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- | Welcome once again as MIT Professor Paul Samuelson | 0:02 |
discusses the current economic scene. | 0:04 | |
This series is produced by | 0:07 | |
Instructional Dynamics Incorporated. | 0:08 | |
This program was recorded January 7th. | 0:10 | |
- | We begin a new year, 1974. | 0:13 |
The new year is traditionally a time for stock taking | 0:16 | |
and so I'd like today to try to look at | 0:20 | |
what lessons it is that we have been learning | 0:24 | |
or that are there to be learned | 0:28 | |
from recent economic experience. | 0:30 | |
My thoughts are on this subject | 0:35 | |
because between Christmas Day and New Year's, | 0:37 | |
the American Economic Association has its annual meetings. | 0:42 | |
This year those meetings were in New York City | 0:46 | |
at the Hilton Hotel. | 0:49 | |
As usual, a tremendous number of social scientists, | 0:53 | |
statisticians and economists come together, | 0:57 | |
more than 10,000 I believe this year. | 1:00 | |
And they give papers to each other, | 1:03 | |
the audiences are large and I had to appear on a panel | 1:06 | |
with some very distinguished fellow economists | 1:11 | |
to glean the lessons from the current economic expansion. | 1:16 | |
Well, let me take the fist ten minutes | 1:22 | |
to discuss ten lessons | 1:25 | |
that I think there are to be learned from recent experience, | 1:29 | |
that's a rate of about one lesson a minute. | 1:33 | |
Well lesson number one. | 1:38 | |
Economists cannot forecast the future with precision. | 1:40 | |
Lesson number two. | 1:45 | |
Neither can anyone else. | 1:47 | |
And the forecast made by economists, | 1:50 | |
are systematically better than any made by astrologers, | 1:53 | |
cranks, brokers, bankers, businessmen, revolutionists, | 1:57 | |
and apologists, engineers and computers. | 2:02 | |
This I believe to be a finding of experience. | 2:06 | |
I don't know whether or not priori grounds | 2:11 | |
this would be very likely, | 2:14 | |
but when one actually keeps the almanac | 2:15 | |
and puts into the record | 2:20 | |
the errors of forecasting made by different groups, | 2:23 | |
we have a way over a long period of time of | 2:28 | |
comparing the relative | 2:32 | |
batting averages of different groups. | 2:34 | |
So together these first two lessons, | 2:39 | |
might constitute the random dart theory | 2:41 | |
of getting a forecast. | 2:45 | |
Throw a coin at any one of the couple of dozen | 2:48 | |
leading practitioners of the forecasting art | 2:51 | |
Wharton School, University of Michigan, | 2:55 | |
Chase Econometrics, DRI, | 2:57 | |
Townsend Greenspan, so forth, | 3:01 | |
and you'll do about as well, | 3:04 | |
as if you tried to pick out the very best one. | 3:06 | |
In fact it won't matter much where your coin lands | 3:09 | |
you'll get almost the same forecast anyway, | 3:12 | |
which leads to the next lesson. | 3:16 | |
Lesson number three. | 3:18 | |
Economists can succeed in forecasting like each other. | 3:21 | |
Professor Roy Blough of the | 3:26 | |
Columbia Graduate School of Business, | 3:29 | |
stated this when he was at the Treasury | 3:33 | |
in the form of a dogma, and Blough's dogma still holds. | 3:35 | |
Economists are like eight Eskimos in one bed. | 3:40 | |
The only thing you can be sure about, | 3:43 | |
is that they're all going to turn over together. | 3:45 | |
I may add as a corollary to Blough's law, | 3:49 | |
most economists are going to be all correct together | 3:52 | |
or all wrong together. | 3:56 | |
The dispersion between forecasts by a score of university, | 3:58 | |
bank, governments, and corporation analysts, | 4:03 | |
is much less than the dispersion of their best guesses | 4:07 | |
around where the future reality will in fact lie. | 4:11 | |
This is no more surprising than that the space | 4:16 | |
between a man's ears has no relation | 4:19 | |
to his standard error of inference. | 4:22 | |
Lesson number four. | 4:26 | |
Some economists manage to forecast worse than others, | 4:28 | |
but a Darwinian process of selection | 4:32 | |
often self selection, when one deals with rational men, | 4:35 | |
with alternative uses for their leisure time, | 4:39 | |
