Tape 22 - Eisenhower

Download
- Rights
- Limited Re-Use
  CC BY-NC 4.0
  More Rights Info
- Files (1)
- MP3
- Please be patient with media downloads. They are often large files.
Share

Embed Code
<iframe src='//idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r40000g67?embed=true' height='125px' width='100%' frameborder='0' marginwidth='0' marginheight='0' scrolling='no' allowfullscreen></iframe>
Permalink

https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r40000g67
Skip to Item Info

Loading the media player...

Files for this Item

Transcript

Transcripts may contain inaccuracies.

-	Hello again, and welcome to this week's commentary	0:02
	on economics, with Professor Paul Samuelson of MIT.	0:04
	This series is produced weekly	0:08
	by Instructional Dynamics Incorporated of Chicago.	0:10
	Professor Samuelson, the country is still mourning	0:14
	the death of General Eisenhower.	0:16
	Do you have any views about how the history books	0:18
	will judge him in terms of his economic policies and views?	0:20
-	General Eisenhower was certainly a much beloved man.	0:23
	He was a symbol of our leadership in World War II.	0:28
	He was a popular president, and after the presidency	0:32
	he played very well the role of elder statesman	0:35
	and I would add that General Eisenhower will go down	0:39
	in the history books as having played	0:42
	a pivotal role in connection with our two party system	0:44
	because it was through him that the unbroken rule	0:48
	of the Democratic Party was finally broken.	0:51
	But you asked me to comment on his views	0:56
	when it comes to economics, and let me begin	0:59
	by saying there's no reason, really,	1:05
	why a great leader should have to be a profound scholar	1:07
	in economics or in anything else.	1:11
	As a matter of fact, by way of digression,	1:14
	it has been a hobby of mine to study great men	1:18
	in their relationship to economics.	1:24
	Winston Churchill would certainly go down	1:27
	on anybody's list of great men in the 20th century.	1:30
	Yet I think it can be documented throughout	1:35
	Churchill's very long life, that he was	1:37
	very poor at understanding economics.	1:41
	I don't want to dwell on this particular aspect	1:45
	of his career.	1:48
	The most sensational incident in his lifetime biography	1:49
	was the year 1925 when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer	1:55
	and when he was the instrument of England's going back	2:02
	on the pre-war gold standard at the pre-war parity,	2:07
	despite the Cassandra warnings of many economists	2:11
	of the day, and most notably, John Maynard Keynes' warnings.	2:15
	But this was not his last brush with economics.	2:21
	I knew very well one of the top advisors in economics	2:27
	in the British government in the post World War II period,	2:34
	a man who would be, so to speak,	2:38
	the Walter Heller of economics in Britain.	2:42
	And this man was an advisor	2:47
	to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Butler.	2:50
	RAB Butler, Rab Butler, so called,	2:54
	a very distinguished chancellor.	2:57
	And this man told me the difficulties	3:01
	that Butler had with Prime Minister Winston Churchill.	3:04
	To be sure, Winston Churchill by this time	3:07
	was not a young man, but he still	3:10
	was not the invalid that he later became.	3:13
	And when Butler would put forth the suggestion	3:18
	that taxes be increased in order to control	3:23
	the British post-war inflationary conditions,	3:28
	Winston Churchill would always object	3:34
	and would have to be persuaded anew each time	3:37
	and he would ask plaintively why Butler insisted	3:39
	upon putting this cruel yoke on the British people	3:44
	since nobody likes taxation.	3:48
	Now mind you, he did not have a sophisticated view	3:50
	which someone might today have	3:53
	that the role of fiscal policy has been overplayed.	3:56
	It wasn't anything like that at all,	4:00
	it was just the notion that a tax hurts me,	4:02
	therefore a tax on everybody must hurt everybody	4:05
	when of course the whole notion of taxing	4:09
	in order to prevent inflation is to substitute	4:12
	a fair and orderly method of taxation	4:15
	for a disorderly inflationary tax	4:18
	with its haphazard incidence.	4:21
	Now, it's remarkable in the case of Winston Churchill	4:24
	because Winston Churchill was not only	4:27
	a great wartime leader, but he was a great historian,	4:28
