Tape 125 - A look at Japan

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Interviewer	Welcome once again	0:02
	as MIT professor Paul Samuelson discusses	0:03
	the current economic scene.	0:05
	This bi-weekly series is produced	0:07
	by Instructional Dynamics Incorporated.	0:09
	This program was recorder April 9th.	0:11
Samuelson	Today I'd like to talk	0:15
	about the economics of the Pacific Basin.	0:16
	I've just returned from an extended tour	0:21
	of that part of the world, and it couldn't help	0:25
	but exciting my imagination, in fact,	0:29
	at a news conference in Australia,	0:33
	I was unguarded enough to say that the last third	0:35
	of the 20th century may turn out	0:40
	to be the era of the Pacific Basin.	0:44
	Well let me begin at the beginning.	0:49
	Many years ago, once upon a time, so to speak,	0:54
	there was, if you can believe it,	0:58
	a dollar shortage, an under valued American dollar.	1:01
	A surplus of unwanted, foreign currencies.	1:08
	Somebody in Washington had the happy idea	1:13
	to use this confederate money in a useful way.	1:15
	And so the Fall Bright program was set up.	1:19
	This I remind you is a program	1:23
	to export from the United States,	1:25
	to the rest of the world, professors,	1:26
	lecturers, students.	1:30
	In academic life we believe that trade	1:33
	should be a two way street, and so,	1:35
	along with this export came the import	1:38
	into the Unites States of professors,	1:42
	lecturers and students.	1:45
	This I believe by most accounts	1:47
	would be considered to have been a very successful program.	1:49
	And President Nixon had the happy thought	1:55
	to celebrate the 25th anniversary of this program	1:59
	by setting up a new category	2:03
	called the Lincoln lecturers.	2:07
	I presume this is named after Abraham Lincoln.	2:10
	He appointed four Lincoln lecturers, John Updike,	2:13
	the novelist, went to Africa.	2:18
	John Hope Franklin, the distinguished historian	2:21
	for the immersive Chicago,	2:23
	went to another part of the world.	2:25
	Charles Towns, the Nobel laureate in physics	2:27
	who invented the laser has gone to Turkey	2:31
	and to parts of Europe.	2:35
	And I was given my choice of some part of the world	2:37
	to go to, and I selected Asia in particular,	2:41
	down under Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia,	2:46
	Hong Kong, and also Japan where I've been before	2:51
	and in which I'm very much interested.	2:58
	It was a	3:01
	busy trip for me, I was gone three weeks,	3:06
	just to give an example of how busy,	3:11
	the last day of the trip, before my well earned rest	3:13
	and recreation period in Hawaii,	3:19
	was spent in New Zealand, on South Island,	3:22
	at Christchurch where Canterbury College is.	3:26
	On that day I had a TV recording,	3:32
	two radio recordings and a lecture.	3:35
	And all this time, the beautiful Mount Cook	3:37
	was hanging there in the distance.	3:41
	Well it'll have to be another trip	3:44
	before I get to enjoy the sights of New Zealand.	3:45
	I went first to Japan, spent a week in Japan.	3:52
	I spent a week in Australia, but in between and after,	3:57
	the Australian visit, I visited Hong Kong,	4:01
	Indonesia and New Zealand.	4:05
	Every one of these countries has much to offer	4:08
	to an economics researcher.	4:12
	You learn about your own country by going abroad.	4:15
	Let me begin now an substantive economic analysis.	4:20
	If this last third of the century	4:24
	is to belong to the Pacific Basin,	4:29
	without doubt, Japan is the pace setter	4:31
	for this development.	4:35
	The Japanese economy continues to renew its miracles.	4:38
	Its rate of growth this year is estimated to be,	4:45
	in real terms, in the ten percent range.	4:49
	The Japanese economy by careful estimates,	4:53
	estimates by the Japanese Economic Center,	4:57
	estimates by other research organizations in Japan,	4:59
	will by the middle of this decade,	5:06
	by 1974, 1975, be in prescapular terms,	5:09
	where America was at the beginning	5:15
	of this decade in 1970, 1971.	5:18
	This is really cause for wonderment.	5:22
	What it means of course is, that even	5:27
	if there is some slowing down in the Japanese rate of growth	5:29
	later in the decade, and I believe	5:33
	there are good reasons to expect that	5:35
	there may be such a slowing down,	5:38
	by the end of the decade, in prescapular terms,	5:41
	the Japanese economy will, in all likelihood,	5:43
	have equaled that of the American economy.	5:48
	And of course, the minute they attain parity with us,	5:51
	that morning, well by afternoon	5:56
	they will be ahead of us because they will be	5:59