does serve to eliminate those whose comparative advantage | 4:43 | |
lies in cosmology or in futurism. | 4:47 | |
If you can't forecast a business situation, | 4:51 | |
become a futurist. | 4:54 | |
After man has said a dozen times, | 4:56 | |
if this next forecast doesn't turn out to be correct, | 4:59 | |
I'll hang up my gloves, he finally does. | 5:02 | |
Or he may learn that the finance company | 5:06 | |
wants to repossess them. | 5:09 | |
However there are exceptions to this rule. | 5:11 | |
Some masochists do make a nice living | 5:13 | |
out of being wrong in an interesting way. | 5:16 | |
They'll predict in every other year | 5:20 | |
that the Dow Jones Averages will go down to 200, | 5:21 | |
where they'll meet the Dollar price of gold. | 5:24 | |
Businessmen who like to have their adrenaline run | 5:28 | |
listening to a ghost story, will often pay just as much | 5:30 | |
to listen to these ever losers as to informed analysts. | 5:34 | |
But my Darwinian proposition becomes irrefutable | 5:38 | |
when I base it on the tautology | 5:43 | |
that the born losers who stay in the forecasting game | 5:45 | |
soon cease to be regarded as economists | 5:49 | |
by members of our guild. | 5:51 | |
Lesson five. | 5:54 | |
An automatic computer can forecast better | 5:55 | |
than an official government agency. | 5:58 | |
I'll add particularly, if the people | 6:01 | |
in that government agency really aren't trying | 6:04 | |
to give their best scientific forecast, | 6:06 | |
but are being guided, as sometimes happens | 6:08 | |
in any administration, by political motives. | 6:11 | |
But an analyst with judgment can still do better | 6:16 | |
than an automatic computer. | 6:19 | |
This is born out, not only by the rather sad performance | 6:21 | |
in recent years of the reduced form Monitorist Model | 6:25 | |
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, | 6:28 | |
which I gather from recent publication, | 6:31 | |
does seem about to hang up its gloves | 6:35 | |
as far as published regular forecasts are concerned. | 6:37 | |
But it is also born out by Ray Fair, | 6:43 | |
Professor Fair's audit of his own Princeton model, | 6:46 | |
which tries to do without any inputs of judgment. | 6:50 | |
And which thereby runs up, it turns out from experience, | 6:53 | |
a larger means squared error | 6:57 | |
than the leading judgmental computer models | 6:59 | |
of the Wharton, Michigan, VRI, Chase or other type. | 7:03 | |
Lesson six. | 7:08 | |
Judgmental analysts cannot do without the computer. | 7:11 | |
So much of the information that comes to any man of judgment | 7:16 | |
these days, has been massaged by a computer, | 7:20 | |
handled through it, produced by it, | 7:24 | |
you might even say fabricated by it, | 7:26 | |
that the era has passed when one could have a fair contest | 7:29 | |
between a non analytical observer such as Sumner Slichter | 7:33 | |
and a giant post-Kantian macro computer model. | 7:37 | |
Were Slichter alive today, | 7:41 | |
he would be riding on the escalator of the computer, | 7:43 | |
at the same time that he would be making | 7:46 | |
his own forward and upward strides | 7:48 | |
out of his own native shrewdness. | 7:51 | |
I picked Sumner Slichter because for many years | 7:53 | |
he was an excellent forecaster. | 7:57 | |
You may ask how do I know that Sumner Slichter | 8:00 | |
was an excellent forecaster. | 8:02 | |
I know it the way I know most things. | 8:05 | |
I had a graduate student who wrote a thesis | 8:08 | |
on the craft and art and science of forecasting. | 8:12 | |
This is Professor Robert Adams, | 8:16 | |
now of the Michigan Graduate Business School, | 8:18 | |
but then Head of the Economics Department at Exxon, | 8:22 | |
or as it was called then, Standard Oil of New Jersey. | 8:27 | |
And he made a study of all different forecasting methods, | 8:30 | |
and one of his chapters was devoted | 8:34 | |
to being Sumner Slichter. | 8:36 | |
And what he did was to read | 8:38 | |
everything he could get his hands on by Sumner Slichter | 8:42 | |
which had a bearing on the future developments of business. | 8:46 | |
And he tried to decide whether Sumner Slichter | 8:51 | |
was saying something about the future. | 8:53 | |
