Tape 55 - Inflation, Bottoming of Economy, Interest Rates, Capital Spending

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-	This is Instructional Dynamics,	0:02
	inviting you to another of our bi-weekly interviews	0:04
	with Doctor Milton Friedman, Professor of Economics	0:07
	at the University of Chicago.	0:10
	We are recording this tape on Wednesday, July 22nd, 1970.	0:12
	Professor Friedman, there has been a lot of testimony	0:18
	on the Hill by government officials this week.	0:21
	Let me ask you for some of your comments on this testimony.	0:24
	For example, there are a lot of reassuring words	0:28
	from Washington about the battle against inflation.	0:31
	Yet the cost of living index for the month of June,	0:34
	just released, shows prices still rising at 4.8% a year.	0:37
	Do the figures support the reassurances?	0:42
-	Well, the figures, I think, do,	0:45
	but in order to see that,	0:49
	one has to dig somewhat more deeply	0:51
	below the surface then just look at the one released number	0:54
	on the cost of living index number.	0:58
	That number came out as an increase	1:00
	from May to June of 4/10 of 1%,	1:03
	multiplying it up by 12 gives a 4.8% per year.	1:06
	Now, 4.8% is still high,	1:11
	but it's better than the 6% at which prices	1:15
	were rising in the earlier part of the year.	1:18
	But of course, one can't put too much weight	1:21
	on those particular numbers.	1:25
	The 6% was obtained by multiplying 5/10 of 1% by 12.	1:27
	If one month the actual numerical figures came out to be	1:32
	.449% rate	1:37
	of rise, that would be rounded out to .4	1:42
	and given as 4.8% a year.	1:46
	If the next month it came out to be	1:48
	.451% per month, that would be	1:50
	rounded out to 0.5 multiplied by 12 to get six.	1:54
	So, the difference between 4.8 and six is just really	1:59
	about the smallest difference that you can possibly have.	2:04
	It is reassuring that cost of living prices have been rising	2:08
	at a slower rate nonetheless, than they had earlier.	2:14
	But I think other indicators are much more important	2:18
	because they confirm the picture	2:22
	that there is a tapering off of the inflationary pressure.	2:25
	For example, wholesale prices,	2:29
	which generally tend to move earlier than retail prices,	2:32
	have, in the past few months, been rising	2:37
	at a much slower rate than they had earlier.	2:40
	Here again, one gets somewhat different results	2:42
	according as you look at the total wholesale prices,	2:46
	or according as you exclude agricultural commodities	2:50
	and look only at industrial prices.	2:53
	Total wholesale prices have been rising	2:55
	at a rate of only about 2% year,	2:57
	but industrial prices alone have been rising	3:00
	at a rate of about 4% a year.	3:02
	But both the one and the other is decidedly lower	3:04
	than it was four, five, six months ago.	3:08
	Again, if you look not at wholesale prices	3:12
	but at the price deflator implicit in the computing	3:15
	the GNP in constant prices, that figure was just released	3:19
	about a week ago, based on the preliminary estimates	3:24
	for the second quarter of 1970.	3:27
	It showed a 4.2% rate of price rise	3:30
	from the first to the second quarter	3:34
	distinctly lower than the rate of price rise	3:36
	from the fourth quarter of last year	3:38
	to the first quarter of this year.	3:39
	But again, these figures still are subject to errors.	3:42
	That was a preliminary report on GNP,	3:45
	it will undoubtedly be revised when further figures are in.	3:48
	Going still farther afield,	3:54
	you have sensitive commodity prices,	3:55
	a small group of prices which tend	3:58
	to reflect very quickly market movements.	4:01
	These are mostly prices that are determined in open markets,	4:05
	like the Board of Trade Markets in Chicago and so on.	4:09
	Summa these, or many of these,	4:16
	have indeed been absolutely declining,	4:17
	and the index as a whole has been certainly showing	4:20
	a very sharp move away from inflation	4:23
	and toward much more nearly stable prices.	4:27
	But more important, I think in some ways,	4:31
	in any of these facts	4:33
	is an examination of the statistical	4:37
	and economic problems associated	4:42
	with measuring the price movement.	4:44
	For reasons that by now have been	4:47
	spelled out many times, it has often been noted	4:50
	that prices are frequently the last place	4:54
	to show the effect of a slowdown in the economy,	4:58
	that the effect shows up first in physical output	5:01
