Tape 91 - Meaning of the McCracken resignation; international money situation

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-	Welcome once again, as MIT Professor Paul Samuelson	0:02
	discusses the current economic scene.	0:04
	This biweekly series is produced	0:07
	by Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	0:08
	and was recorded December 13th, 1971.	0:11
	Professor Samuelson, we have some questions from subscribers	0:14
	that have been accumulating.	0:17
	Here are the first two, the first one:	0:19
	Paul McCracken has resigned,	0:21
	now what does this mean for policy?	0:22
	Will Dr. Stein stand for different programs?	0:24
	More generally, would you give your appraisal of who's who	0:27
	in the upcoming administration team,	0:30
	and what can we expect from them	0:32
	in the way of recommendations?	0:34
	A second question asks for comments on how	0:36
	the international money crisis is coming along.	0:38
	How will this change and most importantly,	0:41
	how will it affect the stock market?	0:43
-	Actually, these two questions are interrelated	0:44
	and I can try to answer them together.	0:47
	I had, in any case, been meaning to comment	0:50
	on the return of Paul McCracken to academic life.	0:53
	By about the time you hear this tape,	0:57
	there will be appearing in the New York Times,	1:00
	on the so-called Op-Ed page,	1:03
	an appreciation by me of Paul McCracken's work	1:05
	in the first three years of the Nixon administration.	1:08
	Let me summarize what that says	1:12
	and enlarge on its various implications and meanings	1:15
	and then go on to discuss the various personnel.	1:19
	This from a standpoint of what hints we can get	1:24
	about probable policy recommendations in the future.	1:29
	The article is entitled, Welcome Home, Professor McCracken.	1:35
	Begins, As Paul McCracken goes back to private life	1:39
	as a University of Michigan professor,	1:43
	the nation owes him thanks for a thankless job	1:45
	as chairman of the Nixon Council of Economic Advisers.	1:49
	Now why did I write the thankless job?	1:53
	That's because it is easy to be an economic adviser	1:57
	when the country has inherited a slack economy	2:00
	from incompetent predecessors.	2:03
	The real rate of growth in the United States	2:07
	from 1953 to 1960,	2:10
	those are the Eisenhower years, was only 2.5%.	2:15
	But if you come in after such a performance,	2:20
	you have certain opportunities.	2:23
	Then, one can deploy the skills of the head,	2:25
	to achieve the goals of the heart,	2:28
	the goals of greater employment,	2:31
	improved living standards, and even higher profits.	2:32
	But, when you inherit the demand-pull inflation,	2:36
	that stem from the tragic escalation	2:40
	of the Indochina War in 1965,	2:42
	that was another story for	2:45
	Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers,	2:48
	Paul McCracken, and indeed for President Nixon	2:50
	and his whole team of economists.	2:53
	Furthermore, if you inherited a dollar	2:57
	that has been overvalued for a decade,	2:59
	and has been acutely overvalued since 1965, and I wanna add,	3:01
	and which had been growing a more overvalued	3:06
	in the last of part of the five years since 1965.	3:10
	Well, inheriting such a situation would've called,	3:14
	not only for all the wiles of a master economist,	3:17
	but also, the presidential boldness of a Roosevelt.	3:21
	And here I mean either Roosevelt,	3:25
	the Republican Theodore Roosevelt	3:26
	or the Democratic Franklin Roosevelt,	3:28
	or perhaps the spunky, self-confidence of a Harry Truman	3:32
	who could decide that we would drop the atomic bomb	3:36
	on the Japanese and then go right to bed	3:39
	and have a good night's sleep.	3:41
	The Harold Wilsons and the Richard Nixons of the world	3:45
	are always, by nature and temperament,	3:48
	too cautious to act decisively	3:50
	on the first day that they take office.	3:52
	Some of us, by the way, will say thank providence	3:56
	for that cautiousness.	3:59
	But what was open to either one of them,	4:01
	and you may be sure some advisers of Harold Wilson	4:04
	when the labor government took office in the middle 1960s,	4:08
	and to Richard Nixon when he took office in 1969,	4:12
	was your first act should be to depreciate	4:18
	your overvalued currency, putting the blame squarely	4:23
	on the rascals who preceded you.	4:26
	What happened, in other words, on August 15th,	4:29
	the suspension of gold and the termination of our	4:31
	seeming to play ball with the IMF rules,	4:35
	could've happened on the day after inauguration	4:38
