Tape 76 - Time's Board of Economists, St. Louis Price Predictions, Cost-Push-Inflation

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	Hello, this is Rose Freedman inviting you on behalf	0:02
	of Instructional Dynamics to another of our	0:05
	biweekly interviews with Dr. Milton Freedman,	0:08
	professor of economics at the University of Chicago.	0:10
	We are taking this interview on Tuesday, June 15, 1971,	0:14
	and in Vermont, which is why I am substituting	0:19
	for Bill Clark.	0:22
	We are very sorry we couldn't persuade him to come	0:24
	to Vermont with us.	0:26
-	I join you in being sorry that Bill cannot do	0:28
	the interviewing up here, and that my wife,	0:31
	although she is a very good substitute,	0:34
	has to take his place.	0:36
	By coming from the outside, and particularly from the	0:38
	financial community in Chicago, Bill Clark adds	0:41
	an extra dimension to our interview and keeps it from	0:45
	being a wholly family affair.	0:48
-	Time magazine last week had another meeting of its	0:51
	Board of Economists.	0:54
	As they noted, the Board's judgment is very different	0:56
	from your own.	0:59
	The Board regards the present recovery as extremely weak	1:00
	and believes that the U.S. sorely needs a combination of	1:04
	tax cuts and accelerated government spending	1:07
	to speed the recovery.	1:10
	Are you persuaded?	1:12
-	Very far from it. Although Time presents this as a	1:14
	joint judgment	1:20
	of a panel of seven economists,	1:22
	it's sort of like the consensus forecast,	1:26
	which isn't a consensus at all, but a result of	1:30
	a lot of people phoning around to one another.	1:33
	In the same way, of the seven people who happened to be able	1:35
	to make it to this meeting, one, unfortunately, was absent,	1:39
	namely Beryl Sprinkel of the Harris Trust Company.	1:43
	I'll come back to him.	1:45
	Of the seven people who didn't make it to the meeting,	1:47
	you essentially have seven variants	1:52
	of the same kind of point of view.	1:54
	The situation is a little - even more extreme.	1:58
	If you look at the names on the board,	2:00
	you have Otto Eckstein, Walter Heller, Arthur Okun,	2:02
	who were all members of the Council of Economic Advisors	2:07
	during the Johnson-Kennedy administration.	2:10
	Robert Nathan, who has long been a rather left-wing	2:14
	democrat active in Americans for Democratic Action,	2:18
	an economist who has done excellent work	2:21
	and consulting work, who was at the very early stages	2:24
	in on the development of the national income statistics.	2:28
	But, nonetheless, someone whose general point of view	2:31
	conforms to that of the Kennedy-Johnson	2:35
	Council of Economic Advisors.	2:38
	Joseph Pechman, who was at the Brookings Institution,	2:41
	was also in the Kennedy-Johnson administration,	2:45
	and has at the Brookings Institution been rather the	2:48
	chief economist of a government in exile.	2:54
	Or providing a home place for the democratic economists	2:57
	out of a job.	3:01
	And, again, very definitely of the same point of view.	3:03
	David Grove is a little bit out of that stereotype.	3:07
	He's vice president and chief economist of the IBM,	3:11
	and he does have a rather more independent	3:14
	and less politically motivated point of view	3:17
	than the others.	3:20
	Bob Triffin, who is the seventh, is a specialist	3:21
	in international affairs.	3:25
	His views are not quoted in the article, and in past	3:27
	meetings of the board of editors, it has been noted	3:30
	explicitly that he confined his views to the problem	3:32
	of international economic policy.	3:36
	So, instead of having seven independent thinkers,	3:38
	all of whom jointly agree that the economy is weak	3:42
	and needs further expansion, what you really have is	3:47
	one voice, maybe one-and-a-half voices, all confirming	3:50
	one another in their common view.	3:55
	This is not the first time this has happened.	3:58
	You may recall that at the end of 1969,	4:01
	when Time's Board of Economists met,	4:05
	the same group, except that time happily,	4:08
	Beryl Sprinkel was present.	4:11
	They split roughly-	4:14
	I forget whether it was six-to-one or seven-to-one.	4:18
	At any rate, everybody except Sprinkel had exactly	4:21
	the same view with very, very minor variations in the sense	4:24
	that none of them saw a recession coming,	4:29
	all of them thought that 1970 would	4:32
	show a continued expansion,	4:34
	they all estimated fairly high GNPs.	4:37
	Beryl Sprinkel was the one economist who was different.	4:41
	His estimate, as it happened, turned out to be too low,	4:45