Very often, Slichter was not, often he was saying | 8:56 | |
it was going to rain tomorrow unless the sun is shining. | 8:59 | |
But sometimes, it was clear that Sumner Slichter | 9:02 | |
was saying something definite about the future. | 9:05 | |
Sometimes it appeared that he might be saying something | 9:08 | |
about the future, but it wasn't definitely clear, | 9:10 | |
and in that case, Doctor Adams had a panel | 9:13 | |
of two or three fellow graduate students | 9:18 | |
read the passage in question and if they agreed | 9:22 | |
on what it was that was being said | 9:25 | |
then he entered it in the record. | 9:27 | |
And then, having derived what Sumner Slichter | 9:29 | |
said about the future, Adams went back to see | 9:33 | |
what actually happened in the future, | 9:36 | |
and his findings were quite favorable | 9:39 | |
towards Sumner Slichter, in the prime of his life, | 9:43 | |
as a forecaster. | 9:46 | |
But as the point was made here in lesson six, | 9:49 | |
you can no longer have a Sumner Slichter whose judgment | 9:52 | |
was uncontaminated by the output of the prolific computer. | 9:57 | |
Any consumer of business information is already | 10:03 | |
infected by data that comes from the computer, | 10:07 | |
so it can't be the computer versus man, | 10:11 | |
it has to be man with the computer doing one thing, | 10:13 | |
or doing another. | 10:16 | |
Lesson number seven. | 10:18 | |
Economists can forecast everything. | 10:20 | |
Well, almost forecast everything, but prices. | 10:24 | |
In this sense, we are the reverse of Oscar Wilde's cynics, | 10:30 | |
who knew the price of everything and the value of nothing. | 10:35 | |
When it comes to next March's price of wheat, | 10:38 | |
when you come to think about it though, | 10:42 | |
why should any PhD, be able to forecast that better | 10:44 | |
than people who know a great deal | 10:48 | |
about the crops and milling industry | 10:50 | |
and who have a lot of money riding | 10:51 | |
on the outcome of their best guesses. | 10:53 | |
All the things that are easy to forecast, that is, | 10:56 | |
easy enough for a mere Professor to foresee, | 10:59 | |
those things can be expected to have already | 11:02 | |
been taken account of by the speculative market. | 11:05 | |
Indeed, if there were in Las Vegas, or in New York, | 11:09 | |
a continuous casino, on the money GMP of let's say | 11:14 | |
1974's fourth quarter, | 11:19 | |
it would be absurd to think that the best | 11:22 | |
economic forecasters could improve, | 11:24 | |
or improve much, upon the guess posted there. | 11:27 | |
Just imagine that every day, all day long, | 11:32 | |
there is a quoted number for what the GNP will be, | 11:36 | |
and you have as many people who'd like to be on one side | 11:41 | |
as on the other side, the bulls and the bears. | 11:44 | |
It's adjusted as they get new information. | 11:47 | |
Whatever knowledge and analytical skill | 11:52 | |
the best money GNP forecasters posses, | 11:54 | |
would already presumably have been fed into the bidding, | 12:00 | |
and of course, it's a manifest contradiction | 12:04 | |
to think that most economists can be expected | 12:07 | |
to do better than their own best performance. | 12:10 | |
But I'm saying something more devastating, | 12:14 | |
than that economist can't forecast particular prices, | 12:17 | |
or forecast better than themselves. | 12:22 | |
What I'm saying is, that the best forecasters | 12:27 | |
have been rather poor in predicting | 12:31 | |
the general price level's movements | 12:33 | |
and level, even a year ahead. | 12:36 | |
Let's go back to the year 1973. | 12:40 | |
By Valentine's Day, 1973, | 12:43 | |
the best forecasters, those with the best batting average, | 12:46 | |
were beginning to call for the growth recession | 12:50 | |
that we now know did set it at the end of the first quarter. | 12:53 | |
So, if we correct their end of 1972, | 12:59 | |
overly optimistic forecasts, | 13:03 | |
which they changed within a month or two, | 13:06 | |
the fashionable crowd has little to blame itself for | 13:08 | |
when it comes to their 1973 real GNP projections. | 13:11 | |
The emphasis there is on the word real. | 13:16 | |
