Tape 157 - Election Consequences, Media, Money Supply

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-	Hello, this is William Clark of the Chicago Tribune,	0:02
	welcoming you, again, on behalf	0:06
	of Instructional Dynamics, Incorporated,	0:07
	to a visit with the distinguished economist,	0:10
	Professor Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago.	0:12
	And we're recording this interview	0:15
	on November 6th, Wednesday, November 6, 1974.	0:17
	Which of course, is the day after	0:22
	the November 5th elections.	0:23
	And, Dr. Friedman, I think the obvious first question	0:26
	is to ask you about your thoughts	0:29
	on the meaning and the consequences of yesterday's election.	0:31
-	I think the meaning is much harder	0:35
	to interpret then the consequences.	0:36
	The distinction I'm making is the following one,	0:40
	that it's hard to know whether the meaning	0:43
	of this election is that the American people	0:45
	have in fact, given a firm mandate to Congress,	0:48
	to produce more inflation.	0:52
	Or whether, the meaning of this election is simply,	0:54
	that fed up with Watergate, with the high present inflation,	0:58
	affected by the general tendency to blame the White House	1:02
	for whatever happens, regardless	1:05
	of what the source of it is.	1:07
	The public has just expressed a general reaction	1:09
	of unease, of opposition to what was in.	1:12
	Of a rejection of President Nixon and all his works.	1:17
	I rather suspect the latter is the true meaning	1:21
	of the election, but I believe the consequences	1:24
	will be what the first meaning suggests.	1:27
	That is to say if you were a returning Congressman,	1:29
	if you were a returning Senator,	1:32
	if you had listened to what your fellow candidates	1:34
	had been saying on the stump,	1:38
	I think you would go back to Washington saying,	1:40
	the people want us to be sure	1:43
	to reduce unemployment as soon as we can,	1:45
	the people are fed up with inflation,	1:48
	but they don't want, they are not willing	1:50
	to support less inflation via less government spending.	1:52
	I rather think that if I were a returning Congressman,	1:58
	I would read the mandate of the people	2:01
	that the people have instructed us	2:02
	to spend more, not to raise taxes.	2:05
	Now, the people have not explicitly	2:08
	drawn the conclusion from those two statements.	2:11
	But there is only one logical conclusion.	2:14
	How can you spend more and not raise taxes?	2:16
	Fundamentally, the only way you are likely to do it	2:20
	is by imposing the hidden tax of inflation,	2:23
	by printing money to pay for the difference.	2:26
	I think Congress will take that message,	2:29
	I shall not be surprised if the Federal Reserve System	2:31
	takes the same message.	2:34
	So that I interpret the true significance	2:36
	of the election, that it is another firm push forward	2:38
	on the road to higher and higher government spending.	2:43
	To more and more government intervention	2:46
	into the economy, and to higher rates of inflation.	2:48
	I don't think that will occur overnight,	2:53
	as I've mentioned before, I believe the immediate	2:55
	prospect is for a tapering off of the rate of inflation	2:57
	and these things take time, there are legs involved,	3:00
	it will be next year before they get around	3:03
	to voting the spending, it will be the year after that	3:05
	before the spending occurs.	3:07
	I don't wanna predict the precise time table.	3:09
	But consider, for example, just one issue.	3:13
	We have been moving on a road towards socialized medicine.	3:16
	Medicare and Medicaid were big steps on that road.	3:20
	The proposed National Health Insurance	3:24
	is another major step down that road.	3:26
	Is there anything to stop it right now?	3:29
	Where is there any strong, coordinated,	3:31
	effective opposition to that move?	3:35
	I don't see it, so it seems to me,	3:38
	that one of the few things you can assert	3:40
	with almost complete certainty,	3:42
	is that within the next decade or so,	3:45
	maybe less, maybe more, the United States	3:46
	will have a completely socialized medical system.	3:49
	Now, I'm not saying that because I think it's desirable,	3:52
	on the contrary, I think it's disastrous.	3:54
	I think the result will be to make our medical system	3:56
	much less effective and much more erratic	4:00
	in its incidents than it presently is.	4:06
	If we look at the experience of Great Britain	4:07
	under socialized medicine, it has not	4:09
	been a happy experience at all.	4:11
	But I'm not now talking about what's desirable,	4:13
	but what's likely, and the question is,	4:15
	where can you see, what trends can you see,	4:17
