Tape 151 - Implications of Prospective End of Nixon Presidency, Retrospective on Nixon Years, Commercial and Industrial Loans / Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated / Duke Digital Repository

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Hello, this is Rose Friedman inviting you

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on behalf of Instructional Dynamics

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to another of our bi-weekly conversations

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with Milton Friedman, professor of economics

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at the University of Chicago.

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We are taping this conversation

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on Wednesday August 7th, 1974.

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As we tape this conversation, it seems increasingly clear

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that Mr. Nixon is not likely to survive for long

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in the presidency.

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That certainly is the case.

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The revelations that came out two days ago, on Monday,

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seem to make that inevitable.

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What has been going on is a true Greek tragedy

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in every sense of the word.

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A Greek tragedy for Mr. Nixon personally,

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for those who, over the years, have supported him,

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and for the nation as a whole.

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It is a Greek tragedy not only in the sense

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that one development seems to follow from the other

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with utter inevitability

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toward ever deeper trouble,

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but it is a Greek tragedy in a more direct sense,

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that the essential ingredient of the Greek tragedy

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was almost invariably hubris,

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pride going before us, before a fall.

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And that seems to have played an enormously large role

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in the Greek tragedy that is unfolding in Washington today.

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It was the pride and the desire to assure

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a complete victory in 1972 in the elections

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that led Mr. Nixon to approve of the activities

1:34

that went underway.

1:37

It was pride and hubris that led him to order

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a taping of his conversations,

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an act which if it had never occurred

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would have almost surely meant

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that the situation would have developed

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in a wholly different way

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and he would never be in the problem,

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in the situation he was, he is now.

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It was the enact of hubris that led him,

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after the existence of the tapes was made known,

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to turn down the advice of some of his close associates

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that in in order to preserve

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the confidentiality of his tapes he should

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erase the whole of them.

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At each step of the way, that has been the case.

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The extraordinary thing about the whole episode

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is that we have here a man of great ability,

2:21

of high intellectual quality,

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who has demonstrated by his performance

2:30

his political sagacity and capacity,

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and yet even to the most uninstructed, naive citizen,

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his whole behavior over the past year or so,

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ever since the Watergate affair started, seems to consist of

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one incomprehensible mistake after another.

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And it is hard to attribute that sequence of mistakes

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to anything but this same quality of hubris.

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Why should the stock market

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have taken this latest blow as a bullish sign?

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Well, that's very simple.

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The essential thing,

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one essential feature of the stock market is that it hates,

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that is, the people who are participating

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in the stock market hate uncertainty.

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Certainly, one of the things

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that has been driving down the stock market

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is the uncertainty about what was coming.

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Were we in for a three or four month period

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of trials in the senate in which all other business in the,

3:29

all other governmental business in the United States

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would be more or less put on the shelf?

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In which there would be the possibility

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of divisive moves within the country,

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of a destruction of the harmony

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and confidence of the community at large?

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Or were we in for a dramatic change

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in presidency very quickly?

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Now, it's important to note that,

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in judging matters like this,

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there are two pairs of distinctions that are important.

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One must distinguish between expected

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or average values in the future

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and the uncertainty about those values.

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Let me illustrate.

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When World War I and II broke out,

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II in Europe in September 1939 and especially that occasion,

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one would have thought that almost everybody

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would have anticipated that it would

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sooner or later produce inflation

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and that as a result of producing inflation,

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that would tend to raise stock prices

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and also commodity prices.

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The effect of the outbreak of the war was surely,

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by any reasonable anticipation,

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to raise the average expected value

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of the prices in these areas.

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Yet, both commodity prices and stock prices fell

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immediately on the outbreak of the war.

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Why? Because while there

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might have been a higher average value,

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it was a much greater degree of uncertainty

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around that average value,

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a much greater range of possibilities.

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It might be very high, it might be very low.

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It might be a disaster.

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That's one distinction

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between the mean and the average value,

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but another distinction is between

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uncertainty about the state of the world in general

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and uncertainty about the particular commodities

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or stocks in which people transact their business.

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Again, to take the same case, the...

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Even though, if you looked,

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for example, at the price of copper,

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I haven't gone back to look at the figures,

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but my recollection is that all commodity prices

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almost fell immediately on the outbreak of war

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in September 1939,

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you might say, "Well, the expected value of copper

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"is gonna be higher,"

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but on the other hand, participants in the copper market

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who are going to benefit from that

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would have to commit themselves to tie up funds

5:56

to become more illiquid in order to purchase copper stocks.

