Tape 103 - International trade for a rich country part II

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-	Welcome once again as MIT Professor Paul Samuelson	0:02
	discusses the current economic scene.	0:05
	This biweekly series is produced by	0:07
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated	0:09
	and was recorded June 5th, 1972.	0:11
-	This is the second and concluding part	0:15
	of my discussion on the long-term future	0:17
	of America's international trade.	0:19
	Our nine economists write in their fears	0:21
	that the high real wage of American workers	0:24
	can be maintained only by using quotas and tariffs	0:26
	to protect our industries from foreign competitors	0:30
	who can pay such,	0:33
	so very much lower wage rates.	0:35
	This was a topic I treated in my public Nobel lecture	0:38
	given in New York just last month in May	0:42
	before the Swedish-American Chamber of Commerce.	0:46
	Let me now very briefly summarize	0:50
	my first installment given on a previous tape.	0:52
	I pointed out there the rather cheerful findings	0:56
	of conventional economic theory of international trade,	0:59
	so-called comparative advantage.	1:03
	Here were some of the points made by the optimists.	1:05
	One, two-way trade between a rich and poor country	1:09
	is mutually profitable	1:13
	even if real wages are very different in the two countries.	1:15
	Two, if, so to speak, the price is made right,	1:19
	then there need not be any hitches	1:23
	in the American balance of payments	1:24
	or in full employment job opportunity in America.	1:26
	When economists say if the price is right,	1:30
	they of course mean in this context	1:33
	if we let the parity of the dollar	1:35
	relative to the parity of other currencies,	1:38
	such as the mark or the yen or the lira or the franc,	1:40
	be depreciated to whatever level is needed	1:44
	to equalize our exports and imports balance.	1:47
	This on current account, on capital account,	1:52
	on government account.	1:54
	Three, an optimist thinks	1:56
	that not much of a depreciation of the dollar	1:58
	will be needed or was needed	2:02
	to correct the disequilibrium	2:03
	that prevailed before August 15th, 1971	2:05
	when President Nixon suspended gold payments.	2:09
	The optimist thinks in the first place	2:13
	that the dollar is better than gold	2:14
	and that foreigners will gladly swallow	2:16
	a lot of our dollar deficits	2:18
	because they need our key currency	2:20
	for transactions and for liquidity holdings.	2:22
	What the optimists admit	2:26
	that to the extent that there is an American deficit,	2:27
	bigger than foreigners will gladly absorb in dollars,	2:30
	it will take they think though	2:34
	only a slight depreciation of the dollar	2:36
	or appreciation of the yen and the mark	2:39
	to generate a tremendous correction	2:41
	in our current exports and imports	2:43
	and in our capital balance payments.	2:45
	Probably therefore, according to the optimists,	2:49
	the December 1971 depreciation of the dollar,	2:51
	which averaged 12%	2:54
	against all the other principal currencies,	2:55
	was more than enough, certainly enough	2:58
	of an appreciation of the other currencies	3:00
	relative to the dollar to do the job.	3:02
	And according to these optimists,	3:05
	only irrational doubts could irrationally snowball	3:06
	to create a self-fulfilling breakdown	3:10
	of the Smithsonian Agreements.	3:13
	Now, finally, the optimists go on to point out	3:16
	that some kind of a gliding band or crawling peg	3:18
	of gradually adjusting currency parity	3:23
	or some kind of clean floating regime	3:26
	in which the exchange rate is set	3:31
	by supply and demand without government intervention,	3:32
	that is still needed	3:34
	and that when we do come hopefully very soon	3:36
	to an international agreement on this,	3:39
	from that time on,	3:42
	the American worker will hardly have to notice	3:43
	the whole problem of international trade	3:45
	any more than any one of us has to think	3:47
	about our well-functioning pituitary gland.	3:51
	In short, according to the optimistic doctrine,	3:55
	in the years ahead,	3:58
	with quotas and tariffs gradually removed,	3:59
	the American real wage will benefit	4:02
	in this rate of growth from international trade itself	4:05
	and the same will take place abroad.	4:08
	Now that is the optimistic view,	4:12
	that is the conventional view.	4:15
	It has a great deal to be said for it.	4:16
	As I mentioned,	4:20
	if you listen to it, you won't think of economics	4:23
	as the dismal science, quite the contrary.	4:25
