Tape 56 - Income policies
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- | This tape is recorded biweekly | 0:02 |
for Instructional Dynamics Incorporated of Chicago | 0:04 | |
on the week of August 10, 1970. | 0:07 | |
Professor Samuelson, | 0:09 | |
I understand we have some questions today. | 0:10 | |
- | Yes, we have from our subscribers | 0:12 |
quite a number of questions. | 0:14 | |
Let me just pick out a couple of them for comment. | 0:15 | |
The first one says, | 0:19 | |
"Please explain what you mean by an incomes policy." | 0:21 | |
I'm glad to do so because it's a very poorly named | 0:27 | |
doctrine. | 0:33 | |
By incomes policy, we mean a wage price policy. | 0:37 | |
For example, a wage price freeze | 0:42 | |
or | 0:46 | |
controls on wages and prices | 0:48 | |
of an absolutely mandatory and comprehensive type. | 0:51 | |
That would be one extreme. | 0:54 | |
Or, jawboning for the purpose of | 0:56 | |
putting pressure on business and on unions | 1:02 | |
to keep prices and wages from rising. | 1:05 | |
I can best define it by contrast. | 1:09 | |
By incomes policy, | 1:14 | |
we do not mean macroeconomic policy | 1:15 | |
that the Federal Reserve Board normally follows, | 1:19 | |
namely, restricting the rate of growth of the money supply. | 1:22 | |
By incomes policy, | 1:26 | |
we do not mean running a deliberate budgetary surplus | 1:27 | |
or a smaller deficit | 1:32 | |
in order to put downward pressure on total dollar spending. | 1:33 | |
Those last two policies go under the heading | 1:38 | |
of macroeconomic aggregate demand policy | 1:42 | |
of a monetary policy type or of a fiscal policy type. | 1:47 | |
Incomes policy tries to be a third weapon | 1:51 | |
which cuts across and reinforces | 1:55 | |
macroeconomic aggregated demand policy. | 1:59 | |
One may wonder where the name came from. | 2:03 | |
I think that the name originated in England. | 2:07 | |
One of the post-World War II chancellors of the exchequer | 2:11 | |
diagnosed England's problem at that time | 2:16 | |
as being one in which people tried | 2:20 | |
to get wage rates and prices | 2:22 | |
which would give them an aggregate money income | 2:26 | |
larger than the nation was able to produce | 2:29 | |
at unchanged prices of actual goods. | 2:33 | |
And so he said, | 2:37 | |
"What we've gotta do is to keep incomes down." | 2:37 | |
A better name for it would be a price tag policy, | 2:41 | |
including under the category of price tag, | 2:46 | |
wage tag along with price tag. | 2:49 | |
With the major emphasis upon the big picture, | 2:55 | |
the global aggregate macroeconomic picture, | 2:58 | |
and not, let's say, | 3:01 | |
the problem of the price tag of rubber | 3:02 | |
when rubber is in overabundant supply | 3:06 | |
and the price is very low, | 3:08 | |
as happened in the Great Depression, | 3:10 | |
or not the price tag problem as applied to, say, copper, | 3:12 | |
when the price of copper suddenly, | 3:16 | |
because of a shortage and an increase in demand, | 3:19 | |
triples and quadruples. | 3:22 | |
Those are what economists would call microeconomic | 3:23 | |
price tag problems. | 3:29 | |
This is the macroeconomic price tag problem, | 3:31 | |
is what is referred to by the expression incomes policy. | 3:35 | |
I've talked a good deal about this. | 3:39 | |
Of course, there's been a great deal of talk | 3:41 | |
about incomes policies in the public press | 3:43 | |
and in congressional debate. | 3:46 | |
I talked about it in connection with guideposts, | 3:48 | |
in connection with the so-called Phillips curve problem, | 3:52 | |
which is the relationship between | 3:56 | |
the degree of unemployment | 3:59 | |
and the degree of price instability, or price stability, | 4:01 | |
the so-called short run trade-off problem. | 4:06 | |
That is what's meant by an incomes policy. | 4:10 | |
I should not leave the problem of taxonomy and definition | 4:14 | |
without mentioning that this is one of the great | 4:19 | |
unknown, unsolved areas of modern economics | 4:24 | |
because it is not the case | 4:28 | |
that any mixed economy known to me | 4:31 | |
has successfully found a way | 4:35 | |
of conducting an incomes policy to everybody's satisfaction. | 4:38 | |
I don't mean that | 4:45 | |