	so that numerically his GNP figure was probably	4:48
	just as far away from the actual figure, if I remember	4:53
	the data correctly.	4:56
	I think the actual figure	4:57
	was sort of halfway between his estimate	4:59
	and the lowest of the estimates of the other people.	5:01
	But, aside from the numbers, his qualitative forecast	5:04
	was certainly correct, and his estimates of unemployment	5:07
	and the behavior of real GNP were almost perfect.	5:10
	He was the only one who clearly saw and definitely stated	5:15
	that there would be a recession.	5:19
	Now, again, as I say, one should not	5:21
	regard that as six-to-one.	5:24
	It's really one-to-one, because you have six voices	5:25
	from a common point of view, all looking at	5:28
	the facts the same way, namely in terms of	5:30
	the Keynesian income-expenditure approach,	5:34
	in which fiscal policy is of dominant importance,	5:38
	in which investment is the key to economic activity.	5:41
	As of the end of '69, there had clearly been a shift in-	5:45
	there looked as if there was going to be a shift	5:50
	in fiscal policy away from restraint.	5:52
	And this underlay a good deal of their forecast.	5:56
	Beryl Sprinkel, on the other hand, represents the	6:00
	moderatist point of view, the point of view of those	6:02
	like myself, who put a good deal of emphasis	6:04
	on the money supply.	6:06
	And, what was in contention was not one man versus six,	6:08
	but one theory versus an alternative theory.	6:13
	One way of examining the evidence versus	6:16
	an alternative way of examining the evidence.	6:19
	And 1970 turned out to be	6:21
	the latest in a sequence of such tests, in each of which	6:27
	the moderatist's point of view gave better results	6:31
	than the alternative point of view.	6:34
	Now, once again, you are in exactly the same position.	6:37
	The six, or seven if you want to include Bob Triffin,	6:41
	are looking at the current situation.	6:47
	They see, incorrectly, that unemployment	6:52
	has remained high for a few months.	6:56
	They see that real output has been	6:58
	growing relatively slowly.	7:01
	And they are correct in describing the expansion,	7:04
	up to this point, as a very, very mild one.	7:07
	I'm a little more puzzled by how they interpret	7:12
	the fiscal situation, because although the budget	7:15
	calls for a full employment balance,	7:18
	nonetheless the actual deficits	7:24
	are running at a very high rate	7:26
	and it's very dubious that you will achieve	7:28
	the full employment balance.	7:30
	So from their point of view, I've regarded the present	7:33
	fiscal policy as very expansionist already.	7:36
	But, nonetheless, they regard it as insufficiently	7:39
	expansionist and call for further tax cuts and	7:42
	accelerated government spending.	7:45
	On the other hand, if Beryl Sprinkel had been there,	7:49
	I am very confident that he would have again been	7:54
	in the minority of one, and the reason is clear.	7:57
	In the past six months, you have had a monetary explosion	8:02
	following an earlier variant from February of 1970	8:06
	of rather rapid monetary expansion.	8:12
	So here we are, in the pipeline, you have something like	8:15
	15 or 16 months of what by historical standards	8:20
	is very rapid monetary growth.	8:23
	Moreover, you don't need to rely solely on the	8:26
	monetary figures on this occasion.	8:28
	You also have a very expansive fiscal policy,	8:30
	with high actual deficits and with a shift	8:33
	in the full employment budget, in an expansionary direction.	8:37
	If this amount of steam in the boiler	8:42
	on the fiscal side and on the monetary side	8:45
	isn't sufficient to get a recovery going,	8:48
	there is something seriously wrong with both	8:51
	the analysis of a moderatist and	8:54
	the analysis of a fiscalist, and the analysis of the	8:56
	Time's Board of Editors.	8:59
	At the moment, I am very far from being prepared	9:02
	to say that there is something wrong on both sides.	9:05
	I believe, and continue to believe, that we will see	9:08
	a fairly rapid expansion.	9:12
	I have all along expected that the real expansion	9:15
	would for a time be mild because the recession was so mild.	9:18
	That unemployment would be slow and declining	9:22
	because whenever you come to a turning point in the economy	9:26
	it takes some months before output is rising fast enough	9:30
	to match the growing labor force, in addition to which	9:35
	employers at about that stage of the cycle	9:39
	tend to hoard labor.	9:42
	They tend to have somewhat excessive workforces,	9:44
	and thus can expand output rapidly for a while	9:47