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And here they were in a state of the world

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where they couldn't know

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what in the world was going to happen.

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Was this a phony war?

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Was it going to be ended soon?

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Was Germany going to overrun France?

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Was France going to overrun Germany?

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Would the United States be dragged in?

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Would it be over in three months, six months, a year?

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How much of the world would go down in flames?

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And so on and so on.

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Given such uncertainty about the world in general,

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the wise man wants to keep himself in a flexible position,

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to take advantage of opportunities that may develop

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or to protect himself from catastrophes that may develop.

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And thus, he will be highly desirous

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to be in a more liquid position,

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to have his funds in readily available forms

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and much less willing to undertake ventures,

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in copper, for example.

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Now, even with respect to copper as I say,

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there is great uncertainty along the same lines

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even thought the mean value may be higher.

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But I suspect that the more important factor

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that accounts for this kind of a phenomenon

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is the enormous growth in general uncertainty.

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Well, coming back to the immediate situation,

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surely that has been the situation here.

7:12

Everybody has been very uncertain

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about what was going to go on,

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what was going to happen,

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what the state of the world was gonna be like,

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what opportunities or problems were going to arise.

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And, of course, that uncertainty has been intensified,

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not only by the political situation in Washington

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but by such events as the failure of the German bank,

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the difficulties of Franklin National Bank,

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the extremely diverse profit experience

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of various companies.

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The sudden appearance of the smoking pistol,

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as it was referred to in some of the Watergate business,

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and the immediate move toward an essentially unanimous

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position in favor of impeachment

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by the House of Representatives and by the Senate

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seems to reduce, does in fact reduce

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the degree of uncertainty about the state of the world.

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And thus, it makes people willing to part with liquidity

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and to undertake some of the ventures

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that they have been considering all along.

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Everybody has known that there are

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big bargains in the stock market,

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but the question is there might be bigger bargains yet.

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And consequently, the elimination of the uncertainty

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produced a sharp rise in the market.

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Now, that doesn't mean that the market is right.

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That doesn't mean that, really,

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the elimination of Mr. Nixon is a good thing.

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Let me illustrate.

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In August 1971, after wage and price controls were announced

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the market made an enormous jump.

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I believe a much bigger jump than it made

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on Monday of this week on the Watergate business.

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The market thought that uncertainty had been reduced

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because the government, in its opinion,

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was taking decisive action to stem inflation.

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Now, the market was wrong.

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The decisive action which the government took was,

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ultimately, to have the effect

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of increasing, not reducing, inflation.

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And it is worth noting that on the next occasion

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when Mr. Nixon imposed price and wage controls,

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in the spring of, June I guess it was, of 1973,

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the market reacted very differently and did not jump.

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I don't remember exactly what it did,

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but it did not move, if I remember rightly,

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very much in either direction.

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So, the market apperception

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may, of course, turn out to be false,

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but nonetheless I think it's not hard to see

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why the market takes it as a favorable sign.

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What implications does a change of guard have

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on the prospects for the economy?

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I must confess that I do not know

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how to answer that question with any confidence.

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The policies Mr. Nixon has recently announced

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are the right policies.

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In direction, they are a return to the policies

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which he followed before August 15th, 1971.

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No price and wage controls, moderate fiscal policy,

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moderate monetary policy.

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But the implementation of them is the real question.

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I have, over and over, emphasized the contrast

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between the word which the Federal Reserve utters

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on the subject of monetary policy and its actions.

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Now, the question is,

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first, will the new guard want to continue that same policy?

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Second, will they be able to carry it out

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more effectively than Mr. Nixon could carry it out?

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With respect to the first,

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I think the odds are very heavy that the new,

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that Mr. Ford will want to continue the same policy.

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Mr. Ford has, in general, had a large measure of agreement

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with the basic principles of Mr. Nixon.

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It seems clear that he will continue,

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essentially, the same economic advisors

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in the sense that Alan Greenspan,

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about whom we spoke on our last past last tape, will

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be coming in on September 1st.

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Perhaps Mr. Ford...

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No doubt, Alan will offer Mr. Ford his resignation,

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but I should be amazed if Mr. Ford took it.

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I am sure that Mr. Ford's desire

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will be to keep Alan Greenspan as chairman of the council.

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I suspect that Bill Simon will stay

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at Secretary of the Treasury.

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In fact, if you ask, "What is the intelligent,

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"reasonable, responsible policy for Mr. Ford to follow?"