nothing good has been accomplished in any period by any, | 4:47 | |
let us say of the 13 to 15 leading industrial nations, | 4:52 | |
of the so-called free world of the West. | 4:56 | |
On the contrary, | 4:59 | |
most of the careful econometric studies that I have seen | 5:01 | |
suggest that after they have allowed | 5:06 | |
for all patterns of market behavior | 5:09 | |
based upon past experience, | 5:14 | |
they do find, in many countries, | 5:16 | |
a little bit of extra moderation on the inflation front, | 5:18 | |
which, these interpreters at least, | 5:23 | |
say may well be due to an incomes policy. | 5:27 | |
This has been done for Britain. | 5:31 | |
This was done in a very widely quoted set of studies | 5:34 | |
of the early 1960s by Professor George Perry, | 5:39 | |
then of the University of Minnesota, | 5:44 | |
now a senior economist at Brookings Institution. | 5:45 | |
In a typical study of that sort, | 5:50 | |
there are some favorable effects of incomes policy | 5:52 | |
detected by those writers. | 5:56 | |
I may say that this is not above controversy | 5:58 | |
and there is more than one way to read the same data, | 6:00 | |
so that I believe that those | 6:04 | |
who are against incomes policy | 6:07 | |
completely | 6:13 | |
have, to their own satisfaction, alternative explanations | 6:14 | |
of the extra degree of moderation which is in that data | 6:18 | |
which they may regard as no moderation at all | 6:22 | |
and as nothing extra at all. | 6:24 | |
Without, on this occasion, | 6:28 | |
going into a full-fledged discussion | 6:30 | |
of the merits and demerits of an incomes policy, | 6:33 | |
the dilemmas for modern political economy | 6:36 | |
involved in this domain, | 6:40 | |
let me simply mention | 6:44 | |
that this is one of the less agreed-upon areas of economics. | 6:46 | |
This leads me to a second question from a subscriber. | 6:52 | |
This subscriber says that he read in a recent article | 6:58 | |
in a publication, he gives the name of the publication, | 7:02 | |
it's one of the well-known weeklies, | 7:07 | |
that inflation has taken on a global look. | 7:10 | |
According to the article which he read, | 7:14 | |
inflation now seems to be in most | 7:16 | |
of the mixed market economies. | 7:18 | |
"But," he says, | 7:21 | |
"There was an omission of the economies | 7:23 | |
"in the collectivist economic camp. | 7:27 | |
"Should I interpret this to mean," he says, | 7:31 | |
"That collectivist economies | 7:34 | |
"are not subject to the virus of inflation, | 7:36 | |
"and that if one draws up a balance sheet | 7:40 | |
"of advantages and disadvantages of a collectivist economy," | 7:44 | |
and I presume he means there the Russian economy, | 7:48 | |
the Hungarian, the Czech economies, the Romanian economies, | 7:52 | |
all the Eastern European so-called satellite countries, | 7:57 | |
and of course, | 8:00 | |
the similar economies, | 8:02 | |
in a degree similar, | 8:05 | |
of mainland China, North Korea, and so forth. | 8:07 | |
"In drawing up such a balance sheet, | 8:11 | |
"are we to conclude that they at least | 8:13 | |
"have the inflation problem licked? | 8:16 | |
"And so, that's one for their side." | 8:19 | |
Well, that's a very tall question. | 8:23 | |
Let me try to break it down | 8:27 | |
and give you some opinions about it. | 8:29 | |
First, it is true that the | 8:32 | |
major free world economies | 8:37 | |
are to a considerable degree integrated together. | 8:40 | |
Before World War II, | 8:44 | |
the National Bureau of Economic Research | 8:46 | |
under Wesley Mitchell | 8:49 | |
could study the development of business cycles | 8:50 | |
in different countries. | 8:54 | |
It was rather remarkable that for the years, | 8:56 | |
say, 1825 to 1939, | 9:00 | |
how common was the pulse of the business cycle | 9:04 | |
in all the major industrialized countries of the world. | 9:09 | |
We first see the business cycle most clearly | 9:14 | |
in the post-Napoleonic warriors in the UK, | 9:16 | |
England, I suppose, as it would've been called at that time, | 9:22 | |
or the British Isles. | 9:24 | |
At that time, England, of course, | 9:26 | |
was the spearhead of advance. | 9:28 | |
It was the most advanced country of the world, | 9:30 | |
and it was the citadel of developing capitalism. | 9:35 | |
