Tape 191 - Money, Inventories, Communists in Italy

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-	Hello, this is Rose Freidman	0:02
	inviting you on behalf of Instructional Dynamics	0:04
	to another conversation with Milton Freidman,	0:07
	Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago.	0:10
	We are taping this conversation in mid May.	0:13
	As is our custom, what's the situation	0:17
	on the (laughing) monetary front?	0:20
-	Well the monetary explosion	0:22
	that has been going on for some months now	0:24
	seems to be continuing.	0:26
	Over the past year as a whole,	0:28
	that is from April of 1975,	0:31
	to April of 1976,	0:35
	the last month for which we have figures for a whole month.	0:37
	M2 rose at the annual rate of 10%	0:41
	and M1 rose at the annual rate of 6%, 6.1%.	0:44
	But that number conceals the wide variations	0:48
	within the period.	0:52
	For M2, from April of 1975 to July	0:54
	M1, M2 went up at 14%.	0:58
	From July to December it went up at 6%.	1:02
	From December to April it went up at close to 13%.	1:05
	So, in its usual behavior the Fed was swinging wildly	1:09
	from one side of the road to the other.	1:13
	The M1 numbers show a similar pattern.	1:16
	10.2% from April to July.	1:21
	2.6% for July to December 1975.	1:23
	And 7.7% from December '75 to April '76.	1:28
	Moreover, for M1 in particular,	1:33
	the rate of growth is recently	1:37
	been accelerating rather sharply.	1:39
	It was 7.7% for the past five months	1:41
	but 8.5 for the past four,	1:44
	11.0 for the past three and 12.5 for the past two.	1:46
	The reason for these movements from side to side	1:53
	are fairly clear as I've indicated so many times before.	1:57
	They reflect the way in which the Fed operates	2:01
	in trying to control the money supply.	2:04
	It operates through the Federal funds right.	2:06
	Whenever market forces are tending lower interest rates,	2:08
	the Fed tends to lean against that force.	2:12
	The only way it can do so is by promoting	2:15
	a slower rate of monetary growth than it intends.	2:17
	Conversely, whenever a short term interest rates	2:21
	are tending to rise,	2:23
	the Fed tends to lean against that.	2:25
	It can do that only by producing a more rapid rate	2:27
	of monetary growth than it intends to.	2:30
	In the later part of 1976,	2:33
	when the Fed's rate of monetary growth was very slow,	2:38
	rates, short term rates were coming down.	2:42
	The recent explosion is about as good an evidence	2:46
	as you can want that there is at the moment	2:50
	upward pressure on interest rates	2:52
	which the Fed has been trying to resist.	2:55
	It has in the past few weeks	2:58
	raised its trigger point on federal funds,	3:01
	the federal funds rate at which it seeks to maintain	3:04
	by about a half a percentage point.	3:08
	From about 4 3/4% to somewhere up around 5 1/4%.	3:10
	How much longer the monetary explosion will continue	3:16
	depends entirely on this interplay	3:21
	between the market forces affecting the short term rates	3:24
	and the rapidity of the Fed	3:27
	in catching up with or adjusting to it.	3:29
	If we judge from these past episodes,	3:33
	the swings have lasted about five months.	3:36
	April to July is only four months.	3:40
	July to December is only about five months.	3:44
	December to April is now about four months.	3:46
	So, on this basis it would look as if	3:51
	you had a couple more months to go.	3:54
	However, that may not be a very good basis	3:56
	for judging what the Fed is going to do.	3:59
	They are certainly in this year under great pressure	4:03
	to try to avoid any drastic moves one way or another.	4:07
	And particularly, they will be hesitant to allow	4:11
	to raise the Federal funds rate very dramatically.	4:15
	So, it may be that this explosion will last some what longer	4:19
	but that is in the lap of Gods	4:22
	and I have more or less given up	4:25
	trying to predict these short run gyrations	4:26
	in the Fed's behavior.	4:30
	The gyrations have had as I have noted before,	4:34
	some impact on the course of economic activity	4:38
	with a much more rapid rate of growth	4:42
	in industrial production in the early part	4:43
	of the expansion than in the later months	4:46
	of 1975 and the early months of '76.	4:51
	The more rapid rate of monetary growth	4:55
	seems not yet to have shown up	4:58
	in its impact on any of the magnitudes.	5:00
	So far as the average rate of growth	5:04
	over the past year is concerned,	5:07
	a 10% rate of growth in M2,	5:09
	a 6% rate of growth in M1 implies something like	5:12
	a nine, 10% rate of GNP growth for this coming year.	5:17
	It also implies something like perhaps	5:24
	a 6%, 5-6% inflation rate.	5:27
