Tape 11 - Difference of opinion between Samuelson and Friedman

Download
- Rights
- Limited Re-Use
  CC BY-NC 4.0
  More Rights Info
- Files (1)
- MP3
- Please be patient with media downloads. They are often large files.
Share

Embed Code
<iframe src='//idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r49g5gw5f?embed=true' height='125px' width='100%' frameborder='0' marginwidth='0' marginheight='0' scrolling='no' allowfullscreen></iframe>
Permalink

https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r49g5gw5f
Skip to Item Info

Loading the media player...

Files for this Item

Transcript

Transcripts may contain inaccuracies.

-	Hello, Instructional Dynamics Incorporated welcomes	0:02
	you to this weekly series of commentaries	0:05
	on the current economic scene.	0:07
	Reporting to you will be one of the nation's	0:09
	leading economists, Professor Milton Friedman,	0:11
	of the University of Chicago.	0:13
	Doctor Friedman, the flurry of finals messages	0:16
	by President Johnson touch on quite	0:19
	a number of economic issues.	0:21
	One that's received much attention is his request	0:23
	for a continuance of the 10% surtax.	0:25
	What is your reaction?	0:28
-	The motto of President Johnson and the whole group	0:30
	of people who have been, who are urging a continuation	0:33
	of the 10% surtax seems to be that once wrong, twice right.	0:36
	The surtax was originally sold on the ground	0:41
	that it would be an effective measure	0:44
	to halt the inflationary pressure.	0:46
	This was by all odds the most important issue	0:48
	that was stressed by President Johnson	0:51
	and by the myriads of commentators who came out in favor	0:54
	of the surtax last year.	0:57
	In practice, it appears not to have had that effect.	1:01
	In practice, what happened was that whatever repressive	1:05
	effect the rise in the tax might of had	1:10
	was much more than overbalanced	1:14
	by the very easy money monetary policy,	1:16
	as I've commented on at great lengths in earlier tapes.	1:19
	But despite the fact,	1:25
	that the surtax seems not to have had the desired,	1:28
	the effect on the basis of which it was sold,	1:33
	President Johnson and other people are now reselling	1:36
	it on exactly the same basis.	1:38
	They are saying, well now inflation is still proceeding	1:41
	at a terrible rate, at a tremendous rate,	1:44
	you must not take off the surtax	1:47
	because to do so would stimulate further inflation.	1:49
	However, despite the fact that that's what	1:53
	all the talk is about, it seems to me very clear	1:55
	that that is not in anyway whatsoever the basic reason	1:59
	why Mister Johnson and other people are in favor	2:02
	of continuing the surtax.	2:05
	The inflationary issue is in many ways a smokescreen,	2:09
	the real issue is a very different one.	2:12
	The real issue has to do with the size	2:14
	of governmental expenditures in general.	2:16
	The major reason why Mister Johnson wanted	2:19
	in his final message,	2:21
	to suggest continuation of the surtax,	2:25
	was because he wanted in that final message	2:29
	also to suggest a very high-level	2:31
	and an increasing level of government spending.	2:34
	You will notice that his budget message	2:36
	calls for a very much larger increase in federal spending	2:38
	from this year to next than occurred from last year to this.	2:42
	Of course, the fact that the expenditures did not rise	2:47
	anymore than they did from last years	2:50
	to this was not of Mister Johnson's doing.	2:52
	It was because Congress imposed as a condition	2:54
	of raising the surtax, a reduction in government spending.	2:57
	And of course, the actual figures are not yet in,	3:02
	and my own guess is that actual government spending	3:05
	is likely to turn out higher	3:07
	than Mister Johnson forecasted.	3:09
	But all that is beside the point,	3:12
	he wanted to propose a continuation at a high-level	3:14
	of the various programs that had been introduced	3:17
	during his administration.	3:18
	He wanted to propose an increase in the amount	3:20
	of money going forward.	3:21
	He did not want to do that and at the same time	3:23
	appear to be irresponsible by suggesting a deficit.	3:25
	As a result, the only way he could combine those desires	3:30
	was by urging a continuance of the surtax.	3:36
	There was as you know an enormous amount to do,	3:40
	between Mister Johnson on the one hand	3:43
	and Mister Kennedy and Mister Paul McCracken,	3:45
	Mister Nixon on the other,	3:48
	about the form in which the statement would be made.	3:50
	Mister Johnson was unwilling to urge continuance	3:53
	of a surtax unless he could get at least some kind	3:55
	of a nominal indication from President Nixon,	3:58
	from President Nixon, that he would not,	4:01