	without hiring additional laborers	9:50
	in proportion to the expansion in output.	9:56
	It's too early to judge, but one little straw in the wind	9:59
	that the expansion may be picking up steam	10:04
	is the latest figure on the rise in industrial production.	10:08
	That was at a very satisfactory rate, something like	10:12
	an 8% a year annual rate, which would be certainly	10:15
	a very satisfactory rate of real rise.	10:19
	Retail sales have been showing considerable strength	10:22
	in the last few months.	10:25
	Indeed, I continue to be of the opinion that what we have	10:27
	to be worried about is not that the expansion will be	10:30
	insufficiently fast, but that it will be too fast.	10:33
	That it will start inflation resuming again.	10:37
	The picture on the inflation front is not anything like	10:40
	so encouraging as it was a few months ago.	10:45
	The tapering off of inflation, which was then clearly	10:50
	in prospect, is not so clearly in evidence today.	10:53
	If you look at the cost of living, it has been	10:59
	relatively low for the last three or four months.	11:02
	But that is partly a statistical artifact	11:05
	due to the handling of mortgage interest rates.	11:08
	Other indexes are showing a rather steady rate of growth	11:11
	at a much lower rate than a year-and-a-half ago,	11:16
	but still no continued decline.	11:19
	I hope I am wrong in this, but that seems to me to have	11:23
	all the earmarks of an economy that is getting ready	11:26
	to stop the tapering off of inflation	11:30
	and to start going up again.	11:33
	In short, the stage seems to be set for another test	11:35
	of the comparative reliability of the two approaches	11:41
	to interpreting economic phenomenon.	11:46
	That of the Times Board of Economists who were present	11:48
	at this meeting, and that of Beryl Sprinkel and myself.	11:52
	Let's see how this one comes out.	11:56
-	We have a question from a subscriber in New York:	11:58
	"Would you care to comment on the projections of the	12:02
	GNP price deflator in the recent model simulation	12:04
	published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis?"	12:08
-	The subscriber goes on to indicate the features of this	12:12
	simulation that particularly interest him.	12:16
	Those features stated generally	12:21
	are that the model of the	12:25
	Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis shows extremely little	12:27
	effect on the rate of inflation of more rapid rates	12:31
	of monetary growth.	12:34
	They simulate the effect of a continued rate	12:36
	of monetary growth of 3% per year and conclude	12:41
	that under this policy, by the fourth quarter of 1972-	12:45
	that is the last quarter of 1972- the prices as measured	12:51
	by the GNP price deflator would still be growing	12:57
	at a little over 3% per year, 3.1%.	13:00
	On the other hand, with a 9% rate of monetary growth,	13:06
	which is certainly a great deal higher,	13:09
	they have a higher rate of price rise at that time,	13:12
	but not very much higher.	13:16
	Only 4.7% per year.	13:18
	That is, a six percentage point difference in the rate	13:21
	of monetary growth brings about	13:24
	only a 1.6% higher rate of price inflation.	13:28
	This is the feature that the subscriber asks about.	13:35
	Now, two questions that can be raised about this:	13:38
	One, what is there about the model	13:42
	that produces this result?	13:43
	And the second is, is this something that one	13:45
	should have confidence in?	13:47
	What produces this result in the model is that you have,	13:49
	with respect to prices, a very important role	13:53
	being played by past rates of price rise.	13:57
	This is because an important factor that	14:01
	enters in to their equation for prices	14:03
	is what people anticipate will happen to prices.	14:05
	Because of past experience,	14:12
	what they have as anticipated prices is in turn	14:14
	based on the average of experience	14:18
	over a fairly long period of time.	14:21
	That is what's built into the very equation,	14:23
	is that individuals form their expectation about	14:25
	future price rise on the basis of the past.	14:29
	This means that- and a fairly long past.	14:33
	If I remember correctly, they average out over something	14:37
	like over a two-year period.	14:39
	This means that the actual rate of price inflation	14:41
	is a very sticky kind of thing, because it is being	14:44
	dominated by an average of the past.	14:47
	And the different rates of monetary change,	14:49
	monetary growth, have only a marginal impact on it.	14:52
	And most of their impact is reflected not in the	14:55