But of course the upwards surge of food and decontroled | 13:18 | |
industrial prices, was not foreseen in advance. | 13:21 | |
It wasn't foreseen in advance by the people in Washington, | 13:25 | |
who made the January 11 1973 decision | 13:28 | |
to decontrol and end phase two, | 13:32 | |
and it wasn't foreseen in advance by | 13:35 | |
Wharton, DRI, Chase, et cetera. | 13:38 | |
And this has been a recurring pattern. | 13:42 | |
Surprise. | 13:46 | |
During and after the event, | 13:47 | |
at the virulence of the inflation, | 13:49 | |
wisdom after the event, in that demonstrating | 13:51 | |
that it did after all | 13:54 | |
fit in with past patterns of experience. | 13:55 | |
And I actually don't know of any exception | 13:58 | |
to this generalization. | 14:00 | |
And monetarists have generally been no better | 14:03 | |
in this regard, according to my records, | 14:05 | |
although some have thought that there is somehow | 14:09 | |
a closer link between M & P than between M and money GNP | 14:11 | |
equals price times quantity. | 14:17 | |
Now, off course over a very long period of time, | 14:21 | |
if you are able from trend considerations | 14:24 | |
of productive potential | 14:27 | |
and average degree to which we realize | 14:32 | |
our productive potential if, for those reasons | 14:34 | |
we were able to predict Q, | 14:37 | |
then you can from the quantity equation of exchange | 14:38 | |
be pretty sure | 14:42 | |
of saying something sensible about the | 14:44 | |
long run relationship between the | 14:47 | |
stock of M and the price level. | 14:49 | |
Even then off course there are some trends in | 14:54 | |
the velocity of money which have to be made. | 14:58 | |
But we're not talking about short run | 15:02 | |
and intermediate run forecasting, and the | 15:03 | |
logic of monetarism itself | 15:11 | |
is that it's the product of price times quantity, | 15:15 | |
which aught to be related to the | 15:18 | |
past rates of change of various definitions | 15:21 | |
of the money supply, with fairly long and variable lags. | 15:25 | |
To be sure, when it comes to predicting the future | 15:31 | |
of price level, some economist have been | 15:35 | |
less unlucky in their guesses than others. | 15:38 | |
But we all know what the corollary of that proposition is. | 15:41 | |
What seems to have thrown the economist fraternity off | 15:45 | |
is the fact that the Phillip's curve | 15:49 | |
seems to have worsened, | 15:52 | |
both in the eyes of those who belief in the Phillips Curve | 15:54 | |
and the eyes of those who don't. | 15:57 | |
And who use a different language to describe | 15:59 | |
the same disappointing effect upon wages and costs | 16:03 | |
generally of each degree of stagnation. | 16:08 | |
Improvement in the rate of inflation, | 16:12 | |
18 months ahead, | 16:15 | |
is a mirage that economists keep seeing before their eyes, | 16:17 | |
but just as the rail road tracks never seem to meet | 16:23 | |
as they appeared to do ten miles back, | 16:28 | |
so that return to normalcy | 16:31 | |
in the rate of inflation, never seems to occur. | 16:35 | |
Not even after we have euphemistically | 16:39 | |
redefined normalcy to permit of not stable prices | 16:41 | |
not reasonably stable prices 1% per year, | 16:46 | |
but even when we talk about | 16:50 | |
2,5% annual rates of inflation or more. | 16:52 | |
I remind that it is only a week back | 16:57 | |
that the official government forecast | 17:01 | |
for the end of 1973 was for the rate | 17:03 | |
of increase of prices of 2.5 to 3%, | 17:06 | |
that is something like a third | 17:09 | |
of the rate of increase that we actually were enjoying. | 17:12 | |
Paradoxically as soon as the analysts | 17:16 | |
stopped underestimating wage increases, | 17:19 | |
they began to underestimate general pride increases. | 17:22 | |
One suspects that two things are involved; | 17:26 | |
wishful thinking and perhaps a change | 17:29 | |
in the structural difficulty of the economy | 17:32 | |
in experiencing steady or slowly growing price levels. | 17:34 | |
What usually happens when people's | 17:40 | |
predictions go wrong, is that they find alibis | 17:42 | |
in contra factual predictions | 17:45 | |
