Tape 34 - Samuelson vs. Friedman

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-	Instructional Dynamics of Chicago	0:02
	again brings you Professor Paul Samuelson	0:04
	with his biweekly commentary on economics	0:06
	for the week of August 25.	0:08
	In recent weeks, Professor Samuelson,	0:10
	we've had several inquiries from our subscribers commenting	0:12
	on differing opinions between you and Dr. Milton Friedman.	0:16
	Would you like to comment on that this week?	0:19
-	I'm sure that the number of the listeners to this tape	0:21
	read the Wall Street Journal story	0:24
	on the cassette series of IBI.	0:28
	There was a nice publicity blurb I suppose	0:32
	from the standpoint of the sponsoring company	0:35
	about the cassettes that Professor Friedman makes	0:38
	and the cassettes which I make,	0:42
	and always to have a good story,	0:44
	journalists look for a human interest angle,	0:47
	something exciting.	0:50
	So one of the things that they emphasized was	0:52
	that there are differences of opinion expressed	0:56
	by Professor Friedman and myself.	0:59
	Now that's true, and...	1:01
	I gather from some of the mail that has come in	1:05
	as a result of those,	1:08
	that story, a certain number of new subscribers,	1:12
	that this is considered to be a valuable feature	1:15
	by many subscribers.	1:19
	And so it has been suggested to me that	1:22
	if I can find it in my heart, or I should say in my brain,	1:24
	to find something to disagree with,	1:28
	in the views of my esteemed colleague,	1:33
	then please,	1:38
	don't inhibit yourself, Professor Samuelson,	1:41
	in discussing those differences.	1:45
	I have mixed feelings about that.	1:49
	I like to cater to the public tastes.	1:51
	I believe in consumer's sovereignty,	1:54
	and I realize that an adversary procedure	1:57
	is one way of arriving a truth.	2:01
	For example, we rely upon this in the court rooms.	2:04
	We assume that a fair-minded jury,	2:07
	listening to speakers for different sides of an issue,	2:10
	will not expect from each speaker,	2:16
	from the defense counsel, for example, an unbiased report,	2:18
	they will not expect from the prosecuting attorney	2:24
	an unbiased report.	2:27
	But the theory is	2:28
	that you know where the bias is of the defense counsel,	2:32
	you know where the bias is of the prosecuting attorney,	2:37
	and therefore, the jury, taking those biases into account,	2:41
	and the taking into account the checks and balances	2:46
	of the conflicting viewpoints,	2:49
	will thereby be able to arrive at truth.	2:52
	Now, I suppose this is a good enough system	2:56
	in criminal jurisprudence.	3:00
	I don't know whether it's ever been proved	3:02
	that it's the best of all possible systems.	3:04
	I know that some very learned continental people	3:07
	are absolutely shocked to think that 12...	3:10
	Citizens,	3:15
	lay people, in an English country town,	3:17
	or in an American city, are to pass judgment.	3:20
	They find this very odd.	3:25
	On the other hand, we all know	3:27
	very learned members of the bar,	3:30
	who after a lifetime spent in the courts,	3:32
	have an almost mystical belief in the correctness	3:35
	of a lay jury in arriving on the average in truth.	3:39
	I believe they say that in case of civil cases	3:44
	where a jury tends to be a bit sympathetic	3:47
	and to over award damages, for example, in automobile cases,	3:49
	the jury system may be less than perfectly optimal,	3:53
	but in criminal cases, it just cannot be beat.	3:57
	But we don't use that in scientific discussions.	4:01
	You do not have in the learned journals of physics,	4:04
	the learned journals of mathematics,	4:07
	and I may add in the learned journals of economics,	4:09
	quite this adversary procedure	4:12
	in which each man tries to argue for victory,	4:14
	hoping that the intelligent readers will,	4:19
	through a check-and-balance process,	4:23
	arrive at the best estimate of the conflicting truth.	4:25
	Still...	4:31
	This is not a learned journal,	4:33
	and so, I'm perfectly prepared to,	4:37
	on occasion, when I find something to disagree about,	4:40
	to call attention to it.	4:46
	Fortunately, Professor Friedman and I are very old friends	4:48