	So that as yet there is no particular reason	5:30
	to alter the kinds of predictions	5:34
	we have been making about the average rate	5:37
	of behavior over the next year or so.	5:40
	However, if the rate of,	5:44
	if the monetary explosion should continue,	5:47
	if the Fed should permit the rate of monetary growth	5:50
	to settle at the continue at its present level	5:54
	or at a very high level,	5:57
	then of course, we would have to start revising	5:58
	the inflation predictions for 1977,	6:01
	though not yet for 1976.	6:03
-	The Wall Street Journal had a piece the other day	6:07
	about business inventories increasing	6:11
	6/10ths of a percent in March	6:14
	to a seasonally adjusted 269 billion dollars.	6:16
	They went on to say that this was	6:22
	the third consecutive monthly gain	6:24
	and another favorable economic sign.	6:26
	Is this necessarily a favorable economic sign?	6:29
-	Inventories are one of the most tricky elements	6:33
	to analyze and is by no means clear	6:35
	that a rise in inventories is a favorable sign.	6:40
	In the first place, everything depends	6:45
	on why inventories rise.	6:47
	If inventories rise because sales are less	6:50
	than businessmen anticipated,	6:54
	so that the rise in inventories is an unanticipated rise,	6:57
	well then the effect of that of course	7:02
	is an unfavorable sign.	7:04
	What that means is that businessmen	7:06
	are going to have unduly high inventories	7:08
	and then consequently they will be cutting down	7:11
	in production in order to get inventories in line.	7:13
	On the other hand, if inventories rise	7:17
	because businessmen intend them to rise	7:19
	because given the course of sales in recent months,	7:23
	they would like to get their inventories larger	7:28
	in line with their increased sales.	7:30
	Then that's a rather neutral factor.	7:32
	It is a neutral factor in the sense	7:36
	that it adds to employment.	7:41
	Total GNP rises by more than	7:45
	the rise in so called final demand.	7:49
	Goods and services available for final investment	7:53
	or final consumers.	7:55
	It rises by this increase in inventories	7:57
	and that means that there is employment.	7:59
	But the employment does not correspond	8:02
	to any goods available for people to purchase.	8:04
	So, from an employment point of view	8:07
	it's a good thing.	8:09
	From a consumption investment point of view it is not.	8:13
	So far as its implications for the future are concerned,	8:19
	a rise in business inventories	8:23
	can only be interpreted as a favorable sign	8:26
	if it is taken first to have been an intended rise	8:28
	and second to have been a rise at a lower rate	8:33
	than businessmen really intended	8:37
	so that they still have some unmet inventories,	8:38
	some desired inventories that they have not yet achieved.	8:44
	In this case, the favorable element is what it reflects	8:48
	about the expectations and anticipations	8:51
	of business community.	8:54
	But on the whole, I would say,	8:59
	that one oughta look at business inventory change	9:00
	with a very skeptical notion	9:04
	and not either take any encouragement or discouragement	9:09
	from a simple increase or a decrease	9:14
	unless one can analyze the forces in back of it	9:16
	and choose between an intended and an unintended	9:20
	inventory increase.	9:23
	A less than intended or a more than intended	9:24
	inventory increase.	9:27
-	Moving to a quite different area.	9:29
	There's been a fair amount of talk	9:32
	about the growing likelihood of communist governments	9:33
	in Italy and France.	9:37
	Some of the talk has indicated	9:40
	that it won't have much affect as far as	9:42
	their relationship with the United States or with NATO.	9:45
	And others of course, have been more alarming.	9:49
	What is your reaction to that?	9:53
-	Well, I think the issue is	9:55
	a very important one.	9:59
	And the important aspects of it	10:02
	are not necessarily those which are given	10:05
	the greatest attention in the news media.	10:09
	In the main, the news media tend	10:12
	to stress the political aspects of it.	10:14
	They ask whether the communists are serious	10:17
	when they say that they wanna be	10:19
	a constructive force in the Italian government.	10:20
	Well then the communists are serious	10:23
	in saying that they are willing to accept	10:25
	the judgment of the democracy	10:27
	and to leave office if they're voted out	10:29
	et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.	10:31
	Now, one may have strong feelings about those issues.	10:32
	Personally, I believe that	10:36
	a dog barks, a cat meows,	10:40
	and communists stick with their belief.	10:44
	Their belief may not necessarily make them	10:47