	in the picture which will stop us	4:20
	going to socialized medicine?	4:21
	What trends do you see in the picture	4:23
	which will stop Congress from enacting	4:25
	a very large so-called public employment program?	4:27
	The latest fad, I shouldn't say the latest,	4:31
	it's a replay of the Public Works Administration	4:33
	and the Works Progress Administration of the late New Deal.	4:37
	That's exactly what the public employment program is.	4:41
	But what chance do you see now of stopping it?	4:43
	The only bit of hope I can see in this picture,	4:46
	it's only my natural optimism that forces me	4:51
	to dig so deep to see such a bright light,	4:53
	is that with the kind of overwhelming majorities	4:57
	the Democrats will have in the House and the Senate,	4:59
	with the kind of veto-proof Congress it will be,	5:02
	the responsibility for these measures	5:07
	will be clearly placed.	5:09
	If in the next couple of years we have,	5:11
	as I expect we shall have, an outburst of spending.	5:13
	If we have a very expensive monetary policy.	5:17
	If this, in turn, results in inflation,	5:24
	it will be clear who is responsible.	5:27
	But I have to temper even that optimistic note	5:29
	by suggesting that that you'd one,	5:34
	look very closely at the time pattern involved.	5:35
	The probability is that the inflationary consequences	5:39
	will be reaped after the next election, not before.	5:42
	Whereas the expansionary effects	5:45
	will be reaped before and not after.	5:47
	I recently was setting down the dates	5:49
	at which, in the past 15 years,	5:53
	attempted cures for inflation were stopped	5:58
	and replaced by expansionary, monetary and fiscal action.	6:00
	And those are very interesting dates.	6:03
	They are 1963, 1967, 1971, they are exactly	6:06
	four years apart, each one is in the year	6:13
	preceding a presidential election.	6:16
	And it now looks as if 1975 is gonna	6:18
	be the fourth in that series.	6:21
	And interestingly enough, if we push back	6:24
	and ask, how did it happen in 1959?	6:26
	Was it in the series?	6:30
	It was because of the accident	6:31
	which I have mentioned before on these tapes,	6:33
	that we had a non-political president,	6:35
	Dwight Eisenhower, who was perfectly willing	6:37
	to sacrifice his possible successor	6:40
	in order to break the back of inflation.	6:44
	And he succeeded.	6:48
	The only occasion on which we have	6:49
	really broken the back of inflation	6:51
	was in 1960 when we got	6:53
	inflationary expectation down to zero.	6:55
	We were ready to start out on a path	6:57
	of no inflation and healthy growth,	7:00
	but in 1963, the year before the '64 election,	7:01
	we had the tax cut, we had big increase	7:05
	in government spending, we had	7:08
	a move toward easy money policy.	7:09
	And the same thing happened in 1967, '71,	7:12
	and now as I fear, '75.	7:15
	And, so it may well be that this	7:18
	possible favorable effect, we will	7:20
	have to wait till 1978 before we can see any effects of it.	7:22
-	I wonder where that will put President Ford in 1976.	7:28
	The timing of those developments.	7:32
-	The timing of those developments	7:33
	will put President Ford, in one sense, in a good position.	7:35
	In another sense, in a very bad position.	7:41
	Because, what will happen between now and then?	7:43
	He would have been vetoing these spending measures.	7:45
-	Yes, I see.	7:49
	But a Democratic Congress, a democratic	7:50
	presidential nominee will be able to say,	7:53
	well you see, look you're back	7:55
	on a prosperous course, why?	7:57
	Because we passed these things over President Ford's veto.	7:59
	On the other hand, if the effect is,	8:03
	that the economy has expanded	8:06
	and is expanding at that time, is booming.	8:08
	Even though inflation may be somewhat rising,	8:11
	the general tendency to favor the White House	8:14
	and give him the credit, will be	8:17
	a good feature for President Ford.	8:18
	I think it's a, so I really don't,	8:21
	don't have any strong predictions on that matter.	8:23
-	Any national election always heightens interest	8:26
	in the influence and position of the media.	8:29
	You have a letter, Milton, which is	8:32
	two or three months old, here.	8:36
	But the question it raises	8:38
	is certainly very pertinent today.	8:40
	The writer, Mr. J. Allen Rudolph,	8:42
	recalls that at one time you said something	8:46
	to the effect that, a quote if they, the media,	8:48
	succeed in driving him, referring to President Nixon,	8:52
	out of office, it will be impossible	8:55
	for them to not to continue to use this newfound power.	8:58
	I wonder what your thoughts on that are today?	9:04
