Tape 54 - Monetary Developments, Interest Rates / Money Supply, British Tax Policy, Debt Liquidation / Dollar Devaluation / Black Angus

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-	Hello, this is Instructional Dynamics,	0:02
	inviting you to another of our bi-weekly interviews	0:04
	with Dr. Milton Friedman,	0:07
	Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago.	0:09
	We are taping this interview on Wednesday, July 8.	0:12
	Professor Friedman, have there been	0:16
	any new monetary developments?	0:18
-	One new development that has kind of	0:22
	passed unnoticed is a further change in the directive	0:24
	which the Open Market Investment Committee	0:28
	of the Federal Reserve System issues every three weeks.	0:31
	I say issues, that's wrong.	0:35
	It's the directive,	0:37
	which it gives to the New York Bank about the operations.	0:38
	It's issued to the public only three months later.	0:40
	And what I'm referring to now	0:44
	are the changes that occurred in the directive	0:45
	in March, three months ago.	0:49
	You will recall that in January, a major shift took place.	0:52
	Prior to January, the directive had specified	0:57
	the instructions to New York	1:01
	in terms of money market conditions.	1:03
	By money market conditions, the directive refers to,	1:06
	fundamentally to interest rates.	1:09
	The Treasury Bill rate, Federal Funds rate	1:11
	and other similar interest rates.	1:14
	The earlier form of the directive, before January,	1:17
	had said that the bank in New York,	1:20
	the desk at New York was to maintain	1:24
	specified money marketing conditions with a proviso clause	1:26
	saying provided that this is consistent	1:30
	with the changes in monetary aggregates	1:32
	within certain specified ranges.	1:35
	In January, what happened was that the major criteria	1:38
	in the proviso were reversed,	1:44
	that is, the directive specified that the desk	1:46
	was to achieve a certain rate of growth	1:50
	in monetary aggregate	1:53
	provided that this did not involve	1:54
	money market conditions outside of an indicated range.	1:59
	In March, there was a further	2:03
	and basically more fundamental shift.	2:05
	Instead of the instructions being stated in these terms,	2:08
	what the instructions said was that the desk	2:12
	was to maintain monetary conditions that would be	2:15
	consistent with specified rates of growth	2:18
	in the monetary aggregates.	2:21
	This in effect drops the proviso clause,	2:23
	and essentially substitutes	2:26
	the single criterion of monetary aggregates	2:27
	for the dual criterion that had been used before.	2:30
	I don't want to overstate the importance	2:33
	of this on the actual operating procedures.	2:36
	The statements of the directives	2:38
	are always deliberately vague.	2:40
	They seldom are stated in terms of precise numbers	2:44
	like achieve over the next three weeks	2:47
	at 2.78965 percentage point rate of growth	2:49
	and the quantity of money.	2:53
	They rather achieve a rate a growth	2:54
	consistent with the staff projections,	2:56
	and then when you check what the staff projections are,	2:58
	they tend to have quite a wide range in them.	3:01
	But nonetheless, this is further evidence	3:04
	that a major shift has taken place	3:07
	in the attitude of the Federal Reserve System	3:10
	toward the quantity which it is going to take	3:13
	as its primary criterion of policy.	3:15
	The next major shift to watch for,	3:18
	and the one that in some ways would be even more important,	3:21
	will be a change in the mode of operation	3:24
	of the New York desk,	3:26
	which will make it possible for the Fed	3:28
	to achieve control over the money supply aggregates	3:31
	more promptly and more accurately.	3:35
-	What about the behavior of the quantity of money?	3:38
-	Well now, I had been saying monetary aggregates,	3:41
	because if you look at those directives,	3:45
	you will see that there are still moldable objectives	3:46
	in the sense of which monetary aggregates are talked about.	3:52
	The staff projections talk about the money supply,	3:54
	by which they mean M1,	3:58
	that is currency plus adjusted demand deposits.	4:01
	They also talk about the bank credit proxy	4:04
	and the adjusted bank credit proxy.	4:08
	The bank credit proxy is fundamentally	4:10
	member banked demand deposits.	4:13
	The adjusted bank credit proxy	4:15
	is member bank demand deposits	4:18
	adjusted for non-deposit sources of funds,	4:20
	such as Eurodollars and other borrowings.	4:23
	For our purposes, what we're interested in	4:29
	from the point of view of the economy	4:31
	is not really these bank credit proxies,	4:33
	but the money supply, and as you know,	4:36
	I have tended to stress two major money supply aggregates.	4:38
