Tape 14 - New Bretton Woods Would Be Disaster, Monetary Policy Article in New York Times

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-	Hello, this is William Clark,	0:02
	financial editor of the Chicago Tribune,	0:03
	welcoming you again on behalf of Instructional Dynamics	0:05
	to this weekly series of commentaries	0:09
	on current economic developments.	0:11
	Reporting to you again this week	0:14
	will be one of the nation's leading economists,	0:15
	Professor Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago.	0:18
	Dr. Friedman, some economists argue that a new	0:24
	Bretton Woods Conference is an essential thing,	0:28
	and others say that no new international arrangement	0:30
	could offset the lack of financial self-discipline	0:34
	within individual countries,	0:37
	and therefore that a new Bretton Woods Conference	0:38
	might not accomplish very much.	0:41
	I wonder what your views are on this question.	0:43
-	I believe that a new Bretton Woods Conference	0:45
	at this stage would be a disaster.	0:47
	I cannot say what it can accomplish	0:50
	except to promote a wave of speculation,	0:52
	a wave of uneasiness and no decision.	0:56
	The reason why that's so, is because we do have	1:00
	at the moment existing institutions	1:04
	for international cooperation,	1:07
	the International Monetary Fund,	1:08
	the Group of Ten central bankers,	1:10
	the Bank for International Settlement.	1:12
	There has been no shortage of forums	1:15
	of institutional arrangements	1:17
	within which you could get monetary reform,	1:19
	but there hasn't been any significant monetary reform.	1:21
	The most recent of these episodes	1:24
	was the Bonn conference last fall,	1:26
	and again there wasn't any agreement there.	1:29
	There's little point, it seems to me, to having	1:31
	any kind of an international conference	1:33
	unless there has in advance been a wide measure of agreement	1:36
	among the participants as to the kind of changes	1:41
	in the institutional arrangements	1:43
	they would like to bring about.	1:44
	Short of that, you will have an interminable discussion	1:46
	and very little consequence.	1:49
	But if you had that kind of an agreement,	1:51
	if you were anywhere close to that kind of an agreement,	1:54
	it could be affected through IMF,	1:56
	or through one of these other institutions,	1:57
	and would not require another conference.	1:59
	So far as the United States is concerned,	2:02
	I think we ought to be willing to continue to	2:04
	cooperate fully with all of the other countries,	2:06
	to deal with them,	2:09
	to go back and forth with them,	2:10
	but I do not believe that we have anything to gain	2:12
	by submitting ourselves to the kind of a farce	2:15
	that at this stage would be involved	2:18
	in a Bretton Woods Conference.	2:20
-	Doctor, do you think the meetings of the so called Ten,	2:22
	out of which came the Special Drawing Rights plan,	2:25
	were constructive affairs?	2:29
-	I do not myself think so in terms of the outcome,	2:33
	I am in a small minority of those who have very little	2:36
	hope or faith in the SDRs.	2:40
	The SDRs are an attempt to postpone matters,	2:43
	they are an attempt to provide	2:46
	some kind of a paper-gold substitute,	2:48
	they have not yet come into effect.	2:50
	I venture to predict that while they may come into effect,	2:53
	they will never come into effect	2:57
	in more than a rather token fashion.	3:00
	Now why is this so?	3:02
	You have widespread agreement on it.	3:04
	But unfortunately what you have agreement on is the idea,	3:06
	the general idea, the general principle.	3:10
	You do not have an agreement upon the exact details,	3:12
	in particular on when it should come into effect,	3:16
	and on the amount that should be produced.	3:18
	Now each country separately,	3:20
	will be delighted to join in an arrangement	3:23
	under which it can use as much SDRs as possible,	3:26
	provided at the same time that it need accept	3:29
	as little as possible.	3:31
	So while every country separately will be in favor of SDRs,	3:33
	under the right arrangements,	3:37
	these arrangements are ones	3:39
	that it will be very difficult mutually to agree upon.	3:40
	People are talking about the SDRs being better than gold	3:43
	and therefore why shouldn't people want 'em?	3:47
	But if they were better than gold,	3:49
	it is hard to see why they would have to be hedged around	3:51
	with all the requirements that they are in fact	3:53
	hedged around with,	3:56
	about redeemability in gold,	3:57
	about how many you have to take,	3:59