	in January of 1969.	4:43
	Well, Paul McCracken is not himself by temperament	4:47
	and a brilliant person like, say, Dr. Nicholas Kaldor,	4:53
	who did advise, we now know,	4:58
	that the Harold Wilson government to depreciate.	5:01
	By the way, Kaldor was not alone in England	5:03
	and you couldn't really expect him to have urged	5:07
	such decisive action, of course we didn't get it.	5:11
	Now what has Dr. McCracken been like?	5:15
	In my view, and I say this in admiration,	5:19
	he has been an eclectic centrist in an administration	5:22
	that has not been short on extremists,	5:28
	not short on people who, actually, are beginners	5:35
	in the mires of macroeconomics.	5:37
	From the beginning, Chairman McCracken was also,	5:42
	the record should read, not master in his own house.	5:46
	For example, in the first year of the Nixon administration,	5:49
	Dr. Arthur Burns was calling a lot of the signals	5:55
	from the White House.	5:58
	This is a matter of clear and public record.	6:00
	This is a situation that I don't think that Chairman Burns	6:03
	of the 1953, 1956 Eisenhower Council of Economic Advisers	6:07
	would never have tolerated from anyone	6:15
	in the Eisenhower White House.	6:17
	Actually, Dr. Gabriel Hauge,	6:20
	now of the Manufacturers Hanover Trust bank,	6:22
	was in the White House,	6:27
	but Hauge and Burns got along very well indeed,	6:28
	and there was no question of Burns being subordinated	6:33
	to any unilateral advice or actions by Dr. Hauge.	6:37
	Well, later, of course, others,	6:44
	in my view, less age than Arthur Burns	6:47
	also usurp the authority of the CEA.	6:51
	Dr. George Shultz, who was Secretary of the Labor	6:55
	and who did magnificently in that job, was one whom	6:58
	the new president had not known very well,	7:04
	but he soon developed a great deal of confidence in him	7:06
	and it was understood in the public press	7:09
	that the number one domestic authority on economics	7:13
	was Dr. Shultz and not Dr. McCracken.	7:20
	This parallels, of course, the situation	7:24
	with respect to foreign policy.	7:26
	The number one adviser to the president	7:28
	has been Dr. Kissinger.	7:31
	This does not mean that Dr. Kissinger	7:34
	tells the Secretary of State what to do	7:37
	as if the Secretary of State is a puppet,	7:39
	but it does mean that the most important person	7:43
	discussing with the president	7:49
	and what the president himself is gonna decide to do,	7:50
	has been in the foreign policy area, Dr. Kissinger.	7:52
	And something like that was apparently being duplicated	7:56
	in the domestic economic policy sphere.	8:01
	Speaking as a professional economist,	8:07
	I have a slight objection to having the authority	8:10
	of the Council of Economic Advisers downgraded in this way.	8:14
	I know that Walter Heller, when he took office	8:18
	as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers	8:23
	at the beginning of 1961	8:26
	in the John F. Kennedy administration,	8:27
	stipulated, as a condition for his taking the job,	8:29
	that not only would he have access	8:32
	to the president all the time, but he stipulated	8:35
	what some of his predecessors had never done,	8:38
	which was that the other two members of the Council	8:40
	were not to be just guys named Joe, but they were to be	8:42
	on these presidential meetings and cabinet meetings	8:46
	and that actually was the case.	8:52
	Well, now let's return to the case of Paul McCracken,	8:55
	because I think we have some lessons	8:58
	for how the administration works	8:59
	and what's coming up in the months ahead.	9:02
	A careful reading of the text of last years economic report,	9:07
	and also of Dr. McCracken's testimony	9:12
	before the Joint Economic Committee	9:14
	in defense of that report, suggests to me the hypothesis	9:16
	that his heart was never in the administration's	9:19
	almost ludicrous, over-estimate of 1971 GNP.	9:23
	Let me say that I read in a bank month letter,	9:29
	this was the letter, actually, by Tilford Gaines,	9:33
	I guess it was the Manufactures Trust,	9:39
	that the 1971 forecast, by the government	9:42
	of 1065 and so forth, was not a forecast but was a target.	9:47
	If you will review the language, not only of the report,	9:52
	but the testimony of the CEA	9:56
	before the Joint Economic Committee,	9:59
	you will find again and again the sentence	10:01
	that not only is this a target,	10:03
	but this is the most probable outcome, so it was a forecast.	10:05
	Well in any case, if his heart wasn't in it,	10:11