	Well now, you just have to circulate	4:30
	among Congressmen, among editors, among businessmen,	4:33
	among unionists, among the man in the street,	4:37
	and you will realize that this optimistic view	4:41
	is not widely shared.	4:44
	There are plenty of scares in this present age,	4:47
	and economics certainly has its work cut out for it	4:50
	if it is going to rid people of their fears.	4:53
	I quoted the Duke of Wellington who said	4:57
	I don't know whether my officers scare the enemy	4:59
	but they sure as hell scare me.	5:02
	Well, as a sophisticated economist,	5:04
	I have to confess that I myself	5:07
	have some apprehensions	5:10
	about the future of the American balance of payments	5:11
	and apprehensions about the effects of future	5:14
	trade developments on the average level	5:18
	of American real wages and living standards.	5:20
	I want to discuss these apprehensions with you,	5:24
	reason together, try to get them out and see	5:29
	whether there's anything in them.	5:33
	There is a new protectionism in the land,	5:40
	one of the most baleful heritages of our ostrich-like policy	5:44
	of benign neglect of the international deficit,	5:47
	which had been urged upon us	5:50
	both from the right and the left	5:51
	before August 15th.	5:53
	Well, its inheritance at home	5:55
	has been the mushrooming up of this protectionism.	5:58
	And abroad, its heritage was the	6:04
	freezing of vested interest in the export industries.	6:08
	To most Americans today I'm afraid,	6:14
	it is an article of faith	6:16
	that using quotas on a wide scale	6:18
	to save the textile industry, the shoe industry,	6:20
	the steel industry,	6:22
	but also the TV industry,	6:24
	the electronics industry generally, the auto industry,	6:26
	and soon it will be the Tiddlywinks industry,	6:29
	that these constitute an important step	6:31
	in keeping real wages in America from deteriorating	6:34
	from their present all-time peak levels.	6:38
	Theoretical economists may quote comparative cost examples	6:42
	until they're blue in the face,	6:45
	but the man in the street just will not believe	6:47
	the assertion	6:49
	that high-paid American workers can compete	6:50
	with imported goods made by low-paid foreign workers.	6:52
	Actually, throughout our whole history,	6:57
	one of the most powerful weapons	6:58
	in the arsenal of the protectionists	7:00
	has always been the competitive threat	7:02
	from pauper foreign labor.	7:04
	If that threat can be combined with the yellow peril,	7:06
	as in the threat from cheap coolie labor,	7:09
	the argument is all the more powerful.	7:12
	I had to mention that in certain circles,	7:15
	I found that the Japanese had become Japs again	7:19
	because of their competition.	7:22
	Now it's ironical	7:25
	that at the same time that we're so apprehensive	7:26
	about competition from cheap foreign labor,	7:29
	all over the world, the laboring movement	7:33
	and the parliamentarians are apprehensive	7:36
	about the competition from the affluent United States	7:39
	from our high productivity capacity.	7:42
	I will just recall to you	7:47
	Servan-Schreiber, whose book The American Challenge	7:49
	was a best seller on the continent	7:54
	and who regarded the multinational corporation	7:56
	which he thought of as American as a third power,	8:01
	along with Russia and along with the United States	8:04
	came this third footloose international corporation.	8:06
	I can't go along with this	8:12
	apprehension that the United States lacks	8:17
	comparative advantage in everything.	8:20
	From the very nature of the theory of comparative advantage,	8:23
	a nation cannot lack comparative advantage	8:28
	in every single good.	8:31
	We may lack comparative advantage in cheap textiles.	8:35
	After all, any advancing country, newly advancing,	8:38
	backward country can mobilize labor	8:42
	and the kind of machinery that's used	8:45
	to make basic textiles or shoes.	8:46
	It's right, therefore, that in our own interests	8:50
	as well as in the interests	8:54
	of the developing part of the world	8:55
	that we should give over these industries to them.	8:57
	And I know it with a great deal of satisfaction	9:02
	that in Sweden, it is a	9:06
	target of the textile workers union	9:11
	for textiles to shrink away in Sweden.	9:14
	And this is only possible because all unions in Sweden	9:18
	have the confidence that there are alternative	9:22
	uses of Swedish labor	9:26
	and that the government will make sure	9:28
	that labor is mobilized into those more efficient uses.	9:30
	I don't want to belabor the point of the automobile industry	9:38