	The narrow money supply currency plus demand deposits,	4:43
	adjusted, and a broader money supply,	4:46
	including commercial buying time deposits,	4:49
	but excluding the large CDs.	4:53
	The desirability of excluding the large CDs	4:55
	was reinforced by the Federal Reserve Action,	4:59
	one of the actions which they took	5:05
	in response to the Penn Central failure.	5:07
	In order to assure they,	5:10
	or to improve the possibility of banks	5:14
	taking over various commercial paper	5:17
	outstanding by railroads and others	5:22
	and thus avoiding difficulty in the financial markets,	5:23
	the Fed eliminated the ceiling on the interest rates	5:27
	that commercial banks could pay on large CDs.	5:33
	I say this is the ostensible reason that was given.	5:37
	Of course, one ought to look behind it.	5:40
	The fact of the matter is that very few people	5:41
	in the financial community	5:44
	and certainly not the Federal Reserves board itself	5:45
	have much to say in favor of Regulation Q.	5:49
	They would like to get rid of it,	5:52
	they would like to get out from under	5:53
	the setting of maximum interest rates	5:55
	that banks may pay on any of their deposits.	5:57
	The Penn Central offered a very convenient excuse	5:59
	in an opportunity at least to get rid of one part of it,	6:02
	and I suspect that that played at least as large a role	6:05
	in that way as an excuse as it did as the real reason.	6:12
	However, it is true that it was a desirable step to take	6:16
	and does increase the flexibility	6:19
	and adaptability of the banking system.	6:20
	At any rate, the effect of that is going to be	6:22
	a substantial and rapid increase in CDs,	6:25
	and once again the money figure which included CDs	6:28
	will be misleading, because it will represent	6:32
	as an increase in the money supply what is really a transfer	6:36
	in the name attached to certain deposits.	6:39
	You will now see domestic CDs replacing Eurodollars,	6:42
	all a big bookkeeping change and not affecting much	6:46
	in the economy at all.	6:49
	To go back to what the figures show,	6:50
	you will recall that in my tape two weeks ago,	6:55
	I stressed that you had a very rapid rate of growth	6:58
	in the quantity of money in the prior few months,	7:01
	and that there was a real question	7:04
	of interpreting the figures, that the question was,	7:06
	well we were off on another surge of overreaction	7:09
	which would restart the inflation,	7:13
	or whether we had a temporary bulge	7:15
	in response to the combination of circumstances.	7:18
	The stock market panic plus	7:21
	a large government financing operation	7:23
	that happened to coincide	7:26
	with the announcement of Cambodia.	7:27
	The further evidence of the past two weeks	7:29
	suggests that the right interpretation	7:33
	is the second of these,	7:35
	that is that we had a temporary bulge.	7:36
	In those two weeks, the Fed has been getting rid of	7:39
	some of the extra money supply	7:45
	at one end of the system earlier.	7:47
	You have had an absolute decline	7:48
	in the seasonally adjusted money supply.	7:50
	If you look at figures averaging out over a broader period,	7:52
	from February to the four weeks ending June 10th,	7:56
	which was the latest figures I had available	8:01
	at the time I dictated the last tape,	8:03
	the money supply had been growing,	8:08
	narrowly defined at 7.5%	8:10
	and with M2 minus CDs at 9.7, close to 10%.	8:13
	That was over roughly a three and a half month period,	8:19
	from February to the middle of June.	8:25
	If we now go two weeks farther on	8:27
	to the latest figures we have available,	8:29
	namely four weeks ending June 24,	8:31
	those rates have come down from 7.5 for M1	8:35
	to 6% for M1, from 9.7 for M2 minus CDs to 8.3.	8:38
	So that over those, as of now,	8:46
	you've had rates of rise which are too large	8:48
	for a long sustained period,	8:51
	but which are interpretable as a minor bulge.	8:54
	If you average out from December	8:59
	when really the Fed started to try to change its posture,	9:02
	the situation is even more moderate	9:06
	from the four weeks ending December 24th,	9:12
	leaving out the last week of December	9:15
	because there was a big year end bulge in the figures.	9:16
	M1, when it has risen at a rate of just under 5%	9:20
	and M2 minus CDs at just 5% over roughly a six month period.	9:26
	So that taking, averaging out over a half year,	9:35
	you have just about hit the 5% per year,	9:41
	which is about the top range	9:44
	of where it would be desirable to have the money supply go.	9:45
	As a result, I am inclined now to believe	9:48
	that the Fed will continue on the path	9:51
	which it set out and which Chairman Burns	9:54
	set out a path of moderate,	9:56