	immediately move to an opposite recommendation.	4:07
	They finally worked out a form of phrasing	4:12
	which commits Mister Nixon to absolutely nothing	4:14
	and only commits him to saying that he won't recommend	4:16
	a different course of action unless his,	4:19
	until he has studied it,	4:22
	which of course he would not do in any event.	4:24
	But nonetheless, Mister Johnson was able under cover	4:26
	of that statement to urge a continuation of the smoke,	4:29
	of the surtax.	4:33
	The reason why I have been opposed,	4:38
	I was originally opposed to the surtax,	4:40
	and why I now am in favor of dropping the surtax	4:43
	at the earliest possible moment	4:46
	is precisely for, because on the one hand I do not myself	4:49
	believe that the surtax has much effect	4:53
	on inflationary pressure, that monetary policy	4:55
	is far more important from this point of view,	4:58
	and on the other I believe that the present size	5:00
	of the government is much too large	5:03
	and we are not getting our money's worth out of it.	5:04
	And therefore, that we must take whatever measures	5:06
	are effective in trying to get a curtailment,	5:10
	a prompt curtailment, in the size of government.	5:13
	The most effective way of doing that,	5:16
	I think the experience of the past several decades	5:18
	has demonstrated, is to keep tax receipts from rising,	5:22
	to cut them if possible.	5:28
	I think experience has demonstrated that Congress	5:31
	is going to spend whatever the tax system will raise	5:33
	plus a little more, and in recent years a lot more.	5:36
	If spending is to be cut, the politically effective way	5:39
	to do so is to hold down government revenues.	5:43
	And that is why, I on my side have been in favor	5:46
	of not imposing the surtax and indeed of cutting taxes.	5:50
	But in discussing this view, one point should be made	5:53
	that perhaps is not obvious at the onset,	5:56
	and that is that continuing the surtax	5:59
	at its present 10% rate in effect	6:02
	means a higher level of taxes.	6:04
	It means a higher level of taxes for two reasons.	6:07
	In the first place, the 10% surtax was effective	6:11
	only for part of the calender year 1968.	6:15
	It amounted to something like a 7.5% tax for that year,	6:20
	not to a 10% tax.	6:24
	Continuing it at the 10% rate will mean that it will amount	6:27
	to a 10% tax for the whole of the year 1969.	6:32
	The second reason why it means an automatic rise in taxes	6:38
	is because as incomes rise, in nominal terms,	6:42
	both because real output is going up,	6:47
	and because of the inflationary price rise,	6:50
	as nominal incomes rise people tend to get pushed	6:54
	up into higher and higher income tax brackets.	6:57
	The rates that become applicable to them get higher.	7:00
	As a consequence if you hold the tax rate schedule,	7:05
	the tax schedule constant, the effective tax rate	7:09
	imposed on people automatically rises as income rises.	7:12
	But if the effective tax rate rises,	7:18
	the basic effective tax rate,	7:21
	then clearly so also does the surtax	7:23
	because the surtax is 10% of the tax.	7:26
	In consequence, holding the surtax unchanged	7:29
	is equivalent to letting taxes, effective taxes, rise.	7:36
	While in my own view is that the best thing	7:42
	you could possibly do would be to let the surtax expire	7:45
	completely on June 30th and not renew it.	7:48
	I am by no means sure that that is the conclusion	7:51
	to which Mister Nixon and his advisors will come	7:54
	when they face out both of the economics	7:57
	and the politics of the problem in the coming months.	7:59
	Mister Nixon is very anxious indeed	8:03
	to get rid of the surtax as soon as he can.	8:05
	But he also,	8:08
	must accept the fact that informed economic opinion	8:11
	on the one hand and general public opinion on the other,	8:17
	does not accept the kind of view about the role	8:20
	of taxes and inflation that I have been expressing.	8:25
	They do not agree with me,	8:27
	or let me say I have not yet persuaded them of that view.	8:29
	As a result, allowing the tax to expire,	8:34
	to expire completely, will appear to be to many	8:38
	to be a step courting inflation.	8:43
	Mister Nixon from a political point of view,	8:49
	would like to, needless to say, to avoid that point of view.	8:52
	Especially since he is firmly committed to trying	8:56
	to hold down the inflationary price rise.	8:59
	As a result, my own guess is that what you	9:02
	will end up with is a kind of a compromise.	9:04
	Namely, the continuation of the tax but at a lower rate,	9:06
	rather than a complete elimination of the tax,	9:11
	could be that events between now and June will order that.	9:14
	Much depends on whether actual tax expenditures	9:18