	going into that equality with a more rapid rate of growth	6:01
	than we will then be enjoying,	6:06
	even if, at that time, the Japanese do not have	6:08
	so rapid a rate of growth as they now have.	6:11
	You see this, a visitor to Tokyo,	6:17
	if you go at short intervals, only 15 months	6:21
	separated my last visit from the present visit,	6:25
	you can see a difference in 15 months.	6:27
	But the difference between say a 1959 visit	6:30
	and a 1971 or 1973 visit, is absolutely breathtaking	6:33
	in the developments.	6:41
	I may say that from the same point of a simple tourist,	6:43
	by no means are all the changes advantageous.	6:48
	But from the same point of the material wellbeing	6:53
	of the Japanese people, I don't think	6:55
	there can be any doubt that between 1959	6:57
	and 1973, the Japanese economy has skipped many stages	7:00
	which have taken the advances nations say of western Europe	7:07
	many many decades to achieve.	7:11
	I don't want here today to review	7:15
	the history of that miracle, all miracles in retrospect	7:19
	are explicable, there are no secret weapons	7:23
	in the theory of economic development,	7:26
	and if you do, as Angus Madison of the OACD has done,	7:28
	an analysis of real output growth in Japan	7:34
	in terms of behavior of population,	7:40
	movement of population from the country	7:43
	to the city, in terms of capital formation,	7:46
	very heavy rates of capital formation	7:51
	relative to the growth national product in Japan,	7:55
	has compared to almost any other country in the world,	7:59
	certainly in comparison to the Unites States.	8:01
	And if you, more specifically, pinpoint	8:04
	the qualitative composition of that capital formation	8:07
	which has been very heavily in the direction	8:12
	of machine tools and equipment,	8:14
	and not so heavily in the direction of housing	8:16
	for the Japanese people.	8:19
	And if you go on to measure productivity changes	8:21
	and technological innovations and technological imitations,	8:25
	then you will tightly account for all the growth	8:29
	that took place.	8:35
	And nevertheless to explain something	8:36
	is not to lose your sense of wonderment	8:39
	because it certainly is remarkable people	8:41
	who have been able to achieve	8:44
	and maintain such a productivity rate of growth.	8:46
	I want to concentrate upon the problems ahead for Japan	8:51
	as they impinged upon the rest of the Pacific Basin,	8:57
	and as they impinged upon the Unites States.	9:00
	Just 15 months ago when I was in Japan,	9:02
	we were at the height of the so called Nixon shock.	9:06
	It was in October, after the August 1971,	9:09
	substantial gold convertibility by President Nixon,	9:13
	it was in October, before the December	9:16
	Smithonian resolution of the crisis.	9:19
	A resolution which some people thought	9:24
	was for all time, but, which in the event,	9:26
	prove to be viable only for the 14, 15 months	9:29
	from December 1971 to the last crisis	9:35
	of February 1973.	9:41
	When I was in Japan in October 1971,	9:44
	people were frightened.	9:47
	I mean business people were frightened,	9:48
	I mean people in the government were frightened,	9:50
	I mean that the men in the street were frightened.	9:52
	They had a good thing going with an undervalued Japan Asian	9:54
	for many years, they had been running large surpluses,	9:58
	larger surpluses than really made sense	10:02
	on a long term basis, from the same point	10:05
	of Japan internally, and also from the same point	10:07
	of Japan's relationships with the rest of the world.	10:11
	But, nevertheless, the correction of a dis equality	10:15
	can be very painful, it can be very frightening	10:20
	in anticipation and they really didn't know	10:23
	but what this was gonna send them	10:28
	into a tail spin, into a recession, into a depression,	10:30
	into a lowering of their standards of life,	10:34
	if not a lowering of their rate of improvement	10:40
	in their standards of life.	10:43
	It was very different this time, in March 1973,	10:45
	because these trepidations, these fears,	10:49
	were of course not realized.	10:53
	Indeed we wouldn't have gotten into the new crisis	10:55
	if the Japanese bouncer payments	10:58
	had not remained so very strong	11:00
	as it actually did, and so, this time,	11:03
	the Japanese were really not frightened.	11:09
	They were concerned, they were in some cases bitter	11:12
	about actions which the United States had taken,	11:15
	which the United States was urging upon them,	11:18
	but there really was, I thought I could detect	11:21
	an underlying sense of confidence	11:23
