't know why he wasn't put on the enemy list	11:30
	because he said harder things	11:32
	about the president personally	11:35
	and much harder things about the president's team.	11:37
	than I have ever dared to say, and you will recall	11:40
	because I've quoted this and I'm only quoted it	11:44
	because Pinera Frei, said it on the airwaves	11:46
	and repeated it and lectures about 10 times twice	11:51
	in my presence that he had gone to President Nixon	11:53
	in the early months of 1969 and then told President Nixon	11:58
	that he must use his presidential leadership	12:02
	to help have some kind of incomes policy,	12:04
	some kind of an informal guidepost guidelines policy	12:07
	to hold down the rate of increase of prices and wages.	12:11
	And that the president had said to him that,	12:14
	no, he wouldn't do that,	12:18
	he didn't believe in anything he would work	12:19
	in any case was against his philosophy.	12:21
	And then Pinera Frei went back and sent telegrams	12:22
	to his 500 or 1000 clients saying raise prices,	12:26
	the White House doesn't care, which he boasted,	12:29
	they proceeded to do.	12:32
	Well in this third area then I did criticize	12:36
	the first game plan	12:40
	for completely turning its back on incomes policy.	12:41
	This, by the way, it was not a monolithic policy	12:45
	inside the administration.	12:48
	It's a nearly kept secret that Paul McCracken	12:50
	and when he saw that the other medicine wasn't working,	12:53
	moved gradually towards favoring	12:55
	some kind of incomes policy.	12:58
	And we know in the end	13:00
	that the Secretary of Treasury, Connolly, a non economist	13:01
	captured the president's agreement	13:05
	in August 15th, 1971 we went into phase one.	13:08
	But the record I think is a little more shameful	13:13
	than that because there were a number of people	13:16
	presidential appointees who were fired for saying under oath	13:20
	before Congress when asked whether they thought	13:25
	that some kinds of incomes policy was a good thing,	13:28
	they grudgingly said, yes, they did.	13:32
	And that was considered grounds for dismissal.	13:35
	Well, the president himself threw away the old game plan.	13:41
	He tore it up in August of 1971.	13:45
	I think he did that because he realized that the election	13:50
	was going to be, goes badly in 72	13:55
	if the country was still doing this badly.	13:58
	And I came out with the writings in which I gave	14:01
	two cheers for his policy.	14:06
	So I don't think that that's a very weak support	14:09
	in this particular case.	14:14
	I very rarely give three cheers to very few of the things	14:15
	that President Johnson, for example, did.	14:19
	Now, as long as we're going into this aspect	14:24
	of political economy,	14:28
	at the time that I received the Nobel award	14:29
	in October of 1970, I was besieged by the press	14:32
	and had press conferences and there was there I think	14:36
	a professional even ethical issue as to whether	14:41
	one should use an occasion like that	14:44
	for giving opinions on policy.	14:47
	You certainly were deluged by questions	14:49
	with respect to policy.	14:51
	And I'll remind you that, that was at the bottom	14:53
	of the recession of 1969 and 1970.	14:56
	We now know, we came out of it in November of 1970	15:01
	when the General Motors strike was a settled.	15:05
	And I spoke out very strongly and critically.	15:08
	And there I think that, depending upon how you feel	15:12
	about this ethical professional issue,	15:17
	you might fairly introduce some	15:20
	(mumbles)	15:23
	criticism of my particular stand.	15:25
	Well, one could go on and I guess I conclude	15:30
	as I look back over my writings	15:38
	that I feel on the whole, I pulled my punches	15:41
	rather than went out slugging.	15:46
	But I feel on the whole I would do the same thing again	15:49
	because I think you actually gain a credence	15:51
	and you gain weight in political, economical discussions.	15:54
	If you take the less polemical line,	16:00
	what you gain by the polemical clever arguments and humor,	16:05
	in the short run, I think you lose in the longer run	16:10
	and what you lose in the short run,	16:14
	by playing it straight and being if anything	16:16
	leaning over backwards, I think that, you may hope	16:22
	to gain in the long run.	16:26
	In any case, it's a matter of temperament.	16:28
	Now let's turn to more interesting matters	16:30
	to exactly what seems to be going on	16:35
	in the American economy in the summer of 1973.	16:39
	Two things are note-worthy	16:43
	and worth commenting on it this time.	16:46
	First, the suspected weakness in real growth	16:48