	certainly McCracken's head was never in it.	10:14
	Because he never really did supply a reasoned defense	10:16
	of the 1065 billion estimate	10:21
	and the even more dubious estimate of real GNP growth	10:24
	and the reduction of unemployment by mid-1972.	10:27
	When the CEA testified before the Joint Economic Committee	10:34
	they didn't even give a breakdown	10:39
	of how this marvelous GNP number was to be achieved,	10:41
	and Senator Proxmire, the chairman of that committee,	10:45
	insisted that they attempt such a breakdown	10:49
	and they did reluctantly bring one in.	10:52
	My recollection, it's a little vague now	10:55
	because it's not an important matter,	10:57
	was that it was some providential increase	10:59
	in the propensity to consume	11:03
	that was going to save our bacon.	11:04
	Well now, worst of all, Paul McCracken was kind of unlucky.	11:08
	In the Republican Papers, written during the heady days	11:14
	of the presidential campaign, he stated himself	11:17
	to be more of a monetarist than he had ever been previously	11:21
	or, in fact, than he has ever been since.	11:26
	If you want to find a reference to that,	11:29
	look up the paperback of the Republican Papers.	11:32
	Or even better, for this purpose, there is an edited version	11:35
	that appeared in a readings anthology in economics	11:39
	that's widely used in the classrooms of the United States	11:42
	under my editorship, and the edited version which I have	11:44
	brings out more strongly the monetarist position	11:49
	of Paul McCracken at that time.	11:54
	I sent him a copy of the edited version	11:56
	and it was only with his permission	12:00
	that it appeared in that form.	12:02
	Well, if that particular version of monetarism,	12:06
	which attaches almost complete importance	12:11
	among the systematic influences determining inflation	12:17
	and the level of money spending	12:20
	on the rate of growth of the money supply,	12:23
	if you, like me, think that that is a one sided view,	12:26
	then you have to say that for	12:32
	adopting that view at that time	12:34
	Paul McCracken had only himself to blame.	12:37
	But more important, how could any economist throw a stone	12:40
	at him for not having predicted the unpredictable?	12:43
	Namely, the fact that the cost-push,	12:47
	or what we economists call the Phillips curve pathology	12:50
	of the American mixed economy,	12:53
	has turned out, since 1969, to be so much worse	12:55
	than past patterns of experience has suggested.	13:00
	And by this I mean, all the regression equations	13:03
	to predict how much deceleration	13:08
	of price and wage inflation	13:10
	the Nixon-engineered stagnation would induce,	13:13
	all of those, and I have gone over a great number of them,	13:16
	prove to be systematically over-optimistic.	13:20
	You understand that I mean all of those in academic life	13:22
	not those inside the government.	13:25
	For a little unemployment,	13:28
	we got all the derisory reduction in the rate of inflation,	13:29
	and even for a rather considerable amount of unemployment	13:33
	we got less improvement in the rate of inflation	13:36
	and a more delayed improvement in that rate	13:40
	than the regression equations	13:43
	based upon past experience had suggested.	13:46
	I was asked, by the way, when I spoke	13:50
	at the Investment Bankers Association meeting in Florida,	13:53
	I appeared on a panel with Ezra Solomon,	13:56
	Dr. Ezra Solomon of the Council of Economic Advisers,	13:58
	what the expression regression equation means,	14:01
	and let me simply say for brevity that this is the name	14:04
	that we give to the statistical fitted relations	14:08
	that tell you how to predict	14:14
	from a multiple correlation study of past behavior,	14:15
	of unemployment and similar factors,	14:21
	what's to be expected about the change in GNP deflator.	14:23
	Well, both Dr. Burns and Paul McCracken recognized	14:28
	ahead of the rest of the administration	14:35
	that the game plan was not working out as hoped.	14:38
	Dr. Burns put the matter overdramatically when he said	14:43
	that the laws of behavior of the economy	14:46
	are different from what they used to be.	14:50
	However, it took the November 1970 election	14:54
	and the force of a Texan non-economist,	14:58
	I'm referring of course to	15:01
	Secretary of the Treasury Connally,	15:03
	who came on the new team succeeding David Kennedy,	15:05
	to persuade a politically sophisticated president	15:08
	that the time had come for 180 degree change.	15:11
	And of course, I almost forgot,	15:14