	he was a great writer, he was a great journalist,	4:32
	he was a great character in many, many respects,	4:34
	but with respect to economics you might say	4:38
	that he was born with a chromosome or a gene	4:40
	which made him tone-deaf to economics.	4:45
	Before getting back to Eisenhower,	4:49
	let me go down my list a little bit.	4:50
	Let's take the name of Albert Einstein.	4:53
	Albert Einstein was certainly one of the most	4:56
	lovable men that ever lived.	4:58
	He was unassuming.	5:01
	He played the violin.	5:03
	He was gentle.	5:05
	He was also one of the greatest minds	5:06
	not only of our age, but of any age.	5:09
	When we name great men of the intellect,	5:12
	we name Isaac Newton and we name Albert Einstein.	5:15
	To a physicist, he was a physicist's physicist.	5:21
	To the public, he was the developer	5:24
	of the esoteric theory of general relativity,	5:26
	which only 12 men were supposed	5:29
	to be able to understand.	5:30
	Well, what about Albert Einstein with respect to economics?	5:33
	I think he well illustrated the dictum	5:38
	of Alfred North Whitehead that when you scratch a man	5:41
	in respect to his philosophy, usually you turn up	5:47
	the philosophy that he learned from his nanny,	5:50
	his nursemaid, at the age of six.	5:54
	Well, Albert Einstein had a sweet,	5:57
	utopian, socialistic view of the world.	6:01
	This did not preclude him from having very strong	6:07
	and adverse opinions about capitalism,	6:10
	but I think I have scrutinized every	6:13
	written line of his on the subject,	6:15
	and I have to report that there isn't a single paragraph	6:17
	that shows any particular sophistication	6:21
	or erudition or even ordinary understanding	6:24
	of the problem.	6:27
	Let me continue down the list.	6:30
	Let's take a great man like Bertrand Russell.	6:33
	And I'm now again not referring to Bertrand Russell	6:36
	who is now in his nineties and who	6:39
	is somewhat the captive of his entourage,	6:42
	but Bertrand Russell in his prime.	6:45
	Russell is one of the greatest mathematical logicians	6:49
	of all time.	6:52
	The Russell-Whitehead Principia Mathematica	6:53
	is a landmark in man's intellect and thought.	6:57
	Now in the case of Bertrand Russell,	7:02
	the problem is a little bit more complicated	7:04
	because Bertrand Russell in the 1890s	7:06
	did study economics for a while,	7:09
	and he actually wrote a book on Marxism	7:10
	which I must say is a pretty good book!	7:15
	It happens to be a book against Marxism	7:17
	but he does touch the Achilles heel of Marxism.	7:20
	But after those wild oats, so to speak,	7:26
	it's very hard to find in Bertrand Russell's writings	7:30
	any very informed views with respect to economics.	7:34
	Let me just illustrate with an example	7:42
	that I used as a quotation in an exercise	7:44
	in my elementary textbook, it's from	7:49
	one of the writings of Bertrand Russell.	7:51
	"Bertrand Russell takes it for granted	7:53
	because he read Dickens as a boy	7:55
	that the Industrial Revolution must have represented	7:58
	an impoverishment of the British working classes."	8:02
	If you take the best testimony	8:08
	of economic historians who study that difficult subject,	8:10
	you can get an argument.	8:15
	An older generation, in particular the Hammonds,	8:16
	husband and wife team, thought	8:20
	of the Industrial Revolution as having	8:22
	lowered the standard of living somewhat	8:23
	but the revisionist to that view	8:26
	have swung around to the opinion	8:29
	that, bad as things were in the London and Manchester	8:31
	of Charles Dickens' time, the previous period	8:38
	had also been very bad	8:43
	and perhaps even worse, as can be demonstrated	8:45
	by cost of living and wage calculations.	8:48
	But Bertrand Russell was as innocent	8:52
	of this controversy and of this literature	8:54
	as his nanny or nursemaid might have been.	8:57
	Well, I could go on having a field day	9:04
	with respect to scientists.	9:07
	I want though to be fair-minded	9:09
	and call the shots as they fall.	9:13
	There are contrasts.	9:16
	I have met scientists who seem to me	9:17
	to be good, intuitive, natural economists.	9:20
	I can name them from both the left and the right.	9:25
	Patrick Blackett, the Nobel Prize winner in physics	9:30
	from Manchester, who was one of the founders	9:34
	of operation research and a strong left-wing	9:36