	in the second quarter seems now to have been confirmed	16:51
	by the preliminary estimates	16:54
	that are beginning to come out.	16:56
	We went from 7.9% real growth	16:58
	in the first quarter of the year,	17:02
	which is pretty much the way we've been going along	17:04
	for the previous four or five quarters down to below 4%,	17:06
	It now appears.	17:12
	We don't have the official first estimate,	17:15
	but that is the way the experts seem to be sizing this up.	17:17
	We have to ask ourself what that means.	17:24
	Secondly, we've had some developments	17:27
	with respect to the so-called monetary crunch	17:29
	and that's worth commenting on.	17:32
	Let me begin with the second point.	17:33
	You will remember in earlier tapes	17:37
	I discussed the extremely interesting view of Albert Wildgen	17:40
	one of the First Boston Corporation.	17:45
	He held as early as April of this year,	17:50
	but even earlier, but I quoted his April speech in Boston	17:54
	that in mid-year we'd be in a money crunch.	17:59
	And just two weeks ago,	18:02
	I commented as to whether that had really happened.	18:04
	Well, perhaps we are in a money crunch.	18:07
	It depends semantically on how you define the word crunch,	18:10
	but at least I've seen people in Wall Street	18:15
	use that word as if it was here and now.	18:18
	The Lehman Weekly, a letter on the bond market	18:21
	and interest rates, by Mr. Santo and others,	18:27
	spoke bluntly of our being in a money crunch.	18:31
	What was involved was federal funds rates	18:36
	that aren't six, 7%, aren't eight or 9%, but are at 10%	18:40
	and even for a short periods may go to 15%.	18:46
	The unavailability of certain credit	18:52
	is beginning to be reported	18:55
	in different parts of the country.	18:57
	So some of the conditions which the economic historians	18:59
	use to define a money crunch may already be in the scene.	19:04
	We'll have no argument at all if we say that tight money	19:11
	as measured by a high interest rates,	19:15
	by rising interest rates,	19:18
	by tougher rationing of credit is here.	19:20
	If you wanna call that a crunch,	19:25
	then we are in a money crunch.	19:27
	If you wanna play it safer	19:29
	and speak of pre-crunch conditions	19:31
	as Dr. Otto Eckstein does,	19:33
	then we are further along in the pre-crunch syndrome	19:37
	in the development.	19:42
	This is beginning to have its toll.	19:44
	Just as an example, when I was coming up in the airplane	19:47
	from Washington a couple of days ago,	19:51
	sitting next to me was a civil servant economist	19:56
	in the government and we just happened	20:02
	to spring up a conversation and he told me	20:04
	that his wife was in the real estate business.	20:06
	She is a broker in the selling of houses,	20:09
	and he said that in the last two weeks	20:11
	that money had dried up completely.	20:14
	I said, does that mean she can't sell houses?	20:16
	And he said, of course she can't sell anything	20:18
	unless the buyer will take back a first mortgage	20:20
	for the amount, then he can't sell.	20:24
	Now, economists know from experience	20:28
	that if this happens in the short run,	20:32
	if you wait at a higher and higher price,	20:35
	you'll be able to get some kind of accommodation.	20:38
	Not everybody but people with good jobs and so forth.	20:41
	But in the meantime, there's the real estate agent	20:45
	doing no business, and there are people who want	20:49
	to get rid of their homes who are locked in.	20:52
	That is typical of a crunch when it develops.	20:55
	I mentioned to you that the ramblings that I get	20:59
	from the West Coast, show that already	21:02
	for the purpose of a promotion,	21:04
	you can't any longer raise money	21:11
	for a new suburban shopping market development.	21:13
	This is just not the time.	21:19
	Now, what we haven't got yet is the bank's breathing	21:21
	very hard on dealers in the money market	21:25
	and saying, because your old customers,	21:28
	because we've been dealing with you for years,	21:31
	we'll accommodate you,	21:32
	but we really don't want your business,	21:33
	we want you to cut down.	21:35
	And when that happens, that's very typical of a real crunch.	21:36
	Then these dealers in the money market,	21:40
	no longer will make a market.	21:42
	In other words, somebody comes in with a batch of bonds	21:44
	and wants to sell them ordinarily,	21:46
	they position these but when the friendly banker	21:48
	isn't so friendly and is breathing very hard down on them,	21:53
	then they just won't put in a bid and you can get	21:56
	for a day or two or several days in a row,	22:00
	just sort of no bottom in the bond market.	22:03
	We've had a condition in which government bonds	22:07