	it also took a currency crisis to bring that about.	15:16
	Well, by this time, the blackboards of Ann Arbor	15:20
	began to beckon and I conclude the article by saying	15:23
	that my whole profession wishes Paul McCracken well	15:28
	as he returns back to real life,	15:31
	that is back to the real life of professorial studies.	15:33
	Let me enlarge upon the explanation	15:40
	of why I think the president came to an agonizing decision	15:45
	in the week before August 15th	15:50
	to change his previous policy.	15:52
	I'm now going by what is in the public record	15:55
	and I'm going by what I have heard both in speeches,	15:58
	as for example, the speech given	16:03
	by the presidential assistant, Peter Flanigan,	16:05
	at the Investment Bankers Association meeting,	16:09
	but also elsewhere in Washington.	16:13
	Secretary of Treasury Connally, had never,	16:19
	in my judgment, believed in the 1065 billion.	16:22
	I go along with the gossip at cocktail parties in Washington	16:25
	that the Treasury, in the infighting	16:32
	at the beginning of this last year,	16:38
	was not one of the enthusiasts for the high estimate.	16:41
	And Secretary Connally is not an economist,	16:49
	but he is also a good political animal	16:56
	who has lived through the jungle of Texas political life	16:58
	and I think that he was telling the president,	17:02
	week in, week out, that the Gallup and other polls	17:07
	were showing that he was being murdered by this game plan.	17:11
	Peter Flanigan said as much when he said,	17:14
	and I'm going to paraphrase what it is that he said	17:18
	because it represents two important strains	17:21
	in the team which is still there,	17:25
	one, said Peter Flanagan,	17:27
	the old game plan really was working,	17:28
	and I think that Dr. Shultz	17:31
	has been quoted as believing this.	17:35
	But now back to Flanigan, he went on to say,	17:39
	But the public didn't realize that, and there was danger	17:42
	that the public's failure to realize this could,	17:46
	aside from politics, aside from election,	17:48
	could have affects upon confidence	17:52
	which would undermine the program.	17:55
	You'd have a self-fulfilling prophecy on the downside,	17:58
	people would think that the program	18:00
	was gonna work out badly	18:02
	and that would make it work out badly.	18:03
	And then more constructively, Flanigan went on to say	18:06
	that the way an administration spokesman can justify	18:09
	the president's doing on August 15th,	18:13
	what he had said many times he would not do,	18:16
	was that, unlike the attempts by the British and others	18:19
	to have a freeze and price and wage controls phase,	18:25
	two like programs, in the face of inflation,	18:32
	this administration, because the old game plan was working,	18:36
	was working with nature and was reinforcing nature	18:41
	and so there really was no contradiction.	18:45
	Well, let me go on, Dr. Stein who succeeded Paul McCracken,	18:48
	I do not think was more in favor of wage and price controls	18:54
	than Paul McCracken was.	18:58
	My suspicion is that since he is	18:59
	a good Chicago-trained economist,	19:02
	since we know his writings, we know his speeches,	19:03
	that he was even less enthusiastic for them	19:06
	than Paul McCracken had been.	19:08
	Nevertheless, he was the head of the design committee	19:10
	that set up the apparatus, but as has been widely said,	19:13
	he may have been the architect of the new controls	19:17
	but he was not the contractor.	19:19
	And he was just being the good civil servant,	19:21
	sort of civil servant that Britain has turned out	19:23
	more often than we have, who translates for the executive	19:27
	what it is that the executive wants,	19:31
	and Dr. Stein will be the architect of dismantling	19:33
	the controls, just as cheerfully, in fact,	19:38
	more cheerfully, I believe, when the times comes.	19:41
	Obviously, Secretary Connally moved up,	19:45
	he moved up in the public eye because he turned out to be	19:48
	about the most effective spokesman	19:52
	that the administration has been able to find	19:54
	to go before the people and before the Congress,	19:57
	in favor of the president's programs.	20:01
	Indeed, and now I am repeating	20:05
	what appeared in Joseph Craft's	20:08
	column in Washington, but which I have heard	20:11
	from many different unofficial sources,	20:16
	Governor Connally got so far out	20:21
	in the public pronouncements, that he began to seem	20:23
	a little bit blustering and threatening to our lives	20:28
	so that the strength of his position	20:32