	devitates of Moscow.	10:52
	You've had independent communist groups	10:53
	like Tito in Yugoslavia and Mao in China.	10:55
	And it might be that the Italian communist	10:59
	would not, or the French communists	11:01
	would not be the slavees of Moscow,	11:03
	that may be.	11:06
	But it's very hard for me to believe	11:07
	that they have suddenly given up their belief	11:08
	that the appropriate way to organize society	11:11
	is through authoritarian and collective means.	11:13
	But that isn't the issue I wanna discuss.	11:15
	This issue was brought up in my mind	11:18
	by two things recently.	11:20
	One was a comment that Guido Carli,	11:24
	the former Governor of the Bank of Italy,	11:30
	is reported to have made	11:32
	at the recent business council meeting in Hot Springs,	11:34
	as it was reported to me,	11:46
	what Carli said was that Italy	11:49
	was an extremely open society	11:52
	which relied heavily on imports and exports.	11:54
	That the communist no less than any other group	11:58
	would have to try to maintain	12:01
	a viable export/import business,	12:03
	a viable foreign trade.	12:07
	And that as a result,	12:10
	they would find it in their own interest	12:13
	to follow policies which would promote	12:16
	such foreign trade	12:20
	rather than	12:22
	eliminate it.	12:25
	And as a result as I gather,	12:27
	he did not regard the accession of communists	12:29
	to at least a part of the government of Italy.	12:34
	Their inclusion in the new government	12:36
	after the vote which has now been scheduled,	12:38
	he did not regard this	12:41
	as a clearly negative economic sign	12:42
	from the point of view of Italy's future.	12:44
	The other item which is relevant to this	12:47
	was a paper essentially dealing with this same subject	12:52
	that I received from a friend of mine in California.	12:55
	A, believe it or not, a professor of sociology	13:01
	at the University of California in San Diego	13:05
	by the name of Jack Douglas.	13:08
	Professor Douglas considered the Italian/French situation	13:14
	in a much broader context.	13:17
	And he compared it with earlier examples	13:20
	of left wing governments as for example,	13:23
	in the case of France	13:26
	in the 1930's.	13:30
	But also in a still broader context,	13:32
	namely anything which provided a threat	13:35
	to existing capitals such as not merely private capitals,	13:39
	such as not merely a left wing takeover	13:42
	or anything like that,	13:44
	but also extreme inflation.	13:46
	He cited the example of the early 1920's in France	13:48
	when France had a very erratic inflationary episode	13:52
	which was finally brought under control	13:57
	by in the Poincaré government when Émile Moreau	14:00
	who was then the head of the	14:04
	Bank of France refused to finance governmental expenditures	14:07
	by printing money and stopped the printing of money	14:13
	and you had a re-valuation of the Franc	14:15
	and that stopped the flight of capital	14:17
	which had been going on before that.	14:19
	And enabled France then to go on to a	14:21
	period, a brief period of very rapid progress.	14:26
	And his essential point was	14:30
	that the thing to look at was much less	14:31
	the activities directly of the people who got into power	14:33
	but what those activities did to the attitudes	14:37
	of private owners of capital.	14:41
	His fundamental argument was	14:45
	that if something comes along	14:47
	which tends to frighten capital,	14:50
	leads to an exodus of capital,	14:52
	that this exodus of capital ultimately leaves the country	14:54
	with only two choices.	14:57
	Either a strong authoritarian government	14:59
	which will have to impose the discipline	15:02
	to keep the capital from going out,	15:05
	or to organize the economic system	15:07
	on some basis other than private arrangements.	15:11
	Or else an end to whatever it is	15:15
	that threatens the outflow of capital.	15:19
	He cited the example of the 1930's in France	15:21
	when you had the	15:25
	the Popular Front government under Blum	15:28
	which almost caused a complete collapse of the country.	15:31
	Again because there was fear of a left wing takeover.	15:35
	And he said Blum came up to the point	15:38
	where he either had to move in an authoritarian direction	15:40
	or else he had to step down.	15:43
	And Blum was enough of a believer	15:45
	in the laws of democracy that he stepped down.	15:46
	He cited in the same direction	15:51
	as in still another example	15:52
	and I think a very potent example.	15:54
	Britain's experience in the past 10 years,	15:56
	arguing that what was really happening in Britain	15:59
	was that people who owned property in Britain	16:01
	where trying to get it out of the country.	16:05