	and only later in the rate of price rise.	5:04
	But there is another aspect of that	5:06
	that is a little bit more complicated,	5:08
	and that is that the numbers recording the price movements	5:12
	also tend to be late in recording what actually happens.	5:15
	This is a purely statistical matter,	5:19
	and in saying this, I don't mean to put any blame	5:22
	on the people who compute the price indexes.	5:26
	The fact is that it is an extraordinarily difficult task	5:29
	to construct a price index that will record correctly	5:33
	what is actually going on to prices.	5:37
	Let me just suggest one minor problem	5:39
	which you will see immediately.	5:42
	Whenever there is a slackening	5:45
	in aggregate demand, one of the manifestations	5:51
	of this will be that there will be a larger number	5:54
	of sales put on by retail stores and that the sale prices	5:56
	will be cut more sharply than they were before.	6:01
	Now, the Bureau of Labor Statistics,	6:04
	in collecting its prices, tries to collect sales prices	6:06
	as well as regular prices.	6:09
	But obviously that's not enough.	6:12
	Let's suppose I have a store which has a sale for a week	6:14
	and not a sale for another week.	6:18
	But at the sale price, it does a lot more business	6:21
	than it does at the regular price.	6:25
	Well then, in computing the index number, in principle,	6:27
	you oughta weight the sales price	6:30
	more heavily than the non-sales price,	6:33
	in order to allow for the greater volume	6:35
	of business done at that price.	6:36
	You can see immediately that that would be	6:39
	an extraordinarily difficult thing to do,	6:41
	and the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not,	6:43
	in fact succeed in doing so.	6:45
	As a result of this and other factors,	6:47
	for example, the difficulty of allowing	6:53
	for changes in quality,	6:55
	either quality improvements or quality worsenings,	6:57
	the the difficulty in allowing for special discounts,	7:01
	special terms, and so on, and I may say,	7:04
	the Bureau of Labor Statistics tries its best	7:06
	to allow for this, with respect to automobiles for example,	7:09
	it has an extremely extensive sampling program	7:12
	that tries to make full allowance for changes	7:18
	in discount prices, that is,	7:21
	for the actual sales price	7:25
	versus the recommended retail price,	7:26
	for trade-in allowances, and so on.	7:30
	But, with the best will in the world,	7:34
	it remains the case	7:37
	that the Bureau of Labor Statistics'	7:38
	cost of living index number, in the first place,	7:43
	understates an increase in prices,	7:46
	and in the second place,	7:49
	also understates any slowing down	7:52
	in the price rise, any decrease in prices.	7:55
	It tends to be more sluggish	7:57
	and to move less both up and down.	7:59
	And over and above that, it tends to have an upward bias.	8:01
	It tends to produce prices that are rising,	8:04
	when in fact, the real prices underneath are not.	8:07
	Now, recently, there has been published a fascinating study	8:11
	by George Stigler and Jim Kendall,	8:15
	published by the National Bureau of Economic Research,	8:18
	which has been an attempt to explore some of the problems	8:21
	I've just been talking about.	8:25
	But this study is restricted,	8:28
	not to consumer prices,	8:30
	but rather to industrial prices.	8:34
	The approach which the authors used	8:38
	was to try, for a sample of products,	8:41
	to get actual transactions prices.	8:44
	That is to say, they tried to get direct evidence	8:48
	on the amount that was paid for a particular order	8:52
	of steel, let us say, and then divide that total amount paid	8:55
	by the number of tons of steel purchased,	8:59
	and in this way, get the price	9:01
	that was actually paid on a transaction	9:03
	instead of a quoted price or the list price.	9:06
	And then they compared an index which they constructed	9:10
	in this way from transactions prices	9:13
	with published indexes of prices produced	9:16
	by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, if my memory is right,	9:20
	though it may have been produced	9:23
	by some other government agency.	9:24
	One finding, which is to be expected,	9:29
	is that the transactions prices	9:33
	were much more flexible than the prices shown	9:35
	in the price index numbers.	9:40
	I may say that this has an importance	9:43
	entirely aside from the question	9:45
	of how well price indexes measure inflation.	9:47