But as the United States developed a nonfarm economy, | 9:40 | |
we began to swing into that same orbit. | 9:45 | |
You see France and England early in the century | 9:48 | |
swinging into the common orbit of the business cycle, | 9:51 | |
and then, by the end of the century, | 9:55 | |
Japan is coming along, no longer isolated, | 9:58 | |
and it too is part of that same orbit. | 10:01 | |
Well, we should not be surprised | 10:04 | |
on the basis of that past history | 10:06 | |
if even today, there should be a integrated world economy. | 10:09 | |
Indeed, if we succeed | 10:16 | |
in reducing tariff barriers | 10:18 | |
and quotas and administrative restrictions | 10:21 | |
so that the world moves more towards a free-trade basis, | 10:24 | |
you would expect an increase in the degree | 10:29 | |
of interdependence and concordance | 10:32 | |
between the major economies of the world. | 10:34 | |
However, the primary statistics | 10:39 | |
that I've been quoting to you up to this moment | 10:41 | |
have been those of pre-World War II. | 10:44 | |
One of the most remarkable phenomena, I think, | 10:47 | |
of the post-World War II period | 10:51 | |
has been that the international business cycle | 10:54 | |
has in some degree been pulverized, | 10:58 | |
so that we have business recessions at different times | 11:01 | |
in different parts of the world. | 11:07 | |
You don't have everything going sour at the same time. | 11:09 | |
I could illustrate that by the fact | 11:13 | |
that in the 1950s, | 11:15 | |
1953, '54, was a year of recession for the United States. | 11:18 | |
If the old Wesley Mitchell 19th century pattern | 11:22 | |
had still been prevailing, | 11:25 | |
one could be pretty sure | 11:27 | |
that you would have | 11:29 | |
had in consequence of that | 11:32 | |
an importation of the infection of the US recession | 11:37 | |
to the major countries | 11:41 | |
of the Common Market of Western Europe. | 11:43 | |
That, however, did not happen. | 11:45 | |
Britain did not have its recession at the same time, | 11:47 | |
and this was a very good thing. | 11:51 | |
Now, why do I say it's a good thing | 11:52 | |
that the international common business cycle | 11:54 | |
has been pulverized into separate business cycles? | 11:57 | |
I suppose because during the early 1930s, | 12:00 | |
we had everything going sour at the same time. | 12:06 | |
The Creditanstalt failed in Austria | 12:09 | |
and this had repercussions not only | 12:13 | |
in Wall Street and Main Street of the United States, | 12:16 | |
but in the Fiji Islands as well. | 12:19 | |
This is, from that viewpoint, a good thing. | 12:23 | |
It's the same as the fact | 12:26 | |
that we prefer being able to speak of rolling readjustments | 12:29 | |
in which the Florida land boom | 12:34 | |
gets corrected during one year, | 12:36 | |
and then during another year, | 12:39 | |
overbuilding in the Northern cities gets corrected, | 12:41 | |
and then in another year, | 12:43 | |
the excesses of wool inventory speculation get liquidated, | 12:45 | |
rather than to have all of these things | 12:50 | |
be part of the common pulse of the business cycle. | 12:52 | |
That's just good diversification for a nation. | 12:56 | |
Well, so for the world, | 12:59 | |
it's better not to have everything happen all at once | 13:00 | |
and be mutually reinforcing. | 13:04 | |
It's also of course better for mobile capital | 13:07 | |
to have a part of the world at all times | 13:10 | |
which is immune from the downswing, | 13:13 | |
because then you can keep your diversified eggs | 13:15 | |
in a diversified basket. | 13:19 | |
Let me turn, | 13:23 | |
before I get back to the problem of the present inflation | 13:24 | |
and whether it's worldwide, | 13:29 | |
let me turn to the question of, | 13:31 | |
how is it possible that in the current era, | 13:34 | |
the different nations of the world | 13:40 | |
seem able to immunize themselves | 13:43 | |
from the common ups and downs of a world business cycle? | 13:46 | |
I think the main reason for that is the new economics. | 13:52 | |
I think the main reason for that | 13:58 | |
is the whole general philosophy | 13:59 | |
that goes with Keynesian economics. | 14:04 | |