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it would seem, off hand, that it is surely

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to try to introduce as few disturbing elements

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in the situation as possible,

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to build on what elements of strength remain

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in the Republican Nixon administration.

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And those elements of strength as he will perceive them,

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and as I think the public at large

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and the informed pubic perceives them,

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include Mr. Simon at the treasury,

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Mr. Weinberger at HEW,

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the Federal Reserve,

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and Mr. Greenspan at the Council of Economic Advisors.

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Under these circumstances, it would seem that

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Mr. Ford would get, essentially, the same economic advice

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that Mr. Nixon would have been getting and was getting.

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Will he be able to carry these out more effectively?

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Certain of them, obviously, yes.

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To begin with, there will be a honeymoon

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between Mr. Ford and the Congress.

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He is, in any event, a creature of the Congress.

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He is, in any event, much closer in tune

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with the House than was Mr, Nixon

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and will be able to have a more sensitive

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antenna toward the House.

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I would suspect

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that Melvin Laird, former Secretary of Defense,

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a close associate of Mr. Ford over many years

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in the House of Representatives,

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would play an important role in the Ford administration.

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Mr. Laird, too, is extremely close to people in the Congress

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and very effective at reading congressional sentiment.

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And thus, I can well believe

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that Mr. Ford could be far more successful than Mr. Nixon

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in getting effective measures

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to hold down governmental spending.

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If he could get effective measures

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to hold down governmental spending,

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that would certainly encourage the Federal Reserve

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to hold down the rate of monetary increase.

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In consequence,

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it is not to be ruled out that the change in administration

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would produce a fiscal and monetary posture

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that would be less inflationary

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or more anti-inflationary than the present one.

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But here's where the imponderables start to come in.

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Because, after a few months, that will also mean,

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very likely, that unemployment in the short run

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will rise more rapidly than it otherwise would.

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And the questions is, what further effects will that have

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in the new political climate, in which, very rapidly,

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the honeymoon that Mr. Ford would be enjoying

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will be disappearing?

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And he will be now cast in the role

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of a candidate for the 1976 presidential nomination.

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We're now in the...

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So, I think that that crystal ball is extremely clouded.

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I must say, I was discouraged,

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in contemplating that crystal ball,

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by the story in this morning's paper

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about Arthur Burns's testimony

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before the Joint Economic Committee yesterday.

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I heartily endorse and welcome Arthur Burns's call

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for a 10 billion dollar reduction in the federal budget,

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but the remainder of his policy recommendations

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were not good auguries.

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He recommended an agreement among oil consuming nations

15:12

to try to drive down the international oil price of oil.

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I don't believe producer cartels hold up,

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I don't think consumer cartels hold up.

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I think that would be pure window dressing,

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but the market price of oil is,

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in any event, going to come down.

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But it has no great importance for the domestic scene.

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Much more important were two other elements,

15:33

his call for a strengthened,

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for a return to a cost of living council

15:38

which would monitor wage and price control

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and which would have some power

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to postpone large wage and price increases.

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Any such move would be a major threat

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to the retention of a free market

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and to the avoidance of wage and price controls.

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In some ways, even more troublesome

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was a paragraph in the story which said, and I quote,

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if the nation's jobless rates hit 6%, however,

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Mr. Burns said he favors a four billion dollar

16:10

public service employment program by the government

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that would provide jobs for 800,000 persons, unquote.

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What's wrong with that?

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Isn't it going, won't it prevent a lot of suffering

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as a result of unemployment?

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Well, this is just another one of those short-sighted,

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not thought through programs that have been so,

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that have backfired so much over the course of years.

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Consider a government public service program

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and ask where does the government

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get the four billion dollars which it's going to spend,

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supposedly to provide jobs for 800,000 persons?

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If it gets that four billion dollars

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by imposing taxes on other people,

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then the people who pay the taxes will hire fewer people.

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There are no net jobs creation, created.

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There are only people now working for the government

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instead of for the taxpayer.

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If it gets the money by borrowing from the public at large

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at high, at whatever interest rate it has to pay,

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then, again, the jobs created by the government

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are balanced by the jobs that are lost

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in the private sector.

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Is there really, does it really improve matters

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and keep down unemployment

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for the government to employ people instead of

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for a housing firm or a construction firm to employ them?

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The third possibility is

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that it gets the four billion dollars by printing the money.

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But then, that's inflationary.

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If it prints this, spends printed money for this purpose

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instead of for something else,

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there's no net increase to demand.