	but the automobile industry	9:40
	is not an advanced, high technology industry in many ways.	9:42
	In many ways, any country that can develop a	9:47
	large scale of production	9:50
	can go through the rather routine operations	9:53
	of the conveyor belt line	9:57
	that's involved in the automobile industry.	10:00
	This could not have been true perhaps in 1912	10:02
	when Henry Ford was pioneering,	10:05
	but now that outside of North America,	10:07
	in western Europe, more automobiles are being produced	10:11
	than in North America,	10:14
	and if we combine Japan and western Europe,	10:16
	far more automobiles are being produced	10:19
	outside the United States than inside the United States.	10:21
	Now that being the case, it may be only a matter of time	10:24
	that under free trade,	10:28
	the automobile industry in the United States	10:30
	would shrink, shrink, shrink down to a very low level	10:33
	and it could be that 10 years	10:37
	from the time I am now speaking	10:38
	under a regime of free trade,	10:40
	the automobile industry would disappear	10:42
	essentially from the North American continent.	10:45
	Now, that will come as quite a shock	10:49
	to people in Detroit, to the two senators from Michigan	10:52
	because nothing seems more American	10:56
	than Henry Ford and the automobile.	10:58
	What I will remind all of us	11:01
	that comparative advantage is a very changing thing	11:04
	and at one time, there was nothing more American	11:07
	than barbed wire but no barbed wire	11:09
	can be produced in this country at costs competitive	11:11
	with the barbed wire which we can import.	11:16
	The best econometric estimates	11:22
	that I have been able to marshal	11:24
	are those reviewed by Professor William Branson	11:26
	of Pitzer University.	11:31
	I'm proud to say that he's a former MIT graduate student,	11:33
	and in the forthcoming Brookings paper on economic activity	11:37
	from mid-1972, Dr. Branson reviews	11:41
	three sets of estimates	11:44
	as to whether the Smithsonian dosage	11:46
	of dollar depreciation by 12% will do the job.	11:49
	The estimates of the international monetary fund,	11:52
	the estimates of the OECD, Office of Economic Cooperation	11:54
	and Development, in Paris,	11:58
	those are quite official estimates,	12:00
	and then Dr. Stephen Magee of the University of Chicago,	12:02
	also a former MIT student,	12:07
	has made independent estimates.	12:09
	And all three of these suggest	12:11
	that a 12% depreciation ought to improve	12:13
	America's current balance,	12:15
	that's our merchandise,	12:17
	exports over our merchandise imports,	12:20
	corrected by invisible items,	12:23
	this should be corrected by about	12:27
	seven or eight billion dollars	12:28
	and many people think that	12:30
	that will be enough to do the trick.	12:32
	In what period of time will it be corrected?	12:34
	Well, we can't be so confident there.	12:37
	I don't think, by the way, we can be too confident	12:39
	even about the seven or eight billion dollar figure	12:41
	because we all of us remember	12:43
	a similar econometric estimate	12:45
	also by a number of very distinguished Brookings economists	12:47
	including some very distinguished colleagues of my own	12:51
	who said that by 1968, our balance of payments problem	12:55
	would be under control.	12:59
	Now, their econometric estimates floundered in part	13:02
	on the escalation of the Vietnam War	13:06
	after the summer of 1965,	13:09
	but who can say what new, extraneous events	13:12
	may vitiate the rather optimistic estimates that	13:16
	Dr. Branson has brought together.	13:20
	It's not my purpose here to deny that	13:25
	this is plausible but I want to discuss	13:27
	some of my apprehensions.	13:31
	These apprehensions are more in the nature of possibilities	13:35
	than in the nature of probabilities,	13:38
	but they are worth talking about	13:40
	because what they show I believe is this,	13:42
	that the man in the street may not put things right	13:45
	in his dire forebodings,	13:48
	but it is possible to construct a logical model	13:50
	and a logical case in which his dire forebodings are in fact	13:54
	pretty much realized.	13:58
	I want to add and stress that when it's carefully	14:01
	formulated in that way,	14:04
	it will not contradict the	14:06
	economic theory of comparative advantage	14:09
	and the conventional wisdom.	14:12
	In my view, the sophisticated conventional wisdom	14:13
	has to be used to understand	14:17
	all the things that can legitimately happen.	14:19
	Well, because time is rather short,	14:22