I don't have in mind here something technical, | 14:06 | |
such as the difference between national income analysis | 14:09 | |
and older-fashioned quantity theory of money analysis, | 14:12 | |
not at all because what I'm saying | 14:16 | |
could be reinterpreted in terms | 14:19 | |
of a technical belief in either one of those two doctrines, | 14:20 | |
but the fact that we are interventionist, | 14:25 | |
that the government is now activist, | 14:29 | |
that we are not a laissez-faire world. | 14:31 | |
We are not a world in which rules | 14:35 | |
rather than men and committees and legislatures dominate, | 14:38 | |
because if you were following rules, | 14:43 | |
and I don't care what they are. | 14:45 | |
For this purpose, | 14:46 | |
we might take the much maligned, old-fashioned gold standard | 14:47 | |
and we'll assume you're playing the rules of the game | 14:50 | |
of the old-fashioned gold standard. | 14:52 | |
Then, automatically, | 14:54 | |
if there was an inflation in a major country of the world | 14:56 | |
such as the United States, | 14:59 | |
the remaining countries of the world, | 15:00 | |
this time through gold flow specie influences | 15:03 | |
would be importing inflation from the United States, | 15:09 | |
and would be subject to those same effects. | 15:11 | |
Well, before 1914, | 15:15 | |
central banks knew how to offset such effects, | 15:18 | |
but there wasn't in the electorates | 15:22 | |
of the pre-1914 major countries of the world | 15:25 | |
the will to be captains of their own ship, | 15:30 | |
masters of their own fate, | 15:34 | |
and the determination to use | 15:36 | |
their central banking and fiscal policy weapons | 15:37 | |
in order to follow their own star | 15:42 | |
rather than to be chained | 15:45 | |
to the international business cycle. | 15:46 | |
Now, | 15:49 | |
the major reason, then, for the change | 15:53 | |
is the fact that | 15:55 | |
all the major industrial nations of the world | 15:58 | |
now, like the United States, | 16:01 | |
follow a full employment policy. | 16:04 | |
They do not play the rules of the game. | 16:07 | |
This of course creates some new problems | 16:10 | |
for the foreign exchange mechanism in international trade, | 16:12 | |
because if everybody in the world was on a common currency, | 16:16 | |
and let's suppose we all use gold coins | 16:19 | |
as our unit of account | 16:21 | |
and as our medium of exchange, | 16:25 | |
and it wouldn't matter from this point, standpoint, | 16:26 | |
whether the gold coins have the picture | 16:29 | |
of a local king or queen on them, | 16:31 | |
or whether they simply are a certificate | 16:34 | |
of one ounce gold coin. | 16:36 | |
That in such a world, | 16:39 | |
there isn't any room for the local legislature, | 16:41 | |
for the local prime minister | 16:44 | |
or chancellor of the exchequer | 16:47 | |
or congressional committee | 16:48 | |
to influence events very much. | 16:50 | |
Well, that world is gone. | 16:53 | |
Actually, before World War II, | 16:55 | |
we already had in hand the economic theory | 16:59 | |
needed for understanding | 17:03 | |
a world in which nations were not connected | 17:06 | |
by a common currency | 17:10 | |
and by a common business cycle pulse. | 17:12 | |
The late Frank William Taussig, | 17:15 | |
dean of international trade economists | 17:17 | |
who for many years was a professor at Harvard, | 17:19 | |
in his book, oh, going back to the 1920s, | 17:22 | |
devoted whole chapters and sections | 17:28 | |
to inconvertible paper money. | 17:31 | |
And in that model, | 17:34 | |
each country determined its own supply of money | 17:37 | |
and the total supply of its money | 17:41 | |
determined in Taussig's view, | 17:44 | |
'cause he was a classical and a neoclassical economist, | 17:47 | |
determined its price level. | 17:50 | |
This was determined independently in different countries. | 17:52 | |
How, then, was there a synthesis | 17:55 | |
of trade throughout the world? | 17:58 | |
Well, it took place, according to Taussig, | 17:59 | |
when you had inconvertible money, | 18:01 | |
by means of having the exchange rate be flexible. | 18:03 | |
And so, if Argentina insisted upon tripling its price level | 18:07 | |
because they tripled the supply of money, | 18:11 | |