	about a 13 billion dollar increase	20:35
	in the balance of payments,	20:37
	about our not giving up the investment tax surcharge	20:38
	until the others had already shaped up,	20:43
	until we got a big appreciation	20:47
	of the other currencies and so forth,	20:49
	that this was standing in the way of an agreement	20:52
	and was threatening to create a world recession.	20:54
	And according to these same rumor mills,	20:59
	both Dr. Burns and Henry Kissinger,	21:04
	who after all does have an interest in world prosperity	21:08
	as a foreign relations advisor,	21:11
	went to the president and said	21:14
	that you really have to start calling in Secretary Connally.	21:15
	This is my explanation of what happened	21:21
	at the meeting in Rome	21:23
	because as you know and as the stock market noted	21:24
	with a great deal of satisfaction,	21:28
	'cause the stock market went up and we've had a nice rise	21:30
	presumably based upon what happened there,	21:34
	Secretary Connally became much more conciliatory.	21:37
	In particular, the stumbling block of raising	21:40
	the dollar price of official gold and of paper gold,	21:44
	of SDRs, which we had said we would never do	21:48
	even though this was urged upon us	21:51
	by all other nine members of the club of ten,	21:53
	there's now an indication that that'll happen.	21:58
	I have been saying all along it's going to happen	22:00
	because there are no effective reasons against it	22:01
	and there are many reasons	22:04
	at the tactical level in favor of it.	22:06
	So, I would say that Secretary Connally has been leashed in.	22:09
	Indeed, this shows the danger of an overly strong position	22:15
	on one side because it tends to lead	22:19
	to an overly strong position on the other side.	22:21
	My fear now, and this is the fear	22:23
	of many Washington watchers, is that the president	22:25
	is so eager to have an agreement,	22:29
	that he has, in effect, told Connally,	22:31
	you understand that I really do want an agreement	22:35
	and I want it before some of these summit meetings	22:36
	and before I go to Pete King, and as a result,	22:39
	I think we're likely to settle for more	22:43
	than we ought to settle for and the French	22:46
	are likely to get more than they ought to get.	22:48
	Now what does that mean, that my time is almost up?	22:52
	Let me develop that.	22:56
	Of course it will be a good thing	22:58
	if we can get an agreement from the rest of the nations,	23:00
	particularly the Japanese Yen and the German Mark,	23:06
	to have a sizable appreciation.	23:10
	Let's say 15%, at least, for the Yen and 12%, at least,	23:15
	for Mark, the 12% not from August 15th	23:20
	but from the pre-May, a previous parody of the Mark.	23:22
	And a similar good appreciation even from the French,	23:29
	averaging, different numbers are given	23:34
	but lets speak of numbers like 10% and 11% across the board.	23:36
	Of course that's better than to have a stabilization	23:40
	at only half that amount of appreciation.	23:42
	But many people would rather see	23:45
	the currencies continue to float	23:47
	than for us to settle at too modest a level,	23:49
	and some of those people,	23:53
	I'm not sure whether I am one of them	23:55
	'cause it's a very tough question,	23:58
	think even the 10% and 11% is inadequate.	24:00
	However, let's suppose that it's out of the question,	24:05
	for feasibility reasons of diplomacy and otherwise,	24:08
	to continue to have a float and to continue	24:11
	to have clean floating in which governments don't intervene.	24:14
	That particular goal maybe is ahead of us	24:17
	but maybe it's five years ahead of us	24:20
	or ten years ahead of us	24:21
	and it's not in the cards in the immediate future.	24:22
	When we stabilize, even at this rather satisfactory level,	24:26
	do we stabilize with some kind of an agreement	24:30
	towards convertibility, or do we not?	24:33
	Now, most American economists outside of government	24:36
	and outside of the business community,	24:40
	I think wish us not to make any serious commitments	24:42
	with respect to convertibility.	24:47
	If the official price of gold is raised	24:49
	and its $38 an ounce instead of $35 an ounce,	24:51
	the United States is not gonna be selling gold	24:54
	or giving gold away freely at $38 an ounce	24:57
	any more than it was willing to do so at $35 an ounce.	24:59
	More than that, all the dollars that have gone abroad,	25:03
	a lot of them through speculators and are still there,	25:05
	those dollars are not to be regarded	25:09