	figure in Britain, seemed to me to have	9:41
	a very good grasp of economics	9:43
	in the few times that I talked to him	9:46
	and in the writings of his that I have read.	9:49
	Leo Szilard, who was a genius in physics	9:54
	and was one of the men who helped persuade	9:59
	President Roosevelt to start the Manhattan Project	10:03
	which culminated in the atomic bomb,	10:06
	discovered after the war, more or less for himself,	10:12
	the beauties of the pricing system	10:17
	and he became quite a sophisticated economic analyst.	10:19
	I think the knowledge came to him late	10:24
	and therefore he tended to attach	10:26
	a little too much importance to it,	10:29
	but that's another matter.	10:31
	Still another name, and this may make	10:33
	some of my listeners a little bit furious,	10:35
	is the insidious, notorious Herman Kahn, formerly of RAND,	10:38
	the think tank out on the West Coast,	10:45
	and now head of his own Hudson Institute.	10:47
	Herman Kahn is the chap who writes books	10:50
	in which he discusses this policy or that	10:54
	and says policy A will result in the destruction	10:58
	by a nuclear holocaust of 173 million Americans	11:02
	and policy B will only result in the destruction	11:08
	of 143 million Americans, and the difference	11:12
	between 173 and 143 is 40, so there's	11:16
	40 million Americans who survive	11:21
	under one policy and not under the other.	11:25
	Well, this kind of writing which he does partly	11:27
	to shock, but which I can assure you	11:31
	he does in all seriousness too,	11:33
	just absolutely infuriates some people.	11:36
	How can a man even think in such terms?	11:38
	And the reviews that his books have received	11:42
	have been apoplectic, by and large.	11:47
	Well, Herman Kahn, although not a trained economist	11:52
	has studied economics somewhat	11:56
	and is able to appreciate some of the niceties	11:59
	and he used to go around and ask his friends	12:02
	who were not economists whether they could imagine	12:05
	under any circumstances being against	12:07
	a so-called reasonable minimum wage.	12:13
	"Could you," Herman Kahn would ask	12:18
	of a, let's say a sophisticated physicist,	12:20
	"Could you imagine it being a bad thing	12:23
	"to have a two dollar minimum wage	12:26
	"in the United States, this most affluent nation?"	12:27
	And most of his friends just regard	12:30
	the question as ridiculous.	12:33
	How could there be but one answer?	12:34
	Any man in good will must be for a two dollar minimum wage	12:36
	because you can't live even on three, four	12:40
	or five dollars, so two dollars would be barely enough.	12:43
	Well, you know, I think listeners	12:48
	of this tape would generally know,	12:51
	that economists both of the right and the left	12:54
	and the middle realize that there are very grave	12:56
	dangers in raising a minimum wage	13:00
	to what seem like humanitarian levels.	13:02
	I mean dangerous not to the employer,	13:05
	but dangers to the impoverished group,	13:07
	in particular ghetto youth unemployed	13:12
	from not letting them have a job	13:17
	unless they can qualify for a two dollar job.	13:19
	This at a time when some of them	13:21
	would love to get dollar and 60 cent jobs	13:25
	but there do not seem to be in the marketplace	13:29
	any employers to whom they are worth	13:32
	a dollar and 60 cents.	13:35
	Well, so it goes, some people	13:40
	understand economics well, some people don't.	13:43
	I should say that Franklin Roosevelt	13:47
	was very disappointed in President Roosevelt	13:49
	when he talked to him in the Great Depression	13:52
	in the 1930s, because he had expected more sophistication.	13:54
	I think that's a story on John Maynard Keynes,	13:58
	not on Franklin Roosevelt.	14:01
	Franklin Roosevelt had I would say	14:03
	very good, pragmatic instincts in the field	14:06
	even though he didn't understand	14:08
	the intricacies of the multiplier.	14:09
	One last name, since I'm engaged in naming names.	14:12
	My good friend, Arthur Schlesinger Junior,	14:15
	who is a brilliant historian and who I believe	14:18
	has won a couple of Pulitzer Prizes,	14:22
	one for his youthful book on the age of Jackson	14:25
	and the other for his multi-volumed biography	14:29
	of Franklin Roosevelt, The Age of Roosevelt.	14:32
	Well, Arthur Schlesinger is one of the smartest	14:36
	people that I have ever known,	14:38
	by almost any test that I can apply.	14:39