	One of the charges that has been brought	9:50
	against large enterprises is that they engage	9:52
	in an administered price fixing,	9:55
	and the charge has usually been based on the claim	9:58
	that their prices stay constant	10:01
	even when demand is changing,	10:03
	that they aren't flexible	10:05
	and adaptable to market conditions.	10:07
	Well, the work that Stigler did earlier,	10:09
	when he was chairman of a special committee	10:12
	examining the BLS price indexes,	10:15
	plus the work in this new book,	10:18
	establishes pretty conclusively that	10:20
	that's mostly a statistical artifact,	10:22
	and it's only the way in which the figures are collected	10:25
	that give the impression that there are a class of prices	10:27
	which are administered in the sense	10:30
	that they do not correspond to market forces.	10:32
	So, this first finding simply reinforces	10:37
	these earlier results and shows	10:40
	that the actual transactions prices	10:41
	are highly flexible and not at all rigid.	10:44
	But the second finding, which is really	10:47
	rather more interesting for our present purposes,	10:49
	and more novel, is a different one.	10:51
	This is, that when prices are rising,	10:55
	the quoted prices lag behind	10:59
	the actual transactions prices by relatively little.	11:02
	But when prices are falling, the quoted prices lag	11:06
	behind the transactions prices by rather much.	11:09
	Now, the reason for this is fairly easy to see.	11:12
	When there is downward pressure on prices,	11:18
	a producer is hesitant to reduce	11:21
	his quoted price promptly for two reasons.	11:25
	In the first place, he may think	11:29
	that this is a temporary phenomenon,	11:33
	and there are always many more objections	11:35
	to a rise in price than there are plaudits	11:37
	for a decline in price.	11:40
	Therefore, if he thinks that soon he's going to have	11:42
	to raise the price back up again,	11:44
	he would rather cut the price in concealed ways,	11:46
	by giving discounts or by making	11:49
	a special transaction, and so on.	11:51
	But a second reason is particularly important right now.	11:53
	If and when there is government wage and price control,	11:58
	the prices that will be used for control	12:05
	will undoubtedly be the quoted price,	12:07
	and undoubtedly the maximum price will somehow	12:10
	be linked to a base price.	12:12
	If you are a manufacturer or producer	12:14
	and contemplate the possibility that price and wage control	12:17
	might be imposed, you would be very foolish indeed	12:21
	not to try to maintain as high a base price	12:25
	as possible for your product.	12:28
	As a result, you will tend to keep your quoted price up,	12:30
	even when the actual price is going down.	12:35
	Well, I think these results that Stigler and Kendall found	12:38
	help to go a long way to explain	12:42
	the puzzle of the statistics of prices	12:45
	over the past four or five months.	12:49
	There has been little doubt that the economy as a whole	12:51
	has been under great pressure.	12:54
	This has shown up, of course, in unemployment,	12:56
	in the low operating rate	12:59
	of manufacturing enterprises,	13:02
	in what's been happening to real GNP, and so on.	13:04
	And yet, it has been notorious that the indexes	13:08
	have been very sticky in coming down.	13:12
	And it may well be that a not negligible part of that	13:14
	is because the indexes are lagging behind reality	13:19
	in telling what is going on.	13:22
-	On another economic front, President Nixon,	13:26
	Paul McCracken, and George Schultz,	13:28
	are all talking as if the economy has bottomed out.	13:30
	Do you agree?	13:33
-	I think that's a question	13:35
	of what you mean by bottoming out.	13:36
	I do not believe, myself, that the economy has yet come	13:38
	to the bottom turning point of the recession	13:43
	we've been going through.	13:45
	I think that when historians of business cycles	13:46
	date the present move, they will put the peak,	13:50
	that is the beginning of the recession,	13:54
	sometime in the latter part of 1969.	13:56
	I have heard dates all the way from August to December	14:00
	suggested as the upward turning point.	14:04
	But I do not believe that they will put	14:07
	the lower turning point as early as June or earlier.	14:09
	It will be somewhere in the latter part of the year,	14:13
	July, August, September, October, November, December,	14:16
	somewhere there at the very earliest.	14:19
	In that sense, the economy has not bottomed out.	14:22