	that this new change would not do them irreparable harm.	11:27
	I may say that I agree with that diagnosis,	11:34
	I didn't think that the change	11:38
	was likely to do the Japanese long run harm,	11:43
	but I couldn't rule out a rather considerable impact,	11:47
	on a temporary basis.	11:52
	However, I argued repeatedly before the Nixon shock,	11:59
	that the Japanese and their own interest	12:06
	should appreciate their undervalued yen.	12:09
	I nagged at them for years, I gave very good advice	12:13
	to the Japanese, I write frequently	12:16
	for a publication there, that good advice is uniformly	12:18
	not heated, I have no complaint	12:25
	because much of the good advice that I give	12:28
	is precisely what their own people	12:31
	have been saying, what their own invest economers	12:34
	have been saying in great numbers,	12:37
	and what, to tell the simple truth,	12:39
	they know in their hearts is the right thing for them to do.	12:41
	To be honest right, before I went to Japan in March,	12:46
	I did my homework, on what was happening	12:49
	with the Japanese economy, and I would see	12:52
	in all of the forecasting projections,	12:54
	that the knowing economists in Japan	12:59
	presume that there would be another up valuation.	13:02
	The up valuation of the yen, which resulted	13:05
	from the unilateral ten percent devaluation	13:08
	by President Nixon in March, in February of 1973,	13:10
	did, in other words, not come as a surprise.	13:15
	Now perhaps its magnitude, when the Japanese yen	13:17
	floated up by 16 percent, was more	13:20
	than most of the analysts had thought.	13:23
	But a typical analyst was building	13:25
	into his 18 months projections ahead	13:29
	at least a ten percent up valuation of the yen.	13:33
	And I learned in Japan, and I learned elsewhere	13:36
	in the Pacific Basin, that the large trading companies	13:39
	have been building their goods	13:44
	and making their long term contracts	13:47
	for quite a while now on the basis,	13:50
	not on the pre February 1973 period of the yen,	13:52
	but on the basis of 250 yen to the dollar,	13:58
	which, I translate for you, means a more appreciated yen	14:01
	than has, in the fact, emerged,	14:08
	after the defacto stabilization.	14:11
	I was in Tokyo by the way, right at the height	14:13
	of the crisis when the markets in Tokyo	14:17
	and in Western Europe were actually closed.	14:21
	It's a matter of interest to me	14:23
	that a traveler like myself, was actually in no trouble.	14:26
	I was able, by whose arrangements I don't know,	14:30
	in any American type hotel in Tokyo,	14:36
	to convert my dollars into yen freely,	14:40
	the rate wasn't a very favorable one,	14:46
	it was 256 to the dollar if I remember correctly,	14:48
	but in the other hand it's not a terribly unfavorable one.	14:51
	And in the event after the defacto float steadied down,	14:53
	after the markets were open, the rate which I got	15:01
	256 was not much worse than the 265 rate	15:05
	which then prevailed.	15:09
	I wanna say a word about these trading companies.	15:13
	I think that my listeners should read	15:17
	for trading company conglomerate.	15:20
	Conglomerates are a dirty word in the United States,	15:22
	if you take a typical conglomerate	15:24
	and if you look through its bookkeeping	15:26
	and you'd better know how to look	15:28
	through the bookkeeping of a typical conglomerate,	15:30
	you will still find that the price	15:32
	which the stock market attaches to the shares	15:35
	of a typical conglomerate in terms of its genuine earnings	15:39
	and in terms of its earning prospects,	15:43
	as calculated by the prudent man,	15:47
	is a very low multiple.	15:49
	In other words, conglomerates are in the dog house	15:50
	in the United States, people don't really believe	15:53
	in the principle that one company can run	15:56
	many unrelated activities.	16:00
	Yet when we turn to Japan, a typical trading company,	16:03
	a typical group, the Mitsuis, Mistubashis,	16:07
	and so forth, those are all	16:13
	what we would call a conglomerate.	16:16
	And if you look into economic history,	16:19
	you will realize that as soon as you go abroad,	16:21
	as soon as you go to smaller economies,	16:24
	there is really no substitute because of the laws	16:26
	of increasing returns for conglomerates.	16:29
	In a typical small country,	16:32
	in a typical less developed country,	16:34
	you will find corporations like WR Grayson company,	16:36
	which do a great number of only partially related activities	16:40
	and I remind you that this ginger company	16:45
	which helped to develop India and the East	16:49
	are, was a conglomerate by modern standards	16:52