and the United States did not increase | 18:15 | |
its supply of money at all | 18:16 | |
and we kept a steady price level, | 18:17 | |
each one of us masters of our own fate, | 18:19 | |
then all you had to do was change the gear ratio, | 18:21 | |
the foreign exchange rate, | 18:24 | |
between the Argentinian, I can't remember, | 18:26 | |
peso, let us call it, and the dollar. | 18:29 | |
According, actually, to a very famous doctrine | 18:33 | |
called the purchasing power parity doctrine | 18:36 | |
of a great Swedish economist of the past, Gustav Cassel, | 18:39 | |
the Argentinian exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar | 18:43 | |
would go down to exactly 1/3. | 18:47 | |
Now, the purchasing power parity doctrine | 18:50 | |
is not an exact doctrine. | 18:52 | |
It was often misused, | 18:53 | |
but it has a very important kernel of truth in it, | 18:55 | |
as important a kernel of truth as the truth | 18:58 | |
that underlies the quantity theory of money. | 19:01 | |
Returning to the post-World War II world, | 19:04 | |
we have all the countries determined | 19:09 | |
to pursue their own policies, | 19:13 | |
but they're not willing in the Taussigian fashion | 19:18 | |
to have freely-floating exchange rates. | 19:21 | |
Of course, this makes for trouble. | 19:24 | |
A lot of our disequilibria in international trade, | 19:27 | |
in my judgment, | 19:30 | |
have been traceable precisely | 19:31 | |
to this independence of action. | 19:35 | |
At least under the old-fashioned gold standard, | 19:37 | |
you got a small discrepancy, | 19:39 | |
and immediately, it began to be corrected. | 19:41 | |
But in the present world, you get a discrepancy, | 19:45 | |
each country follows its own star. | 19:48 | |
That discrepancy is not corrected. | 19:51 | |
It is not on its way to being corrected. | 19:54 | |
There is a cumulative strain, | 19:57 | |
and events are allowed to proceed | 19:59 | |
in this disequilibrium manner so long until finally, | 20:01 | |
somebody has run out of gold or IOUs | 20:04 | |
or the patience of foreign governments and speculators, | 20:07 | |
and something has to give. | 20:11 | |
And so, you have a cataclysmic | 20:12 | |
perforce devaluation of an exchange, | 20:15 | |
or you have a regime of autarky | 20:19 | |
in which exchange controls and mandatory capital controls | 20:22 | |
are put into effect. | 20:27 | |
I would like to have the best of both possible worlds. | 20:30 | |
Again and again, | 20:34 | |
I publicly favor a full employment policy in each country, | 20:36 | |
but a policy in which there is some flexibility | 20:42 | |
in terms of foreign exchange rates, | 20:47 | |
so that if different countries are pursuing | 20:50 | |
different rates of increase of their price level, | 20:52 | |
for example, | 20:55 | |
that will be compatible with long-run equilibrium. | 20:56 | |
I don't care for the present purpose | 21:00 | |
to argue in favor of a sliding peg | 21:02 | |
which does this gradually, | 21:05 | |
or in favor of a freely-floating exchange rate | 21:07 | |
which, from day to day, | 21:10 | |
gets set in from moment to moment | 21:11 | |
by the actions of speculators and counter-speculators | 21:13 | |
with or without some stabilization efforts by government. | 21:17 | |
That is not of a great deal of importance | 21:21 | |
from this viewpoint. | 21:24 | |
Well, now, let's take this mixed world | 21:25 | |
with its disequilibrium, such as we have, | 21:27 | |
and ask ourselves, where do we stand? | 21:30 | |
The United States after the Vietnam War period | 21:34 | |
had a very considerable inflation. | 21:37 | |
That inflation is just beginning | 21:39 | |
to get under control, in my judgment, | 21:41 | |
and we are having a slowdown and a recession. | 21:44 | |
As is typically the case, | 21:47 | |
this somewhat improves our trade balance. | 21:49 | |
I've noticed in the recent statistics | 21:52 | |
that our current accounts, | 21:55 | |
export surplus has gone up a little bit | 21:58 | |
because our exports have continued | 22:00 | |
to grow a little bit faster | 22:02 | |
than our imports have grown, | 22:03 | |
the imports languishing just a bit | 22:05 | |
because of the inventory | 22:08 | |
and other slowdown within the country. | 22:10 | |
Nonetheless, | 22:14 | |