	have gone down 100 basis points in a day in recent times.	22:09
	So, measured by what seems to be happening	22:13
	to the rates quoted for loans	22:17
	for investments and the rationing,	22:23
	you would say we were in very tight money and you know,	22:26
	there are at least two different definitions of tight money.	22:30
	There's the effect of interest rates,	22:32
	but there's the other definition which monetarists	22:34
	would insist is the primary one.	22:36
	Some would say it's the only one	22:39
	which they will have any interest in at all	22:40
	and that is what's happening	22:43
	to the rate of growth of money supply.	22:44
	And so paradoxically, we've been having very high rates	22:46
	of growth of the money supply in recent months	22:50
	after low rates in the first quarter of the year.	22:53
	At the same time that interest rates are shooting upward.	22:56
	Presumably, if the Federal Reserve had achieved	23:00
	what must have been its open market committee's	23:05
	primary targets, which we'll read about in 90 days,	23:08
	90 days after the fact, then if they'd held the rate	23:13
	of growth the money supply down to what I've supposed	23:18
	as Dr. Arthur Burns and his colleagues have been aiming at,	23:20
	which would be not more than 6%.	23:24
	If they had achieved that instead of the 9% numbers,	23:28
	which were actually realized, then one has to suppose	23:31
	that in the short run, the interest rates	23:34
	would be shooting upward even more strongly.	23:36
	People ask me, what's the matter with the Federal Reserve?	23:42
	Don't they know that the first quarter,	23:45
	second quarter rate of growth of the real output is down?	23:47
	Don't they know that most of the experts	23:50
	using computer models or judgmental models	23:54
	expect that we are already moving	23:56
	into a mini recession and growth recession?	23:59
	Some think we're moving into a real a recession.	24:02
	Why then do they let this money crunch develop?	24:06
	And I think the answer is at first, that the first signs	24:11
	of a turn do not mean that with confidence	24:16
	you can be sure that the turn is already taken place.	24:18
	The Federal Reserve doesn't know	24:20
	that we're now in a mini recession.	24:21
	All it knows is that a very strong,	24:24
	excessively strong first quarter	24:26
	was followed by some relaxation in the second quarter	24:28
	and it will take a good deal more confirmation	24:32
	than that for them to really shift completely around.	24:36
	Secondly, we still have	24:42
	miserable behavior on the price front.	24:43
	The Department of Agriculture has now, so to speak,	24:47
	thrown in the sponge, they've just come out	24:50
	with their very important announcement	24:53
	and what's going to happen to the crop estimates.	24:54
	This is something that every speculator	24:59
	and the Board of Trade waits for anxiously.	25:00
	A scandal like Watergate would be nothing	25:04
	compared to a scandal in which this particular information	25:06
	was made available to private traders for their profit	25:09
	in advance of the official release.	25:12
	Of course that didn't happen.	25:14
	Well, we got the news, namely that the crops	25:16
	look to be good, look to be better than last year.	25:19
	The wheat crop has been marvelous	25:23
	and there's been a lot of acreage.	25:25
	And even though it's a little bit late,	25:26
	in going in the ground,	25:29
	the general total soy bean allocation,	25:30
	corn and so forth, looks to be good.	25:36
	But the spokesman for the Department of Agriculture,	25:38
	I guess the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture	25:41
	had to say at the same time, nevertheless,	25:43
	it looks if food prices are going to go up	25:45
	because this increase in grain will not show itself	25:48
	in the form of an increase in meat, red meat	25:54
	coming on the market.	25:56
	Chickens, broilers in time to dampen down	25:57
	and reduce the very high prices,	26:03
	which we're now having anyway.	26:05
	So it's widely expected outside of Washington	26:06
	and inside of Washington,	26:09
	that after the freeze period is over,	26:11
	which will be very soon after	26:12
	I'm now talking to you, on this morning	26:14
	that there's going to be some kind	26:17
	of upward bulge in prices.	26:20
	Well, the Federal Reserve has a duty to try	26:23
	to keep employment high,	26:27
	to try to keep the unemployment rate down,	26:30
	but it also has a duty and a concern	26:32
	to worry about inflation and increase in price level.	26:35
	Federal Reserve is being screamed at from Paris,	26:41
	from Frankfurt, from Basel because the dollar,	26:44