	price deflator, but in what happens to real output.	14:59
	For example, if you look not at the price deflator but at	15:02
	real output, the St. Louis simulations have,	15:06
	in the fourth quarter of 1972, real GNP rising	15:10
	at only 1% per year for a 3% rate of monetary growth,	15:15
	but at nearly 6% per year for a 9% rate of monetary growth.	15:19
	That is to say, of the six percentage point difference	15:25
	in the rate of monetary growth on their simulations,	15:29
	they have almost five percentage points of that absorbed	15:33
	by output and only one percentage point absorbed by prices.	15:38
	It's this sticky price expectation factor based on	15:43
	an average of a long period that accounts	15:47
	for this particular feature of their model.	15:50
	The second question is how reliable is this result?	15:53
	How accurate are their equations,	15:57
	and how much confidence can you have in it?	16:00
	This is a little tricky.	16:02
	Their model consists of two separable parts.	16:05
	One is an equation, which gives the relation	16:08
	between monetary growth and also government expenditures,	16:13
	on the one hand.	16:18
	And the rate of growth of nominal GNP on the other,	16:19
	that is the dollar change.	16:22
	This is an equation which seems to me to be	16:25
	very soundly based, and in which one can have	16:28
	a great deal of confidence.	16:30
	It's based on evidence for a long period of time,	16:32
	it's given fairly reliable predictions,	16:34
	and more important, it is consistent with much other	16:37
	knowledge that we know based on other kinds of studies	16:40
	for the United States and other countries	16:43
	about the relations between money on the one hand	16:45
	and income on the other.	16:47
	The second part of their model is a breakdown of the	16:50
	rate of nominal income growth- it's two parts:	16:54
	The price growth and the real output growth.	16:57
	This part of their model, as they themselves stress	17:01
	and emphasize in their bulletins, is less soundly based	17:04
	than the nominal income equation	17:07
	and deserves less confidence.	17:10
	Part of the reason for less confidence is that the	17:13
	theoretical analysis underlying it is less clear,	17:16
	definite and satisfactory.	17:19
	But part of the reason, also, has to do with	17:23
	the kind of statistical manipulations involved	17:25
	in getting to it.	17:28
	It turns out that you cannot use as long a period of time	17:30
	for these equations without making some adjustment	17:35
	as you can for the nominal income equation.	17:39
	In particular, there is a sharp break,	17:40
	according to their analysis, in the way in which	17:43
	price expectations are formed: before 1960 and after 1960.	17:46
	As a result, the version of the equations which underlies	17:52
	the estimates I have cited are really based only on	17:58
	about 10 years of data.	18:01
	And even that doesn't consist of 10 years	18:04
	of independent data.	18:08
	You've had only one substantial price movement in that time,	18:10
	the rapid acceleration of inflation, and essentially	18:13
	that's what's giving the coefficients	18:16
	that enter into the equation.	18:19
	And for this reason, I may say I have much less confidence	18:21
	in these estimates in the breakdown between	18:25
	price inflation and output than I do in the estimates	18:27
	of the behavior of total nominal GNP.	18:31
	This skepticism based on the	18:35
	structure of the equations	18:39
	and on its data source is reinforced by another factor,	18:42
	qualitative in kind.	18:49
	I believe that concern about inflation,	18:51
	awareness of inflation, monitoring of inflation,	18:54
	is far more widespread today than in the period	18:58
	of the '60s or in the period of the '50s.	19:01
	It is hard for me to believe that one result of this	19:04
	will not be a shortening of the time lag-	19:08
	well, the expectation's quite right-	19:13
	will not be that people will change their expectations	19:16
	more rapidly, particularly in an upward direction.	19:18
	I think one of the reasons why prices have been	19:22
	so resistant to coming down- why the rate	19:26
	of price rise, I mean, has been so resistant to coming down,	19:29
	is that people have not been persuaded that inflation	19:32
	is going to be beaten.	19:34
	And maybe they're right.	19:35
	Given the monetary policy of the past six months,	19:37
	given the political imperatives to expand at all cause,	19:39
	it's as I have emphasized over and over again	19:43
	on these tapes, if one is going to predict for the	19:45
	next five or 10 years, is very, very hard to have	19:49