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If you really are going to keep, to hold down inflation,

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you mustn't kid yourself.

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You mustn't suppose that you can hold down inflation

17:44

without producing a reduction in total spending.

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And you can't produce a reduction in total spending

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if, to offset any such reduction,

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the government starts printing money

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in order to provide public service employment.

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And thus,

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this is one of those,

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as Burke says somewhere, one of those plausible schemes

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which misleads you in the long run.

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It's creating jobs with the right hand

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and eliminating jobs with the left hand.

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I know that you just talked to a New York Times reporter

18:18

who is doing a story on the economics,

18:21

of the economic aspects of the Nixon administration.

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I think your subscribers would be interested

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in what you told him.

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Well, I said to him that it seemed to me,

18:32

in retrospect, as you looked at the Nixon administration,

18:35

August 15th, 1971 was a watershed in that administration,

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a point that my subscribers will not find strange

18:44

or novel coming from me.

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But it's interesting, as you look back,

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to see that it was a watershed

18:53

which had precisely the opposite significance

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for domestic policies and for international policies.

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Consider the domestic policies.

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Prior to August 15th, 1971,

19:08

Mr. Nixon was following what I regarded then

19:11

and regard now as, on the whole,

19:14

and admirable and excellent policy.

19:16

It was the same three-pronged policy

19:19

that he announced in his recent speech

19:22

he was going to revert to now,

19:23

no wage and price controls,

19:26

reduction in the rate of government spending,

19:30

and that is fiscal restraint,

19:32

a slow rate of growth in the quantity of money,

19:35

that is monetary restraint.

19:37

That policy had not been executed fully,

19:42

and particularly in the monetary area,

19:45

it had left much to be desired.

19:47

But yet, on the whole, the general thrust of policy

19:49

was in the direction of those three measures,

19:52

the three steps.

19:54

Moreover, Mr. Nixon had taken great efforts

19:57

to try to educate the public about the

20:00

virtues of a free market,

20:04

about the evils of imposing price and wage control.

20:07

In speech after speech, he had talked against it.

20:10

And the policy was working.

20:14

In early 1969, when Mr. Nixon was inaugurated,

20:18

inflation was running at the rate

20:20

of somewhere between six and 7% a year.

20:22

By August 15th, 1971, inflation was running,

20:25

measured by cost of living,

20:28

at about four and a half percent a year.

20:29

We had suffered, experienced a recession in 1970,

20:32

but it was the mildest recession in the post-war period

20:37

and one of the mildest in US history.

20:39

The economy, by mid-1971 was expanding.

20:42

So, if you stop on August 15th, 1971, and look back,

20:45

you have to give Mr. Nixon high marks for domestic policy

20:49

and you have to say that policy was working.

20:52

On August 15th, 1971, he imposed price and wage controls,

20:57

and in my opinion, Mr. Nixon

21:00

did far more harm to this country

21:03

in the long run by that act,

21:05

which went against his own deeply held long run principles,

21:08

than he did by anything that, any of the misdeeds,

21:12

and they certainly are misdeeds,

21:15

that come under the rubric of Watergate.

21:16

It was the first time in American history

21:20

that price and wage controls had been imposed

21:25

in time of peace when there was no obvious emergency.

21:28

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And by a Republican president.

21:32

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And by a Republican president, quite right.

21:33

Against his own basic principles

21:36

and against the principles that, supposedly,

21:38

his party had always stood for.

21:40

We shall long pay a heavy price for that act.

21:44

The result economically

21:48

has been catastrophic.

21:51

At the risk of appearing to be self-serving,

21:59

I cannot forebear from repeating

22:01

that this is not hindsight,

22:03

that this is what I said at the time,

22:05

that I said at the time that undercover

22:07

of these price and wage controls,

22:09

inflationary forces would build up, be repressed,

22:12

and sooner or later break out into the open.

22:15

And that is, of course, what happened.

22:18

Because Mr. Nixon not only imposed price and wage controls,

22:22

which violated the first of his three phase program,

22:25

but he also encouraged an expansive,

22:30

a much more expansive and inflationary fiscal policy

22:33

and the Federal reserve undertook

22:37

a much more expansive monetary policy.

22:39

So, on all sides, you had the situation

22:41

that I described at the time

22:44

as putting a brick on top of the kettle

22:46

and turning up the flame under the kettle.

22:48

And finally, the lid blew off in early, in 1973, and then

22:50

to multiply his mistake,

22:58

Mr. Nixon imposed a second price and wage control in 1973,

23:03

which fortunately did not last nearly as long as the first.