	how little you have to take and so on.	4:00
	And all of these things lead me to believe	4:02
	that when and if SDRs come into effect,	4:04
	they will be in a rather token fashion.	4:06
	Of course I should explain that partly	4:08
	part of my underlying uneasiness about it	4:11
	is that I think it is not desirable	4:16
	from the point of view of either our country,	4:19
	or more important the world,	4:21
	to give a group of central bankers from ten countries	4:24
	enormous powers to run the world.	4:26
	We have had experience with this kind of thing before.	4:29
	One of the episodes that has most strongly	4:36
	impressed itself on me,	4:40
	was the experience of the western world	4:42
	from about 1925	4:45
	to 1933 or 4.	4:48
	At that time, you had a smaller number	4:50
	of major central bankers.	4:52
	You really only had four that counted.	4:53
	You had Montagu Norman who was	4:55
	a head of the Bank of England,	4:57
	you had Emile Moreau whom I mentioned	4:59
	in one of these earlier talks in connection	5:01
	with his standing up firmly against Poincare.	5:03
	You had Emile Moreau of the Bank of France,	5:07
	you had Benjamin Strong in the United States,	5:10
	until he died in 1928,	5:12
	and then after that George Harrison.	5:14
	They were both the heads	5:16
	of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.	5:18
	You had Hjalmar Schacht in Germany,	5:20
	the man of notorious Nazi fame,	5:23
	who was a Nazi finance minister,	5:25
	the man who invented one of the few	5:27
	modern inventions in the economic sphere,	5:29
	namely exchange controls of the modern type.	5:32
-	Oh.	5:34
-	This is a separate issue.	5:35
	You know one of the extraordinary things	5:36
	is how people take things for granted,	5:38
	because they're familiar with them.	5:41
	We take the status quo for granted.	5:43
	And everybody thinks well,	5:45
	if you ask people, What about exchange controls,	5:46
	the limitations and how much you would pay and so on?	5:49
	Everybody takes it for granted	5:51
	that that's something of very, very long standing.	5:52
	But it's one of the few things	5:55
	whose invention you can date with precision.	5:56
	It was on a--I've forgotten the exact day,	5:59
	but there is a day in 1934	6:01
	when Schacht introduced these in Germany.	6:04
	Prior to that date you have various	6:07
	minor forms of exchange control,	6:09
	but you never have had the extensive	6:11
	kind of sweeping control	6:13
	of what a man may do with his money,	6:16
	the kind of sweeping prohibition	6:19
	of converting marks as it was then	6:20
	into other currencies that you had then.	6:23
	And of course what people don't realize,	6:25
	is that Schacht's controls were not	6:27
	solely for balance and payments purpose,	6:32
	indeed not predominantly.	6:34
	A major function of Schacht's controls,	6:35
	exchange control,	6:37
	was to make it difficult or impossible	6:39
	for the Jews to get their capital out of Germany.	6:40
	And it was a very, very successful measure	6:43
	from that point of view.	6:45
	But the modern imitators,	6:47
	the India's, Brazil's, and others who are imitating it,	6:48
	are not using it for that purpose.	6:53
	Well let me go back.	6:56
	I was saying at that time you had the consortium	6:57
	of Montagu, Norman, Emile Moreau,	6:59
	Hajalmar Schacht in Germany,	7:01
	Benjamin Strong in the United States.	7:02
	And here were the four men	7:05
	who did have an enormous amount of power,	7:07
	and who were cooperating.	7:09
	Montagu Norman is a key figure in this.	7:11
	He was the Englishman.	7:13
	And this is why I bring it up in this connection.	7:15
	He was absolutely clear and explicit	7:17
	about what their role was to be.	7:19
	Said Montagu Norman in so many words,	7:21
	essentially in private conversations that were recorded,	7:24
	"The world needs some sensible people and strong people	7:28
	"to run it properly.	7:33
	"We can't depend," said he,	7:34
	"on either the vulgar mobs or vulgar democracy	7:36
	"that controls Britain and the United States,	7:40
	"nor would it be desirable to depend	7:43
	"on the plutocracy that controls wealth.	7:45
	"We need these well-intentioned public civil servants	7:47
	"who have the good of the world at heart,	7:51
	"namely I and these fellow men,	7:52
	"to control the world.	7:55
	"If the four of us," he said,	7:56
	"really work together and cooperate,	7:58
	"we can run the economic destinies of the world,	8:00
	"in the right way."	8:04
	A benevolent dictatorship.	8:05
	Not called that but that's what it was to be.	8:06