	any confidence on any prediction other than	19:52
	a continued inflation.	19:55
	Under these circumstances, with expectations sticky,	19:59
	prices have not been coming down,	20:02
	or the rate of inflation has not been coming down.	20:05
	But I don't believe that's reversible	20:08
	in the sense of making it sticky on the upside.	20:10
	Quite the opposite.	20:13
	I think even minor signs of an acceleration of inflation	20:14
	will cause people to renew their expectations	20:20
	in this direction and, therefore, I would be surprised	20:23
	if the acceleration of inflation on this occasion	20:26
	did not go much more rapidly than it has in the past.	20:29
	I have mixed feelings about this attitude toward the	20:32
	St. Louis projections because I wish, in a way,	20:37
	that I could accept them.	20:42
	Because if you could accept them, they would mean that	20:44
	over the next year or so, at any rate,	20:47
	we do not pay much of a price in inflation for getting	20:49
	a very rapid resumption- a very rapid growth	20:54
	in real output.	20:57
	As I mentioned before, a 9% rate in monetary growth	20:58
	instead of a 3% rate of growth, on their projections,	21:03
	would by the end of '72 add nearly five percentage points	21:06
	to the rate of real growth, and only one-and-a-half	21:11
	percentage points, roughly, to the rate of inflation.	21:14
	So, I wish I could accept their results,	21:18
	because it would mean that my fears	21:21
	of a resumption of inflation	21:27
	in the fairly near future as a result of pushing too hard,	21:31
	as a result of overstressing the unemployment objective	21:36
	as compared with the price objective,	21:39
	that danger would be much less than I now fear it today.	21:41
-	We have another question that's related to this one.	21:45
	Another subscriber writes, "It seems that monetary policies	21:49
	can control demand-pull inflation but not	21:53
	cost-push inflation.	21:56
	The explosive monetary advance in the first part	21:58
	of the year should be felt in the second part of the year.	22:00
	If the telephone workers, the aluminum workers,	22:04
	the steel workers, the copper workers,	22:06
	all get the equivalent of the GM contract,	22:08
	even though they are asking for more,	22:10
	won't that mean an explosive inflation	22:14
	in the final quarter of the year?	22:16
	Isn't this what Mr. Burns fears,	22:18
	and in his dilemma he is grasping at the only straw left	22:20
	to beat cost-price inflation, namely an incomes policy?	22:24
	What would you do to rectify the above situation?"	22:28
-	And when did- that's sort of like asking me	22:34
	when did I last beat my wife, because I don't	22:36
	really accept the description of the situation.	22:39
	I don't believe, as I have emphasized over and over again,	22:45
	that there are two different kinds of inflation.	22:48
	I don't believe we are experiencing cost-push inflation.	22:52
	I don't believe there's anything new along these lines.	22:55
	What we are experiencing and have been experiencing	22:57
	is not cost-push inflation, but the aftermath of	23:02
	demand-pull inflation, a transition from a high rate	23:06
	of inflation to a low rate of inflation.	23:10
	And during that transition, costs, wages, and so on,	23:12
	have, of course, risen, to make up for their	23:16
	failure to rise in accordance with other prices earlier.	23:20
	In addition, we have been experiencing, as I just said	23:26
	in answer to this last question,	23:30
	a rather half-hearted policy of stemming inflation,	23:32
	and widespread skepticism on the part of many people	23:37
	all over that inflation will be stemmed.	23:41
	Now, there is no doubt that what people expect	23:45
	to happen to prices over the course of coming months,	23:49
	does in fact affect what happens to prices.	23:53
	People make wage agreements for two- or three-year periods.	23:57
	They make price agreements for six or nine months.	24:00
	And if they expect that prices are going to rise rapidly,	24:03
	they are likely to embed in those contracts	24:06
	that expectation.	24:09
	And that does mean that, during that period,	24:11
	during the interim, if money is not printed	24:14
	in order to justify as rapid a rate of inflation	24:17
	as they expected, you will get unemployment.	24:21
	That's why we had the recession of 1970.	24:24
	Of course, it is true that the explosive monetary advance	24:28
	in the first part of the year will be felt later on.	24:31
	But it will be a source of demand-pull inflation.	24:34
	It has nothing to do with cost-push inflation.	24:37