	I said by almost any test that I can apply,	14:43
	but I have to exclude economics.	14:45
	He really is not good at mastering the intricacies	14:49
	as a historian sometimes has to,	14:52
	of, say, the Social Security trust accounting,	14:54
	and his Age of Jackson, which made his original reputation,	14:58
	was full of howlers from the standpoint of economics.	15:01
	I may say, his Roosevelt books are better	15:06
	but I attribute this to the fact	15:08
	that his friends Seymour Harris of Harvard,	15:10
	late of Harvard, now of La Jolla in California,	15:14
	and John Kenneth Galbraith vetted out	15:18
	the new books so that most of the howlers are gone.	15:22
	He just doesn't come naturally to it,	15:25
	whereas I think of another historian	15:27
	who is a more pedestrian figure than Arthur Schlesinger,	15:29
	who has a much lower IQ, who writes less speedily	15:34
	and reads less speedily and is less profound,	15:37
	I would say, and let on the same kind of problem	15:40
	he seemed to be able to get them pretty well.	15:43
	Well, back now to General Eisenhower.	15:45
	I said that he wasn't a very profound scholar	15:52
	in economics, but he didn't have to be,	15:56
	but I really mean a little bit more than that.	15:59
	What I meant to say is that General Eisenhower	16:02
	did represent a culmination of a tradition.	16:04
	You might even see an atavistic return to a tradition.	16:08
	In my view, Eisenhower represents the culmination	16:13
	of the McKinley-Coolidge era in contrast, say,	16:16
	to the present President Nixon time	16:20
	which to my initial reading represents	16:25
	a continuation of the Roosevelt-Kennedy eras.	16:28
	This doesn't mean that President Nixon	16:32
	is whole-heartedly in favor of everything	16:34
	that Franklin Roosevelt was in favor of.	16:37
	It doesn't mean that he joyfully does many	16:39
	of the things which John F Kennedy	16:43
	would have done with some joy,	16:46
	but it does mean that he carries on	16:49
	in that tradition, having his marginal influence	16:52
	to be sure, but nevertheless having agreed	16:54
	to many things which would surprise	16:58
	turn of the century presidents	17:03
	like William Howard Taft or President McKinley.	17:05
	Now, when I say that Eisenhower then	17:10
	was an atavistic figure, a return to an earlier tradition,	17:12
	I want to make clear I don't say this	17:17
	by way of criticism.	17:19
	Actually, if there were any blame in this matter,	17:21
	this time just a couple of weeks after his death	17:24
	would not be the seemly time to speak of it.	17:30
	But I think that if we understand	17:33
	that President Eisenhower was insulated	17:38
	from civilian life, from 1912 until 1952,	17:41
	we see that we have preserved	17:51
	in his person the ideology of an earlier period.	17:53
	Let me illustrate with some examples.	17:59
	First, to declare my hand that this is not	18:02
	in any sense partisan.	18:08
	I, as a democrat, would have been delighted	18:11
	either in 1948 or in 1952	18:13
	to have had General Eisenhower run	18:16
	on the democratic ticket.	18:20
	So the events and times that I'm speaking of are times	18:22
	when Eisenhower had only recently become	18:29
	known as a republican.	18:35
	When he returned from NATO to Abilene, Kansas	18:37
	to declare his candidacy, he was asked	18:42
	by one of the reporters there	18:46
	what his opinion was of the Social Security system.	18:48
	And in that frank manner which he had,	18:50
	he said, "What is that?	18:53
	"I don't really understand it."	18:55
	He had been out of the country in 1937	18:57
	when Social Security went into effect.	19:00
	He was in the army.	19:02
	He had never had a Social Security Number,	19:04
	he had never had a payroll deduction,	19:07
	he did not understand what it was.	19:10
	He had no knowledge of it.	19:14
	Now, that couldn't have been possible	19:18
	of a Nixon at a comparable stage of development	19:20
	who has been in the mainstream of American life throughout.	19:25
	So Eisenhower took over as president really	19:32
	with a clean slate.	19:36
	He might have been a democrat,	19:37
	he might have been a republican,	19:38
	all he really had were his intuitions and his instincts.	19:41
	Now, given that fact, I think it's remarkable	19:47
	how successful economically Eisenhower's first term was.	19:50
	I like to distinguish between the first 1952 to 1956 term	19:56