	except for three days strength based upon a rumor	26:48
	that there was intervention by the central banks	26:51
	of the governments that in other words,	26:55
	if you were having a dirty float,	26:57
	except for those three days,	26:59
	the dollar has been extremely weak.	27:00
	So the Federal Reserve has that reason,	27:02
	to continue to let interest rates rise	27:04
	if that's the way they seem to wanna do	27:10
	when the rate of growth of the money supply	27:12
	is at reasonable level.	27:15
	But the final reason I think why the Federal Reserve	27:21
	is behaving the way that it is,	27:23
	is that although money is very tight, and even crunchy	27:27
	in the credit cost of credit sense, this is all taking place	27:33
	with very rapid increases in the aggregate money magnitudes.	27:38
	In other words, M1 is leaping forward at a very high rate.	27:44
	And as long as that's the case, the Federal Reserve	27:47
	having been under pressure, by the monetarists	27:49
	and by eclectic economists for many years	27:52
	to pay lot of attention to the total of the rate of growth,	27:55
	of money supply, this means that it's more or less	27:59
	in a cliff, a stick.	28:02
	Well now, I haven't much time left,	28:05
	let me in the remaining minutes which I do have,	28:08
	just comment a little bit on what we can conclude	28:12
	from the second quarter weakness in the rate of growth.	28:17
	They're two completely different interpretations possible.	28:24
	First interpretation is the rosy one.	28:27
	I've mentioned this before,	28:30
	I think that Dr. Otto Eckstein	28:31
	of the Data Resources Incorporated, leans towards this,	28:34
	namely that this is moderating the excesses	28:39
	of the boom and it's a good thing.	28:43
	So we should feel a little more cheerful today	28:46
	than we did two months ago.	28:49
	The opposite interpretation is that of Alberti Summers	28:52
	of the Conference Board.	28:56
	I've quoted his memoranda earlier,	28:57
	on many an occasion because they're worth quoting.	29:00
	Well, I have here his most recent that of July 6th,	29:03
	devoted to what's going to happen in the next 18 months.	29:07
	And to summarize it very briefly,	29:10
	he says that we're still in a raging boom.	29:12
	That the weakness of growth of output is a supply,	29:17
	not a demand effect.	29:21
	I called attention to that and wondered	29:23
	why more people weren't looking into that question.	29:25
	Well, Dr. Summers has looked into the question	29:28
	and as far as he's concerned,	29:32
	it's still is economy running all out	29:36
	and the best thing that can happen	29:42
	would be for the Federal Reserve	29:44
	to be even tighter than it is now.	29:45
	Let me in the remaining moment,	29:48
	just quote the last paragraph of his very interesting piece.	29:50
	The model described here, an economy,	29:56
	that's the model that he's describing	30:00
	in which inflationary excesses and cyclical expansion	30:01
	are being confronted	30:05
	by disinflationary policy much too late.	30:06
	The consequences are a tough than prolonged struggle	30:10
	with inflation and almost inevitable recession.	30:13
	In fact, it would in the end be less painful	30:17
	if policy now we're to relinquish	30:20
	its concern over recession and focus on the need	30:21
	to build a sustainable longer term relationship	30:24
	between demand and supply,	30:27
	that does not depend on mandatory price controls.	30:28
	Any resort to tax increases or selective controls,	30:32
	will bring recession nearer.	30:34
	It would also bring stability and order nearer.	30:36
	For this reason, the application of such devices	30:39
	should be cause for celebration in financial markets.	30:41
	One is tempted to say that recession	30:45
	is no longer a fear of financial markets.	30:46
	It is now nearly a hope.	30:49
	For industrial markets too, the great threat	30:51
	is not recession, but the boundless capabilities	30:54
	for mischief that reside in direct price controls.	30:56
-	If you have any comments or questions	31:01
	for Professor Samuelson,	31:03
	address them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	31:04
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	31:07

Item Info

Title:

Tape 132 - Watergate; the money crunch

Date:

1973

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

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Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0129
ref2397_24r
samuelsonpaul
duke:325152
pstau001129
ark:/87924/r4fx74f0j
044f45b7-9fd1-417b-9b61-f4e49ee38c9e

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Tape 132 - Watergate; the money crunch

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