incapable of being falsified or corroborated. | 17:48 | |
Thus some say an alibi: | 17:52 | |
it is price controls that have caused | 17:54 | |
the error in my forecasts in either direction, | 17:56 | |
but off course we shall never know | 17:59 | |
what the world would have been like | 18:01 | |
without those price controls. | 18:03 | |
Or they say, if the FED would do something, | 18:05 | |
this or that, which actually there is | 18:08 | |
no betting odds that the FED would do, | 18:10 | |
then the really would agree with my forecast. | 18:14 | |
Much of the disagreement from policy, | 18:17 | |
but not all, comes from differences between advisors, | 18:19 | |
on how much sacrifice a short term welfare | 18:23 | |
their willing invest now and in the near future | 18:26 | |
for some hypothetical better behavior | 18:29 | |
of the economy in the more distant future. | 18:31 | |
Those with a low rate of time discount | 18:34 | |
who will cheerfully recommend the flyer | 18:37 | |
in seito masochistic losterity, | 18:40 | |
are likely by the Darwinian process of politics | 18:43 | |
to find themselves not in power | 18:46 | |
for the period of time they say their therapy requires. | 18:48 | |
You know there are all sorts of people | 18:54 | |
who say if the Government only do | 18:56 | |
what I tell them to do, namely | 18:58 | |
be tough, hang in there tough, | 19:00 | |
cause a recession, temporary recession, | 19:04 | |
then we'll get back on the beam | 19:08 | |
including the beam of my own regression equations. | 19:10 | |
That's a very safe gambit to pursue | 19:14 | |
because there is very little likelihood | 19:17 | |
in our populous democracy, | 19:21 | |
that if you advice that to the prince or the president | 19:23 | |
that you'll stay in a power, | 19:26 | |
in a position of power and advice. | 19:27 | |
Lesson number eight. | 19:34 | |
We have discovered that in recent years, | 19:35 | |
the US economy has been remarkably unprone | 19:38 | |
to swings of inventory accumulation | 19:41 | |
such as characterized our past history. | 19:44 | |
Those who were predicting a 1974 genuine recession | 19:47 | |
prior to the post mid-east war energy crises, | 19:53 | |
they were counting on just such an inventory | 19:58 | |
slingshot effect to give them their downturn. | 20:01 | |
But they have had to look elsewhere for their recession. | 20:05 | |
Namely, as we've been discussing in these tapes, | 20:08 | |
to the energy situation. | 20:11 | |
A lesson like lesson eight can be | 20:16 | |
a very dangerous lesson to learn, | 20:18 | |
if we learn that | 20:21 | |
the US economy is unprone | 20:23 | |
to swings of inventory accumulation | 20:25 | |
just as that ceases to be the case | 20:27 | |
and I note that some recent new forecast | 20:30 | |
that I've been getting by some analysts | 20:34 | |
do look for considerable inventory accumulation | 20:37 | |
in 1974. | 20:41 | |
I think we should suspend judgment and | 20:43 | |
wait for some signs of that before we belief in it | 20:47 | |
precisely because we've been burned | 20:50 | |
so often in so many quarters in making such forecasts | 20:52 | |
in the last eight, ten, twelve quarters. | 20:56 | |
This stability of | 21:01 | |
inventory behavior of the American Economy, | 21:04 | |
it seems to me is particularly paradoxical | 21:07 | |
because in an age of inflation | 21:09 | |
it would be less than excusable | 21:11 | |
for a good business manager | 21:14 | |
to try to accumulate inventory and | 21:19 | |
successfully to accumulate inventory | 21:21 | |
just when it will help you to have a | 21:23 | |
an active inventory policy it would appear | 21:26 | |
that American industry seems to be in fact | 21:29 | |
following a very stable conservative, | 21:32 | |
you might even say sluggish inventory policy. | 21:37 | |
Lesson number nine. | 21:40 | |
We have learned that a micro event, | 21:42 | |
such as an Arab Oil boycott, | 21:44 | |
can loom large as a macro economic depressant. | 21:47 | |
And actually as we've been seeing, | 21:52 | |
if the boycott is more than a charade, | 21:54 | |
more than a passing thing, | 21:57 | |
most experts now do agree, | 21:59 | |
that real output will decline in this first half of 1974. | 22:02 | |