	I will make my assertions somewhat brief	14:26
	and therefore necessarily a bit dogmatic.	14:30
	Point one.	14:35
	No one knows the true size	14:37
	of the disequilibrium gap in the U.S. balance of payments	14:39
	just prior to August 15th,	14:43
	that this disequilibrium gap may have been	14:46
	much larger than our experts have been thinking.	14:50
	This must be stressed.	14:55
	The pre-August 15 disequilibrium,	14:57
	which needs to be accommodated,	15:00
	may be a good deal larger than the experts think.	15:02
	Furthermore, the differential trends of productivity	15:06
	abroad relative to those here at home,	15:11
	I'm referring here to the fact that	15:14
	we being the front runner cannot imitate them	15:16
	but they can't imitate us,	15:19
	and so, the big fact of the last two decades	15:21
	has been a more rapid rate of growth	15:23
	of productivity abroad than at home.	15:26
	Those trends, which in my judgment, were	15:31
	very important, perhaps primary, in establishing	15:35
	the overvaluation of the dollar that prevailed	15:40
	before August 15th, those trends may still be	15:42
	and I would say presumably are still	15:47
	working strongly against us	15:49
	in the years following	15:51
	last December's Smithsonian Agreement.	15:53
	We've got to expect this to be continuing.	15:55
	So this brings me to my point two.	15:58
	Therefore, the equilibrium parity of the dollar	16:01
	might have to be substantially downward	16:05
	in this coming decade.	16:08
	In other words, what's being said here is this,	16:11
	suppose we have clean floating	16:13
	and we just watched what happened to the dollar	16:16
	as it cleanly floated up or down or level,	16:19
	it could be that the size of the gap is so large	16:22
	that we inherited on August 15th	16:26
	and the trend which created that gap is so continuously	16:29
	to operate in the future that	16:34
	the correct thing for the dollar to do	16:37
	in the whole decade of the 1970s	16:40
	is to continue gradually to be depreciated.	16:43
	I would say by the way that is not a moral	16:49
	defeat for the United States,	16:52
	it is not a political defeat for the United States,	16:54
	it is not necessarily an economic defeat	16:55
	for the United States,	16:58
	it is an adjustment to reality	16:59
	if the conditions call for it.	17:00
	Now if such dollar depreciation is to be required,	17:03
	let us pray that gliding bands and crawling pegs	17:06
	and dirty floating or clean floating	17:09
	will be quickly agreed upon	17:11
	so that we can permit this need of depreciation to happen	17:14
	in an efficient way	17:19
	that preserves the fruitful international division of labor	17:20
	during the transition.	17:24
	Point number three, here at home,	17:27
	traditional patterns of resource use	17:31
	may turn out to be very far	17:35
	from that equilibrium pattern	17:37
	which is necessitated by and dictated by	17:39
	the vast changes in comparative advantage	17:43
	that have taken place in the last two decades	17:48
	and which may continue in the next decade.	17:50
	In other words, the theory of comparative advantage	17:54
	is a rather cruel dictator.	17:57
	It tells you, as dynamic conditions change,	18:00
	as productivity changes in Brazil versus the United States,	18:03
	as productivity changes in France versus Germany,	18:06
	in Germany versus Norway, it tells you that industries must	18:09
	die and other industries must swell and be born.	18:13
	And it could be that the amount of the adjustments	18:17
	is rather considerable.	18:19
	Now, even if we live in a post-Keynesian era	18:22
	of high employment and we insist upon using	18:26
	monetary and fiscal policy to maintain that high employment,	18:30
	we still must realize and know	18:35
	that the vested interest in any industry	18:37
	who are in the process of being displaced	18:40
	by dynamic changes in comparative advantage,	18:43
	they never give up their historic profit conditions	18:45
	and rents gracefully.	18:48
	I may add neither would you or I in their same position.	18:51
	The concentrated harm to themselves they see very clearly.	18:55
	And too often, they can make the public see	18:59
	that very clearly.	19:01
	But only the impractical eye of the academic economist can	19:02
	often be relied upon to see clearly,	19:09
	the even greater benefit to the community at large	19:12
	from adaptation to dynamic comparative advantage.	19:15
	So there would be a lot of turmoil and unrest and squawking	19:19
	and congressional pressures	19:24
	even if we let the economic mechanism	19:26