23:09

And once, in early 1974,

23:14

all of the price and wage controls more or less disappeared,

23:17

we experienced this explosive inflation

23:23

which has not yet run its course

23:27

but which I think is close to doing so.

23:29

So that if you look at our present

23:33

domestic economic problems,

23:34

the problems of inflation,

23:36

the problems of a shortage of productive capacity

23:38

and a misallocation of productive capacity,

23:43

these are all traceable directly back, in my opinion,

23:46

to that ill-fated action on August 15th, 1971,

23:50

in the domestic sphere.

23:53

Now, interestingly enough, in the international sphere

23:55

it was the other way around.

23:57

Until August 15th, 1971,

24:01

the Nixon administration had followed a policy

24:04

of controls in the international sphere.

24:06

As my subscribers know, I had all along been in favor,

24:09

I've for many, many years been in favor

24:12

of closing the gold window,

24:14

and indeed, I wrote a memorandum to Mr. Nixon

24:15

early in his administration,

24:18

or just before he was inaugurated, in fact,

24:19

urging that as a first act on becoming president

24:22

he should close the gold window

24:25

and lay the groundwork for a system

24:27

of floating exchange rates and repeal all exchange controls.

24:29

He took the first of those steps in August 15th, 1971,

24:33

and therefore, laid the base for a free market policy

24:37

in international financial arrangements.

24:40

It took some time for that to mature,

24:42

but by now, all exchange controls have been eliminated.

24:45

The interest equalization tax has been wiped out

24:50

and the restrictions of foreign lending

24:54

by banks hase been wiped out.

24:55

The restriction on foreign investment

24:57

by American corporations have been wiped out.

24:58

So, you have this interesting spectacle,

25:01

that before August 15th, 1971,

25:04

we had a free market policy at home

25:06

and a policy of controls abroad.

25:08

After August 15th, 1971, we had a policy of controls at home

25:10

and a free market abroad,

25:14

And of course, in both segments,

25:16

the area in which we had a free market policy was successful

25:18

and the area in which we did not was a great failure.

25:21

In the international sphere,

25:25

as I've pointed out here time and again,

25:26

we would've had many a...

25:28

We would have had an enormous international financial crisis

25:30

at the time of the Yom Kippur War

25:33

if it was not for the floating exchange rate system

25:35

which had been set in motion

25:38

by the closing of the gold window on August 15th, 1971.

25:40

So, in retrospect,

25:45

you have to give a very mixed appraisal of

25:50

the Nixon years.

25:56

I cannot really say the Nixon economic program

25:58

because the Federal Reserve Board, for example,

26:00

is independent of the president,

26:04

and our present inflation certainly owes a great deal

26:05

to their behavior.

26:08

-

So do price and wage controls.

26:10

-

You are quite right, so do price and wage controls.

26:12

It was Arthur Burns, by his advocacy

26:15

of voluntary price and wage controls

26:18

in early 19, in late 1970, early 1971,

26:20

who really made it respectable

26:25

for Republicans to be in favor of price and wage control

26:27

and who, in that way, certainly had a great deal to do

26:30

and must bear a large share of the responsibility

26:33

for the fact that Mr. Nixon imposed price and wage controls

26:36

in the summer of 1971.

26:42

I may say Mr. Burns was very strongly

26:43

and vigorously and publicly opposed

26:46

to the second freeze in 1973.

26:48

But I am sorry to say that from his present testimony

26:52

before the Joint Economic Committee,

26:54

that he seems once again to be backsliding.

26:56

But, at any rate, as I say,

26:59

if you look at the Nixon years

27:02

and don't try to say whether it's Mr. Nixon personally

27:04

who's responsible or what,

27:07

you have to give a very mixed assessment.

27:08

You have to give a good plus

27:11

for economic policy until 1971,

27:15

a good minus for international economic policy till then.

27:19

A good plus for (laughs)

27:23

economic policy internationally after that date

27:25

and a big minus for domestic policy.

27:29

Unfortunately, it was too bad

27:31

that we couldn't get it all together

27:33

and have the pluses come at the same time and continue.

27:35

That is, of course, what makes,

27:40

from another point of view, the situation so tragic.

27:42

What a magnificent opportunity we had,

27:46

and what a magnificent opportunity was thrown away.

27:49

The 1970 recession was mild.

27:53

It was not a major tremor.

27:55

But, in retrospect, it was a purely masochistic exercise.