	and you might say colleagues and antagonists,	4:53
	so that we can in a very cheerful amiable fashion	4:57
	aim a shaft, one at the other,	5:02
	without taking any particular offense.	5:05
	So, this is a preamble	5:11
	to a possible difference of opinion	5:15
	that exists between an eclectic analyst like myself,	5:18
	in appraising what's going to happen	5:23
	to the economy in the months ahead as compared	5:25
	to a very strong and able advocate	5:29
	of the monetarist position,	5:33
	which is Professor Friedman's position.	5:35
	This comes out, as a matter of fact,	5:38
	in Newsweek article,	5:42
	which Professor Friedman wrote recently,	5:45
	it's a bit longer than his typical	5:48
	once-every-three-weeks column,	5:51
	and it is entitled,	5:54
	Monetary Overkill, or something like that.	5:58
	And in this, Professor Friedman points out	6:02
	that in his opinion, the Federal Reserve has been too tight	6:05
	for too long and that if the Federal Reserve continues	6:09
	in its present tightness for sometime longer,	6:12
	I don't have the article at hand	6:16
	so I can't give you the exact words,	6:17
	and therefore, I maybe in some degree, I hope small degree,	6:20
	misrepresenting those words.	6:26
	But the arguments I recall,	6:28
	it went something like the following,	6:30
	that if they continue the present degree	6:33
	of tightness for too long a time,	6:35
	in the future, then there is a very great risk	6:38
	that we will be in for a recession for a	6:43
	rather serious recession,	6:48
	which could send the rate of unemployment up	6:50
	rather considerably.	6:54
	And so, in accordance with his gradualist position,	6:56
	which many of you will have read	6:59
	and a number of you will have heard,	7:02
	Professor Friedman thinks that it would be better	7:05
	for the Federal Reserve, instead of having	7:08
	the money supply virtually flapped as it seems,	7:11
	at least superficially, to have been since April,	7:15
	it would be better for the Federal Reserve to aim	7:19
	for something like a four to 5% rate of increase,	7:23
	which is the only legitimate long-run average rate	7:27
	of increase in Professor Friedman's opinion.	7:31
	Now it happens that I also write a column for Newsweek,	7:37
	and at the present time, the routine	7:44
	involves Professor Wallach one week,	7:48
	Professor Friedman another week, myself another week,	7:51
	then Professor Wallach, Friedman, Samuelson.	7:54
	So my column, which was begun quite independently	7:59
	of any knowledge of Professor Friedman's column,	8:03
	directed its attention to the concern	8:06
	about overkill and inflation	8:09
	which many people in the financial community share	8:12
	with Professor Friedman.	8:15
	I make a very conscious attempt in these	8:18
	broadcasts, in these cassettes,	8:23
	to avoid as best I can duplication	8:25
	with any financial writing that I may do	8:30
	and in particular, with my Newsweek column	8:32
	because I assume that everybody	8:34
	who has ears also has eyes	8:37
	and that it's easy enough to read,	8:39
	you don't have to subscribe to a cassette series,	8:42
	to read my views as expressed every third week.	8:45
	However, one can do very little in 700 or 800s words	8:49
	and almost always, I am conscious of the feeling	8:54
	that my financial columns have to be rather cryptic	8:58
	and have to be brief, and therefore,	9:02
	I cannot elucidate exactly what I have in mind.	9:04
	I cannot develop the nuances,	9:07
	and sometimes the basic assumptions	9:09
	and analyses that underlie them.	9:13
	And so, it is no duplication, I believe,	9:15
	if I on occasion go more deeply into the reasoning	9:18
	that is in my mind in taking up a position	9:23
	that is expressed in a brief 800 words.	9:27
	Now let me turn to my problem	9:32
	in writing the Newsweek column,	9:37
	which will already have appeared	9:40
	by the time that most of you hear this.	9:44
	I had to first frame the problem,	9:47
	what is meant by	9:52
	an inevitable recession	9:55
	if the Federal Reserve continues	9:57
	the present degree of restraint.	9:59
	As everybody knows in this game,	10:02
	it's very easy to get involved in semantic snarls and games	10:04
	in which everybody can be victorious,	10:09