	Hudson Bay company which helped to develop	16:56
	our Northern neighbors Canada,	16:59
	was India's a conglomerate.	17:01
	Well this has a bearing because, just as an example,	17:05
	I wanna go on to appraise what the two devaluations in Japan	17:10
	have done to relative prices.	17:16
	And what those devaluations are likely	17:18
	to accomplish in the way of corrective action	17:20
	on the imbalance in our payments relationship	17:23
	to the Japanese.	17:29
	But to anticipate just one small aspect of that discussion,	17:31
	let me mention that I received evidence	17:37
	on my return here from American business men in Tokyo,	17:40
	some of whom had listened to me	17:44
	and on one or another of the many lectures	17:47
	that I found I had to give in a very few days,	17:51
	in the week that I was in Tokyo,	17:55
	there is evidence that the trading companies	17:57
	are both on the import side	18:01
	and on the export side of the market.	18:03
	Now of course, they're more on the export side	18:05
	than on the import side because Japan doesn't import	18:07
	as much as she exports, she has a very large,	18:10
	positive, swollen surplus in her balance	18:13
	of trades and her balance of merchandise trade.	18:18
	But they are in both sides.	18:22
	And, one of the corrective effects which we should expect	18:24
	from the depreciation of the American dollar	18:30
	by about a third relative to the Japanese yen,	18:35
	or what's the same thing, the appreciation	18:39
	of the Japanese yen relative to the American dollar	18:41
	by about a third, is, that the prices	18:43
	of delivered American goods in yen	18:48
	should now be cheaper.	18:50
	But there's some evidence that the trading companies,	18:53
	who feel that they're gonna take a loss,	18:58
	and gonna be squeezed on their exports,	18:59
	have been raising their prices in Japan	19:01
	on American goods.	19:05
	Now that's exactly in the wrong direction.	19:08
	And one suppose that that's a short run effect.	19:11
	But even if they maintain the prices intact,	19:14
	and I was able to check for myself,	19:18
	that many of the American prices were,	19:20
	in the short run at least, maintained intact	19:23
	in the face of this 33	19:26
	and a third percent depreciation of the dollar.	19:28
	They, if they continue to maintain such practices,	19:32
	then those of us who are trying to be elasticity optimist,	19:37
	and are trying to tell ourselves	19:41
	that the depreciation of the dollar will help	19:43
	to correct the situation, we'll find ourselves	19:46
	in very gloomy position because of course	19:49
	the classical medicine won't have a chance to work	19:51
	unless it's given that chance to work.	19:53
	Now you may say, how can they do this,	19:56
	and why do they do it, well it's easier	19:58
	to explain why they do it than to explain	19:59
	how they can do it.	20:02
	The reason that they give is that technical loss	20:04
	on their export in comparison with their previous hopes	20:07
	and anticipations, expectations, desires,	20:11
	they try to make up for it by,	20:14
	as you might say, increasing their monopoly profit	20:17
	on the import side.	20:21
	This perhaps gives us a key, as to	20:23
	how they're able to do it, if they are able to do it,	20:26
	namely it must be the effect of some monopoly power.	20:29
	In fact, it must be the effect	20:33
	of someone using monopoly power,	20:36
	it must be that they have some market power,	20:38
	if it really exists in any considerable amount,	20:40
	but that they were utilizing all of that market power	20:44
	to the hilts and it's not of course a question	20:48
	of one Japanese trading company,	20:52
	of one Japanese importer, if you have a common psychology	20:55
	and a common elusive practice,	20:59
	then it's easier for an economist to believe	21:02
	that a whole group of them, at least in the short run,	21:04
	acting in concert, could have some unused monopoly power	21:07
	which, under the threat of necessity,	21:11
	they began to use.	21:15
	Now I must caution myself and any listener,	21:17
	not to extrapolate into the long run	21:23
	all the perversity that happen in the short run.	21:27
	But, I do just wanna report to you,	21:30
	that if you talk to a representative group	21:32
	of American business men who are in very close	21:34
	of a relationship to the Japanese,	21:37
	you will not find yourself surrounded	21:40
	by a bunch of elasticity optimists,	21:43
	on the contrary, and perhaps it's the bias inherent	21:45
	in any practical means special pleading.	21:49
	The anecdotal and casual empirical material	21:53