27:57

We got nothing whatsoever out of it.

28:02

Let us hope that we don't go through that process again,

28:07

but unfortunately, I am not very confident

28:10

that we shall not.

28:12

-

I think we have time to answer one subscriber's question

28:18

in our time today.

28:22

Mr. Windsor, Vice President of Parker/Hunter Incorporated

28:24

writes it would appear to me that in order to explain

28:29

the phenomenal increase in interest rates

28:32

during the past three and one half months,

28:34

one must first explain why commercial and industrial loans

28:36

increased so sharply in March and April.

28:39

Would you kindly comment on the following thesis?

28:43

The massive increase in industrial

28:46

and commercial loans in March and April

28:48

may be the result of inventory accumulation

28:50

precipitated by anticipated price increases

28:52

resulting from the dismantling of wage price controls

28:55

on April 15th, 1974.

28:58

And then Mr. Windsor gives the actual figures

29:01

showing the phenomenal increase

29:04

in industrial and commercial loans in March and April.

29:06

-

What has been...

29:11

That's, of course, a very, very perceptive comment.

29:12

What has been most done, most prominent about this period

29:18

has been the extraordinary, phenomenal increase

29:20

in short-term interest rates.

29:23

The long-term rates have not risen anything like as much,

29:26

and you have the continuation of the situation

29:28

in which short-term interest rates

29:32

have been decidedly above long-term interest rates,

29:33

which historically has been a case in which

29:36

people have been expecting interest rates to fall.

29:39

I have no doubt

29:43

that Mr. Windsor,

29:46

the factor Mr. Windsor points to is an important one,

29:47

that the prospect of the end of wage and price controls

29:51

made it advantageous for people to accumulate inventories.

29:55

We had a, had this phenomenon on a massive scale

29:58

in the case of the meat business,

30:01

when we had a meat freeze in '73

30:03

and we had the great accumulation

30:04

of meat inventories, of cattle,

30:06

but the expectations were sadly disappointed

30:10

and prices of meat fell sharp.

30:13

Now, in the present case,

30:15

the expectations have not yet been completely disappointed,

30:17

although there has been a good deal of weakness

30:20

in commodity prices.

30:22

They may be.

30:23

But it is certainly true that revised estimates

30:24

by the Department of Commerce have been revising upward

30:28

at a volume of physical inventory accumulation

30:32

during not only the months Mr. Windsor points to,

30:36

March and April, but throughout the first part of 1974.

30:40

And indeed if, I'm not certain about this

30:44

but I believe also in late '73.

30:46

The inventory accumulation at prices that are far higher

30:50

than they were a year ago

30:55

does introduce an increase in demand

30:57

for commercial and industrial loans

30:59

and may well explain part

31:00

of the rapid rise in interest rates.

31:02

But I wonder whether an even more important factor

31:05

may not be a point that has been widely noted in May,

31:09

that the rising prices of commodities

31:14

produced very rapid increase in inventory profits,

31:18

in recorded profits of enterprises

31:23

on a first in, first out basis,

31:25

inventory profits which provided no cash

31:27

because they had to be,

31:31

the replacement costs of the inventories

31:33

went up as the price did,

31:35

and therefore, this was fundamentally a book entry,

31:37

but yet, inventory profits which created tax,

31:41

federal tax liability

31:43

and which enterprises then had to finance

31:45

in one way or another.

31:48

And so I would...

31:50

I really haven't gone through the figures

31:51

on the flow of funds.

31:53

This is a question Mr. Windsor raises

31:54

is one which can be examined in a much more detailed

31:57

and satisfactory way than I am doing it on this offhand way,

32:00

but I would not be at all surprised

32:03

if the raise, if the borrowing of funds to meet the tax,

32:05

in a way, the artificial tax lie...

32:12

Let me put that, they were real tax liabilities.

32:14

The tax liabilities on artificial profits

32:17

was not a more important factor

32:20

in the short-term rise in commercial and industrial loans,

32:23

and, therefore, in the upward pressure

32:27

on short-term interest rates,

32:29

than was the accumulation of physical inventories

32:31

for the speculative purposes of profiting

32:35

from an anticipated rise in prices.

32:39

-

Thank you very much.

32:42

Remember, subscribers, if you have any questions or comments

32:43

please send them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated.

32:46

450 Ohio Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.

32:50

We shall be visiting with you again in two weeks.

32:56

Tape 151 - Implications of Prospective End of Nixon Presidency, Retrospective on Nixon Years, Commercial and Industrial Loans

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