	of monetary growth but moderate monetary growth,	10:00
	and that it will avoid the overreaction	10:02
	that took place in 1967 and in many other earlier episodes.	10:05
-	Professor Friedman, interest rates	10:14
	were going up sharply until recently,	10:15
	but have been declining in the past week or two.	10:18
	How do you reconcile this	10:21
	with the movements in the quantity of money?	10:22
-	That is of course a very good and relevant question,	10:25
	because on the surface, the movements seem contradictory.	10:28
	During the period in May,	10:34
	when the Fed was increasing the money supply	10:36
	from a short term point of view very rapidly indeed,	10:38
	interest rates were rising,	10:41
	although we would ordinarily expect	10:43
	that the initial short term effect	10:45
	of rapid monetary expansion	10:47
	would be a decline in interest rate.	10:49
	Similarly, in the past few weeks,	10:52
	the Fed has been reducing the quantity of money	10:54
	which we would ordinarily expect in the short run	10:56
	to be associated with a rise in interest rates,	10:59
	and yet interest rates have been coming down.	11:01
	I think what this illustrates is simply the fact	11:04
	that so far as interest rates are concerned,	11:08
	the money supply is only one,	11:11
	and by no means the most important factor	11:13
	determining their movements.	11:15
	The earlier rapid rise in the money supply	11:19
	coincided, as I've already mentioned,	11:22
	with the great stock market panic	11:24
	and with the big Treasury Financing	11:27
	outbreak of the Cambodian venture.	11:33
	This introduced a great deal of uncertainty	11:35
	into the financial markets,	11:37
	both pawn markets and stock markets,	11:38
	and therefore it was a factor	11:41
	which tended to raise interest rates, and raise them sharp.	11:43
	And consequently, the most that the rapid increase	11:46
	in the money supply did	11:50
	was to offset a little bit this rapid rise.	11:51
	Similarly, now that the panic has sort of evaporated,	11:54
	now that you had the Cambodian venture	11:58
	turning into a tactical exercise	12:01
	rather than a major change	12:04
	in the whole character of the Indochina War,	12:06
	you've had a reverse movement.	12:08
	This reverse movement has, to some extent,	12:11
	I think been reinforced by the money supply movements.	12:13
	In looking at the money supply movements,	12:21
	I think you have to look at two aspects.	12:23
	The first of them is what they're actual,	12:25
	real effect is in altering liquidity.	12:28
	That used to be the only thing you had to look at.	12:32
	But more recently, thanks to the wider understanding,	12:35
	some people would say acceptance of a fallacy,	12:41
	but let me say understanding, the wider understanding	12:45
	of the crucial role of monetary supply changes,	12:48
	changes in monetary policy and in the quantity of money	12:52
	have had a psychological influence	12:57
	as well as a direct influence.	12:59
	That is to say, the fact that the money supply	13:01
	has been coming down,	13:04
	the fact that that bulge in the money supply	13:05
	looked as if it was going to be temporary,	13:08
	has many participants in the market recognizing	13:10
	we are not starting off on another round of inflation.	13:13
	It may be inflation is really	13:16
	going to be kept under control,	13:18
	and as a result on a psychological level	13:20
	has led them to look forward to lower,	13:22
	lower interest rates, particularly long term interest rates.	13:26
	So I would say that the perverse movements,	13:29
	the apparently perverse movements,	13:32
	are to be explained by two factors.	13:34
	The changes in the general political	13:37
	and economic situation in the United States,	13:40
	and the interpretation placed by participation,	13:43
	participants in the market on the money supply movements.	13:48
	Now as to the situation from here on out,	13:51
	that depends in no small measure	13:54
	on how seriously the Middle East situation develops.	13:58
	President Nixon's comment the other day	14:04
	that fundamentally the Middle East situation	14:06
	was a more dangerous one than the South East Asia situation,	14:08
	plus the Israeli announcement	14:13
	that Russians have been firing missiles at their planes.	14:16
	That has understandably and correctly	14:20
	caused a great deal of concern about the Middle East.	14:23
	If this became severe enough,	14:26
	it could reinstall a panic atmosphere	14:28
	that we had in May, and anything might happen.	14:31
-	Professor Friedman,	14:35
	we have a fair number of subscribers' questions on hand.	14:36
	This might be a good time to turn to them.	14:40
	The first one relates clearly	14:43
	to the discussion that preceded.	14:46
	If the recession continues to deepen,	14:49