	each person seems to be disagreeing	10:13
	with the other person,	10:16
	but there's a difference in words.	10:17
	As I recall it, monetarists have,	10:20
	as they say, laid their neck	10:25
	on the chopping block in this regard and...	10:28
	One example of a recession would be this, I think,	10:33
	if the total money, gross national product,	10:41
	were to stand still for a couple of quarters,	10:44
	two, three quarters,	10:46
	and if the rate of price increase very stubbornly	10:48
	can be expected to continue to be at about 4%	10:52
	as we end 1969 and go into 1970,	10:57
	and I may say that there's no difference of opinion here	11:00
	between me and any monetarist who believes	11:04
	that that is likely to be the case.	11:07
	Well, under those circumstances,	11:09
	the real gross national product,	11:12
	the measure of the true growth	11:14
	of real goods and services corrected	11:17
	by the so-called implicit GMP price deflator	11:20
	would have to be falling for	11:24
	two, three quarters at a 4% annual rate.	11:27
	And I must say that	11:31
	that is indeed a wolf at the door	11:34
	and something to be worried about and to deplore	11:36
	two or three quarters of a 4% decrease	11:40
	in the real gross national product.	11:45
	And so at this moment, I'm addressing myself	11:48
	to the considerations which are in my mind as to whether	11:50
	so sharp a decrease is likely	11:54
	and how inevitable it would be, given continuation	11:59
	of the present posture of the Federal Reserve authorities.	12:05
	Now, let me, just thinking loosely,	12:11
	and not even giving you	12:15
	written-down-on-the-back-of-an-envelope estimates,	12:18
	say what seems to me to be indicated	12:21
	from my smelling out of the present atmosphere	12:24
	of the American economy,	12:29
	for the money and real GMP	12:32
	in the next two or three quarters.	12:36
	You recall that the rate of real growth	12:40
	of the gross national product was reported as 2.3%	12:45
	by the Department of Commerce for the second quarter.	12:49
	That's annual rate.	12:54
	That is already a slight drop	12:56
	from the 2.5% annual rate of real growth,	12:59
	which the authorities reported for the first quarter.	13:03
	And one thing needs emphasis is	13:09
	that already, within a year,	13:13
	that is from the time just before the tax surcharge.	13:16
	The second quarter of 1968	13:20
	to the time that I'm talking about,	13:22
	we've had a very marked reduction	13:24
	in the rate of real growth in the economy.	13:27
	In the second quarter of 1968,	13:30
	according to the official figures,	13:32
	the deflated real rate of growth	13:35
	of the gross national product was over 6%.	13:38
	That was a whopping rate.	13:41
	That was an unmaintainable rate.	13:43
	That was one of the reasons	13:46
	why the votes could be found in Congress	13:47
	to pass the rather unpopular 10% tax surcharge.	13:52
	Well, 2.4% the average of the first half of 1969 is less	13:57
	than half the rate	14:05
	of the pre-surtax period.	14:07
	So whether you attribute this slowdown	14:11
	to monetary policy exclusively,	14:15
	or whether, as I would do,	14:18
	you attribute it both to monetary policy	14:20
	and to fiscal policy, I think the first major fact	14:24
	to emphasize is that those Wall Street smart alecs	14:28
	who say that monetary and/or fiscal policy are ineffective	14:33
	in curbing a modern economy are just plain wrong.	14:39
	The major fact to emphasize, I'm now quoting myself,	14:43
	is that there has been a definite slowdown	14:46
	in the rate of real growth.	14:49
	In my opinion, there will be a further slowdown	14:51
	in the rate of real growth.	14:55
	This will be hidden in the money figures	14:56
	for the third quarter because in July,	14:58
	there was a massive wage increase of federal employees.	15:00
	And so,	15:05
	when we correct for more than 5% annual increase	15:06
	in the GMP price deflator for the third quarter,	15:11
	I will be rather surprised	15:14
	if we have as much as a 2% annual rate of real growth.	15:16
	And as a matter of fact by the fourth quarter of the year,	15:22
	I should not be at all surprised if there was temporarily	15:25
	no real rate of growth at all.	15:30