	which they provide to a person like me,	21:57
	if I took it at face value, would be	22:00
	in the direction that you've gotta hold your breath	22:03
	for a long time before you can hope	22:06
	to see strong influences in the balance of payments,	22:09
	as a result of the two dollar depreciations.	22:16
	However, I have to stand back a little,	22:26
	and use my judgment, not as a practical man,	22:28
	but as a student of economics.	22:32
	Prices in Japan are very high.	22:37
	To an American tourist, they seem really astronomical.	22:41
	We're accustomed here back at home,	22:47
	and in the three weeks interval that we were gone,	22:50
	my wife reports coming back home,	22:54
	that she had a strong impression	22:56
	that prices had risen significantly,	22:59
	and noticeably, just in that three weeks interval.	23:03
	Well that says nothing, compared to what's happened	23:07
	to the purchasing power of the American abroad.	23:09
	Tokyo, it's well known, is the most expensive place	23:14
	in the world for an American business man to live.	23:18
	If a business firm sends an executive to Tokyo,	23:21
	and provides him with their special cost of living allowance	23:26
	and they do, they must, nobody could live	23:30
	as an American in an American style of living	23:35
	in Tokyo without such a special, a living allowance.	23:37
	That allowance must be a very large one.	23:41
	I asked a business man there whether the home offices	23:44
	had been making adjustments to the depreciation	23:48
	of the buying power of an American income	23:52
	spent in Tokyo and usually I got the report	23:56
	was that the home office was making such adjustments	24:00
	but belatedly and inadequately.	24:03
	To illustrate what I have in mind,	24:06
	supposed that you had a young couple,	24:09
	with one child or two children,	24:14
	assigned to Tokyo and they had to find	24:16
	for themselves a relatively modern,	24:20
	relatively up to date, American style apartment,	24:24
	with two bedrooms, with one or two beds,	24:29
	with a modern kitchen and in an area	24:36
	where they could live, where somebody	24:41
	would know their language if they weren't able	24:43
	to speak more than a little bit of kitchen Japanese.	24:45
	Now, such an apartment in Boston, Greater Boston,	24:50
	the area which I know best, would, I think,	24:55
	cost, let me say 250 dollars a month.	24:59
	You could get an apartment like, what I've described,	25:03
	for less than that, but if it was suitable	25:08
	to a young executive, it might well cost that amount.	25:12
	You also by the way could pay more than that.	25:15
	Now, those of you who're listening from New York City,	25:17
	I will, unless you are in a rent controlled area,	25:21
	will not think this figure to be high,	25:26
	so raise it by a hundred dollars if you'd like	25:29
	for Greater New York and call it 350 dollars a month.	25:31
	In Tokyo, such an apartment I think	25:37
	would cost you a thousand dollars a month.	25:40
	It might cost you 12 000 dollars a month.	25:42
	A typical large oil company, will have a compound	25:45
	for its executives and as one moves out,	25:48
	another moves in the the bed they just change the sheets,	25:51
	so to speak.	25:55
	I want to separate out the effects	25:58
	of the depreciation from certain other things	26:01
	that are going on in connection to relative prices	26:04
	in Japan and in some of these other areas.	26:07
	So let me just turn to the problem of hotel rooms.	26:10
	A traveler in the Pacific today	26:15
	will find American type hotels everywhere.	26:18
	Hiltons, Intercontinentals, they are not great luxury hotels	26:21
	but they're very comfortable by American standards.	26:27
	You can expect to pay more abroad,	26:31
	this is shocking to people in those areas,	26:34
	than you'd have to pay in American cities,	26:37
	and you'd have to pay more than you'd have to pay	26:40
	in New York and Washington which,	26:41
	in my experience, are the most expensive places.	26:43
	In other words, you've gotta figure out	26:45
	about 45 dollars a day for a couple	26:47
	and you might not even get twin beds	26:51
	under those circumstances, they would not be	26:53
	considered choice hotel accommodations	26:55
	by American standards.	26:58
	To capital one business man was trying	27:01
	to explain to me how the home offices	27:03
	could never really learn the facts of life	27:05
	as fast as the people on the scene,	27:09
	he mentioned to me that he'd gone to lunch	27:11
	in the Oakroom of the hotel Acora,	27:13
	that's the typical American hotel near the embassy,	27:17
	and had paid six dollars for a hamburger.	27:19
	That's an exaggeration because	27:23