	of General Eisenhower and his 1956, 1960 second term.	20:03
	We might call the first term the term	20:11
	of Arthur Burns and Eisenhower.	20:13
	Arthur Burns took over an almost defunct counsel	20:15
	of economic advisors and he rebuilt its stature	20:19
	on a one-man basis.	20:24
	He was in a close and intimate relationship	20:26
	with President Eisenhower, whom he had known	20:29
	as president at Columbia University.	20:32
	And Eisenhower very early on in 1953	20:35
	just as we were going into a recession,	20:38
	stated that, and this is a very non-McKinley-like,	20:42
	non-Coolidge-like statement,	20:46
	that he would use every power of government	20:48
	to ensure that we not have a repetition	20:51
	of any Great Depression.	20:54
	And I can recall from personal experience	20:56
	that Arthur Burns was doing everything possible	21:00
	in the last months of 1953 and then the first months of 1954	21:05
	to increase total aggregate dollar demand.	21:11
	He was using unconventional fiscal policy,	21:16
	not conventional fiscal policy.	21:20
	He was putting such pressure as he could put	21:22
	upon the Federal Reserve to make money easy	21:24
	in order to lessen the impact of the 1953, 54 recession.	21:30
	And as a matter of fact, I like to think of 1955	21:39
	as Arthur Burns' finest year because he predicted	21:42
	at the end of 1954, against the testimony	21:46
	of all of his own staff and almost all	21:51
	of the experts in the country that 1955	21:55
	would be a very strong year of expansion.	21:57
	And indeed it turned out to be the case.	22:00
	Well, Eisenhower had his heart attack in 1955	22:04
	in September, and there are some of his advisors	22:10
	who think that he was never really the same man.	22:14
	It shows that in history we are at the mercy, still,	22:16
	of the gods and of the elements.	22:22
	And so George Humphrey, the Secretary of Treasury,	22:27
	the businessman from Ohio who would have fit in very well	22:32
	with the McKinley era, was much stronger in fact,	22:38
	I'm not now speaking in terms of articulated ideology	22:43
	but in fact, in that second term period.	22:46
	And his successor, Robert B Anderson,	22:50
	nominally a Southern democrat from Texas	22:53
	but who represented what I would call	22:57
	the conventional unwisdom was very much	23:00
	in the saddle in the second term.	23:05
	And Maurice Stans as Director of the Bureau of Budget	23:08
	and who was an unreconstructed fiscalist budget balancer	23:14
	was very much in the saddle and there was no Burns	23:21
	in Washington and no one of his stature	23:24
	and influence to stop them	23:28
	and the country, in my judgment, suffered.	23:31
	Now I say in my judgment but you can find	23:34
	in the writings of some of the people	23:38
	in that same government who look back	23:44
	and with the advantage of hindsight have themselves declared	23:47
	that the war against inflation was overdone	23:50
	in the late 1950s, and this is what cost the country	23:54
	a great deal of real product and vigorous growth	23:59
	and it created great problems of unemployment	24:03
	which even seemed to look like structural unemployment	24:07
	in those days, and finally,	24:10
	it probably cost Richard Nixon the presidency in 1960	24:14
	in his close, hard-fought competition	24:20
	with John F Kennedy.	24:24
	The prime casualty of the almost sadistic policy	24:28
	of empty inflation at the expense of unemployment	24:33
	was Richard Milhouse Nixon.	24:37
	So we realize that when it comes to political economy,	24:42
	simple instincts of what is right and what is wrong	24:51
	are learned at one's mother's knee,	24:56
	so-called church-sleeve economics	24:59
	or McGuffey Reader economics, is not these days enough.	25:01
-	Professor Samuelson, before we leave today,	25:07
	we have a question which you might try and tackle	25:09
	in the couple of minutes we have left.	25:12
	The stock market has a readjustment every so often.	25:13
	People lose a few dollars.	25:18
	Then why, says this question, in our country	25:19
	is it such a calamity to have budget adjustment;	25:22
	that is, slight recession downturn every so often?	25:25
	Why must we continue to offset these business downturns?	25:28
	If a shake-out is good for an overpriced stock market	25:31
	then why not have a shake-out in the business economy	25:34
	for an over-sluggish market?	25:36