	turn out to be higher, as I suspect they will	9:22
	and has been for, actual government expenditures	9:24
	not taxes, turn out to be higher than they will.	9:26
	Much depends on the course of the economy during	9:29
	the next six months, whether as I anticipate	9:31
	we shall have a continued expansion	9:33
	in continued inflationary pressure and so on.	9:35
	But that at any rate would be my guess as of the moment.	9:38
-	What are your reactions to the economic report?	9:42
-	Well the Council of Economic Advisors,	9:45
	or the outgoing Council of Economic Advisors,	9:47
	has just submitted of course its final economic report.	9:49
	And apparently there is nothing that is so conducive	9:51
	to frankness and candor,	9:57
	as going out of office.	10:02
	The reports of the Council of Economic Advisors	10:05
	have always been, to some extent, a political document.	10:07
	The extent to which they have been a political document	10:13
	has varied greatly over the years.	10:16
	Under the Eisenhower Administration	10:21
	they were put out as a report of the president,	10:25
	not of the Council of Economic Advisors,	10:28
	and so were explicitly political.	10:30
	But in recent years, the Council of Economic Advisors	10:33
	has been a highly political council	10:36
	that has testified before Congress,	10:40
	made speeches in promoting particular kinds	10:42
	of legislation and so on.	10:45
	And its reports have shown that.	10:47
	There has been a discrete silence in the reports	10:49
	about issues in which it was not politic to talk.	10:53
	This year, the council doesn't have to worry	10:59
	about the political implications, it's out of office.	11:02
	This is a testament, not a document,	11:07
	that the members of the council today	11:11
	will have to live with as part of government.	11:12
	And the amusing and interesting thing about it is,	11:15
	that as a result they have spoken frankly on issues	11:18
	which in the past they have been very circumspect about.	11:21
	There are three such issues that it's kind of interesting	11:24
	to know because they have, all have this character.	11:27
	One of these is a minimum wage rate.	11:32
	It is clear that the members of the council being economists	11:35
	have all along recognized that minimum wage rates	11:38
	produce unemployment among unskilled people,	11:42
	particularly among teenagers,	11:46
	and particularly among Negro teenagers.	11:49
	When there was pressure to raise the minimum wage rate	11:52
	a couple of years ago to a $1.60 as was in fact done,	11:56
	the Council of Economic Advisors,	12:03
	the Democratic Council of Economic Advisors,	12:06
	within the halls of government,	12:08
	was in favor of moderating that increase,	12:10
	keeping it as small as possible.	12:15
	They did add their voice to the pressures	12:16
	within the administration, precisely on the grounds,	12:19
	that increasing the minimum wage rates	12:23
	would cause unemployment among particular groups.	12:25
	But in their public positions they invariably	12:30
	and understandably, I'm not criticizing them for this,	12:33
	you or I would of done the same thing	12:36
	if we had been in their position	12:38
	as part of the administration,	12:39
	they understandably and public supported	12:41
	the administration's stand in favor	12:43
	of a higher minimum wage rate.	12:45
	But in this final, shall I say Valedictory Report,	12:47
	or Last Will and Testament,	12:54
	I'm not sure what you want to refer to it as,	12:55
	they have come out with a much more explicit statement	12:59
	about the adverse consequences of further increases	13:07
	in the minimum wage rate.	13:11
	With much stronger statements than ever before,	13:13
	that the way to solve the unemployment problem	13:17
	and to promote the interests of the low-income people	13:20
	is not by legislative enactment of higher	13:24
	and higher minimum wage rates.	13:27
	On a second topic that I have been particularly	13:29
	interested in is their treatment of exchange rates,	13:32
	of international trade.	13:34
	Some years back the council managed	13:37
	an extraordinary intellectual feat.	13:42
	They had a section in their annual report	13:45
	in which they purported to be presenting	13:48
	an economic discussion of the alternative ways	13:51
	of resolving balance of payments difficulties.	13:55
	And in the course of that they managed	13:58
	to be able to carry through the whole analysis	13:59
	without once just commenting on, or even referring to,	14:02
	the possibility of changes in exchange rates.	14:06
	This time they proceed in a very different way indeed.	14:09
	This time they have a explicit discussion of exchange rates,	14:13
	they even refer to the possibility	14:19
	of complete exchange rate flexibility.	14:21