	So let's suppose we drop from 2.5 to 2.3	15:33
	to zero, and then,	15:40
	here's where we separate the men from the boys,	15:43
	what is the likely pattern to take place after that date?	15:45
	Now if you are a monetarist who believes	15:50
	that the most important thing to determine	15:54
	what's going to happen today	15:56
	is what has happened six to nine months before,	15:58
	I should suppose you're in a pretty position,	16:01
	sitting pretty, to tell us exactly what you think	16:04
	is going to happen in the first quarter of next year.	16:07
	And I would suppose that	16:12
	that would call for a negative rate of growth,	16:14
	and if by hypothesis the Federal Reserve were	16:18
	to continue what superficially seems	16:21
	to be its very tight posture,	16:24
	as measured by what people believe has been happening	16:26
	to the money supply, then you would conclude	16:29
	that we are in for a real serious recession.	16:34
	Not a mini recession, which of course,	16:38
	by National Bureau standards,	16:42
	was no recession at all,	16:43
	as in the first part of 1967,	16:46
	it just didn't qualify for the ordinary tests	16:49
	that Geoffrey Moore and others apply at the National Bureau	16:52
	to defining a business cycle recession.	16:55
	Well, I'm talking about the prospects	16:59
	for something more than that kind of a non-recession,	17:02
	which might be called a mini recession.	17:05
	Well, I, before going into what's going to happen	17:10
	in the first, second, and third quarter,	17:14
	I would say that on the basis of what I now know,	17:16
	but I must admit, I am assuming that I know something	17:18
	about the way the Federal Reserve is likely	17:23
	to react to each new development from now on.	17:26
	And so, I'm not postulating any simple maintenance	17:29
	of a somehow defined past degree of restraint,	17:32
	but thinking of how they're likely to behave.	17:37
	In fact, my best guest at this time would be	17:40
	that in the first quarter,	17:44
	you would not have a perceptible worsening	17:47
	than a leveling off of the real GMP,	17:52
	and by the middle of 1970,	17:56
	after inventories have run off a little,	17:59
	then I would expect there to be a good chance of some	18:03
	beginning of restoration of expansion.	18:09
	Although, not to the rate of a vigorous expansion	18:14
	such as we've enjoyed for almost 100 months in the 1960s.	18:18
	I may say that such an expansion	18:23
	is called for, I believe,	18:27
	by the Wharton School model of Professor Lawrence Klein,	18:29
	a model which, I think,	18:33
	I don't wish to be unjust, I don't wish to be harsh,	18:35
	but I think has not been predicting very well recently.	18:37
	Well, that model I think calls for a comeback	18:42
	by the middle of 1970,	18:46
	of some substantial degree.	18:50
	I don't really want to pontificate	18:52
	over what's going to happen after the middle of 1970	18:55
	because my vision doesn't go that far.	18:57
	Now, this brings me to a very interesting point,	18:59
	I must say, to me, a surprising point.	19:03
	I read in the newspaper, got a little hint	19:05
	from one financial columnist in an outright story	19:10
	that the money supply may not in fact have been growing	19:14
	at the rates which the Federal Reserve of St. Louis	19:17
	and other authorities have been reporting	19:20
	to me from week to week,	19:22
	that the Federal Reserve is about to announce	19:24
	that they have overlooked some wrinkle connected	19:27
	with the Eurodollar market,	19:30
	and this will greatly change the profile of money behavior	19:33
	in the months which have just passed.	19:39
	By the time you hear this tape,	19:44
	you may have available to you	19:47
	from the St. Louis Bank, and from the Federal Reserve,	19:48
	and from the daily Financial Press,	19:51
	a detailed confirmation of this story.	19:53
	If I were a monetarist,	19:58
	that would be about as uncomfortable	19:59
	a bit of news as I could imagine	20:02
	because I put great weight,	20:05
	in fact, more weight than on anything else,	20:07
	and more weight than upon everything else put together	20:09
	on what's happening to the money supply.	20:13
	And here I find that while I think,	20:15