	They were certainly unwilling to invest.	16:07
	But this had the effect of turning private enterprises	16:09
	into losing enterprises	16:11
	at which point the government had to step in,	16:16
	or did step in and provided government capital.	16:18
	So you had a substitution of governmental capital	16:21
	for private capital.	16:23
	And unless, he argued, something came along in Britain	16:26
	that restored the confidence of property owners	16:28
	and their property,	16:30
	this process was bound to continue.	16:33
	Similarly in the Italian case, his argument was,	16:36
	that it was a threat of communist in the government	16:40
	or if communists were in the government,	16:43
	the threat of what they might do in the future,	16:45
	that would make any property owner in Italy	16:47
	naturally very fearful of his property,	16:50
	would lead to an exodus of private capital.	16:53
	Of course, a great deal of that has already happened.	16:55
	We know that for example, in the most extreme form,	16:58
	Switzerland has limited the amount of Italian currency,	17:02
	or currency of any kind that may be brought	17:07
	in in suitcases because there was a veritable flood	17:09
	of Italian currency trying to evade	17:12
	Italian Exchange Control regulations	17:14
	in getting into Switzerland in order	17:16
	to be converted into foreign currency.	17:18
	And the Italian government has imposed	17:20
	extensive foreign exchange control	17:22
	to try to prevent the export of capital.	17:24
	But fundamentally there is no way to prevent	17:27
	the export of capital over any long period.	17:29
	There are all sorts of indirect ways	17:31
	in which so long, especially in an open society	17:33
	engaging in extensive international trade,	17:35
	in which capital can directly or indirectly	17:38
	by open means or devious means be exported.	17:41
	I believe this argument is extremely powerful,	17:46
	in that it is far more persuasive to me	17:50
	than is the argument which Dr. Carli made.	17:54
	And I say this with despite the fact	17:58
	that I have the very greatest of admiration	18:02
	for Guido Carli I believe	18:04
	of all the central bankers I have known.	18:06
	He certainly ranks very near the top	18:09
	in terms of ability and understanding	18:11
	of monetary and economic forces.	18:14
	And he did a remarkable job as	18:16
	Governor of the Bank of Italy	18:19
	under very adverse circumstances.	18:22
	And yet, it seems to me, the thing to look for	18:25
	if communists get into the Italian government,	18:29
	is a continued pressure on private capital,	18:33
	a continued exodus of private capital,	18:36
	and the possibility ultimately,	18:38
	and not so ultimately, no so far down the line,	18:41
	of the communists coming up against the gun either.	18:44
	They will have to give up power,	18:47
	get out of the government	18:49
	and essentially take a self-denying ordinance	18:51
	about getting back in.	18:53
	Or else, they will have to move	18:54
	in an authoritarian direction	18:56
	to substitute a centrally controlled economy	18:58
	for a privately directed one.	19:01
	And given of course, their own values and beliefs,	19:03
	it is hard to believe that if they have that choice,	19:06
	they will not take the second	19:10
	rather than the first alternative.	19:12
-	We have a question from Father Martin Scherberg	19:16
	of St. John's University in Minnesota.	19:20
	He asks, he writes, concerning your statement	19:24
	on an earlier tape with respect	19:28
	to the crowding out effect of government deficit financing.	19:31
	Dr. Scherber writes, you said that the fiscalists argue	19:36
	that the crowding out effect is minor	19:40
	largely because in time of depression,	19:42
	government bonds will be bought with quote idle balances.	19:45
	Which at such time supposedly have nowhere else to go.	19:50
	The effect will be an increase in V and total spending	19:53
	and thus a stimulus to the economy.	19:57
	He goes on, the monetarists on the other hand,	19:59
	according to your statement,	20:02
	also believe that the crowding out effect	20:03
	will be relatively minor.	20:06
	But also that the effect on V	20:07
	will be secondary and unimportant.	20:09
	That the major effect will be government borrowing	20:11
	instead of other people borrowing	20:14
	and that interest rates will be only somewhat higher.	20:16
	But this rise in the rate of interest	20:20
	will not be sufficient to induce a large decline	20:22
	in cash balances with a consequent increase in V.	20:24
	The result will simply be spending by the government	20:28
	instead of by the public with no increase	20:30
	in total spending.	20:33
	I am particularly interested in the evidence	20:36