	Though, obviously people can't change completely overnight	14:24
	and they can't go all the way in that direction.	14:28
	They say that that is a alternative to be considered	14:31
	only as a desperate last resort,	14:35
	when international cooperation has completely broken down.	14:37
	But they do stress the desirability of at least considering	14:41
	wider fluctuation in exchange rates.	14:45
	They discuss in particular,	14:49
	the two ideas that have been the most popular Fed's	14:51
	recently in the, among the people who are shifting	14:54
	from unquestioning faith,	14:57
	in rigid exchange rates to some desire for flexibility.	15:02
	Namely, the two expedients are a wider band	15:06
	and a crawling peg, that is the fact that exchange rates	15:10
	should be permitted to fluctuate	15:13
	more than plus and minus 1% about the parity	15:14
	established with the IMF, that's the wider band.	15:17
	They talk about 2%, they talk about possibly wider ranges.	15:21
	And the other is a crawling peg which is the idea	15:25
	that the parity itself should change	15:28
	in a gradual way over time,	15:30
	either by being expressed as an average	15:32
	of prior exchange rates or by,	15:35
	in a announcement by the country in question	15:38
	that it is going to change the exchange rate	15:41
	at a certain time, pattern over time.	15:43
	My present point is not so much to discuss the merits	15:47
	or demerits of these,	15:50
	these arrangements would be better than what we have now,	15:52
	but from my point of view they are far from ideal.	15:54
	I much prefer a straight flexibility,	15:56
	a completely free market in exchange rates.	15:58
	But my purpose is not to discuss the pros and cons	16:00
	but only to call to your attention the fact	16:03
	that the outgoing council does have something to say	16:05
	about this and it has something to say about it	16:07
	which is quite different from the line	16:10
	which it has taken in the past.	16:12
	It's fair to item on which they have some discussion	16:14
	that I think it's worth a bit of comment here,	16:17
	is the Federal Reserve Board, its independence	16:22
	and its relation with the executive.	16:26
	It comes out with a proposal that was first made,	16:30
	I shouldn't say first,	16:35
	but which was made in a formal public way	16:36
	a number of years back by the private Commission	16:42
	on Money and Credit which was established,	16:45
	I've forgotten the exact date,	16:49
	but the reports with the commission were published	16:51
	in something like 1961 or 62,	16:53
	and there were then hearings at that time	16:57
	before the Joint Economic Committee,	16:59
	or perhaps it was the Banking and Currency Committee	17:02
	on that report.	17:04
	In their report the Commission on Money and Credit	17:06
	at that time recommended that the term of the Chairman	17:08
	of the Federal Reserve Board be made coterminous	17:11
	with the term of the President of the United States.	17:15
	The idea of this being that this would be a step	17:20
	whereby you could get a greater coordination	17:22
	of other governmental policies with monetary policies.	17:27
	At present, as you may know,	17:30
	the President names the Chairman,	17:32
	but the term of the Chairman is not coterminous	17:35
	with that of the President.	17:37
	Mister William McChesney Martin has testified	17:40
	before Congress on a number of different occasions	17:43
	that he also favors such an arrangement.	17:46
	He has discussed some variance of it,	17:49
	one of which under, would involve the term of the Chairman	17:53
	ending six months after a new President took office	17:57
	in order to separate the appointment of the Chairman	18:01
	of the Federal Reserve Board from the Cabinet appointments.	18:03
	The council, I believe for the first time,	18:07
	to the best of my knowledge they have not made	18:13
	this recommendation before but I am not certain	18:14
	on that and I may be wrong,	18:17
	but the council in their report this time	18:18
	does come out with a recommendation of exactly the same kind	18:20
	that the term of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board	18:24
	be made coterminous with the term of the President.	18:27
	That is a recommendation which would be,	18:32
	all three of these recommendations	18:35
	I may say are fascinating,	18:36
	all three of these areas I emphasize	18:38
	because they all go against the line which the council	18:40
	has taken in the past, but are very much in the line	18:45
	of what Mister Nixon has expressed	18:49
	and what the Nixon Administration is interested in.	18:50
	The Nixon Administration is clearly anxious	18:53
	to try to get down high unemployment rates	18:56
	among the disadvantaged groups,	18:59