-	Well, I think it's a very pertinent question today	9:06
	and I think we've been having an example	9:10
	of the phenomenon I was referring to.	9:14
	It seems clear to me that the major cost	9:16
	to the nation of the whole Watergate episode,	9:20
	has been the extraordinary power,	9:23
	which it has demonstrated that the media have.	9:26
	They had this power all along.	9:29
	They didn't really recognize it.	9:31
	But it's perfectly clear that the key factor	9:33
	which finally drove President Nixon out of office,	9:36
	I don't mean to say that what he did	9:38
	was not reprehensible, or warrant things,	9:40
	I'm not condoning any of his behavior.	9:42
	And yet it is perfectly clear	9:45
	that it was the continuous, vehement,	9:48
	day after day attacks by the media	9:52
	that finally drove him out of office.	9:55
	That converted what was really a minor misdemeanor	9:58
	from any point of view or broad perspective.	10:01
	Into what people call, in a way,	10:04
	that it just seems to me as incredible,	10:06
	they call it the greatest crime of the century,	10:08
	the worst thing that ever happened to this country.	10:10
	It's incredible, as I've say over and over again,	10:11
	I hold Nixon's imposing price and wage controls	10:13
	on August 15, 1971 against him	10:17
	far more than i do the whole Watergate incident.	10:19
	And the whole cover up and so on.	10:21
	The first had far more important consequences.	10:24
	But, and in a way it was a far more unprecedented act.	10:29
	The first time it had ever been done in peace time.	10:33
	Whereas at most you could say what was done	10:35
	under Watergate was a slight expansion	10:37
	of things that had been done many times before.	10:39
	Certainly there were many earlier opportunities.	10:42
	If the media had gone after the Bobby Baker case	10:45
	in President Johnson's time.	10:48
-	Yes, Yes,	10:50
-	People today would not be in the same sense of stupor	10:51
	they are when you first mention the word Bobby Baker.	10:54
	They don't recall it.	10:57
	So, and no doubt Mr. Nixon gave 'em cause,	10:59
	but nonetheless, I think you have to say	11:02
	that our fundamental Constitutional	11:04
	system has been changed.	11:07
	We have added, essentially,	11:09
	a fourth branch of government.	11:10
	The fourth of state has also become	11:12
	a fourth branch of government.	11:13
	And it has discovered, that if it makes	11:14
	a sustained attack on any individual,	11:17
	that individual can be driven out of office.	11:20
	It has been flexing its muscles a little	11:23
	with respect to Rockefeller.	11:25
	The same pattern of build-up, of insinuations,	11:27
	of stories, of over-estimating the importance of it,	11:31
	of saying, this, that and the other.	11:34
	I am no friend of Rockefeller	11:36
	on the grounds of his political views and opinions.	11:37
	On the other hand, it again seems to me,	11:40
	that what the media has been saying	11:43
	about his loans and gifts,	11:45
	they've just been building	11:46
	the things up out of all proportion.	11:48
	There was nothing improper in anything he did.	11:49
	On the contrary, you haven't had	11:51
	any emphasis in the media at all,	11:53
	or very little at the fact that he paid	11:55
	some 20 odd million dollars of taxes	11:57
	over those period of years.	11:59
	There was great deal of emphasis	12:01
	on a re-audit of this taxes	12:03
	that raised them by a million dollars.	12:05
	I don't know, but I would be willing to wager you,	12:07
	that were Mr. Rockefeller not now contending	12:11
	for a Vice Presidential campaign,	12:14
	his lawyers would've successfully	12:16
	challenged much of that audit.	12:18
	And the actual extra taxes	12:19
	would have been much less.	12:21
	But Mr. Rockefeller's now in a position	12:22
	where he dare not do that.	12:24
	Just think what the media would say.	12:26
	If instead of Mr. Rockefeller leaning over backward	12:28
	and saying of course I'm gonna pay that million dollars,	12:30
	he had said that million dollars is wrongly assessed,	12:33
	I've instructed my lawyers to fight it	12:36
	and to take it to court and to defend my rights.	12:37
	He would've been pilloried in the press.	12:40
	We have seen a similar kind of thing	12:43
	with respect to Henry Kissinger.	12:45
	You have again had something in the media campaign	12:48
	to get Mr. Kissinger, it's been much more,	12:51
	it hasn't been as stringent, as extreme	12:54
	as the one on Rockefeller recently,	12:58
	because, partly because it's less important	13:00
	from the point of view of a political scene.	13:04
	Now, I'm not talking about the world situation.	13:07
	But, partly, also because, Henry Kissinger	13:13