	and reasoning behind that last sentence.	20:38
-	This is a very important	20:42
	and sophisticated question as I would expect	20:45
	from Father Scherber.	20:47
	But I believe it partly also reflects	20:50
	some misunderstanding of my position	20:53
	or a misstatement by me in the earlier cassette	20:55
	of what that position is.	20:57
	It is not correct that the monaterists	21:00
	believe that the crowd out effect	21:02
	of government deficit financing	21:05
	will be relatively minor.	21:07
	On the contrary, we believe that on the whole,	21:09
	or I believe, let me speak only for myself,	21:13
	that the crowding out effect is likely to be substantial.	21:16
	And that indeed the bulk of government	21:19
	well let me say that a little bit less extreme fashion,	21:25
	that a very large fraction of government deficit spending	21:30
	will in fact take the place of private spending	21:35
	on investment on housing or on other things	21:40
	that funds might be borrowed.	21:43
	I will come back in a later to a qualification of that	21:45
	on a much deeper level.	21:48
	But for a moment, let me go to the more technical questions	21:49
	that Father Scherber raises.	21:54
	You have to separate out two very different questions.	21:56
	What happens to velocity during the course of an expansion?	21:59
	However that expansion comes about.	22:03
	And second, what further happens to velocity	22:06
	as a result of an expansion in which	22:10
	deficit financing plays a large role?	22:14
	In a cyclical expansion,	22:19
	which typically is stimulated by a rise	22:21
	in the rate of monetary growth at an earlier date	22:25
	and after a lag the economy expands.	22:28
	It is very typical that velocity rises	22:31
	and rises fairly substantially during the expansion.	22:35
	That is velocity is usually measured	22:38
	which is to say current income divided by	22:41
	the current money supply.	22:44
	That is the experience that we have had in this past year	22:46
	when the velocity M2 and M1 both of 'em have risen.	22:50
	M1 for part of the time very rapidly	22:56
	but that's a temporary aberration over the year as a whole.	23:00
	Both M1 and M2 velocities have risen.	23:05
	M1 by something perhaps like 6%,	23:08
	M2 by two or by a much smaller amount.	23:11
	That's fairly typical during an expansion.	23:14
	Now, this expansion was distinguished by the fact	23:19
	that deficit, government deficit spending	23:22
	was much more important	23:27
	than it ordinarily has been in other expansions.	23:28
	But in my opinion, that did not have a major effect	23:31
	on the increase in V.	23:34
	V increased and as a result of V increasing,	23:35
	total GNP or total dollar spending	23:39
	was able to increase at a much faster rate	23:42
	than did the money supply.	23:46
	But now, the effect of government deficit financing,	23:51
	was to bid away funds that would otherwise	23:56
	have been bid away for purposes of houses,	23:59
	for purposes of investment spending.	24:04
	And once again, a distinctive feature of this expansion	24:06
	is that consumption and government spending	24:10
	played a much larger role in the expansion than usually	24:13
	and investment and housing played a much smaller role.	24:16
	In the process of bidding the funds away from other uses,	24:20
	the interest rate was made somewhat higher	24:24
	that it otherwise would have been.	24:25
	But at this point, the argument is not	24:27
	that a rise in interest rates would not increase velocity.	24:30
	Of course it will and it does tend to.	24:33
	But that the rise in interest rates	24:35
	as a result of deficit spending	24:38
	rather than private spending was not very substantial.	24:40
	And the argument for that	24:43
	is that the investment demand as it were	24:45
	is highly elastic, highly sensitive to interest rates.	24:48
	And it doesn't take much of a rise interest rates,	24:51
	I shouldn't say a rise	24:54
	because what we're always talking about	24:56
	is interest rates being higher or lower	24:59
	than they otherwise would be.	25:01
	For example, in the past year	25:02
	interest rates actually fell a little.	25:03
	But they didn't come down to anything	25:06
	like the levels that which they have been	25:07
	during other expansions.	25:09
	So that they were higher than they otherwise would be.	25:10
	And in my opinion, it takes very little additional,	25:13
	very little extra	25:17
	rise in interest rates	25:21
	or higher interest rates	25:22
	to discourage investment spending.	25:23
	And that's why I think you have	25:25
	on the one had crowding out,	25:27
	on the other you have a rise in velocity.	25:29
	In the third place, you have higher interest rates	25:32