	work the way it ought to.	19:31
	Point number four.	19:33
	Suppose we do achieve equilibrium dollar parities	19:37
	and we adapt to changing comparative advantage.	19:40
	Suppose we do this by letting our currency	19:44
	depreciate as needed, appreciate as needed.	19:47
	Still, maintaining that equilibrium	19:53
	may only serve to minimize	19:57
	the loss that America stands to experience in welfare	20:00
	from dynamic international trade changes.	20:05
	There is no special God looking over the American people	20:10
	that says that the changes in productivity	20:13
	and tastes cannot harm the American standard of living.	20:16
	Malaya was harmed by the invention of synthetic rubber,	20:21
	the terms of trade of Malaya, what you could sell her	20:26
	export products for.	20:29
	Similarly, the United States having had	20:32
	an advantage in the past in certain export industries	20:36
	may be losing those advantages	20:39
	and therefore the net benefit	20:41
	which we stand to gain from international trade	20:43
	which we have gained from international trade in the past,	20:45
	that may slip away from us.	20:47
	Now of course while the dollar was overvalued,	20:50
	while we were in disequilibrium,	20:53
	we did enjoy to a degree a higher standard of living	20:55
	from the tangible goods which we were able to import	20:58
	in return for the payment of our mere dollar IOUs.	21:01
	And also I remind us, our corporations acquired	21:06
	lucrative, productive assets abroad	21:09
	partly in exchange for those American dollars,	21:11
	our paper IOUs that foreign central banks	21:14
	reluctantly had to swallow.	21:17
	Well, just as Germany or any country paying reparations	21:20
	suffers a primary burden from its	21:24
	having to make these unrequited payments,	21:27
	so there's a primary burden upon America,	21:29
	if we must now replace our previous deficit	21:34
	by genuine export earnings.	21:36
	But I'm saying something beyond that.	21:39
	Even if we adapt to that situation,	21:43
	with a currency depreciation to restore equilibrium,	21:49
	that might bring into play	21:53
	a further deterioration in America's terms of trade,	21:56
	in our export prices relative to our import prices.	22:00
	This is in the form of a so-called secondary burden upon us.	22:03
	And so, it's possible that as western Europe and Japan	22:09
	closed the gap between our overall productivity and theirs,	22:12
	quite aside from the financial aspects of currency parities,	22:17
	there could be a plausible trend against us	22:20
	in terms of what economists technically call	22:23
	lessened consumer surplus from international trade.	22:26
	Now, in summarizing this point,	22:29
	I want to guard against alarmist quantification.	22:32
	As long as America remains a continental economy,	22:36
	whose imports stay in the neighborhood	22:39
	of not much more than 5% of our GNP,	22:40
	it's hard to see how even elasticity pessimism	22:43
	can knock more than a few percentage points	22:47
	off the 50 plus percent real growth in our GNP	22:51
	that we can have in the coming decade	22:56
	according to the best demographic and productivity analysis.	23:00
	However, if this factor became ominously against us,	23:05
	the value of our imports would shoot up to much more	23:09
	than 5% of our GNP	23:13
	and that's one of the ways	23:15
	that this loss of consumer surplus would show it.	23:16
	Let me conclude	23:23
	with a possibility that has some ominous overtones	23:26
	for the share of labor, the wage share	23:30
	in the growing GNP.	23:33
	Under modern trends of comparative advantage,	23:38
	American management know-how,	23:41
	and for that matter management know-how anywhere,	23:44
	plus American mobile capital	23:48
	may find that their most efficient use	23:50
	is increasingly to employ foreign labor	23:52
	as a substitute for traditional American activities.	23:55
	So to speak, Washington, New York City,	23:59
	Pittsburgh, and Denver are increasingly	24:01
	what Max Weber called cathedral cities	24:03
	or as I would call them headquarter cities.	24:06
	So under floating exchange rates	24:10
	and relatively free trade equilibrium,	24:12
	the United States might in time	24:14
	become a headquarters economy.	24:15
	Our emphasis on employment would shift,	24:18
	as Dr. Larry Krause of Brookings	24:20
	has so nicely emphasized,	24:23
	to services and away from manufacturing.	24:25
	It would become normal for us	24:28
	to enjoy an unfavorable balance of merchandise trade,	24:30
	reverting to the pre-1893 pattern,	24:34