	in the way the sterling balances were regarded	25:11
	at the end of World War II as an obligation	25:13
	of the United States and that we have some obligation	25:15
	to develop surpluses and earn them back.	25:18
	Or that we have some obligation to fund them in the way	25:23
	that, say, the Young Plan, or the Dawes Plan,	25:27
	funded reparationed obligations	25:29
	at the end of World War I or inter-allied debts.	25:33
	The people who were over 21 who took those dollars in,	25:38
	government and otherwise, and there should be no explicit	25:40
	commitment to convert them into anything except themselves.	25:44
	Now, more than that, even if we get the right amount	25:52
	of appreciation, even if we remove the surcharge,	25:56
	we know that this kind of economic medicine works slowly.	25:59
	So, we're gonna continue, by every estimate I have seen	26:02
	that's reasonable, to still have	26:05
	an inadequate basic balance.	26:08
	That means that more dollars, at even the new rates,	26:11
	are gonna continue to go abroad and the French, I know,	26:14
	will want us to be good boys and to come into court	26:17
	with an agreement of how to fund those in some special way,	26:22
	and how to make those convertibility,	26:26
	and how to give certain guarantees	26:27
	with respect to the value of those in terms of gold.	26:29
	I am very much against, and I speak now	26:34
	for a wide spectrum of economist opinion,	26:37
	this includes, by the way, the economist generally	26:42
	of libertarian views who have less sympathy	26:46
	for new deal matters than I do,	26:51
	they also prefer a floating regime.	26:54
	And so I hope that the new deliberations	26:59
	which are going to get underway	27:05
	in Washington just before Christmas,	27:07
	around December 17th, do not result in a victory	27:11
	by the French at the last moment on this particular issue.	27:17
	And I know that if you let the money doctors of the world,	27:21
	the people with plans, I'll name the best of them,	27:25
	people like Dr. Triffin from Yale	27:31
	and Dr. Edward Burnstein from Washington,	27:33
	who's a consultant to governments and was a great expert.	27:38
	If you get them in, they'll be able to dream up	27:41
	various convertibility bines, which the French will like	27:45
	better than American economists will like.	27:47
	Finally, I was asked about the stock market,	27:52
	let me simply say in the seconds that are left,	27:56
	that the move towards an international agreement at Rome,	27:59
	which was actually a very slight straw in that direction,	28:05
	has been given as the explanation for the final end	28:09
	of the down, down, down movement of the Dow Jones Averages	28:14
	and the rather sizable post-Thanksgiving	28:17
	recovery of the stock market.	28:21
	In my view, the explanation will not bear the weight	28:23
	put on it, I think just as important was the fact	28:28
	that many bits of good news have been coming in	28:34
	about retail sales, about capital appropriations,	28:36
	about plant and equipment investment,	28:39
	intentions about the strength of final demand	28:43
	in the third quarter of the year,	28:47
	which are telling the Wall Street community	28:49
	that you'd better not sell the official	28:52
	standard consensus forecast, the one I talked about	28:54
	in my annual outlook tape of the last time,	28:56
	that you better not sell that as short as you've been doing,	29:01
	and you ought to brace yourself	29:04
	for some improvement in profits.	29:06
	And I think that that sort of thing, if I'm right,	29:09
	is a much more solid underpinning for a maintenance	29:12
	of stock market values or even in resumption of growth	29:17
	in them than would be transitory news	29:19
	about a purported agreement	29:22
	to end the international monetary crisis.	29:25
-	If you have any comments or questions	29:28
	for Professor Samuelson, address them	29:30
	to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	29:32
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611.	29:34

Item Info

Title:

Tape 91 - Meaning of the McCracken resignation; international money situation

Date:

1971

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0091
ref2321_b8s
samuelsonpaul
duke:325114
pstau001091
ark:/87924/r4ff3mg5v
75b20f77-d633-4ded-ada9-de0719802d05

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Tape 91 - Meaning of the McCracken resignation; international money situation

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Economists' Papers Archive

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