	And indeed, let me go directly to the subscriber's question.	24:40
	He says if the telephone workers, etc., etc. get	24:43
	the equivalent of the GM contract,	24:47
	won't that make for explosive inflation?	24:50
	Not at all.	24:52
	If you examine the GM contract in detail,	24:53
	you will find that it is not, in any way,	24:56
	an inflationary contract.	24:59
	Of the first-year increase in wages, the great bulk of it	25:02
	was accounted for by the making up of past inflation.	25:08
	That is, GM and its workers had a contract three years ago.	25:15
	At that time, they anticipated a lesser-degree	25:20
	of inflation than actually occurred.	25:24
	The result was that by the third year of the contract,	25:26
	the real wages of the GM workers was lower	25:29
	than either GM or the workers had thought they were	25:32
	bargaining for.	25:35
	And most of the first-year increase in the GM wage	25:37
	is the make up for this failure of the past.	25:42
	As to future years, the GM agreement builds in a modest	25:47
	growth factor, and for the rest-	25:53
	and this is, in a way, the answer	25:57
	to the subscriber's real question-	25:59
	it allows for the possibility of future inflation	26:02
	by building in a full escalator clause.	26:04
	Now, if all of the other contracts	26:07
	also were to build in a full escalator clause,	26:09
	then there would be no danger at all that they	26:14
	would give rise to cost-push inflation.	26:16
	Because if demand-pull inflation weren't there,	26:18
	and prices didn't rise, their wages wouldn't rise either	26:22
	because the escalator clause would	26:26
	prevent that from happening.	26:30
	On the other hand, in that eventuality,	26:32
	if the monetary explosion of the past six months	26:35
	does lead to accelerated inflation later on,	26:39
	then of course wages, escalated by a cost of living clause	26:42
	will rise along with prices, as they should.	26:48
	But to return to the subscriber's question	26:51
	more specifically, he asks whether Mr. Burns isn't	26:54
	grasping at the only straw left to beat cost-price	27:00
	inflation, namely an incomes policy.	27:02
	Well, if so, it's a very, very weak straw.	27:05
	It has so far worked nowhere.	27:10
	It didn't work in the United States	27:13
	with Johnson's guidelines.	27:15
	It didn't work in Canada.	27:16
	It didn't work in Great Britain.	27:18
	It hasn't worked in Holland.	27:19
	It hasn't worked in several other European countries.	27:21
	The only places where incomes policy is said to be working	27:24
	is those where it hasn't been tried for very long.	27:27
	When it's new, people have hopes in it.	27:30
	I believe that it would be far more important	27:33
	for Mr. Burns and the Federal Reserve Board	27:37
	to rectify their own contribution to inflation,	27:41
	namely the very rapid rate of monetary growth	27:44
	of the past six months.	27:47
	It would be far more important to do that than it would be	27:48
	to try to press for an incomes policy.	27:52
	Of course, in saying that I should stress that whatever	27:55
	Mr. Burns has spelled out in incomes policy,	27:59
	what he means by an incomes policy,	28:02
	part of it has been very desirable	28:04
	and acceptable to all of us.	28:06
	It has consisted of such things as improving the	28:08
	competitiveness of markets, reducing tariffs,	28:12
	eliminating Davis-Bacon, and so on.	28:16
	But, in addition, and more recently than earlier,	28:18
	he has also been stressing a Wage and Price Board.	28:22
	This, I think, would be sheer window-dressing.	28:26
	I do hope that we do not resort to it.	28:28
-	I think that just about brings us to the end of the tape.	28:33
	Subscribers, if you have any questions, please send them	28:36
	to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	28:40
	166 E. Superior St., Chicago, IL, 60611.	28:42
	We will be visiting with you again from beautiful Vermont	28:49
	in two weeks.	28:52

Item Info

Title:

Tape 76 - Time's Board of Economists, St. Louis Price Predictions, Cost-Push-Inflation

Date:

June 15, 1971

Contributor:

Friedman, Milton, 1912-2006

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Milton Friedman

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

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This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0267
ref2674_q9k
samuelsonpaul
duke:325289
pstau001266
ark:/87924/r42b8vt9m
0cf489e4-1ff4-497a-8a28-9e909d8e92ad

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Tape 76 - Time's Board of Economists, St. Louis Price Predictions, Cost-Push-Inflation

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