	Why are we not able to sell the idea	25:39
	that a slight recession is good for the economy	25:41
	in the long run?	25:43
	We support farmers, businessmen, students et cetera,	25:44
	why not support stockholders against such adjustments?	25:47
-	First, I think the question probably	25:50
	refers to some remarks I made earlier	25:53
	in which I said that the stock market	25:55
	could decline rather substantially	25:57
	without having serious macro-economic effects	25:59
	upon the economy.	26:02
	I want to stand by that factual statement.	26:05
	Second, if various groups are to be heard	26:09
	if we make it a matter of equity,	26:13
	as the questioner has seemed to do,	26:15
	I would certainly like to have the hurt	26:18
	go to people who can stand it the best.	26:22
	I would rather see middle income	26:24
	and high income holders of stock,	26:27
	of whom there are only about 25 million	26:29
	in this country, take it on the chin	26:31
	for a little while than to have ghetto youth	26:34
	who already experience high unemployment	26:39
	and great social disorganization,	26:42
	to have them be thrown out of jobs and subjected	26:44
	to higher rates of unemployment.	26:47
	However, I don't see any need for a trade-off,	26:51
	and so let me turn to a third aspect of the question.	26:53
	It was a popular view in my youth	26:56
	that the recession phase of the business cycle	26:59
	was like a catharsis.	27:03
	It was a Crime and Punishment theory	27:05
	of the business cycle.	27:07
	You drank too much on Saturday night	27:08
	and you paid for it for the hangover on Sunday	27:11
	and it was necessary to purify your system	27:14
	of the collected obnoxious fluids.	27:16
	And so, a teacher like Professor Schimpader at Harvard	27:21
	often spoke of how great recessions	27:25
	and depressions were in giving that catharsis to capitalism.	27:30
	I don't think that we have much stock in that today.	27:35
	There can be distortions of a real-estate boom	27:40
	in Florida or in Arizona which can be cured	27:44
	only by a setback, but I don't know	27:47
	that the recession of 1953, 54, or 1957, 58, or 1961,	27:52
	particularly left the body politic	28:01
	in better fighting trim.	28:06
	On the contrary, in some ways it just	28:09
	makes the situation worse.	28:12
	There is one respect in which a let-up	28:14
	would be a good thing, and that is in the trade-off	28:17
	between fast growth and inflation.	28:19
	If we slow things down a little bit,	28:27
	we can get a better short-run Phillips Curve behavior	28:29
	and indeed, the only way that we can bring our current rate	28:34
	of more than 4% inflation down toward 3%,	28:41
	in my judgment, there is no magic substitute,	28:45
	is by in some degree slowing down the rate of growth	28:49
	of the real economy, taking, to be sure,	28:55
	as a cost, some increase in unemployment.	29:01
	So my view is not step on the accelerator all the time,	29:06
	sniff the Benzedrine, let's take the speed	29:11
	and drive our bodies and our political economy	29:15
	as fast as possible.	29:20
-	Thank you very much Dr. Paul Samuelson,	29:22
	Professor of Economics at MIT.	29:24
	If you have questions of comments, write	29:26
	Instructional Dynamics Incorporated, Chicago 60611.	29:28

Item Info

Title:

Tape 22 - Eisenhower

Date:

1969

Contributor:

Samuelson, Paul A. (Paul Anthony), 1915-2009

Subject:

Format:

audiocassettes

Language:

English

Digital Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010 and undated

Source Collection:

Paul A. Samuelson papers, 1933-2010

Series:

Economics Cassette Series: Paul Samuelson

Rights:

Limited Re-Use

CC BY-NC 4.0

Rights Note:

This material is made available for research, scholarship, and private study. Copyright in this material has not been transferred to Duke University. For reuses of this material beyond those permitted by fair use or otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act, please see our page on copyright and citations: https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/research/citations-and-permissions.

Identifier:

RL10082-CS-0022
ref2183_4y9
samuelsonpaul
duke:325045
pstau001022
ark:/87924/r40000g67
b0ec0fa9-e1c5-4285-9dbf-6718b4adb217

Permalink:

https://idn.duke.edu/ark:/87924/r40000g67

Sponsor:

Sponsor this Digital Collection

Tape 22 - Eisenhower

Transcript

Item Info

Economists' Papers Archive

More Info & Options