	My basis for saying this is not merely	14:27
	the behavior of the monetary figures.	14:30
	There we did not get a shift	14:33
	from an essentially zero rate of monetary growth	14:38
	to a positive rate of monetary growth	14:41
	until December 1969 at the earliest	14:42
	and not a decided shift until February.	14:46
	On the basis of the usual six to nine months lag,	14:49
	that would speak for a turning point sometime	14:52
	in the third quarter at the earliest	14:55
	and perhaps not 'til the fourth quarter.	14:57
	But reinforcing and confirming the implications	15:00
	of the monetary figures is what has been happening	15:04
	to the leading indicators.	15:07
	The leading indicators almost always turn up	15:11
	something like three to four months	15:14
	before the economy as a whole turns up.	15:16
	And there is no sign as yet of an upturn	15:19
	in the leading indicators, on the contrary,	15:22
	they have continued to show weakness.	15:24
	So, whether you look at it from the monetary point of view,	15:26
	or whether you look at it from a leading indicator	15:29
	point of view, it seems to me,	15:31
	you must conclude that we have not yet	15:33
	reached the bottom turning point.	15:35
	On the other hand, there is another sense	15:37
	in which you might justify the notion of bottoming out.	15:41
	Real GNP fell a trifle,	15:45
	roughly 4/10 of 1% per year,	15:48
	from the third to the fourth quarter of '69	15:52
	and then fell much more sharply	15:54
	from the fourth quarter to the first quarter.	15:57
	According to the preliminary figures for the second quarter,	16:01
	real GNP seems to have been roughly constant,	16:05
	from the first to the second quarter.	16:09
	In that sense, the rate of decline of GNP,	16:11
	or, let us say, the gap that is emerging between the actual	16:16
	output and the potential output of the economy,	16:21
	has been widening, has been continuing to widen,	16:24
	but at a slower rate.	16:28
	These figures, I must say, quarter to quarter changes	16:30
	in GNP, are very misleading,	16:33
	because one should not look at a zero	16:35
	as if it were really a zero.	16:37
	A zero from one quarter to another means	16:39
	that output hasn't increased.	16:42
	But population is growing, our capital stock is growing,	16:44
	so our potential output is growing from quarter to quarter	16:48
	at a rate of something like three, 4% per year.	16:52
	In consequence, if real output doesn't grow,	16:55
	that means that the gap between actual and potential output	16:58
	is widening at the rate of three or 4% a year.	17:01
	But nonetheless, zero growth is better than decline,	17:05
	and in this sense, one might justify the notion	17:08
	that the economy is bottoming out.	17:16
	I am very dubious that it's the more significant notion,	17:18
	on the contrary, I think the more significant question	17:23
	to ask is when are we going to get an upturn	17:25
	in the sense of a kind of a trough of the cycle,	17:28
	in the sense of a point at which we start	17:31
	to have a positive increase in output	17:34
	rather than simply a bouncing along the bottom.	17:39
-	Do you agree with Secretary Kennedy's testimony	17:43
	that the long-awaited turn in interest rates has come?	17:46
-	Well, the one area in which I have been wrong	17:50
	over and over again has been in long-term interest rates.	17:56
	I thought that they would reach their peak	17:59
	in the latter part of 1969,	18:03
	along with the peak in short-term rates.	18:06
	That did not happen.	18:09
	Short-term rates did reach their peak	18:10
	in December in 1969 and January 1970,	18:12
	while long-term rates went up farther,	18:18
	and a month or so ago were decidedly above the level	18:22
	that they reached in December 1969.	18:27
	At the same time,	18:31
	I hate to stick my neck out once again,	18:33
	and yet I do think	18:38
	that the odds are all in favor	18:42
	of long-term rates continuing	18:44
	to come down over the next six months.	18:46
	Not, of course, every day, every week, every month,	18:48
	there may be reversals, but yet it seems to me	18:51
	the trend should be definitely downward.	18:54
	I say this for a number of reasons.	18:57
	In the first place, that is the pattern to be expected	18:59
	on the basis of earlier experience.	19:01
	The abnormal thing about this episode	19:03
	has been that long-term rates continued to go up	19:06
	after the economy started coming down	19:09
	and after short-term rates started to come down.	19:11