	have thought that the money supply has been flat since April	20:18
	and has grown, taking into account the bulge	20:22
	which we know must have been there in April,	20:24
	has grown in the second quarter by,	20:27
	as I would be thinking, by no more than 2%,	20:30
	suddenly, I am told that the actual increase was 4.5%.	20:33
	For a monetarist, a change in information like this	20:39
	will give rise to a most...	20:44
	Emphatic change in prediction	20:48
	because the most important thing,	20:51
	the only thing, practically,	20:53
	that he has upon which to make his prediction	20:55
	has been changed.	20:57
	He would say,	20:59
	I'm sorry, it wasn't my fault	21:01
	that they reported the wrong things to me,	21:03
	but now that I learned	21:06
	they have reported the wrong things to me,	21:08
	I have no choice but to change my diagnosis	21:09
	of what's going to happen.	21:13
	Now, I'm a great believer in changing your opinion	21:14
	upon the basis of new facts.	21:17
	But I want to emphasize,	21:19
	just by way of good natured controversy,	21:22
	is that this bit of news,	21:27
	to me, is just like one of the 20 bits of news.	21:30
	It'll cause me to make some change in my estimates,	21:34
	some change in what I've just described to you.	21:39
	But the way that I make my projections	21:42
	into the future is not based upon	21:45
	primary weight upon any one particular series.	21:49
	And so, if the economy has been strong,	21:53
	and if the real growth, the money supply,	21:58
	has been stronger than earlier was thought,	22:01
	I've already picked up that effect	22:06
	in the initial conditions from which I make my changes.	22:08
	And I have only a small perturbation or alteration	22:16
	to make in my forecast	22:20
	for the months ahead	22:23
	for the quarters ahead, and for the year ahead,	22:25
	based upon what would be a rather extensive redefinition	22:29
	of the stock of money series.	22:37
	Now I've overstated the matter a little bit	22:40
	because as we all know,	22:44
	if I am a monetarist and I am sophisticated,	22:48
	then I really cannot use the money figures	22:51
	as published alone as an invariable	22:55
	multiplicand for my multiplier analysis.	23:00
	I know that Regulation Q,	23:06
	which causes, let's say, a runoff of CDs,	23:08
	causes a distortion in the usual message part	23:12
	of the signal, which is money.	23:16
	We think of a signal as consisting of message and noise,	23:18
	I'm using the language of the theory of information	23:21
	and of the communication engineer	23:24
	involved in optimal filtering,	23:26
	we think of a signal as consisting of message and noise.	23:29
	Then the official-published figure sometimes	23:33
	have more noise in them because	23:36
	of various governmental regulation's interferences.	23:38
	And so, I dare say,	23:43
	even if the money supply figure is changed,	23:45
	those people who rely primarily upon the money supply	23:48
	will think twice before they use the new money figures,	23:52
	including, let's say a Eurodollar adjustment,	23:56
	in their relationships.	23:58
	They may very well do what some of you will recall	24:00
	Professor Friedman chose to do.	24:04
	Since his past historical time series	24:06
	did not certificates of deposits in them,	24:09
	and since he thinks Regulation Q is particularly distortive	24:12
	of certificates of deposits,	24:16
	he has found it useful in this very puzzling recent period	24:17
	to work with a new hybrid time series,	24:22
	which is not the old M1, money narrowly defined,	24:26
	and it is not quite the old M2, money broadly defined	24:29
	to include saving or time deposits in commercial banks,	24:34
	but only certain part of that latter,	24:38
	namely, that part of M2 which does not consist	24:42
	of certificates of deposits.	24:46
	Now let me go back now not to argument,	24:51
	but to matters of substance,	24:55
	what the Federal Reserve has done,	25:00
	what the Federal Reserve should do in the future.	25:02
	And in particular,	25:05
	what it should do, and what we are to think,	25:07
	if I am wrong,	25:11
	and if the economy is about	25:13
	to become a good deal weaker than I think is the case.	25:16