	Well now if you stop and think about it,	8:09
	suppose you gave the government,	8:10
	the central bankers, a group of ten,	8:12
	enormous powers over the way in which	8:13
	the international financial machinery was to be run?	8:16
	They would have enormous power.	8:20
	That power would be granted to whom?	8:22
	Not to people who have been selected	8:24
	through any democratic process.	8:25
	Not to people who have any responsibility to an electorate.	8:27
	To ten people who happen to be at the heads	8:31
	of their central banks or their governing boards.	8:33
	And this has two things about it.	8:36
	It seems to me a politically intolerable arrangement.	8:38
	We may many of us hope that we will have	8:40
	a greater form of international cooperation,	8:43
	but it must take arrangements which provide	8:45
	for political representation and democracy.	8:48
	So it's undesirable politically.	8:53
	But also it's unworkable economically.	8:56
	Because for the very reason that these men	8:58
	have no political basis,	9:02
	if they try to do something that is very unpopular,	9:05
	or that would go much against the grain	9:07
	of national policies,	9:09
	they will be discarded.	9:10
	This is the second lesson that you learn	9:12
	from the episode of 1925 to 1935.	9:14
	As soon as the central bankers were engaged	9:17
	in an activity which ran into great difficulties	9:21
	for the rest of the world,	9:24
	in our case as soon as the U.S. central bank	9:25
	was forcing a deflation on the rest of the world,	9:27
	well then the central bankers lost	9:30
	their position of power.	9:33
	They weren't able to do what they wanted.	9:34
	And similarly now.	9:35
	It seems to me that to try to have	9:37
	a group of ten central banks	9:40
	have large political and economic powers	9:42
	would be a terrible mistake,	9:44
	from their point of view as well as from ours.	9:45
-	That's an interesting appraisal.	9:48
	Doctor, there've been a number of recent, well	9:50
	articles, commentaries on whether	9:53
	the Federal Reserve Bank is keeping money typed	9:56
	or making it typed or not.	10:00
	One of the popular newsletters starts out,	10:03
	"There's a new policy on money.	10:06
	"The policy is to keep money typed	10:08
	"for the foreseeable future."	10:10
	On top of that,	10:12
	a recent article in a newspaper	10:13
	under a Washington dateline	10:17
	says that the so-called monetary in-groups	10:19
	are looking dubiously at the nation's	10:22
	central bank operations.	10:25
	People are criticizing, sort of laughing at the Fed,	10:26
	according to this piece.	10:30
	What would be your reaction to all these different	10:33
	kinds of opinions on what the Fed is doing,	10:37
	and whether it really knows what it's doing,	10:40
	and what the effect of what it's doing is going to be.	10:42
-	Well what one is observing now I think, Bill,	10:46
	is a very interesting situation	10:49
	of a great deal of discussion and dispute	10:52
	because you are in a transitional phase,	10:56
	in which one conception of monetary operations and policy	10:59
	is in fact taking the place of another conception.	11:03
	And the time when you get the most crossed currents,	11:06
	people misunderstanding one another, confusion,	11:09
	is always at a time when you're shifting	11:12
	direction in this sense.	11:15
	One doctrine which has been dominant is declining	11:16
	and another doctrine is taking its place.	11:22
	Well that's really what you're having now.	11:24
	In grossly oversimplified terms,	11:27
	what we're seeing now is the decline	11:31
	of the credit doctrines,	11:35
	which have in fact ruled the Federal Reserve System,	11:38
	and other central banks as well,	11:41
	for many, many years,	11:43
	and the emergence of the money supply doctrines,	11:44
	which have been gaining increasing adherents	11:48
	among economists and others.	11:51
	Now this shows up in everything.	11:54
	Let me illustrate in a number of ways.	11:57
	First, what are the actual facts	11:59
	about whether money is tight or not?	12:02
	If you're a credit man,	12:04
	if you have been taking that view all along,	12:06
	by the traditional Federal Reserve approach,	12:09
	or credit approach,	12:13
	money has been tight for a long time.	12:14
	Money has been tight because why?	12:17
	Because from that point of view,	12:21
	the measure of tightness is interest rates.	12:22
	If interest rates are high, money is tight.	12:23
	Well interest rates have surely been high	12:26
	for quite a long time,	12:27
	and in particular,	12:28