	That's what's abnormal compared to earlier episodes.	19:13
	In an earlier discussion of this,	19:16
	I stress that in my opinion,	19:18
	this abnormality probably reflected	19:19
	the growing belief that political considerations	19:23
	would make it impossible for any administration,	19:26
	including the present one,	19:29
	to maintain its anti-inflationary posture very long,	19:30
	and that as a result, we were headed for more,	19:34
	and more rapid, inflation, and that this was what	19:37
	had been keeping long-term rates up.	19:40
	A number of events, I think,	19:42
	have occurred which are very,	19:44
	very severely shaking that widespread feeling.	19:48
	In the first place, the fact that inflation is	19:51
	more clearly than before tapering off,	19:56
	fact of experience has been making its impression.	20:00
	But I think an even sharper impression has been made	20:04
	by the firmness and consistency	20:07
	of the administration's policy.	20:10
	Despite the great pressure under which he was,	20:13
	President Nixon did not give in to the clamor	20:15
	for price and wage controls.	20:18
	He did not give in to any of the more desperate	20:20
	and more erratic measures.	20:23
	He has continued to press	20:25
	for budgetary responsibility,	20:29
	for reduction in government spending,	20:32
	for keeping down the deficit.	20:34
	And I believe that this has given pause	20:37
	to many of those who thought that it was	20:39
	only a very temporary matter and that very shortly	20:42
	we would be off to the inflationary races again.	20:45
	Of course, don't misunderstand me,	20:48
	it may be that this latter view is right.	20:50
	If I were to try to judge for the next 10 years,	20:54
	I am far from persuaded that we have really	20:57
	gotten ourselves onto a non-inflationary path.	21:00
	I can very easily believe that political considerations	21:03
	will again emerge will which shove us off,	21:06
	but at the moment, the prospects	21:09
	for a non-inflationary policy look much better	21:11
	than they did a couple of months ago.	21:14
	Reinforcing this very strongly,	21:16
	is the appearance of a rather sharp decline	21:19
	in business capital spending.	21:23
	This decline in business capital spending	21:26
	is itself a manifestation of the tapering off	21:31
	of the inflationary expectations.	21:34
	What was holding up business capital spending	21:36
	was a belief that if it weren't done now,	21:38
	it would be still more expensive to do it later.	21:40
	The decline in that belief has been producing	21:42
	a decline in business capital spending.	21:45
	And as a result, I think that the basic underlying forces	21:47
	are working very strongly toward	21:52
	a continued decline in interest rates.	21:54
	How fast?	21:57
	That's a very hard question to answer,	21:58
	it depends on how rapidly inflationary expectations decline.	22:00
-	Do you regard this decline in capital spending	22:05
	as a healthy thing or as a portent of disaster?	22:08
-	Well, that is a very good question.	22:13
	Not so much in terms of my own points of view,	22:17
	but because I have been amused and interested	22:20
	in the way in which some commentators	22:23
	and some economists have been reacting	22:25
	to the projected decline in capital spending.	22:30
	So far as my own view is concerned,	22:33
	I think it's a very healthy thing.	22:35
	It will take the bloom off the interest rate pressure,	22:37
	it will relieve the pressure on our capital resources,	22:41
	permit more of it to go into areas which have been starved	22:44
	for capital recently in particular housing.	22:49
	But your question leads me to wanna comment	22:53
	on a sort of a broader issue.	22:56
	Some economists, seeing the decline in capital spending,	23:00
	have been very pessimistic indeed	23:05
	about the rest of this year.	23:09
	They have been saying, "Here for the first time	23:11
	"we really are having a recession change	23:14
	"from an ordinary inventory adjustment	23:16
	"of the kind we've had in the post-war period	23:18
	"to what looks like it might be	23:21
	"a real decline in heavy capital spending."	23:23
	And they have been arguing that this decline	23:27
	in capital spending opens the possibility	23:29
	of a really major and serious recession	23:32
	of the '37, '38 variety to take the more extreme,	23:35
	if not, of '29 to '33.	23:39
	What amuses me about this is that it shows	23:42
	how hard it is for an old dog to learn new tricks.	23:44