the rest of the world belatedly, | 22:17 | |
not in 1965 or 1966, 1967, but just in recent years, | 22:20 | |
has itself been on a expansionary period, | 22:24 | |
Western Germany being a very good example of that, | 22:29 | |
so that, | 22:33 | |
inasmuch as they have not sealed them off, | 22:35 | |
themselves off from us and from our inflation | 22:38 | |
by letting the exchange rates fluctuate | 22:42 | |
rather substantially, | 22:45 | |
they have been importing some inflation | 22:46 | |
from the United States. | 22:49 | |
They complained bitterly | 22:50 | |
at international meetings in the past | 22:52 | |
that the United States was exporting part of its inflation. | 22:54 | |
My answer to that is, true. | 22:57 | |
We are guilty as charged. | 23:00 | |
We have been exporting some of our inflation. | 23:02 | |
However, there is a very easy solution to that problem | 23:05 | |
from the standpoint of the German government, | 23:08 | |
to take an example. | 23:11 | |
If they don't want to import our inflation, | 23:12 | |
they don't have to. | 23:14 | |
They can appreciate the mark. | 23:16 | |
This was politically unpopular in the days | 23:19 | |
of the Adenauer government. | 23:21 | |
It was politically unpopular | 23:24 | |
in the days of the Erhard government, | 23:25 | |
although Ludwig Erhard himself is, to my understanding, | 23:26 | |
was in favor of such an appreciation. | 23:30 | |
But there was a political impasse, | 23:32 | |
and it was only when the new Social Democratic government | 23:34 | |
of Brandt came in | 23:37 | |
with Karl Schiller as the economics minister | 23:39 | |
that you got such an appreciation. | 23:42 | |
Now, before my time is out, | 23:46 | |
I'd like to comment on the other part of the question, | 23:49 | |
which is, do the collectivist economies | 23:51 | |
have no problem with inflation? | 23:55 | |
The answer to that is that they are not immune | 23:58 | |
to the laws of economics. | 24:00 | |
For many, many years in Russia, | 24:02 | |
there was under their planning a tendency | 24:05 | |
for too many rubles to be paid out to people | 24:08 | |
in comparison with the goods that were available. | 24:10 | |
As would tend to happen under those circumstances, | 24:14 | |
any price which could be freely bid up would be bid up. | 24:16 | |
Of course, in those days, | 24:20 | |
there weren't very many prices | 24:22 | |
that were subject simply to supply and demand, | 24:23 | |
which could be simply bid up | 24:25 | |
so as to ration off the excess demand, | 24:27 | |
with the result that you had very long queues. | 24:29 | |
You had long lines. | 24:31 | |
You got discrepancies between supply and demand, | 24:33 | |
and these became larger and larger. | 24:36 | |
It was for this reason | 24:38 | |
that the Russians used fiscal policy. | 24:39 | |
They introduced some very heavy turnover taxes | 24:42 | |
which sopped up a great deal of purchasing power | 24:45 | |
so as to get it better aligned | 24:48 | |
between total supply and total demand. | 24:49 | |
Nevertheless, when all is said and done, | 24:52 | |
because the collectivist countries | 24:54 | |
can have a more ruthless manpower policy | 24:56 | |
and a more ruthless policy of rationing and allocation, | 24:59 | |
it certainly is easier for them | 25:03 | |
to have price stability and high employment | 25:05 | |
than it is for a free economy. | 25:08 | |
Let's remember that the essence of the problem, | 25:11 | |
the incomes policy problem, | 25:14 | |
the Phillips curve problem that we are worrying about, | 25:15 | |
is the problem of reconciling freedom | 25:18 | |
and full employment and price stability. | 25:21 | |
It's no trick at all to sacrifice one of that triad, | 25:25 | |
but the big challenge for us in our mixed economy | 25:30 | |
is to try to be able to get all three at once. | 25:34 | |
It's that incomes policy problem | 25:37 | |
which has not yet been solved anywhere in the free world. | 25:39 | |
- | If you have any questions or comments | 25:42 |
for Professor Samuelson, | 25:43 | |
address them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated, | 25:44 | |
166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611. | 25:47 |
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