	would you not expect some decline in bank loans?	14:52
	Furthermore, if the Treasury does all its financing	14:55
	outside the banking system	14:58
	and banks do not add to their investments,	15:00
	what can be done to increase the money supply?	15:02
-	Well, this is in part one of those questions,	15:06
	if I had some ham,	15:08
	I could have some ham and eggs if I had some eggs.	15:10
	The fact is	15:14
	that these things will not simultaneously occur.	15:16
	Let us suppose the recession continues to deepen.	15:24
	It might well be that there would be	15:27
	a decline in bank loans.	15:28
	However, if the Fed were acting to raise the money supply,	15:31
	what would they be doing?	15:36
	They would be adding to the reserves of commercial banks.	15:37
	With commercial banks not making bank loans	15:41
	and having extra reserves, what would they do?	15:44
	Would they simply hold those reserves idle,	15:47
	bearing no interest?	15:49
	Would excess reserves mount to levels	15:50
	not seen for many years?	15:53
	Any glance at the figures on excess reserves	15:55
	show that they are a very small magnitude	15:58
	and that they are seldom more	16:00
	than a couple hundred million dollars,	16:02
	which is trivial in a banking system	16:04
	in which total deposits for the banking system	16:07
	run up in the 350 to 400 billion dollars.	16:10
	So the answer to this question is	16:14
	that if bank loans declined,	16:16
	if the Fed added to bank reserves,	16:18
	banks would seek to put those bank reserves to work,	16:21
	and they always could.	16:25
	How could they?	16:26
	They always have available to them	16:27
	the purchase of securities on the market.	16:29
	They can purchase Treasury securities.	16:32
	The Treasury cannot decide by itself	16:34
	whether it's gonna do all its financing	16:37
	outside the banking system.	16:38
	The banks decide that.	16:40
	Then the Fed, by providing the banks with reserves	16:42
	would give them an inducement	16:46
	to add to their investments	16:48
	at the same time that they were reducing their loans.	16:50
	I'm not saying they will reduce their loans,	16:52
	but I'm saying that would not in any way	16:54
	prevent the Fed from increasing the money supply.	16:56
-	Another subscriber says an Associated Press dispatch	17:00
	in the paper states Britain's new conservative government	17:04
	prepared Tuesday a plan to fight inflation by cutting taxes.	17:07
	Your comments would be appreciated.	17:11
-	Well, there has been a good deal	17:14
	of interesting discussion about that in the paper.	17:15
	As my subscribers know,	17:18
	I think that the only fundamentally effective way	17:20
	to fight inflation is to cut the rate of growth	17:24
	of the money supply.	17:28
	If the British government does that,	17:30
	then it certainly would be desirable	17:32
	from many points of view for them to cut taxes.	17:35
	In particular, the British government	17:38
	has been stressing, the new British government,	17:41
	conservative government, has been stressing	17:43
	a class of taxes that were imposed by the Labour Government	17:44
	that have seriously distorting effects	17:47
	on the allocation of resources.	17:49
	One of these for example is the Selective Employment Tax,	17:51
	which taxes employment in certain industries	17:54
	and not in other industries.	17:57
	So that I would say from my point of view	17:59
	that I don't believe you will in fact,	18:03
	in any immediate direct sense,	18:06
	fight inflation by cutting taxes,	18:07
	but I do think that cutting taxes in Britain	18:10
	as well as in the United States	18:13
	would contribute to a more productive	18:15
	and efficient economy,	18:16
	that this would in the long run fight inflation	18:18
	by permitting a more rapid rate of rising up.	18:21
	From the short run point of view, however,	18:24
	there is no effective way to fight inflation,	18:26
	except to cut down the rate of growth of the money supply.	18:29
-	Another subscriber writes,	18:31
	this is the second time I have asked this question.	18:34
	The Canadian economists say we have to have	18:37
	a lot more debt liquidation to go through	18:40
	before we can lay the foundation for a true prosperity.	18:43
	Do you agree?	18:46
-	Well let me start out by apologizing to this subscriber	18:48
	for not having answered his question before,	18:52
	and to explain to all the subscribers	18:54
	that I get a good many more questions	18:56
	than I can really answer in the course of these tapes,	18:58
	and I wish I could answer all of them.	19:02
	I try to pick those which have the most wide interest,	19:05
	and so I apologize to anyone	19:10
	whose questions I have not used.	19:12
	I hope it won't discourage you from sending them in,	19:14