	Let us suppose that I've overlooked and downplayed the fact	25:20
	that money X was a lag and that we have already been	25:26
	so restrictive on money that a good deal	25:30
	of constriction and contraction is inevitably on the way.	25:32
	According to some recalculations	25:39
	that some of my students have made	25:41
	of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis's formulas	25:44
	for how money and lag basis affects the economy,	25:48
	I've asked them just to use the money supply	25:54
	for say five quarters, it's just an accident	25:58
	that they picked five quarters and not the four quarters	26:01
	of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,	26:03
	and to forget about fiscal variables and other variables.	26:07
	I think this is a very bad method of forecasting.	26:10
	It's so-called reduced form method.	26:12
	I think it will do me in if I use it	26:15
	repeatedly over the years,	26:18
	but in any case, when that is done,	26:20
	it turns out that the patterns gives a great deal of weight	26:23
	to the current quarter.	26:28
	It gives a great deal of weight,	26:32
	not quite as much though, to the last quarter.	26:33
	And the profile of weight going back for four quarters	26:36
	with the fifth quarter made to be zero	26:41
	as a method of technique is almost a straight-line drop.	26:44
	If that's the case, you cannot say	26:48
	what I so often hear said	26:52
	that the data suggests that six to nine months	26:54
	after money is changed do you get the primary effect.	26:58
	Because in the formulas that I'm now quoting,	27:03
	you get most of the effect within the first six months	27:05
	and not with that very long delay.	27:10
	We tried some experiments using eight-period lags	27:13
	to see whether that would push the effects back further	27:17
	and actually, it just makes the effects negative	27:19
	after the fourth quarter.	27:22
	That's one experiment I want to call to your attention.	27:26
	It has great significance 'cause it means	27:29
	if the Federal Reserve does change its mind, all is not lost	27:31
	because there would still be time to change things.	27:35
	Now, I wanna wind up, saying the following.	27:38
	Many monetarists I believe have been very critical	27:43
	of the Federal Reserve for being too tight in 1966	27:46
	and having caused the 1967 pause.	27:49
	Question I would like to ask is this.	27:53
	From the standpoint of a Nixonite,	27:56
	from the standpoint of the current administration,	27:59
	I'm thinking of Paul McCracken and Herbert Stein,	28:01
	and Hendrik Houthakker, the Council of Economic Advisers,	28:03
	so I'm thinking of Arthur Burns,	28:05
	why wasn't the 1967, the first part of the year,	28:07
	pause, a dandy thing, exactly what was aimed for?	28:12
	And so why again, to quote myself,	28:16
	why wouldn't in the troika, in the quadriad,	28:19
	these are the names of the technical meetings	28:23
	in the new administration,	28:27
	why wouldn't there be hallelujah and hosannas	28:29
	if only Paul McCracken could pull off this time,	28:31
	at the beginning of 1970, a pause just like that of 1967?	28:34
	No better and no worse.	28:40
	I'll remind you that unemployment	28:42
	did not go up a great deal,	28:43
	unemployment minority people did not go up a great deal,	28:45
	and yet there apparently was a considerable amount	28:48
	of relief in the price index.	28:51
	And so, if I were a monetarist,	28:53
	I would not be so critical of that part of the period.	28:55
	Thank you.	28:58
-	Thank you, Professor Samuelson.	28:59
	If you have questions or comments,	29:01
	send them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	29:03
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago 60611.	29:06

Item Info

Title:

Tape 34 - Samuelson vs. Friedman

Date:

circa 1969

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0034
ref2207_pmn
samuelsonpaul
duke:325057
pstau001034
ark:/87924/r4d21s138
107da9dd-7433-4ca3-80f5-66815f3697b8

Permalink:

https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r4d21s138

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Tape 34 - Samuelson vs. Friedman

Transcript

Item Info

Economists' Papers Archive

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