	they rose very rapidly during the second half of 1968.	12:30
-	They surely did.	12:34
-	They reached, I guess the most dramatic of these	12:37
	was the prime rate of 7%.	12:39
	And I gather there's talk about a still further	12:42
	hike in the prime rate, isn't there?	12:44
-	Yes there is. You do hear this.	12:45
-	Well from that point of view,	12:48
	money has been tight.	12:49
	And from that point of view,	12:52
	money will surely remain tight.	12:53
	The interest rates are going to remain high.	12:54
	But that's the credit approach.	12:57
	Now comes along the monetary school and says,	12:59
	But now look, interest rates can be high,	13:01
	not because money is scarce in any relevant sense,	13:06
	but for other reasons,	13:12
	because demand is rising for other reasons.	13:13
	Look, we would say to the credit school,	13:15
	interest rates rose and were very high	13:17
	during the last half of 1968,	13:19
	but at the same time the quantity of money,	13:21
	defined as currency plus all commercial bank deposits,	13:25
	rose at a rate of nearly 12% a year,	13:28
	via what the Federal Reserve calls a bank credit proxy,	13:31
	which is simply member bank deposits.	13:34
	And in fact I may say, that very terminology	13:37
	exemplifies this switch from one doctrine to another.	13:41
	They are using the old words	13:44
	to refer to one of the new concepts.	13:46
	We can go back to that if you'd like in a moment	13:48
	'cause I think it's an interesting phenomenon.	13:50
	But what they call a bank credit proxy	13:52
	has been rising at the rate of about 13% a year	13:54
	during the last six months of 1968.	13:56
	By any standards of quantity,	13:59
	that is extraordinary ease, not tightness.	14:00
	So from the new approach,	14:04
	from the monetary supply approach,	14:05
	you would say we've had very easy money	14:07
	for the last half of 1968.	14:09
	Alright now what about this month?	14:11
	Well now for the month of January,	14:13
	both approaches as it happens will say the same thing.	14:16
	Interest rates have remained high,	14:19
	in that sense money is tight,	14:21
	but there has also been a dramatic shift	14:23
	in the rate of monetary expansion.	14:26
	Now as yet we only have evidence for about three weeks,	14:30
	and I would hesitate to make any very firm	14:34
	or long-range prediction	14:36
	on the basis of three weeks.	14:38
	There is a great deal of an erratic element	14:40
	in the monetary supply series.	14:44
	But if you look at that month,	14:47
	money defined as currency plus all commercial bank deposits,	14:51
	which is close to what they call the bank credit proxy,	14:55
	money defined that way has in this month stopped rising	14:59
	and actually declined absolutely.	15:03
	A very rare event.	15:05
	Money defined more narrowly to include only demand deposits,	15:08
	currency and demand deposits,	15:11
	has continued to grow	15:13
	but at what appears to be,	15:14
	in that three week basis,	15:15
	a sharply reduced rate,	15:17
	so that looking at those figures,	15:19
	you would have to say that that first month of 1969	15:21
	looks very much like the first month	15:27
	of the credit crunch in 1966.	15:29
	I no longer remember whether that was March or April,	15:32
	but it's either March or April which showed	15:34
	a sharp tapering off.	15:36
	If indeed this is continued,	15:38
	then you will have had a very drastic shift to tightness,	15:41
	if when you were referring to the letter	15:44
	which referred to the money as being tight,	15:46
	when they said it'll be tight for months to come,	15:50
	if from this point of view,	15:52
	from the monetary point of view,	15:53
	if the change in the behavior	15:57
	of the money aggregates continues,	15:58
	you will have extraordinarily tight money	16:00
	for the next few months,	16:02
	and you will produce something like	16:04
	the credit crunch of 1966.	16:05
-	Is this shift probably the reflection	16:07
	of a shift in the Fed's Open Market Operations?	16:10
-	Oh it undoubtedly reflects a change	16:14
	in the Federal Open Market Operations,	16:16
	but in the present instance it also reflects something else.	16:17
	It reflects the coming into serious operation	16:20
	of Regulation Q.	16:23
	Now what Regulation Q means	16:25
	is that time deposits are allowed to run off,	16:29
	'cause certificates of deposits are not renewed.	16:32
	That in itself would lead to a shift,	16:37
	if that were all that happened,	16:41
	the only real effect would end up by being	16:43
	that demand deposits would increase	16:45
	and replace the time deposits.	16:46