But we realize alas that our King's Fischer | 22:07 | |
Macro Economic Tools, do not tell us how to handle | 22:11 | |
such a micro economic restriction | 22:15 | |
on supply and productivity. | 22:17 | |
I mean how to handle it for the purpose | 22:19 | |
of making better forecasts. | 22:21 | |
It is not even clear that we should call | 22:24 | |
such an energy induced downturn a recession | 22:26 | |
since it may not involve much wastage | 22:30 | |
between our actual GNP and our producible GNP. | 22:33 | |
However to the extend that gasoline scares | 22:37 | |
hurt the auto business | 22:39 | |
and hurt the suburban building market, | 22:40 | |
some of the same secondary effects | 22:43 | |
of conventional recession will become operative | 22:45 | |
calling for some of the same conventional | 22:48 | |
lean-against-the-wind policy measures. | 22:52 | |
Lesson number 10. | 22:56 | |
The conventional wisdom about improvement | 22:59 | |
of the balance of payments, | 23:01 | |
from depreciating of a currency | 23:03 | |
seems in 1973 at long last, | 23:06 | |
to receive some support from the factual evidence. | 23:10 | |
There has certainly been a lot of | 23:15 | |
more important things to worry about in recent years | 23:16 | |
than the way the dollar will move, | 23:20 | |
has moved, up or down, | 23:24 | |
in the somewhat flexible | 23:26 | |
foreign exchange rate markets of the world. | 23:28 | |
And the depreciated Dollar | 23:31 | |
has finally resulted in our | 23:34 | |
developing a balance of trade surplus, | 23:38 | |
much needed, we still don't have enough of that, | 23:44 | |
and also developing an upward trend | 23:47 | |
in our balance on current account. | 23:49 | |
The conventional wisdom does seem | 23:54 | |
to have been working. | 23:55 | |
On the other side we see in Japan at least | 23:57 | |
that the appreciated Yen, | 24:01 | |
has resulted, | 24:04 | |
I must say in combination with a determined effort | 24:07 | |
by the Japanese Government to play ball, | 24:10 | |
to get rid of their surplus, | 24:13 | |
well has resulted in their getting rid | 24:16 | |
of their current surplus | 24:19 | |
and they're actually have been losing reserves, | 24:21 | |
moreover the clean floating | 24:25 | |
or somewhat clean floating | 24:29 | |
Yen Dollar exchange rate has resulted in | 24:32 | |
a upward movement at long last | 24:36 | |
of the Dollar relative to the Yen. | 24:39 | |
My recollection is that in March, when I was in Japan, | 24:41 | |
at par to the worst of the situation, | 24:45 | |
the Dollar had sunk so low | 24:48 | |
that at times I would get only 255 Yen to the Dollar. | 24:52 | |
If it stabilizes, I remember a day facto | 24:58 | |
in end of March at 265. | 25:04 | |
Well it's now, | 25:07 | |
the dollar has appreciated, | 25:10 | |
and you now get | 25:13 | |
280 Yen to the Dollar, | 25:16 | |
but more than that I noticed on six months contracts ahead | 25:19 | |
the quoted rate was 321 Yen to the Dollar. | 25:23 | |
Well, ten lessons, | 25:30 | |
ten minutes, | 25:33 | |
it's taken more than ten minutes, | 25:37 | |
and I've used up almost all of my time, | 25:40 | |
and I still haven't in fact drawn all the lessons | 25:43 | |
that are taught by our recent times. | 25:46 | |
I ought not to finish without giving one extra lesson, | 25:50 | |
one to grow wise on, so to speak. | 25:55 | |
Let's call it lesson 11. | 25:59 | |
Lesson 11. | 26:02 | |
Events of the last half dozen years, | 26:04 | |
have shown us how much economics | 26:06 | |
remains an art rather than a science. | 26:08 | |
Economics is exciting, | 26:11 | |
because what we study is hard, not easy. | 26:13 | |
Once again I think experience has taught us | 26:17 | |
the hard way that eclecticism in economics | 26:19 | |
is to para phrase Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes, | 26:23 | |
not so much a desirability as a necessity. | 26:27 | |
- | If you have any comments or questions | 26:31 |
for Professor Samuelson, address them to | 26:33 | |
Instructional Dynamics Incorporated, | 26:35 | |
166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611. | 26:36 |
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