	you could go to McDonald's in Japan	27:25
	and you'd probably pay about, little under a dollar,	27:27
	more than at home, but it's an exaggeration in a good cause.	27:30
	That's how it goes, everything in Japan,	27:35
	for an American, every Japanese quoted price	27:37
	has to be multiplied by four now,	27:41
	and not by three.	27:43
	The result is that all of the Japanese are not frightened	27:45
	by the second appreciation, anywhere near so much	27:48
	as they were by the first, I suspect that	27:53
	by the second appreciation, it'll begin	27:56
	to really cut into their exports.	27:59
	And I did get some evidence for this,	28:04
	as for example if I talked to an American	28:05
	in the firearm equipment business in New Zealand.	28:09
	He already is finding it advantageous	28:12
	for his multinational company to being	28:16
	to get some items in the United States	28:19
	which were marginally unattractive before	28:21
	in comparison to Japan and elsewhere,	28:24
	because of the changed value of the dollar.	28:26
	So, I'm left with the impression,	28:30
	strong impression, that these appreciations are a good thing	28:34
	that they are needed to bring out adjustments	28:40
	which if long delayed, will cause festering protectionism	28:44
	in the United States, and will cause continuation	28:48
	of swollen invested interest in the Japanese	28:53
	and other surplus country export industries.	28:57
	This therapy is needed, it's in the right direction.	29:02
	But, being on the scene, being impressed	29:06
	by short run effects, I have to report	29:11
	that as far as the trip was concerned,	29:13
	it did not bring me home	29:15
	a more confirmed elasticity optimist,	29:17
	and it did not suggest to me that, within the next year	29:20
	or two, you're gonna get a massive swing	29:26
	in the American balance of payments.	29:29
	Let me say, by the way,	29:33
	that something that's happening in Japan	29:35
	which I think is probably a good thing,	29:37
	there is less cow telling to Americans.	29:40
	Even going through the politeness of the Japanese,	29:44
	which is traditional, almost notorious,	29:49
	you're not so overwhelmed with hospitality,	29:53
	you're not treated as great white Gods	29:56
	in the way that, from the time of the McCarthur occupation	29:59
	Americans tended to be treated.	30:03
	I have a simple materialist interpretation	30:06
	of history for this.	30:09
	Poor people envy rich people, and treat them with difference	30:11
	the Japanese are becoming almost as rich as we are,	30:16
	in fact there's gained to be a suspicion in Japan	30:19
	that America is something of a paper tiger	30:21
	in terms of industry, and in terms of productivity,	30:24
	and you're beginning to get a certain amount	30:29
	of defensive comment on America, like that	30:31
	that we have been getting for a long time	30:34
	from the French, why is it that the Americans expect us	30:37
	to make all of the adjustments?	30:40
	Why don't they pull up their socks?	30:41
	Why don't they work harder?	30:42
	Why aren't they more productive?	30:44
	Why don't they save more?	30:45
	Why don't they stop bellyaching?	30:47
	Why don't they control their inflation better?	30:49
	They are controlling their inflation, the American,	30:53
	better than us Japanese, but they have more need to	30:55
	because it's they who have the balance of payments.	30:58
	I suspect that all of this is the sign	31:01
	of some profound changes to come	31:06
	in the patterns of subordination	31:08
	of Japanese foreign policy to that	31:11
	of our own state department.	31:13
	But, I think too, from the long run view point,	31:15
	it is part of a process of growing up	31:18
	and it's partly, it's probably a good thing.	31:20
	Now, my time is up, I wanna get back to the American scene,	31:23
	I haven't scratched the surface of the Pacific	31:27
	but in later tapes I hope to do that.	31:29
Interviewer	If you have any comments	31:32
	or questions for Professor Samuelson,	31:33
	address them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated	31:35
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	31:39

Item Info

Title:

Tape 125 - A look at Japan

Date:

1973

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

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Limited Re-Use

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RL10082-CS-0122
ref2383_xwr
samuelsonpaul
duke:325145
pstau001122
ark:/87924/r48c9rm1d
3d8ee519-8407-40ea-b5c9-8778bd3fa918

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Tape 125 - A look at Japan

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