	But demand deposits require higher reserves	16:48
	than time deposits.	16:50
	As a result a run-off of time deposits	16:52
	means that for the same amount	16:55
	of Federal Reserve Open Market Operations,	16:57
	for the same reserves fed into the system,	16:59
	the banking community can have a smaller total	17:01
	of money more broadly defined.	17:06
	And consequently,	17:08
	the major reason at the moment	17:10
	why currency plus all commercial bank deposits	17:12
	is turned around,	17:15
	is because of this shift out of time deposits,	17:16
	rather than because of a drastic change	17:18
	in Federal Reserve Open Market Operations.	17:21
-	I see.	17:23
-	But any continuation of this trend,	17:24
	any continuation of such a sharp break,	17:27
	will certainly reflect what the Federal Reserve Board	17:29
	does in buying and selling bonds.	17:31
	Now as I say, if you look at this current situation	17:36
	and ask, Is money tight?	17:40
	you have to say, it seems to me,	17:42
	by whatever measure, for the month of January, yes.	17:44
	Prior to January, yes,	17:47
	if you're continuing the old style,	17:50
	looking at interest rates.	17:52
	No, if you're looking at money supply.	17:53
	What will happen for the rest of the year?	17:55
	Well now that's where you get into this thing	17:58
	that in that article you were quoting,	18:02
	of Ed Dales in the New York Times,	18:03
	there's no use not to give him full acknowledgment for--	18:05
-	It's an interesting piece.	18:08
-	Yes is it.	18:09
	He has his tongue in his cheek	18:10
	(chuckling)	18:12
	and he's having some fun.	18:14
	But as always, nothing is good fun	18:16
	unless there's a real element of truth to it.	18:18
-	Right.	18:20
	Well, that's a much more complicated question,	18:22
	because what's happened is that when old habits change,	18:26
	they don't change all at once.	18:31
	When people change one part of their behavior,	18:34
	some of the other parts of their behavior lags behind.	18:37
	There's what the anthropologists call a cultural lag.	18:39
	Well in my opinion what's been happening	18:44
	in central bank circles,	18:46
	and particularly in the United States	18:47
	and the Federal Reserve,	18:49
	is that unquestionably they have been starting	18:50
	to give more and more attention	18:53
	to these monetary aggregates,	18:55
	to these totals.	18:56
	Currency plus demand deposits,	18:59
	currency plus all commercial bank deposits,	19:01
	bank credit proxy.	19:05
	They've been very resistant on that.	19:06
	And I mentioned before that the titling	19:09
	of bank credit proxy is--	19:11
-	Yes I wanted to come back that and I'm glad you have.	19:13
	So using for an old terminology	19:17
	in connection with new concepts,	19:19
	is that how you put it?	19:21
-	Yes.
	You see what they've really done,	19:22
	what is a bank credit proxy?	19:23
	Why is it called that?	19:26
	Well what it actually is numerically,	19:28
	is total member bank deposits.	19:30
	But why not call it member bank deposits?	19:32
-	Why not?	19:35
-	Because member bank deposits is one	19:35
	of the elements in the money supply totals,	19:37
	and I and others have been urging should be used	19:40
	as a criterion of policy.	19:41
	Now, every bank has a balance sheet.	19:43
	It has a total of liabilities	19:46
	and it has a total of assets.	19:47
	The two, short of an embezzler,	19:52
	always balance, they always agree.	19:55
	That's accounting.	19:57
	The liabilities of a bank are almost entirely deposits.	19:58
	There are a few other liabilities	20:02
	such as capital and net worth,	20:03
	but mostly it's deposits.	20:06
	The assets of the member bank are currency in the vault,	20:08
	deposits with the Federal Reserve System,	20:14
	and then the rest of it is what you might	20:16
	properly call bank credit,	20:18
	namely loans and investments.	20:20
	Alright now, therefore, total member bank deposits	20:24
	are a very close measure of total member bank credit.	20:27
	And so it taketh,	20:32
	while they measure member bank deposits,	20:33
	they call it the bank credit proxy.	20:35
	What does a proxy mean?	20:38
	That instead of measuring credit directly,	20:40
	you measure it indirectly through	20:42
	the means of member bank deposits.	20:44
	Why use that terminology?	20:47
	For the reasons that I'm saying,	20:49
	that that produces a greater continuity	20:50
	in terms of their behavior.	20:53
	They've been accustomed to looking at credit measures,	20:54
	and whether credit is tight or easy,	20:57
	whether interest rates are high,	20:59