	has gone out of his way to play up to the media.	13:16
	As has Rockefeller as well, over a long period of time.	13:19
	The interesting thing about it,	13:23
	and that's why both of these cases are so interesting.	13:24
	These are the two men, probably in the Republican party,	13:27
	who, were the greatest favorites	13:32
	of the media people inserted in the abstract.	13:35
	And yet, the media people have not	13:38
	been able to resist the temptation to go after them.	13:39
	And, it may well be, effectively,	13:42
	I will not be surprised if Kissinger has	13:46
	to give up the Secretary of State-ship	13:48
	in the not too distant future.	13:50
	I suspect Rockefeller will be confirmed	13:52
	after the, now that the elections are over.	13:54
	But it's not, by any means, a sure thing.	13:56
	And yet, it is hard to see, if you go back,	13:59
	and look at the situation when he was	14:03
	first appointed, everybody even said,	14:04
	well there's no man in the country,	14:06
	who will more readily get approval.	14:07
	His life has been a public book,	14:10
	open book for the past 20 years.	14:12
	Now, where would it next surface?	14:15
	I don't know.	14:17
	But I do know that any man who wishes to make	14:19
	a career in politics will pay far more attention	14:25
	to the 20, the 30, the 40 people in Washington D.C.,	14:31
	who control the outputs on the two evening,	14:35
	three evening news shows.	14:37
-	Television.	14:39
-	Television.
	Who are the chief reporters for the New York Times	14:42
	and the Washington Post.	14:45
	He will pay far more attention to them,	14:47
	then he will to his thousands of constituents at home.	14:49
-	That's an interesting commentary.	14:54
	I'm glad you mentioned those specific members of the media.	14:56
	(laughing)	15:00
-	Oh, I don't mean to be making	15:01
	any criticism of any individual person at all.	15:03
-	No, I understood.	15:06
-	We are all of us behaving	15:07
	in accordance with our own position.	15:08
	And I don't mean to say that the members of the media	15:10
	have done this in any deliberate sense at all.	15:12
	I am sure that they are absolutely correct	15:17
	in their indignation.	15:19
	They have hated Nixon all along.	15:20
	And they feel that they were confirmed in their hatred.	15:23
	They feel righteous.	15:26
	But we must remember, that the greatest harm	15:28
	has been done in this world,	15:31
	always by people who were absolutely	15:32
	firmly persuaded of their own right.	15:37
	Who felt that it was essential	15:39
	to override opponents in the name of the good.	15:42
	It is the absolute true believers	15:46
	and the honest fanatics who do the most harm,	15:50
	whether their names, I once made a comment to this effect	15:52
	at a commencement talk I gave	15:56
	at the University of Rochester,	15:58
	and I started saying all the true fanatics	16:00
	and self-believers, and I said whether it be	16:04
	Torquemada, or Hitler, or everybody was with me,	16:06
	or Ralph Nader, at which point there was a dead silence.	16:10
	(laughter)	16:13
	But, that is a good example.	16:15
-	Yes, it is.	16:16
-	I think Nader has done a great deal of harm.	16:17
	But I'm not saying that he's not a sincere, honest man.	16:18
	He's a fanatic.	16:21
	And in the same way, when I say	16:23
	this about the news media, I'm not questioning	16:25
	their motives, I'm not questioning their honesty,	16:27
	or their integrity or anything like that,	16:29
	I'm only saying, that one of things	16:31
	that history demonstrates is that	16:33
	if power exists it will be used.	16:36
	It is hard to find anywhere in history	16:40
	a case where somebody or some group had power	16:42
	and they deliberately avoided using it.	16:44
-	That's right, that's an interesting commentary.	16:47
	I'd like to ask you, comment on the money supply,	16:49
	Milton, and perhaps get into it by,	16:52
	again, using a letter that was written	16:55
	to you by Mr. Donnelley P. McDonald,	16:59
	who refers to hearing Federal Reserve board	17:04
	member John Sheehan speak.	17:08
	He says, I heard Mr. Sheehan speak in Muncie, Indiana	17:10
	about a year ago, and on that occasion,	17:13
	he said, of course the Fed can stop inflation,	17:15
	all you have to do is read Milton Friedman	17:18
	in order to know that.	17:21
	And then, Mr. Sheehan went on,	17:22
	according to Mr. McDonald, to make remarks	17:24
	similar to those in a clipping	17:26
	of which he sent you.	17:28
	Which reads in part, and this is	17:29
	a direct quote from Mr. Sheehan,	17:31
	were we immediately, we, the Federal Reserve Board,	17:34
	were we immediately to begin acting	17:37
	to squeeze out inflation, there will be 15	17:39