	The people who are arguing this way	23:49
	are the very people who all along have been saying,	23:51
	"The money doesn't matter,	23:54
	"what matters is government deficits,	23:55
	"what matters is what happens to investment spending."	23:58
	They are those	24:01
	who were earlier rigid Keynesians,	24:05
	who put primary emphasis on investment	24:07
	and government spending as the key	24:09
	to ups and downs in the economy.	24:11
	Now, there is hardly a person in this category	24:14
	who is so unreconstructed as to continue	24:18
	with that view in the abstract.	24:21
	Not one of 'em but will now admit that monetary factors	24:23
	are far more important than he earlier argued,	24:27
	that you have to give considerable weight to 'em,	24:30
	and that, indeed, if you try to explain	24:34
	the episodes of 1966 to '69,	24:37
	you will do a far better job	24:42
	explaining it by movements in monetary magnitudes	24:44
	than you will by movements in government budgets.	24:46
	But somehow or other, they don't carry through on this,	24:49
	because, from the point of view	24:53
	which gives monetary forces great emphasis,	24:56
	a dollar of capital spending is no different	24:59
	than a dollar of consumption.	25:02
	A dollar of spending is a dollar of spending,	25:03
	from the point of view I would adopt.	25:05
	The fact that the demand for heavy capital goods	25:06
	has gone down simply means that interest rates	25:09
	will be lower than they otherwise would,	25:12
	that, given a steady rate of growth in the quantity of money	25:14
	and a steady rate of growth in aggregate demand,	25:18
	more of that demand will take the form of consumption	25:20
	than of investment, more of it will take the form	25:23
	of housing than of heavy capital goods,	25:25
	the effect of the change in the demand for capital goods	25:28
	simply has something to do with the composition of output	25:30
	but very little to do with whether we have a boom	25:33
	or a recession or a depression.	25:37
	But those who put great stress on the decline	25:39
	in capital spending are, in effect,	25:42
	arguing very differently.	25:46
	They are arguing that investment spending	25:48
	is somehow of altogether different importance	25:50
	than any other kind of spending,	25:53
	that it is the magnitude of investment spending	25:55
	and, on the same logic, of government deficit spending,	25:58
	it is the magnitude of this kind of spending	26:02
	that determines whether the economy	26:05
	is in boom or contraction.	26:07
	I stress this because I think you will very quickly,	26:09
	if you listen to what various people say,	26:13
	find that commentators are readily	26:18
	divided into two categories.	26:20
	The latecomers to the monetary view,	26:23
	who will put great emphasis on what's happening	26:25
	to capital spending from the point of view	26:28
	of its implications for the recession,	26:31
	and those like myself who have all along stressed	26:35
	monetary forces and pooh-poohed the special importance	26:40
	of government deficit spending or investment spending,	26:44
	who will argue that, "Well, this will change	26:47
	"the interest rates and the structure of spending,	26:50
	"but it does not in any way imply	26:53
	a more serious recession than would otherwise occur."	26:55
-	We had intended to answer some subscribers' questions,	26:59
	but I'm afraid that we have run out of time.	27:03
	So, thank you very much, Professor Friedman,	27:06
	remember, subscribers, if you have any questions or comments	27:08
	for topics you would like to hear discussed in this series,	27:11
	please send them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	27:14
	166 East Superior Street,	27:18
	Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	27:21
	Doctor Friedman will be visiting	27:25
	with you again in two weeks.	27:26

Item Info

Title:

Tape 55 - Inflation, Bottoming of Economy, Interest Rates, Capital Spending

Date:

1970

Contributor:

Friedman, Milton, 1912-2006

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Milton Friedman

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0246
ref2632_w2o
samuelsonpaul
duke:325269
pstau001246
ark:/87924/r4dz03j2t
589db406-4794-4bcf-8bbd-90c604a70d11

Permalink:

https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r4dz03j2t

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Tape 55 - Inflation, Bottoming of Economy, Interest Rates, Capital Spending

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