	and Mister Shultz in testifying in his hearings	19:02
	for confirmation of Secretary of Labor made a special point	19:05
	of stressing the importance of getting down the 25%	19:09
	unemployment rate among Negro teenagers.	19:13
	And one way to do this is to keep	19:16
	the minimum wage rates from rising.	19:17
	In the international area the Nixon Administration	19:20
	is strongly opposed to the present direct controls,	19:23
	and the only way to do something satisfactory	19:26
	about that is to provide for more flexibility.	19:29
	And similarly, in the area of monetary policy,	19:32
	as I've stressed repeatedly, one of the great disadvantages	19:34
	of the next administration is that it has no control	19:38
	over the Federal Reserve Board	19:40
	which dominates monetary policy.	19:42
	That situation would be greatly improved	19:44
	if the recommendation of the council were to be taken,	19:47
	or if Mister Martin were to act in accordance	19:51
	with his own recommendations of some years back	19:54
	and make it possible for the President Nixon	19:56
	to appoint his own Chairman of the Federal Reserve.	19:59
-	The price of gold in London	20:03
	has been hitting new peaks recently Doctor Friedman,	20:04
	does that mean that a new crisis is coming?	20:07
-	It may or may not,	20:10
	a new crisis may be coming,	20:11
	but the fact that the price of gold	20:13
	has reached new peaks is no sign of a new crisis.	20:15
	I have been very much interested in the way	20:18
	in which the newspapers and commentators have been handling	20:20
	the price of gold and the whole gold situation.	20:23
	They have been treating it in the way in which people	20:27
	tend to treat the stock market,	20:31
	with a very, very short-term point of view.	20:32
	Every time that the price in gold hits a new peak	20:35
	they talk about some temporary scare	20:37
	in the international market	20:42
	or some other particular event which might occasion.	20:43
	And every time it falls, they talk as if you're on the verge	20:46
	of going back to $35 an ounce.	20:50
	I think that to get a fair understanding of the gold market	20:53
	and what's happening in the price of gold,	20:56
	one must look at it in a much, much longer-term context.	20:58
	From that longer-term context there are two facts	21:03
	that are critically important.	21:07
	The first fact is that the commercial non-monetary demand	21:10
	for gold has been rising and rising	21:15
	at a rapid rate over recent years.	21:19
	This commercial demand, I should say the non-monetary demand	21:22
	consists not only of the use of gold in an industry,	21:26
	though that is rising at a very rapid rate.	21:28
	It consists not only of the use of gold in adornment	21:30
	and decoration as jewelry in our countries.	21:34
	It consists also of the demand for gold as a way	21:38
	in which people should keep part of their assets,	21:41
	the demand for gold on the part of the Indian citizen,	21:43
	not the great, in amount of great wealth,	21:51
	but the ordinary upper class or middle class Indian citizen	21:54
	who as a ordinary and regular matter keeps part	21:59
	of his wealth in the form of gold.	22:02
	Or of the citizens of Africa, or the Middle East,	22:05
	people throughout the world in underdeveloped countries	22:10
	who have no great confidence in their country's	22:13
	monetary system or in such financial institutions	22:15
	as savings institutions and the like,	22:18
	who have no such alternatives as bonds and stocks	22:20
	that we're accustomed to.	22:24
	And who as a regular matter keep part	22:25
	of their wealth in the form of gold.	22:27
	They are not foolish to do this,	22:30
	it's a very sensible thing for them to do.	22:31
	This regular demand, this permanent demand,	22:34
	this demand from commercial purposes	22:37
	and for this kind of hoarding,	22:38
	has been rising as world income and wealth	22:41
	has been rising over recent years.	22:44
	On the other hand, the supply of gold,	22:47
	the amount of gold being mined has reached a peak	22:50
	and in recent years has been declining a little.	22:53
	The result of this is, that this regular standard	22:55
	commercial demand has in recent years	22:58
	been larger than current output.	23:01
	That's fact number one.	23:04
	Fact number two is that, that I think is crucial,	23:06
	is that of total world holdings of gold	23:11
	roughly half are in monetary holdings of central banks.	23:17
	That's not the fact number two,	23:21
	the crucial fact number two is that the central banks	23:23
	show no disposition to let their	23:26
	monetary gold holdings decline substantially.	23:29
	Had they been willing to do so,	23:33
	they could've prevented the going to a two-tier system	23:34
	last March, they could've kept the price of gold	23:38