	because the more I have,	19:16
	the better able I am to judge	19:18
	what is the range of your interest,	19:21
	and I really like very much	19:22
	to get the feedback that comes through the questions.	19:24
	But let me try to answer this gentleman's question.	19:27
	There is the old idea that used to be prevalent	19:32
	that depressions were a necessary evil	19:36
	in order to eliminate the accumulation of bad practices,	19:39
	and as a purgative for the body economic	19:45
	to enable it to resume a healthy growth.	19:47
	There is, as in all such things,	19:52
	there is an element of truth in it, unquestionably.	19:54
	There is no doubt that prosperity	19:56
	leads to all sorts of soft practices,	19:58
	to all sorts of waste in costs,	20:00
	lack of attention to cost cutting,	20:04
	going into debt that's not justified and so on.	20:06
	And therefore, it is also true	20:09
	that recession or economic hard times	20:11
	do have some positive effect.	20:14
	There's hardly a cloud that doesn't have	20:16
	some kind of a silver lining,	20:18
	and it does have some positive effect	20:19
	in getting rid of the least efficient	20:21
	and the least effective firms,	20:23
	and forcing all enterprises	20:25
	to tighten their belt and improve their lot.	20:27
	But I think that it is very easy	20:30
	to go too far along this direction.	20:35
	That in the mind, the problems of recession	20:38
	do not contribute significantly	20:42
	to an improvement in the economic system	20:45
	if they are simply costs that are born.	20:47
	They may have to be born as of now	20:49
	in order to get rid of the prior mistake of over inflating.	20:51
	Now the question is,	20:55
	do we have to have more debt liquidation	20:56
	before we can lay the foundation for a true prosperity?	20:58
	The answer to that I think is no.	21:01
	There is a good deal of debt.	21:05
	It may be that there will be more debt liquidation.	21:06
	I do not think that will seriously interfere	21:09
	with our resuming growth,	21:11
	but I do not think that there is any reason	21:13
	why we have to go through debt liquidation.	21:15
	New enterprises can raise debt on the market at the same,	21:19
	can raise funds in the market at the same time	21:22
	that old enterprises may be having some difficulty.	21:24
	New capital can be financed by internal funds	21:27
	as well as by external funds.	21:34
	So I think it is perfectly feasible	21:36
	for the community to start expanding	21:38
	and to have a good, healthy expansion	21:41
	without a great mass of debt liquidation.	21:44
-	Another subscriber writes,	21:47
	with the Canadian dollar now free	21:50
	and the European Common Market	21:52
	about to establish a separate currency,	21:54
	how long before we will have to devalue the dollar?	21:57
-	I would not like to hold my breath	22:01
	until the European Common Market	22:03
	does establish a separate currency.	22:05
	There has been a lot of talk about that a very long time.	22:07
	I believe the odds are heavily against	22:10
	the European Common Market being able to agree	22:13
	on a common separate currency	22:16
	for a considerable period in the future.	22:18
	In fact, if I had to lay any wagers,	22:20
	it would be the other way,	22:23
	that the European Common Market	22:25
	is going to continue to become,	22:26
	as it has become, less and less common.	22:29
	If you look at what has actually been common	22:34
	about the European market	22:36
	and the high hopes that were placed in it,	22:37
	there is only one area in which it has really become,	22:39
	well maybe I should say two areas	22:43
	in which it has really become common.	22:44
	The one is that it has eliminated most tariffs	22:46
	between the countries within the Common Market.	22:50
	This has not prevented the maintenance	22:53
	of very high tariffs against outside goods.	22:55
	The other areas is that it has become	22:58
	common in the subsidization of agriculture.	23:00
	It is now getting into the stage	23:04
	that we have been in for so long	23:06
	with our own agricultural program.	23:08
	The Common Market adopted the worst features	23:09
	of our agricultural program,	23:11
	namely high price supports,	23:13
	without even accepting the limitations	23:15
	that we did of restricting, trying to keep production down.	23:18
	As a result, they have an enormous	23:22
	and rapidly growing deficit on agriculture subsidies	23:25
	that they have to pay on agriculture,	23:28
	they have very rapidly and large surpluses accumulating,	23:30
	amounts of butter that are astronomical,	23:33
	and they are going to be up against a very hard issue	23:36
	of what to do with this situation.	23:39
	And so far as establishing a separate currency is concerned,	23:43
	I think that's a very long way off.	23:46