	whether funds are available and so on.	21:00
	So by using this terminology and calling it credit proxy,	21:03
	they seem to themselves to be departing less	21:06
	from the earlier approach.	21:08
-	I see.	21:11
-	Well that's one sign, their adoption.	21:11
	They're placing emphasis on that bank credit proxy,	21:13
	on member bank deposits,	21:16
	on one component of the money supply broadly defined.	21:17
	I should say that's another reason for this language.	21:21
	You see, the Federal Reserve has always	21:24
	used the word money supply to refer	21:26
	to currency plus demand deposits.	21:28
	And that's a perfectly good usage.	21:30
	I'm not going to argue strenuously.	21:31
	This is a question of terminology.	21:33
	But it so happens that I and those	21:35
	who have worked with me on monetary studies,	21:37
	have found it more useful	21:39
	to use money supply to refer to currency	21:40
	plus total deposits of commercial banks.	21:43
	A major reason why we have found that more useful,	21:46
	there's lots of reasons and lots of evidence,	21:49
	but a major reason is because if you go back before 1914,	21:51
	the distinction between time and demand deposits	21:55
	did not have the significance it had today,	21:57
	and there are no reliable figures	21:59
	on that break-down before 1914.	22:01
	And since we've tried to do a lot of long historical studies	22:03
	covering the period from about 1867 on,	22:06
	and indeed we've had some people doing it earlier than that,	22:10
	it has been very useful to have a concept	22:13
	that we could keep the same all along.	22:15
	But that being the case,	22:17
	we have used money supply to mean that.	22:22
	The use by the Federal Reserve System	22:25
	of member bank deposits	22:26
	is partly a move in that broader direction.	22:28
	And that has also made it a little more difficult.	22:30
	But now coming back to the change.	22:32
	As I say, this use of my bank credit proxy	22:36
	and other indications,	22:39
	make it absolutely clear that the central bank,	22:40
	the Federal Reserve System,	22:42
	has given increasing attention in recent years,	22:44
	and more particularly in recent months,	22:48
	and this month,	22:50
	to what is happening to the monetary aggregates.	22:52
	But that has to do with their objective,	22:55
	with what they would like to do.	22:58
	On the other hand,	23:00
	their operating procedures,	23:01
	the way the people in New York operate,	23:03
	the instruments through which they carry out their policy,	23:05
	are still the instruments which carry over	23:10
	from the earlier approach,	23:13
	which carry over from the approach	23:16
	of trying to have interest rates behave in a smooth fashion,	23:19
	trying to hold down interest rates,	23:24
	trying to determine credit conditions.	23:26
	Well, now that means	23:29
	that there's a kind of a schizophrenic situation	23:31
	in terms of our monetary authority.	23:34
	While they've changed to a limited extent,	23:37
	to a substantial extent,	23:39
	their objectives of policy,	23:41
	they have not as yet adjusted their instruments of policy	23:43
	to enable them to achieve their objectives.	23:47
	And if you look at Dale's piece on that,	23:49
	you will see, I believe, that this distinction	23:52
	between the objectives and the instruments of policy	23:55
	goes a long way to explain	23:57
	almost all of the humorous puzzles	23:59
	that he mentions in his piece.	24:02
-	Thank you very much, Dr. Friedman.	24:05
	If you have questions or comments or suggestions	24:07
	for topics you would like discussed in this series,	24:10
	please send them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	24:13
	166 East Superior Street,	24:18
	Chicago, 60611.	24:20
	This is William Clark.	24:23
	Dr. Friedman and I will be talking to you again next week.	24:25

Item Info

Title:

Tape 14 - New Bretton Woods Would Be Disaster, Monetary Policy Article in New York Times

Date:

1969

Contributor:

Friedman, Milton, 1912-2006

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Milton Friedman

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CC BY-NC 4.0

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Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0206
ref2552_bwb
samuelsonpaul
duke:325229
pstau001206
ark:/87924/r42z13582
7460d9c3-fdfc-4217-af5f-39b560806184

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Tape 14 - New Bretton Woods Would Be Disaster, Monetary Policy Article in New York Times

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