	at $35 an ounce, but they were not willing to do so.	23:40
	And the fact that they were not willing	23:44
	to do so is the most important second fact.	23:46
	Given those two facts, the conclusion follows inescapably	23:50
	that the long-run price of gold must rise.	23:56
	At $35 an ounce, the former fixed price,	24:03
	the demand for current gold is greater than the supply	24:09
	and there is no stock from which the difference	24:12
	is going to be supplied.	24:13
	What is a long-run equilibrium price?	24:16
	I have made some calculations, starting not from 1933,	24:18
	when the price of gold was raised to, or 34,	24:23
	when the price of gold was raised to $35 an ounce	24:26
	because at that time that was much too high a price.	24:29
	But I have made some calculations starting from 1929,	24:32
	and these lead me to believe that at the moment	24:35
	the equilibrium price, the price that would clear the market	24:37
	of current production and current demand,	24:41
	must be somewhere in the neighborhood	24:43
	of 60 to 70 to $75 an ounce.	24:44
	Now today the price of gold is $42 an ounce,	24:49
	if this analysis is right it means	24:52
	that the long-term price trend is up.	24:54
	What determines the rate of that price trend?	24:57
	What determines the rate of that price trend	24:59
	is that in the great Monetary Gold Crisis	25:02
	of the early part of 1968,	25:06
	something like three to three and half billion dollars	25:09
	was drawn out of monetary hoards,	25:12
	most paid out of the US Monetary Reserves	25:14
	and went into private hands.	25:16
	This amount of gold did not go into the strong private	25:18
	hands, not into the private hands of people	25:21
	that wanted to keep it permanently,	25:23
	it went into the private hands of short-term speculators.	25:25
	The people who were holding it for a short-term movement	25:29
	in the price of gold.	25:31
	This gold overhanging the market	25:33
	is what is holding down the present price of gold.	25:36
	But it also tells us something about the rate	25:40
	at which the price of gold will rise.	25:45
	People will not hold such gold in storage	25:47
	unless they expect to get recompensed for doing so.	25:50
	The cost of holding gold must run	25:53
	somewhere around 10 to 12, 13% a year	25:55
	if you count storage cost plus foregone interest.	25:58
	As a result one would expect an omni-average,	26:02
	the price of gold would be rising at the rate	26:05
	of about 10 to 12 to 15% a year.	26:10
	In this way the excess gold, the short-term gold hoards,	26:14
	which overhang the market, would be drawn into final use.	26:20
	Partly this is being helped along of course	26:26
	by South Africa's hoarding of gold,	26:28
	and this would continue until the price,	26:31
	until this gold overhanging the market,	26:34
	which was three and half billion,	26:39
	which by now has probably been reduced	26:41
	to something like one and half, two billion dollars,	26:43
	until it has been completely absorbed.	26:45
	At that point there is every reason for the price of gold	26:48
	to get up to 65, $70 an ounce.	26:50
	That will occur on this analysis in the course	26:54
	of the next three or four years,	26:57
	and the gradual trend will be up.	26:58
	And therefore you could be absolutely sure	27:00
	that the free market price of gold in London	27:02
	will be making new highs year after year,	27:04
	if not month after month.	27:08
	I should emphasize that I am talking	27:10
	about the free market price in London,	27:13
	not the official price of $35 an ounce.	27:15
	There is no reason why that should change at all,	27:19
	that's a purely artificial thing	27:21
	which has almost no relevance to anything	27:27
	as the monetary system is now being run.	27:30
	This is Milton Friedman reporting.	27:33
-	Thank you sir.	27:36
	If you have questions or comments or suggestions	27:37
	for topics you would like discussed in this series,	27:40
	please send them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated	27:43
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago 60611.	27:46

Item Info

Title:

Tape 11 - Difference of opinion between Samuelson and Friedman

Date:

1969

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Search Collection Guides

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

Rights Note:

This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0011
ref2161_etp
samuelsonpaul
duke:325034
pstau001011
ark:/87924/r49g5gw5f
b31c3d23-3784-431d-ae92-1a9ecb2f8a47

Permalink:

https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r49g5gw5f

Sponsor:

Sponsor this Digital Collection

Tape 11 - Difference of opinion between Samuelson and Friedman

Transcript

Item Info

Economists' Papers Archive

More Info & Options