	to 20% unemployment by the end of the year.	17:42
	There would be 30 to 40% black unemployment,	17:46
	riots in the streets, and perhaps	17:49
	a new form of government.	17:51
	Thus, resolving the problem would be rather simple,	17:53
	rather straight forward and utterly ridiculous.	17:56
	And there is a footnote.	17:59
	Governor Sheehan later commented,	18:00
	this as must be evident as hyperbole	18:02
	used in an informal setting to give emphasis	18:04
	not to make a prediction, as to the serious results	18:07
	that would flow from any sudden	18:10
	and drastic squeeze down in the money supply.	18:12
	Particularly in a situation of	18:14
	world shortages of energy and food.	18:16
-	Well, that certainly is very pertinent,	18:19
	because a crucial question about the money supply,	18:23
	and the one that we have been raising over	18:25
	and over again on these tapes,	18:27
	is whether, the slowdown that appeared in June,	18:29
	is going to continue.	18:33
	Now, let me comment on that on two levels.	18:36
	One a purely technical level,	18:39
	and then get to Mr. Sheehan, who illustrates	18:41
	what I think is the real problem	18:44
	of getting sensible monetary policy.	18:48
	On a technical level, the facts are	18:53
	that a couple of weeks ago, you had a jump in M1,	18:56
	three billion dollars in a week,	19:00
	which almost brought you back	19:02
	to that long period trend,	19:03
	which the Federal Reserve Bank	19:05
	of St. Louis has now superimposed	19:07
	on their weekly money chart.	19:09
	They have a weekly money chart	19:11
	in which they show M1 every week.	19:13
	And they have superimposed on that a trend,	19:16
	going back to 1970, showing the 6.7%	19:19
	roughly rate of rise from 1970.	19:24
	And if you look at that chart,	19:27
	you will see that the actual money supply	19:29
	was hugging around that trend until June,	19:30
	and then came off sharply below,	19:33
	and then this one week rise almost	19:35
	brought it back to the trend,	19:37
	but the week after there was decline,	19:38
	the latest one we have, there was a decline.	19:41
	Which brought it back down again.	19:43
	So that as of now, it is still significantly	19:45
	below that trend and you have to say	19:48
	that since June, there has been	19:50
	an appreciatively lower rate of monetary growth.	19:52
	This would also be true of the M2 series.	19:55
	However, there are a number of technical factors	19:57
	which suggest that you may have a reversal.	20:01
	In the first place, I am told	20:05
	that the revisions that are due to come up	20:08
	for the inclusion of non-member bank figures,	20:10
	are likely to raise the recorded rate of growth	20:13
	over the past few months so that actually	20:17
	money has grown at a faster rate	20:20
	then the published numbers would suggest.	20:22
	In the second place, the base,	20:25
	that is to say, high powered money,	20:29
	currency and reserves, what the Fed controls directly.	20:31
	Has continued to rise, it has shown some retardation,	20:35
	but a much lower retardation than the actual, then M1.	20:39
	This means that the so called multiplier,	20:44
	you see for each dollar a day there are several dollars	20:46
	of deposits and of money supply.	20:49
	That multiplier has been going down.	20:51
	And if it were to return to its earlier level,	20:54
	even though the base kept going at its present level,	20:56
	you would have a more rapid rate	20:59
	of growth of the money supply.	21:01
	Those are the technical reasons.	21:02
	But, underlying those technical reasons	21:04
	is really the fundamental question,	21:06
	which this quotation from Mr. Sheehan raises very sharply,	21:08
	the Fed can control the money supply.	21:13
	As Mr. Sheehan implicitly says,	21:15
	there is no doubt about it.	21:17
	They have not chosen to control the money supply	21:19
	in such a way as to avoid inflation.	21:22
	Why have they not done so?	21:24
	They have not done so, in part,	21:26
	because of their preoccupation with interest rates.	21:27
	There's no doubt that that has affected them.	21:30
	If you ask them now, why did you let	21:34
	the money supply grow so slowly of the past five months?	21:36
	Because, undoubtedly, that slow rate of growth	21:39
	was less than they really intended to produce.	21:41
	The answer they will give you,	21:43
	will be, why look, in the last few months,	21:44
	the interest rates have been coming down anyway.	21:48
	If we had really let the money supply	21:51
	go up at the rate we wanted to,	21:52
	at 4 or 5% instead of 1 or 2%,	21:54
	short term interest rates would have come down still.	21:57
	Sharper, everybody would've announced	21:59