	in which the value of our merchandise imports	24:36
	exceeds the value of our exports.	24:39
	This has happened to Britain.	24:41
	This trade deficit would be normally financed	24:43
	by our current invisible items	24:45
	of growing interest dividends,	24:47
	repatriated or plowed back profits and royalties.	24:49
	Though total America GNP might be the larger	24:53
	because of this free trade equilibrium,	24:56
	it's possible that the competitive share of property	24:58
	would rise at the expense of labor's wage share.	25:01
	And I think this would present a problem	25:04
	for our welfare state,	25:06
	a problem to expand tax and transfer programs	25:07
	to secure a more equitable distribution of income	25:11
	if that's the target that the electorate wants.	25:14
	Now, economics alas,	25:20
	this is my final point,	25:23
	cannot be divorced from politics	25:24
	and from trends of ideologies	25:26
	which are hostile to absentee ownership.	25:28
	Suppose that economic equilibrium did dictate	25:30
	our becoming a service economy a la Dr. Krause.	25:33
	So we're to live like (foreign language)	25:37
	on investment earnings from abroad	25:39
	and let's grant that such an equilibrium is permanent	25:42
	could be optimal for the United States.	25:46
	But would it be safe for us to succumb to this	25:48
	natural pattern of specialization	25:50
	in a world of rising nationalism?	25:53
	Can one really believe that in the last three decades	25:55
	of the 20th century,	25:59
	the rest of the world can be confidently counted on	26:00
	to permit the continuing flow of dividends,	26:04
	repatriation of earnings and royalties	26:06
	to large corporations owned here.	26:08
	I don't think I am paranoid to raise a doubt in this matter.	26:11
	Think of Chile, think of Cuba.	26:15
	There is certainly a danger that after the United States	26:17
	has moved resources out of manufacturing	26:20
	and into the servicing headquarters regime,	26:22
	the world might turn out such in terms of nationalism	26:25
	and collectivism, that the successful collecting	26:29
	of the fruits of our foreign investments	26:33
	would be impossible.	26:34
	We should then not only find ourselves	26:35
	poorer than we had expected	26:37
	but also facing the costly task	26:38
	of redeploying our resources back	26:40
	into the manufacturing in other fields earlier abandoned.	26:43
	Now, to some extent, private corporations perhaps	26:48
	can be relied upon to take into account these contingencies.	26:50
	But remember, our government	26:53
	guarantees them against appropriations.	26:55
	So I think there are some rational grounds,	26:57
	and I really am not in a position to say	27:00
	what we ought to do about this in terms of policy,	27:02
	but there are rational grounds for some apprehensions	27:05
	concerning this aspect	27:07
	of spontaneous foreign trade development.	27:10
	Now, my time is up.	27:12
	I've tried to walk the mile with those who are fearful	27:14
	about international trends	27:16
	yet reason and experience do keep me	27:18
	from walking the whole mile	27:21
	with this overly pessimistic view.	27:22
	And let me conclude with a solemn warning,	27:24
	a dose of classical economics.	27:27
	Even if the most dire pessimists are correct	27:30
	in their belief that much of existing American industry	27:33
	can be preserved in its present form,	27:36
	only by universal protective quotas	27:39
	of the Burke-Hartke type,	27:42
	it's a pitiful delusion to think that such measures	27:44
	could succeed in enhancing rather than lowering	27:48
	the real standard of living of the American people	27:52
	over what would otherwise be the case.	27:56
	If international trade is going to turn against America,	28:01
	then having autarky in protective quotas	28:04
	cannot avoid that evil,	28:08
	it would be a question of jumping right into the frying pan	28:13
	of committing suicide in order to	28:16
	avoid the risk of	28:21
	danger to life.	28:25
-	If you have any comments or questions	28:27
	for Professor Samuelson, address them to	28:29
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	28:31
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	28:33

Item Info

Title:

Tape 103 - International trade for a rich country part II

Date:

1972

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0101
ref2341_2n3
samuelsonpaul
duke:325124
pstau001101
ark:/87924/r4df6kk44
a92096b1-4a34-4a3e-82fb-d6d6d9dfdc0e

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Tape 103 - International trade for a rich country part II

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