	than you otherwise would but not much higher.	25:35
	Now, the Father, Father Scherber asks	25:38
	what is the	25:41
	evidence behind that sentence.	25:45
	The primary evidence behind that sentence	25:48
	consists in empirical studies would show	25:50
	that the relation between changes	25:54
	in the quantity of money on the one hand	25:56
	and changes in GNP or income on the other	25:58
	depends very little if at all	26:02
	on the source of the increase in the money supply.	26:06
	If there were no crowding out,	26:10
	then that would mean	26:14
	that an increase in the money supply	26:15
	that was accompanied by a large government deficit	26:17
	should produce a much more rapid increase in GNP	26:20
	than otherwise, that it would produce	26:24
	a much more rapid increase in velocity	26:27
	than would otherwise occur.	26:29
	But, the various studies that have been made by many people,	26:31
	not only for the United States but for other countries,	26:34
	and I cannot of course give the details	26:38
	of the evidence here.	26:42
	But I interpret the bulk of that evidence as being	26:43
	that the quantitative increase of the money supply	26:47
	is more important for the subsequent increase in income	26:51
	than is the way in which that money supply is increased.	26:55
	Whether it's a result of financing private credit	26:59
	or financing government credit.	27:01
	And moreover, that the effect is little effected	27:03
	by the contemporaneous sides of the government deficit.	27:08
	That fiscal policy has an effect	27:12
	but it seems to be a relatively small and unstable effect	27:14
	compared to the effect of the growth of money.	27:18
	Those are the main effect.	27:20
	Now let me add, the one more sophisticated qualification	27:22
	to all this which has been brought out	27:25
	by a number students in recent years.	27:28
	Notably by a former student of mine	27:31
	by the name of Levis Coschan.	27:33
	There is a striking relationship	27:36
	between the rate of private saving on the one hand	27:39
	and the level of government deficit spending on the other.	27:42
	It looks almost as if you could	27:48
	almost interpret the figures as saying	27:50
	that when the government engages in deficit spending	27:52
	the public at large recognizes	27:55
	that this constitutes a claim on their future wealth	27:58
	and is the exact equivalent of taxes.	28:01
	And proceed to save in order to provide an advance	28:04
	the funds that will be necessary later	28:07
	to pay off this debt.	28:09
	Now, I'm exaggerating because the magnitude of the saving	28:11
	may not correspond to the magnitude of the deficit	28:14
	but the effect is in that direction.	28:16
	Now in so far as that effect existed,	28:18
	then there would literally be no crowding out.	28:22
	Because then a government deficit	28:24
	would lead to an increase in private saving.	28:27
	But at the same time while there would be	28:30
	no crowding out of investment,	28:32
	that would negate any expansionary effect	28:34
	of the deficit per say	28:38
	just as much as would the crowding out of investment.	28:39
	So whichever of these lines you take,	28:43
	the end result is that a government deficit	28:46
	is not per say expansionary.	28:49
	What is expansionary is the rate of change	28:52
	of the quantity of money,	28:54
	for a given rate of change in the quantity of money.	28:56
	The effect of the government deficit	28:58
	is either on private savings or on private investment.	29:00
-	That brings us to the end of our tape.	29:05
	Remember subscribers, if you have any questions or comments	29:07
	please send them to Instructional Dynamics Incorporated,	29:10
	450 East Ohio Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611.	29:14
	We should be visiting with you again	29:20
	in about two weeks.	29:21

Item Info

Title:

Tape 191 - Money, Inventories, Communists in Italy

Contributor:

Friedman, Milton, 1912-2006

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audiocassettes

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English

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Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

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Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

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Economics Cassette Series: Milton Friedman

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samuelsonpaul
duke:325333
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ark:/87924/r4028pw35
e9b471aa-0a3a-4182-a59a-d1a794071848

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Tape 191 - Money, Inventories, Communists in Italy

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