	in the newspapers, the Fed has changed its policy,	22:02
	the market resume, and now, then where would we be?	22:04
	So, despite all their protestations,	22:08
	they are still very much concerned with the money markets	22:12
	in the credit sense and with the interest rates.	22:15
	That's one reason.	22:17
	But surely, the more fundamental reason,	22:18
	is the one that Mr. Sheehan brings out.	22:21
	They have persuaded themselves	22:24
	in the Washington atmosphere along with everybody else	22:26
	in that political atmosphere,	22:29
	that it is not worth reducing inflation,	22:31
	if the cost of it is that you have	22:36
	somewhat higher unemployment.	22:37
	And they have justified their views in that way,	22:40
	if we may take Mr. Sheehan's statements	22:42
	as an indication, by grossly overestimating,	22:45
	in my opinion, the effect of a slower monetary growth rate.	22:49
	A primer level of unemployment.	22:53
	The numbers which Mr. Sheehan throws around,	22:55
	he may say in his footnote, and withdrawn	22:58
	that this is hyperbole, but I didn't notice	23:01
	that he have any other more reasonable numbers.	23:04
	Those numbers come from one place,	23:07
	we know were they come from.	23:08
	They come from American experience from 1929 to '32.	23:10
	They come from the Great Depression.	23:14
	Now, is it really true that what people like myself	23:16
	are asking the Fed to do in order to slow down inflation,	23:19
	is to follow the policies that	23:22
	were followed from '29 to '33?	23:24
	Nothing could be further from the truth.	23:27
	There has been no more severe credit	23:30
	of the policies in the Federal Reserve from 1929 to '33.	23:32
	Then those like myself, who are now urging the Fed	23:36
	to slow down for inflation.	23:39
	What happened from 1929 to '33	23:41
	was that the quantity of money declined.	23:43
	The Fed deliberately followed policies	23:46
	which had the effect of reducing	23:49
	the quantity of money by a third.	23:51
	None of us had been asking them for that.	23:52
	On the contrary, I criticized the Fed	23:54
	for having swung too far in the last six months.	23:56
	I did want them, it wasn't my idea that they should go	23:59
	to a one or 2% rate of monetary growth.	24:02
	For M1, or a 4% one for M2.	24:05
	All along, it has seemed to me,	24:09
	that the right policy for them to follow,	24:10
	is to go to a rate of monetary growth	24:12
	that they can stick with indefinitely for the long run,	24:14
	which would be something like, 3%, 4% for M1,	24:17
	maybe 5%, 6% for M2.	24:22
	Now, those are rates of monetary growth,	24:26
	which if persisted to, within the course	24:28
	of two or three years bring inflation down	24:30
	to two or 3% at the most, maybe to a little less.	24:32
	And, which would not, in my opinion,	24:35
	involve anything like, the kinds	24:37
	of sharp increases in unemployment,	24:41
	the riots on the street corners and so on,	24:43
	which Mr. Sheehan suggests is likely.	24:45
	But the fact that he thinks in these two terms,	24:48
	and that I fear many another of the Federal Reserve Board	24:51
	does, is not a very encouraging portent	24:55
	for what the future monetary policy is likely to be.	24:58
	We have used Mr. Sheehan as an example,	25:03
	and I don't mean to single him out.	25:05
	The fact is that I think the Federal Reserve Board	25:08
	will read the elections very much as Congress will read it,	25:14
	as the mandate to avoid unemployment.	25:17
	And if they read it that way, then the portents	25:21
	for the future are not very encouraging.	25:23
-	Thank you very much.	25:26
	We've been visiting with Professor Milton Friedman	25:27
	of the University of Chicago.	25:29
	If you subscribers would like to ask questions	25:31
	for Dr. Friedman to answer on future tapes,	25:35
	or suggest subjects for him to discuss,	25:38
	please write to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	25:41
	450 East Ohio Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	25:45
	We'll be visiting with Dr. Friedman	25:51
	again in a couple of weeks.	25:53

Item Info

Title:

Tape 157 - Election Consequences, Media, Money Supply

Contributor:

Friedman, Milton, 1912-2006

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Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

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Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

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Economics Cassette Series: Milton Friedman

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Tape 157 - Election Consequences, Media, Money Supply

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