	But let's suppose if this were true.	23:48
	Neither the freedom of the Canadian dollar	23:52
	nor the establishment of a separate currency	23:54
	would mean that we will have to devalue the dollar.	23:57
	In fact, the difficult thing is to know	23:59
	what it means to say devalue the dollar.	24:01
	One meaning of it is to raise the price of gold.	24:04
	We are obviously not going to be forced	24:07
	to raise the price of gold,	24:08
	since we are committed to pay gold	24:10
	only to foreign central banks,	24:11
	and only for monetary purposes,	24:13
	and we can stop doing that at any time we want to.	24:15
	And in any event, if we raised the price of gold,	24:18
	and if all other countries raised the price of gold	24:21
	in their currency the same way,	24:23
	that would not change exchange rates,	24:25
	so it would not be an effective devaluation.	24:27
	The fact of the matter is	24:30
	that the world is now on a US dollar standard	24:31
	and the US has little to say about the exchange rate	24:34
	between its currency and the other countries.	24:37
	On the contrary, the free Canadian dollar	24:40
	shows that it is,	24:43
	that there is no meaning to the devaluation	24:45
	of the US dollar.	24:49
	When Germany appreciated the mark, that was equivalent	24:50
	to a devaluation of the US dollar in terms of the mark.	24:57
	When the price of the Canadian dollar has appreciated,	25:01
	that is equivalent to a depreciation,	25:06
	a devaluation of the US dollar versus Canada.	25:08
	Other countries of the world	25:11
	can either devalue or appreciate vis-a-vis the US dollar.	25:13
	But there is no way at all	25:16
	in which the US can devalue the dollar.	25:18
	This is not necessarily a good thing,	25:22
	but it is a fact of the world,	25:24
	and so we will not have to devalue the dollar	25:26
	by any meaning of the term.	25:29
-	And here's one for comic relief.	25:31
	It comes from someone signed Sir Loin Steak.	25:33
	Does Black Angus have a legitimate beef,	25:39
	or is he just shooting the bull?	25:41
	Of all the verbiage with which I have come in contact	25:43
	on this subject, this is the worst, hereford.	25:46
-	I don't quite understand all these references,	25:50
	but let me explain for the subscribers	25:52
	what this Sir Loin Steak is talking about.	25:54
	Angus, there's a book that has recently appeared	25:57
	entitled A Radical View of Economics,	26:01
	with a red cover, by Angus Black.	26:05
	Now as it happens, Angus Black is a former student of mine.	26:08
	As it also happens, if you look at the book,	26:12
	you will discover that what it is,	26:14
	is large parts of my own book, Capitalism and Freedom,	26:17
	rewritten very well with very healthy doses of obscenity	26:21
	and radical-type language thrown in	26:26
	as a come-on for the radical students and others.	26:29
	My first reaction when I was asked by the publishers	26:35
	to read the manuscript	26:38
	was that the camouflage of obscenity and radical language	26:40
	was not likely to do much good in selling the book,	26:47
	but I am told since that I was wrong.	26:49
	That it has in fact produced a large widespread scale of it.	26:51
	If any of you are interested in looking at it,	26:55
	I think you will find that if you strip it	26:58
	of that kind of obscenity and look at what it says,	27:00
	almost everything it says is perfectly sensible	27:02
	and suggests reforms that are highly desirable.	27:06
	So on the whole, I say more power to Angus Black.	27:09
-	I'm afraid we've come to the end of this tape.	27:12
	Thank you very much, Professor Friedman.	27:14
	Remember, subscribers, if you have any questions or comments	27:16
	for topics you would like to hear discussed in this series,	27:19
	please send them to Instructional Dynamics, Incorporated,	27:23
	166 East Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	27:26
	Dr. Freedman will be visiting with you again in two weeks.	27:33

Item Info

Title:

Tape 54 - Monetary Developments, Interest Rates / Money Supply, British Tax Policy, Debt Liquidation / Dollar Devaluation / Black Angus

Date:

1970

Contributor:

Friedman, Milton, 1912-2006

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Milton Friedman

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CC BY-NC 4.0

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Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0245
ref2630_4ry
samuelsonpaul
duke:325268
pstau001245
ark:/87924/r42n5009g
2d59a622-2421-4aff-8253-904c975adc29

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Tape 54 - Monetary Developments, Interest Rates / Money Supply, British Tax Policy, Debt Liquidation / Dollar Devaluation / Black Angus

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